Right sizing the PLA
- Thread starter crobato
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This should be recommended reading for this Forum.
I was particularly interested in four things, and with regards to the ground forces: first, the "informationization" emphsias in doctrine, organization, and operations, particlularly combined arms and joint ops: second, the problems with corruption especially in the officer corps; third, that not less than 5 of the PLA's 18 Group Armies have had major formations engage in amphibious landing training; and fourth, that not only have two of the northern Group Armies been converted to a Soviet-style Unified Army Corps (Operational Manoeuvre Group) organization, but three other northern Group Armies appear to be reorganizing as well.
Both the third and fourth points indicate a clear shift in the PLA groiund forces from a holding to a primarily long-war defensive capability, to a primarily short-war offensive capability. I strongly suspect that this is unbalanced, and is not only politically and diplomatically unhelpful (although certainly modernization in general and mechanization in particular is operationally and tactically necessary and overdue), but militarily speaking, strategically and operationally unsound.
I say this for three main reasons: First, given the relativley close terrain of much of China, mechanized forces except in urban areas (paradoxically speaking, mechanized forces have some advantages over unmechanized forces in urban areas, as long as they possess a ratio of at least 2-to-1 of infantry to armour), good old fashioned foot-infantry divisions, not armoured/mechanized divisions are the way to go;
Second, the Group Armies reorganized along Soviet Unified Army Corps lines in areas of relatively open terrain may be forced to try to take and hold ground, which they are neither intended nor designed for (if they more or less follow the Soviet concept) unless they are to be immediately followed-up by more traditionally-organized Group Armies to take on that role. Given that the 2 existing Group Armies now organized as OMGs are apparently to be joined by 3 more, this doesn't leave too many other traditionally-organized heavy Group Armies to follow-up and close with and destroy the enemy, and then hold ground;
And the third reason, and this is really important. By preparing for a short-offensive war, the PLA may be falling into a trap of assumptions that so many other countries have fallen into (all initial participants in WWI, the Germans early in WWII, the US in Iraq, etc.), leaving them stuck if the "Plan" doesn't go according to plan. For a long war, you need a lot of infantry divisions to hold the line while you marshall your armoured/mechanized divisions for decivisve operations (terrain and climate permitting). And in Far East Asia, more of the terrain is unsuited to Heavy Armour formations and suited to Medium Infantry formations than the reverse.
Also by preparing for short offensive wars, you expose yourself to greater temptation to engage in offensive wars. Very bad.
Great Post crobato!
I was particularly interested in four things, and with regards to the ground forces: first, the "informationization" emphsias in doctrine, organization, and operations, particlularly combined arms and joint ops: second, the problems with corruption especially in the officer corps; third, that not less than 5 of the PLA's 18 Group Armies have had major formations engage in amphibious landing training; and fourth, that not only have two of the northern Group Armies been converted to a Soviet-style Unified Army Corps (Operational Manoeuvre Group) organization, but three other northern Group Armies appear to be reorganizing as well.
Both the third and fourth points indicate a clear shift in the PLA groiund forces from a holding to a primarily long-war defensive capability, to a primarily short-war offensive capability. I strongly suspect that this is unbalanced, and is not only politically and diplomatically unhelpful (although certainly modernization in general and mechanization in particular is operationally and tactically necessary and overdue), but militarily speaking, strategically and operationally unsound.
I say this for three main reasons: First, given the relativley close terrain of much of China, mechanized forces except in urban areas (paradoxically speaking, mechanized forces have some advantages over unmechanized forces in urban areas, as long as they possess a ratio of at least 2-to-1 of infantry to armour), good old fashioned foot-infantry divisions, not armoured/mechanized divisions are the way to go;
Second, the Group Armies reorganized along Soviet Unified Army Corps lines in areas of relatively open terrain may be forced to try to take and hold ground, which they are neither intended nor designed for (if they more or less follow the Soviet concept) unless they are to be immediately followed-up by more traditionally-organized Group Armies to take on that role. Given that the 2 existing Group Armies now organized as OMGs are apparently to be joined by 3 more, this doesn't leave too many other traditionally-organized heavy Group Armies to follow-up and close with and destroy the enemy, and then hold ground;
And the third reason, and this is really important. By preparing for a short-offensive war, the PLA may be falling into a trap of assumptions that so many other countries have fallen into (all initial participants in WWI, the Germans early in WWII, the US in Iraq, etc.), leaving them stuck if the "Plan" doesn't go according to plan. For a long war, you need a lot of infantry divisions to hold the line while you marshall your armoured/mechanized divisions for decivisve operations (terrain and climate permitting). And in Far East Asia, more of the terrain is unsuited to Heavy Armour formations and suited to Medium Infantry formations than the reverse.
Also by preparing for short offensive wars, you expose yourself to greater temptation to engage in offensive wars. Very bad.
Great Post crobato!
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How can you tell by sight whether a division was reformed into brigade because it is been digitalised or because it doesn't have enough manning to fill up the TO&E of a division? Because from I am seeing, the crack 1, 38, 39 and 54 GA's still have 2 to 3 divisions each, and 190 mechanised brigade of the 39 GA is being digitalised, but the all brigade 27 GA is at lower readiness level than the above.
You are quite correct King_Comm, but I am basing that on two things. First is the organization of the Sivet Unified Army Corps, which was (typically)composed of 4 armoured/mechanized brigades. Second, the PLA reorganization is not complete (I'm guessing) or if it is, the ORBAT that is publicly available as of last month may (or may not) reflect older, not necesarily the current or planned organization.
In addition, the Soviet UACs/OMGs were not structured or intended to seize and hold ground, so if the PLA goes the same way with 5 of its Group Armies, then it'll have a tough time doing so if it doesn't have many more conventionally-organized Group Armies to fight the main force battle. I'm looking ahead to see how this reorganization turns out, and the existing information is not entirely clear. In any case, if the PLA does intend to use the 5 reorganized Group Armies as UACs, and it doesn't have enough of the aforementioned conventional Group Armies to fix and destroy enemy main forces, the reorganized Group Armies will not be available for their deep attack role.
I think it was an article by Blasko(?) in 2004(?) that described the planned reorganization of the first two of the Group Armies along UAC lines. A pair of armoured brigades and a pair of Styker-style mechanized brigades, along with a brigade each of artillery, ADA, engineers, and the like. If that's how the reorganization actually turns out in the end, that's fine for exploitation and pursuit, but it just doesn't have the stamina to slug it out with conventional Heavy forces. They'll either run out of infantry by the time they beat the enemy, or they'll be eaten alive if they don't (and lose their tanks in the process).
Funnily enough, this seems to tie in with something I was thinking about a few weeks ago; namely how the PLA would manage the organisational challenges of transforming from Peacetime to Wartime manning levels.
I was wondering whether or not the PLA would create entirely new organisations for its reservist and conscript forces or simply expand the existing organisations to a vast degree. My instinct was to go for the latter as much as possible, as the disruption to administration and logistics would be far less if contained within existing organisations.
What I read in this thread; only really skimmed the summary , rather reinforces this view with a implication to turning the Professional Units into the Expensive OMG's whilst using the reservist and conscripts into the far cheaper Conventional and Light Formations.
TO my mind it would provide a general format to be able to respond effectively to the kind of challenges that seem to be the hall mark of today, ie an a short Offencive response from a Professional only force to counter local Emergencies etc, whilst a fuller and more balanced response in a longer term general conflict.
Of course I would not expect all the Chinese formations to convert in this way and for the PLA to want to retain the vital Infantry skills it has acquired over the years, especially in the more remote and rugged perimeters.
I would say that the above notion looks good on paper, I wonder how others would rate its efficiency in practise?
I was wondering whether or not the PLA would create entirely new organisations for its reservist and conscript forces or simply expand the existing organisations to a vast degree. My instinct was to go for the latter as much as possible, as the disruption to administration and logistics would be far less if contained within existing organisations.
What I read in this thread; only really skimmed the summary
, rather reinforces this view with a implication to turning the Professional Units into the Expensive OMG's whilst using the reservist and conscripts into the far cheaper Conventional and Light Formations.TO my mind it would provide a general format to be able to respond effectively to the kind of challenges that seem to be the hall mark of today, ie an a short Offencive response from a Professional only force to counter local Emergencies etc, whilst a fuller and more balanced response in a longer term general conflict.
Of course I would not expect all the Chinese formations to convert in this way and for the PLA to want to retain the vital Infantry skills it has acquired over the years, especially in the more remote and rugged perimeters.
I would say that the above notion looks good on paper, I wonder how others would rate its efficiency in practise?
Funnily enough, this seems to tie in with something I was thinking about a few weeks ago; namely how the PLA would manage the organisational challenges of transforming from Peacetime to Wartime manning levels.
I was wondering whether or not the PLA would create entirely new organisations for its reservist and conscript forces or simply expand the existing organisations to a vast degree. My instinct was to go for the latter as much as possible, as the disruption to administration and logistics would be far less if contained within existing organisations.
What I read in this thread; only really skimmed the summary
TO my mind it would provide a general format to be able to respond effectively to the kind of challenges that seem to be the hall mark of today, ie an a short Offencive response from a Professional only force to counter local Emergencies etc, whilst a fuller and more balanced response in a longer term general conflict.
Of course I would not expect all the Chinese formations to convert in this way and for the PLA to want to retain the vital Infantry skills it has acquired over the years, especially in the more remote and rugged perimeters.
I would say that the above notion looks good on paper, I wonder how others would rate its efficiency in practise?
As for managing the transition from peacetime to wartime manning levels, I think the PLA has a distinct advantage over its Western professional counterparts (as opposed to Western and other conscript counterparts) in that all of its Reservists are former Regulars (and most Western professional Armies' Reservists are not former Regulars), which means that they are fully trained, already have some experience, receive regular training in the Reserves just as their Western counterparts do, and the units and formations of which they are a part are fully organized (so far as I know). And so, I suspect the PLA may have a smoother transition from peacetime to wartime manning levels than many of their Western counterparts (especially Professional Armies, paradoxical as that sounds).
SampanViking, I fully agree that the elite Heavy formations (armour/mechanized troops) should generally have priority for men and resources. A suitable proportion of the PLA should consist of such formations and be available to quickly snuff out small wars before they become big ones; alternatively, should a general war occur, said formations should be available for "decisive" offensive or "mobile" defensive operations. But I have qualms about the conversion of many of these formations to a Soviet-style UAC organization and role, for the reasons that I listed in Post #2 of this thread. I think that this is a mistake. But it will take time to see how the PLA's reorganization of 5 of its heavy Group Armies actually turns out, then we'll have something much more substantive and reliable to analyse.
That said, the PLA isn't doing anything that either the Soviets hadn't tried (and failed 20 years ago) or for that matter the US and many Western countries are attempting (and have found tactically and operationally wanting in Iraq, for some of the same as well as different reasons, than the Soviets). The German, not the Soviet or US models, are the way to go here.
I do fear that the Medium Formation, the old-fashioned foot Infantry Division, is being unnecessarily downgraded. The Heavy Formation, the Armoured Division is the King of Open Country, and properly organized with a proportion of Infantry to Armour units of 2 to 1 (following the German model), it can smash through dug-in Infantry Divisions in open country, partial close country or a mix of open and close country, and cities.
But the Medium Formation, the Infantry Division with only a small amount of Armour, is the King of Close Country, as well as open country in certain extreme climactic conditions. And because even in open country the losses of Heavy Formations are so high and it is difficult to keep supplied and up to strength in men and machines, as a matter of necessity a much larger proportion of dug-in infantry divisions traditionally have held the ground while armies spend the rest of their time either building up the armoured divisions and their supplies for the next "decisive" or "mobile" operation, or those same armoured divisions are being rebuilt after the latest such operations and need a few or several months until they are ready for the next round.
A much larger proportion of Infantry Divisions (Medium Formations) to Armoured Divisions (Heavy Formations) historically have been required in order to hold ground and buy time for all this to happen. It is not entirely clear what the situation is now. But if the PLA skimps too much on Infantry Divisions, then the elite UAC/OMG-type Group Armies may pay the price in a long, general war.
As for Light Formations (Mountain, Light, and PLAAF Airborne Divisions), these are necessary, and probably in sufficient numbers, except for the Airborne Divisions; there are 2 right now, a third forming, and 3 more planned - this is far too many, and I doubt that the PLAAF will ever have enough transport available to transport and supply one at any time. Not good. One may be enough; six is unuseable, at least in the Airborne role.
I don't think the PLA is doing a great job of tranformation, but then I don't see them making many more mistakes than anyone else is; only a lot more time and observation may bear this out one way or the other. But the PLA is definitely shifting too much emphasis to winning short-term offensive wars; while it should certainly be capable of handling short-term defensive wars, it must be able to handle long-term defensive wars in the final analysis.; both require a powerful, but not disproportionate, offensive capability. Like so many Armies these days, the PLA is unbalanced and too focussed on quick, offensive wars. That's wrong.
Hi Norfolk
I wonder if you have not actually answered your own question already?
It has to produce such armies as all the real competition will be fielding them and; like a pair of Angry Bull Buffaloes charging head on, only like has a chance of stopping like.
If these modern Heavy Division are what it takes to stop an assault and are what is required to get into Theatre first I suppose their is an element of sense, especially for the PLA which has the numbers to provide a balance of Heavy and Medium formations, which smaller European countries are unable to muster.
When you talk about PLA Medium Divisions, would you include Light Infantry that have access to Legacy Armour to provide stiffening ? To me this makes rather better sense than trying to use them as B or C grade Heavy divisions, as knowing that you are in Obsolete equipment for the task you are being asked to perform seems likely to be highly demoralising.
I wonder if you have not actually answered your own question already?
It has to produce such armies as all the real competition will be fielding them and; like a pair of Angry Bull Buffaloes charging head on, only like has a chance of stopping like.
If these modern Heavy Division are what it takes to stop an assault and are what is required to get into Theatre first I suppose their is an element of sense, especially for the PLA which has the numbers to provide a balance of Heavy and Medium formations, which smaller European countries are unable to muster.
When you talk about PLA Medium Divisions, would you include Light Infantry that have access to Legacy Armour to provide stiffening ? To me this makes rather better sense than trying to use them as B or C grade Heavy divisions, as knowing that you are in Obsolete equipment for the task you are being asked to perform seems likely to be highly demoralising.
Hello SampanViking,
You are quite correct that Armoured Divisions are needed to stop a break-out by enemy Armoured Divisions; you just use Infantry Divisions (when and where possible, and often it's not - the Germans Armoured Divisions suffered this way in WWII) to hold the line and try to slow down and limit the width and depth of any Armoured penetration (and to inflict at least some losses on the enemy along the way), and to hold ground upon which your own Armoured Divisions can pivot and then strike the enemy penetration from the flanks, or at least block that penetration.
Historically, a rough proportion of 3 or 4 Infantry Formations for each Armoured Formation has been typical in long, general wars; the last such war was the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and this held true there. Only another such war in the future would prove whether or not that remains the case for now; I suspect however that it still does. Short wars may obscure this fact, and create a false perception that long, general wars are unlikely, for various reasons. It's too late to prepare for a long, general war when a short war suddenly bogs down and turns in to a long war (ie. WWI and WWII, Korea, Iran-Iraq, etc.).
This leads to the problem that I perceive in the reorganization of some of the PLA's Heavy Formations. If it turns out to be true that the PLA has adopted and adapted the Soviet Unified Army Corps (what NATO called the Operational Manoeuvre Group) concept for at least 2, and perhaps up to 5, of its heavy Group Armies, there's a critical flaw in it that could allow a short war turn into a long war. The Soviet UAC's (only 2 were ever formed) were each composed of 4 Combined All-Arms Brigades (CAAB's), with a equal proportions of tanks and infantry reinforced with plenty of artillery, engineers, reconnaissance troops, etc.
They were intended neither to sieze and hold ground or to close with and destroy the enemy, but to exploit a break-through by other, traditionally-organized Heavy Formations (or if necessary, to attack to make that break-out themselves), and then drive deep into NATO's rear areas, bypassing most resistance, and run amok destroying HQ's, communications centres, logistics bases, and NATO formations held back in Reserve behind the lines for counter-attacks or blocking missions, and possibly to link up with Paratroops/Air Assault Troops/Naval Infantry, etc. at critical locations and relieve them. They were not, to engage the main NATO forces when it could be avoided. With only a one-to-one proportion of infantry to armour, the UAC's would quickly burn-out if they did (infantry alone suffer about 2/3 of all Army battle losses, and they only make up 5% of many Armies' total manpower).
The German Armoured Divisions in the summer of 1940 were stopped in front of Dunkirk because, having at the time a proportion of infantry to armour of only about 1-to-1, they had lost too much infantry fighting their way across northern France to storm Dunkirk and finish the British Army and the surviving northern French formations off then and there. And we all know what that failure eventually led to. Immediately after France surrendered a few weeks later, the German Army re-organized the Armoured Divisions to a proportion of infantry to armour of 2 to 1. General Patton himself said towards the end of WWII that the ideal proportion was 2 battalions of infantry for each battalion of tanks. With few exceptions, such as the British, many other Armies continue to ignore this proportion to their peril.
The PLA Group Armies reorganizing along Soviet UAC lines are to have 2 Armoured Brigades and 2 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, etc.; a 1 to 1 ratio of armour to infantry, and this suitable only for UAC/OMG type operations, if that, not for going head-to-head with enemy Heavy Formations. If the PLA does in fact adopt this organization, and for 5 of its 18 Group Armies, it may not have enough Heavy Group Armies with traditional organizations left over to fight and destroy the enemy Heavy Formations in the main force battle. Of the 13 Group Armies that may not have a UAC-type organization, a number will necessarily be guarding other frontiers, leaving at most around 10Group Armies to fight the main force battle. Of course, some of those Group Armies are not Heavy Formations, or are under-strength.
If the UAC-style Group Armies fail to finish off the enemy especially due to their weakness in armoured infantry, like the German Armored Divisions failed to finish off the British in 1940 for the same reason, even a quick mobilization by the PLA of its Reserves may be too late before what would otherwise have been a short war irretrievabley develops into a long, general war. Even full mobilization of its Reserves by the PLA immediately prior to the outbreak of war may not prevent this from occurring, just as it did not for the Germans in 1940. It remains to be seen whether the aforementioned reorganization of those 5 Group Armies into Soviet-style UACs (with US-style Netcentric Warfare systems for its constituent Brigades) has, or will, occurr as has been claimed. We'll see.
As for Medium Formations, principally foot Infantry Divisions, yes, older tanks, while not ideal, are quite suitable to reinforce Light Infantry if newer and better tanks are unavailable. Indeed, I have read twice (and once was on a thread here somewhere) that the PLA has found that in rough terrain, the transmissions of older Type 59 and Type 69 tanks give them better performance on mountain roads than newer tanks with much more horsepower. The general rule of thumb for tanks reinforcing infantry in the defence is that the presence of even a modest number of tanks may increase the strength of the defence by up to 10 times! So, a battalion of older tanks attached to even a Light Division with 9 battalions of light infantry is made much more potent on the defence, once the infantry are dug-in.
A caveat to this is that while such reinforcement may be effective against enemy infantry attacks with little or no armour, or only similarly older-style tanks in an attack by an Armoured Division, such older tanks would probably not accomplish much more than soaking up enemy ammo as newer-style tanks would probably despatch them with ease.
That said, I understand that the PLA Light Divisions (as well as Mountain and PLAAF Airborne Divisions) may be sufficiently specialized for Deep-Forest and other specialized close terrain operations that they may have little practical need for armour reinforcement, unless they are transferred to more open country. In addition, Light Divisions would require medium, not light, artillery as well as engineers with somewhat heavier (and more) equipment to enable them to have a real fighting chance in the defence against Armoured Divisions, at least for the hours or at most a few days until either friendly Armoured Divisions arrive (hopefully), or the enemy Armoured Divisions break-through. I agree Sampan Viking, that there is little benefit to be had having Heavy Formations composed of oler-style tanks and the like.
Sorry to be so wordy, but I just wanted to be clear on the implications of these matters.
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For the purposes of holding or defending territory, in addition to what has already been said about the advantages of infantry in ground combat, I think they also offer the advantage of better survivability compared to heavier equipped forces when under threat from the air.
Adding to the ground combat point, infantry forces (on foot, or motorized, not necessarily mechanized) are also much more suitable for conducting as well as countering special operations, which undoubtedly would be something an opposing force would conduct against a target rich country such as China.
Adding to the ground combat point, infantry forces (on foot, or motorized, not necessarily mechanized) are also much more suitable for conducting as well as countering special operations, which undoubtedly would be something an opposing force would conduct against a target rich country such as China.
I suspect than you're right, or at least on to something. In an article entitled "PLA Doctrine for Securing Energy Resources in Central Asia" by Martin Andrew (2006), it is noted that the two reasons that the Soviets only formed two UACs/OMGs during the 1980's were their cost, and their vulnerability to aerial attack with PGMs. Here's the link:
About half-way through the article, Andrew also describes how those PLA Group Armies that are undergoing conversion to a UAC/OMG-type organization, are changing from a structure of 3 Mechanized Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division (each of 3 manoeuvre regiments), etc., to a structure of 2 Mechanized Infantry Brigades and Two Armoured Brigades, etc. This is inherently offensive in role, and very unbalanced tactically and operationally; not at all cut-out for sustained operations. If, in addition to the 2 Group Armies that are undergoing, or have already undergone this conversion as Andrew's article identifies, 3 more heavy Group Armies similarly undergo this conversion as the linked article from the Strategic Studies Institute (USAWC) posted by crobato and published last month states, the PLA will be taking a perilous road
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