China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[james smith esq]

Both silo-based deployment and mobile deployment, plus early warning system, are needed for China going forward. With sufficient quantity, which I'm sure is undergoing expansion now, the current doctrine of minimum deterrence will also need to be changed. That doctrine is for a completely different country of a very different era.

Fortunately, China is fast approaching to the point where it will have an advanced and valid nuclear triad (DF41, DF45/DF-5C, JL3/096, H-20), with the industrial and economic base to produce and deploy them in sufficient quantities.

I think we all understand that China’s land based component will comprise both silo-based and road-mobile ICBM, and that both have advantages and disadvantages. It’s simply my opinion that, as the US first strike component is most likely it’s SLBM’s, and as those are armed predominantly with 90 -100 kt warheads intended, specifically, for hardened targets (silos), having an equal number of mobile and silo ICBMs would increase the survivability of a response force.

Despite the experiences and lessons illustrated in blog excerpts posted, above, this seems to be, precisely, the approach that the Russians have taken and Chinese leadership seems, also, to be committed to a sizable mobile ICBM force.

 

[escobar]

And, yet, despite these experiences and lessons, “... after 2000...”, the mobile RS-24 Yars is the single-most deployed missile in Russia’s entire ICBM/SLBM force (~44% of the ICBM force) and mobiles make up over 50% of the ICBM force?
Hmmmmmmm?

I count 167 silos missile vs 153 mobile missile in RU Strategic Rocket Forces...

 

[siegecrossbow]

View attachment 74223
NO WORDS......

The real missile silos are probably built under the concentration camps and could fire radioactive Uighurs.

 

[james smith esq]

I count 167 silos missile vs 153 mobile missile in RU Strategic Rocket Forces...

Okay, as I’m not pretending to be a scholar of this subject, I’m not going to argue the accuracy of counts provided by alternate sources.

However, even at your numbers, what happens to “[...]It was, however, assessed that the situation will change around 2000 and reliance on mobile missile will eventually become a risky proposition.[...]”, which is quoted, directly, from the source that you excerpted? Does not the deployment of ~48% of their ICBM force, and a significant investment in a mobile ICBM system, after 2000, at the least, seem counter to the conclusions reached in that historic assessment? Are these deployments, then, “[...] a risky proposition [...]”? I suggest that they’re not!

 

[Parabellum]

Your scenario makes sense only if MIRV-ed warheads can teleport anywhere on Chinese territory, so you would consume more warheads in a cheaper (more) decoyed clustered silo design than an expensive (less) decoyed isolated design... but MIRV-ed warheads have limits to how far apart it can hit.

In reality, nations are more delivery-vehicle limited than warhead-limited, and MIRV-ed missiles have limitations in how far apart each warhead can target and hit. MIRV-ed missiles are limited to targets along the general linear flight path of the missile, the distance between targets is hundreds to thousands of kilometers, and so MIRV-ed missile can only hit targets in relatively close proximity to that path. Some claim to be able to hit targets as far as 1,500 kilometers apart.

A clustered silo design would be an easy target for MIRV-ed warheads if the "d" distance is less than the MIRV-ed warhead targeting distance of "d2". If isolated silos are built farther than the MIRV-ed warhead targeting distance of "d2", then you are forcing the enemy to use more missile delivery vehicles. Delivery vehicles are generally the bottleneck compared to warheads.

I doubt multiple bombs from a single missile can destroy closely (eg 3km) clustered reenforced silos, each of which would take a (near) direct hit at ground level by 100+kilotons to destruct. All the warheads from the MIRV missile would reach the silos approximately the same time. But there is no gurantee that they would detonate exactly the same time. The result is the first one detonated destroying the neighboring bombs, given the speed and range of thermal nuclear explosion.

 

[Richard Santos]

I doubt multiple bombs from a single missile can destroy closely (eg 3km) clustered reenforced silos, each of which would take a (near) direct hit at ground level by 100+kilotons to destruct. All the warheads from the MIRV missile would reach the silos approximately the same time. But there is no gurantee that they would detonate exactly the same time. The result is the first one detonated destroying the neighboring bombs, given the speed and range of thermal nuclear explosion.

keep in mind the reason why American MX dense pack scheme was abandoned was the soviets demonstrated the ability to make multiple MIRVs hit closely space silos simultaneously. so there is no shielding effect by early hits against later hits.

 

[Phead128]

To what extent can mobile TEL be negated by AI + 24/7 satellites imaging? I would imagine AI analysis of satellite images can detect quite a few mobile TELs... I wouldn't put all my eggs in one basket.

 

[bustead]

I would expect any country with any pretensions to second strike capability would have invested in reliable ways to get the second launch off.

If post attack communication is indeed unreliable, then the second strike force could potentially rely on neutron or gamma ray sensors to detect explosion of incoming warheads, and automatically launch a second strike if certain number of hits are registered in a certain area.

The soviets were deploying such an automatic second strike system in the late 1980s.

The Perimeter system is not fully automatic though. A command bunker will still be responsible for actually ordering a launch. Once the order is given, it is relayed to all silos and mobile launchers via a transmitter installed on a signal rocket.

I don't think China needs an automatic system. With the advancements in early warning satellites/OTH radars, China can detect an incoming first strike and order a launch before it lands.

 

[Richard Santos]

To what extent can mobile TEL be negated by AI + 24/7 satellites imaging? I would imagine AI analysis of satellite images can detect quite a few mobile TELs... I wouldn't put all my eggs in one basket.

Is there 24/7 satellite imaging?

It takes a TEL only 10 minutes, even on poor ungraded roads, to drive out of plausible danger zone of virtually any plausible nuclear warhead.

 

[Richard Santos]

The Perimeter system is not fully automatic though. A command bunker will still be responsible for actually ordering a launch. Once the order is given, it is relayed to all silos and mobile launchers via a transmitter installed on a signal rocket.

The perimeter system senses nuclear strike on soviet territory and automatically decides whether the decision to launch a an all out second strike should remain with soviet command, or taken away from the high command and given to the local commander. The idea is decapitation strike on soviet leadership can not disable soviet ability to retaliate.

A similar system could in principle also bypass even the local commander and directly trigger a launch.

To make second strike maximally assured regardless of what happens, it is plausible for each silo or cluster or silos be equipped with its own version of the device.

The main question is how reliable and fail safe you can make the system so it doesn’t trigger an unintended launch by accident.