How they actually do it is a mystery but they do give a hint in the last test where the ISTAR is separated before missile reentry into the atmosphere and guided the missile to its target
I am not so sure that you cannot track from space because Jilin 1 was show to track the flight of airplane taking off
Here tracking missile launch
Here tracking plane take off real time. I mean it only take 3 to 4 minute from the time missile renter atmospher e to target
So for you everything that exists regarding ASuW operations is outdated? Does everything work out with satellites and anti-ship ballistic missiles thousands of kilometers away?
Patrol planes, AEW planes, patrol drones, ships with anti-ship missiles, submarines with anti-ship missiles ... everything is obsolete. Technology has reached a point where satellites see everything, know everything and just push a button somewhere in China and ballistic missiles with 1500, 2500, 3500, 5000, 10000 km range.
The problem would not even be tracking aircraft carriers in the port, but for those on patrol. The periodicity of a satellite's overflight is a problem and if the NAe is at high speed, it may be well out of the range of the tracking satellite.
Even with a constellation of satellites, you lose sight of it until the next satellite arrives, which can take hours (the specifications get a little complex). At that time, it could be somewhere completely different. Remember that nuclear aircraft carriers can travel at a high speed, above 30 knots. Within an hour, they are many miles from where you last saw them.
To put it in perspective, satellite tracking is not in real time, but in lagged tracking. Real-time tracking comes from reconnaissance aircraft, surface vessels, drones, submarines and a network of maritime surveillance sensors.
This update cannot be from the launcher since by the curvature of the Earth it is not in direct line with the target OTH, which implies that this update would have to start from a platform that is in the direct line of sight of the target (in this case, a USN CSG). This platform needs to be in direct line with the target and connected directly to the “missile” (more precisely, to MaRV). The fact is that this platform would have to remain "on station" until MaRV is able to assume and acquire the target on its own. And this in an extremely challenging environment that is within the defensive bubble of a CSG that has at least 5 to 6 destroyers and Aegis cruisers, plus the aircraft carrier itself, plus some 70 to 80 aircraft, including fighters equipped with AESA radars and missiles. long-range air-to-air, AEW aircraft also equipped with long-range AESA radars and some aircraft specializing in electronic warfare (EA-18G) that can act defensively, circulating the CSG and interfering with enemy communications, including satellite communications.
As a hypothetical example, the attack on a CSG by the DF-21D could be something like this:
1- ELINT reconnaissance satellites locate a threatening CSG and send this data to the command center;
2- a long-range stealth drone equipped with radar is sent to search the determined area, staying about 200 km from the target and confirms the “threat” and validates the targets;
3- 2 or 3 ASBM DF-21D are launched against targets;
4- the drone recognizes when the re-entry vehicles enter the network and connects to them, sending updates on the position of the targets;
5- when already in the atmosphere, the maneuverable reentry vehicles move their fins and take the updated course differently from the initial ballistic one, better positioned to find the targets;
6- at about 50 km from the targets, the MaRV performs a pop-up braking maneuver to allow the radar to be used;
7- in a distance of about 40 km (more or less) the MaRVs' radar is activated and begins to scan the area and acquires the target (in this case, the aircraft carrier) about 10 km from it, with 10 seconds remaining for the impact.
The problem with this concept is that it would hypothetically have no countermeasures, where it would not work in the real world, especially against powerful opponents.
For example, the speed of ballistic missiles, seen as the differential of the ASBM system, is also the Achilles heel of the whole concept, in view of the fragility of the seeker to ECMs. The immense speed reduces the time for defense but it also reduces the processing time of the guide head and this makes it more vulnerable to the immense greater processing and power generation capacity of a CSG.
The complexity of the system is also a weakness since it depends on an RF-based data interconnection that in theory can be blocked, interfering in the “kill chain” from the beginning.
There is a perception that this whole highly complex system can be neutralized with countermeasures as simple as a smoke cloud of carbon filaments, or false targets or even the good old chaff.
And that citing only the soft kill defenses. Regarding active defenses, the DF-21D is already outdated, mainly in view of the effective possibility of interception via SM-6 already demonstrated.
In other words, either the Chinese immediately try to use their “advantage” in the area denial / anti-access issue or the wheel of time will spin and put the invested billions on the ground.
Chinese A2 / AD capability is based on an easily understood concept, which is to be able to reach an aircraft carrier at distances that the aircraft carrier's aviation cannot attack.
As a rule, an aircraft carrier must always stay out of the reach of enemy defense and from this protective distance dispatch its planes to attack. This distance is generally assumed to be 200 NM.
The Chinese's solution to the problem was “brilliant”: they developed an anti-ship missile with a range of 1500 km (the DF-21D), well beyond the range of aircraft carrier fighters. This creates a situation of denial of area (AD) to the aircraft carrier that would have to be vulnerable to be able to operate since the on-board aviation does not have a range of 1500 km, so it brings down the first premise in the use of aircraft carriers that face is to attack without being able to be attacked. Either that, or it becomes useless, and here comes the A2 (anti-access) capability. The aircraft carrier will have to think long before it can reach enemy missiles.
Everything would be simple if we were to do bakery. The DF-21D has a range of 1500 to 2000 km, American naval fighters have a range of a maximum of 1100 km (with refueling it would reach close to 1500 km). Ready!
It's just that it doesn't work exactly that simplistic way. The DF-21D missile may be invulnerable, out of the reach of aircraft carrier fighters, but they are only part of the system and the means necessary for it to work must invariably invade the defensive bubble raised by the CSG (more than 500 km in radius, being able to reach 1000 km) and this due to an indisputable fact, the Earth is not flat.
Why do these means invade the defensive bubble and do not operate from outside it, say 1500 or 2000 km? Because there are limitations regarding the sensors and the altitude that the aircraft fly.
What about satellites? Satellites are not an effective means of targeting. They are extremely useful to find a CSG in the middle of the oceans and even "suggest" where a CSG might be but as a rule they are not able to follow it, track it, in real time, for obvious reasons (they revolve around the Earth immense speed).
But what about a constellation of satellites where there is always one in direct line with the target?
This architecture is the one that the Russians try to look for, but it is very complicated to put into practice, not to mention that it is highly vulnerable to electronic warfare.
But what about OTH radars? They lack the necessary precision to operate in combination with hypersonic missiles that require an extremely refined shooting solution.
