055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[latenlazy]

Since I was not talking about western pacific but mid pacific, I won't comment further on that. Obviously China would have it easier the closer the fight is to its shores.



As for the claim above, ceding actual islands to China? For that to happen, so many other things have to happen first. Japan must force out US military and become more or less neutral. Taiwan needs to be neutral during a larger China-US conflict or already be under Chinese control. And even then China being able to actually take and own (not just deny US access to) various Mariana Islands would require China having near parity in numbers and quality to USN and USAF.

With real world politics, that's something very long way off. Decades needed for political climate to change to accommodate all that.

War is always a political accelerant. If we cede that China could effectively contest and win the first and second island chains, we also cede that China will be in a position to dictate the eviction of the US military in those areas. If China could effectively neutralize and destroy US bases in the region, they wouldn't just sit idly by after doing so. Outcomes to that effect would be followed by taking that territory to prevent its further use against them. For obvious reasons this is far more likely for the first island chain than second island chain, but it’s also true that effectively holding the first island chain would confer very strong advantages in efforts to take the second island chain. If China fought a war with the US eviction of the US military would effectively be the outcome they would be fighting for (This is why it's actually not in the US's interest to escalate tensions and stir conflicts with China, because any disruptions in the current security balance naturally tilts the geopolitical equilibrium against the US's position).

 

[by78]

A nice size comparison between 055 and 052D, modified from a photo from the Shanghai yard. Note that 055 should be slightly smaller than it appears, since the rotated/superimposed 055 is originally in the foreground and closer to the camera than the 052D. However, the difference should be quite negligible, which means that 055 is indeed a big girl.

For your reference, the following is an earlier size comparison based on a satellite photo of the Dalian shipyard:

 

[Red Moon]

I get where you’re coming from, but even that mental exercise isn’t as straightforward as it may seem. For China to achieve overall strategic parity with the US it doesn’t need to match US power one for one everywhere around the world. It just needs to overmatch the US in one major theater enough to neutralize the US’s ability to contest any region it wants without severe impunity. Just as there are incumbent advantages, there are also incumbent disadvantages.

I agree with this, and also with Ironman's comments. But I would add a couple of things.

First, the ship counters here tell us that both 054A's and 052C/D's have been built at the rate of 2.5 a year. It's to early to see with the 055's, but a guess at 2 per year seems reasonable. This adds up to 7 major surface combatants a year, and by 2028, it's 70. Out of today's 51, I suppose the two 052's and the single 051B would have retired, so this puts us at 118 total by 2028, quite comfortably above any estimate for the US at that point. Of course, these construction rates could go down, but they could go up as well, and the record over the last decade and a half shows only an upward trend. Moreover, the whole world seems to have assessed that we're headed into turbulent times, and if China wants to secure it's underwater nuclear deterrent, and hence the South China Sea, I see no reason to expect a reduction in ship building.

Secondly, one needs to see what the regional and global geopolitical impact of all this would be. I don't believe China will "challenge" the US, but the US will certainly "feel" challenged, even by the numbers alone, and everyone else will take note as well. It seems to me that we are already seeing a change in the calculations of Indians, Australians and South Koreans even today. Naval predominance in China's near seas basically means China is the dominant power in the region, without actually seeking it.

Globally, the significant part of this is that this "region" is the most dynamic one in the world, economically, and contains some 60% of the worlds population too (including South Asia, Russia, etc). Consider, in addition, that China's economy will have advanced significantly, both in quality and quantity, and that Belt & Road would have achieved quite a bit by then. Even if no Chinese ships patrol the mid Pacific, or even leave the near seas at all, save for some areas of the Indian Ocean, by being the predominant power in this region, China automatically is the biggest power in the world. The main challenge becomes preventing the breakup of the world into regions.

 

[Tam]

The two 052s were refitted not too long ago. I don't think they will be retired even 10 years from now, but they might be doing training duties. The 051B has recently came out of its refit, and the four Project 956s will be heading for refits. I expect the two 052Bs to follow for refits as well.

The naval budget is sure to rise over the years, as the defense budget will, even if it will just follow 2% of the GDP, which continues to grow each year. By the 2030s, China's growth potential isn't close to being fully used up, given its reservoir of cheap labor and a growing massive middle class, and at some point, China's defense budget will grow to meet and then exceed that of the US as its GDP exceeds the US in absolute dollar terms (it already exceeds the US in PPP terms.)

Then the problem becomes, what are they going to do with all these so many ships.

 

[longmarch]

Chicken are not hatched yet and you start to think of having too many of them

It'll take China decades to match the US in military spending. The two countries have asymmetric strategies.

The two 052s were refitted not too long ago. I don't think they will be retired even 10 years from now, but they might be doing training duties. The 051B has recently came out of its refit, and the four Project 956s will be heading for refits. I expect the two 052Bs to follow for refits as well.

The naval budget is sure to rise over the years, as the defense budget will, even if it will just follow 2% of the GDP, which continues to grow each year. By the 2030s, China's growth potential isn't close to being fully used up, given its reservoir of cheap labor and a growing massive middle class, and at some point, China's defense budget will grow to meet and then exceed that of the US as its GDP exceeds the US in absolute dollar terms (it already exceeds the US in PPP terms.)

Then the problem becomes, what are they going to do with all these so many ships.

 

[Tam]

China will match defense spending in proportion to its economy and its status along perceived threats against it in this world. The budget will still grow, and what we have already seen, we have seen nothing yet of whats to come. The Chinese Navy already has 496 ships, plus 232 auxilliaries, although still behind the USN in absolute displacement. And the chicken has not hatched yet...

 

[Deleted member 13312]

The two 052s were refitted not too long ago. I don't think they will be retired even 10 years from now, but they might be doing training duties. The 051B has recently came out of its refit, and the four Project 956s will be heading for refits. I expect the two 052Bs to follow for refits as well.

The naval budget is sure to rise over the years, as the defense budget will, even if it will just follow 2% of the GDP, which continues to grow each year. By the 2030s, China's growth potential isn't close to being fully used up, given its reservoir of cheap labor and a growing massive middle class, and at some point, China's defense budget will grow to meet and then exceed that of the US as its GDP exceeds the US in absolute dollar terms (it already exceeds the US in PPP terms.)

Then the problem becomes, what are they going to do with all these so many ships.

We may not know for certain unless they tell it to us straight, but we can deduce it somewhat base on circumstantial evidence. Within the next 10-20 years, China would have then completed its BRI economic project, thus positioning it as the main trading partner for the majority of the African nations, since China-Africa trade is near totally dependent on access through the Indian and Chinese Ocean/Seas. There will be a pressing need for China to maintain a capability to ensure that this trade route is not disrupted even during times of military crisis. This is where that huge number of ships come into play. China is almost certainly going to base a naval fleet in the Indian Ocean for this purpose, the only question is when and where. Pakistan and Djibouti are both good candidates.
Then there is the less savory issue of the Taiwan question, suffice to say that if China wants to settle this issue on its own terms. Then it will need to have a navy that is capable of simultaneously ensuring its sea lines of communication and fight a potential battle with the current naval heavyweight champion.

 

[Tam]

We may not know for certain unless they tell it to us straight, but we can deduce it somewhat base on circumstantial evidence. Within the next 10-20 years, China would have then completed its BRI economic project, thus positioning it as the main trading partner for the majority of the African nations, since China-Africa trade is near totally dependent on access through the Indian and Chinese Ocean/Seas. There will be a pressing need for China to maintain a capability to ensure that this trade route is not disrupted even during times of military crisis. This is where that huge number of ships come into play. China is almost certainly going to base a naval fleet in the Indian Ocean for this purpose, the only question is when and where. Pakistan and Djibouti are both good candidates.
Then there is the less savory issue of the Taiwan question, suffice to say that if China wants to settle this issue on its own terms. Then it will need to have a navy that is capable of simultaneously ensuring its sea lines of communication and fight a potential battle with the current naval heavyweight champion.

China might be looking at a base in Vanuatu, because OBOR isn't just, on the sea side, to Africa and the Middle East, but also to Latin America, with China's growing economic links to Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and the rest of the continent. OBOR is going to be a global belt, with the land routes to Central Asia, Russia, Europe and the Middle East, sea based routes to the Middle East and Africa, and a sea based routes to Latin America, which by the way, is also a major supplier of food stuffs to China in a scale that rivals the US.

I believe that China is increasingly looking at itself as the maintainer of the global mercantile order that the US is now abandoning with its isolationist, protectionist policies. It is also moving into the position what a true symmetrical naval power is all about. By symmetrical I mean the three pillars, only one of which is military naval power, the other pillar is the merchant navy, and the third pillar, the shipbuilding industry. The US has lost two of these, although strongly holding on to one.

 

[Deleted member 13312]

China might be looking at a base in Vanuatu, because OBOR isn't just, on the sea side, to Africa and the Middle East, but also to Latin America, with China's growing economic links to Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and the rest of the continent. OBOR is going to be a global belt, with the land routes to Central Asia, Russia, Europe and the Middle East, sea based routes to the Middle East and Africa, and a sea based routes to Latin America, which by the way, is also a major supplier of food stuffs to China in a scale that rivals the US.

I believe that China is increasingly looking at itself as the maintainer of the global mercantile order that the US is now abandoning with its isolationist, protectionist policies. It is also moving into the position what a true symmetrical naval power is all about. By symmetrical I mean the three pillars, only one of which is military naval power, the other pillar is the merchant navy, and the third pillar, the shipbuilding industry. The US has lost two of these, although strongly holding on to one.

True, the OBOR does span the entire globe. But on the list of pressing priorities in relation to the capability to respond appropriately, it would be more logical for China to focus first on the near periphery of its boarders rather than far flung shores. Just as the US will find it extremely challenging to mount an operation near China's sea boarders in the years to come, so will China vice versa. Food supplies from Latin American is important but it is not a thing that China can ensure just yet, though it can mitigate that by increasing food imports from Russia (which has good agricultural lands) .

 

[AndrewS]

True, the OBOR does span the entire globe. But on the list of pressing priorities in relation to the capability to respond appropriately, it would be more logical for China to focus first on the near periphery of its boarders rather than far flung shores. Just as the US will find it extremely challenging to mount an operation near China's sea boarders in the years to come, so will China vice versa. Food supplies from Latin American is important but it is not a thing that China can ensure just yet, though it can mitigate that by increasing food imports from Russia (which has good agricultural lands) .

I agree China should focus on its near periphery (aka the First Island Chain, then Second Island Chain). It is where China's core interests lie, and China is a continental sized nation that, if required, can be self-sufficient in most regards.

I think food supplies from abroad are over-rated. In a wartime blockade situation, China would be ok from a food perspective as they would be able to:

1. institute rationing
2. increase domestic production
3. reduce livestock production (which is consumes edible grain and is really inefficient)
4. continue imports overland (from Russia, Central Asia, Burma, Vietnam etc)