China's SCS Strategy Thread

The way I see it, one with clarity and righteousness, other with guilt and unease.
the muffled sound, produced by your fists hitting the upper trunk of your own body, is audible :)

anyway, Analysis: Can China Enforce a South China Sea Air-Defense Identification Zone?
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Is China about to declare an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea? And how effectively would it be able to enforce such a zone?

The idea that China would declare a South China Sea ADIZ is not new, having been around since China declared one over part of the East China Sea in 2013. However, the very unfavourable ruling by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Permanent Court of Arbitration on overlapping claims between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea that invalidated most of China’s claims have again stoked worries that China will now declare one in retaliation, with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin saying such a move could be an option
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.

That then leads to the question of how effectively China will be able to police a new ADIZ. It has been reported that China has quietly stopped seeking to actively
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, with a March 2016 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission suggesting that a lack of coordination between China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy – Air Force (PLANAF) has led to radar coverage gaps and an inability to
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.

China has taken steps to remediate the coordination issue, however, with the reported formation of a Joint Operations Command Center for the East China Sea in early 2015. Moreover, the issue of PLAAF-PLANAF coordination is less likely to arise for a South China Sea ADIZ, with the entire region primarily coming under the jurisdiction of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (SSF).

In addition to its naval vessels, the SSF also has two PLANAF Naval Aviation Divisions under its command. Like the rest of the PLA, the PLANAF has undergone a drastic modernization starting from the middle of the past decade, and the SSF’s 8th and 9th Aviation Divisions having swapped their elderly J-6, J-7 and J-8 fighters for the newer and more capable Xi’an JH-7A fighter-bomber and Shenyang J-11B fighter.

Both of the SSF’s aviation divisions are made up of three naval aviation regiments, which in the case of the South Sea Fleet, comprises two combat regiments of approximately 24 aircraft per regiment based on Hainan island, at the northern end of the South China Sea. If China were to declare a South China Sea ADIZ, the responsibility to patrol and enforce the ADIZ is almost certain to fall primarily on the shoulders of those four regiments.

Xi’an JH-7
The JH-7 is a twin-seat, twin engine design that entered service with the PLA in the 1990s. Designed primarily as a maritime strike platform armed primarily with the YJ-82 anti-ship missile and free-fall bombs, the first examples used the Rolls-Royce Spey turbofan engines imported from the United Kingdom. Later examples used a license-built copy known as the Xi’an WS-9.

The Chinese introduced an improved variant designated the JH-7A into service in 2004, adding precision strike capability to the type with a new generation of guided bombs and targeting pods. Both the JH-7 and JH-7A are fitted with indigenous multimode radars and have limited air-to-air capability, but the type is perfectly capable of ADIZ enforcement. This was demonstrated on 15 September 2015, when the Pentagon said a JH-7 carried out an unsafe intercept of a U.S. Air Force RC-135 over the Yellow Sea.

The SSF’s 9th Aviation Division, 27th Aviation Regiment currently operates JH-7As at Ledong in south-western Hainan. The unit’s aircraft took part in the Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff against Vietnam in 2014, most likely providing reconnaissance and overwatch against Vietnamese attempts to reach an oil rig then operating in waters disputed by both countries.

The base at Ledong has also been substantially hardened over the past decade and a half, with satellite photos from 2002 showing construction of an underground aircraft storage facility tunnelled into a nearby mountain. Subsequent satellite imagery showed that this was operational some time prior to 2008.

Shenyang J-11B
The SSF’s three remaining air combat regiments operate the Shenyang J-11B Flanker. The J-11B is an unlicensed Chinese-built version of the Sukhoi Su-27 using Chinese avionics, and beginning from around 2010, the Liming WS-10 Taihang engine. China acquired 76 Su-27SK/UBKs delivered between 1991 and 2009, in addition to building around 100 examples under licence known as the J-11A.

Development of the J-11B began as early as 2002, with the Chinese keen to incorporate various indigenous modifications and upgrades to the airframe with improved manufacturing methods as well as Chinese radar, avionics suites and weaponry such as the PL-8 and PL-12 air-to-air missiles.

It was also hoped to include the more powerful WS-10 into suite of local modifications, but well-documented issues with the WS-10 and China’s indigenous engine program derailed that, and the initial batches of J-11Bs were built instead with the Russian AL-31 engines that power the Su-27.

From 2010, a navalized version of the J-11B, known as the J-11BH, was put into service with PLANAF aviation regiments. The first PLAN regiment to convert the new type was be the 8th Naval Aviation Division’s 22nd Regiment at Jialaishi in northern Hainan, with photos of J-11BHs and twin-seat J-11BSHs appearing around the 2012 timeframe. The 22nd Aviation Regiment was the unit involved in the controversial
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, where it was reported that the J-11 performed a barrel roll over the P-8.

The 24th Aviation Regiment is the 8th Naval Aviation Division’s other air combat regiment, also reported to be based at Jialaishi. The regiment turned in its obsolete J-7EHs (improved Chinese-built MiG-21 Fishbeds) for J-11BH/BSHs around 2013-2014, about the same time as the last Hainan-based PLANAF combat regiment.

This was the Lingshui-based 9th Naval Aviation Division’s 25th Regiment, which previously operated the J-8 Finback interceptor, and whose claim to fame is being the unit involved in the collision with a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aries II Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering aircraft in 2001 which resulted in the damaged EP-3 force-landing at Lingshui and the loss of one of the PLAN’s J-8s and its pilot.

Lingshui is currently undergoing refurbishment that began sometime in late 2014 or early 2015, with satellite photos indicating that at the very least, would involve the lengthening of the runway, expansion of apron space and the construction of weather shelters for based aircraft. The work also includes substantial land clearing around the base, which could point to the possibility that a network of hardened aircraft shelters may eventually be built on site.

The J-11B would be a formidable asset with which to patrol and enforce a South China Sea ADIZ. Capable of carrying up to 10 air-to-air missiles and with an internal fuel capacity of almost 10 tons, it is almost an ideal platform for a mission that requires a fighter with the persistence and endurance to undertake long missions far from home.

The PLANAF has deployed its Hainan-based J-11s to the airport at Woody Island in the Paracels, and it is not unthinkable that they will eventually regularly operate from there as well as the reclaimed airfields on Fiery Cross, Subi or Mischief Reefs, providing the PLAN with the ability to deny access to the region.
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... continuation of the above post:
Early Warning network
China’s massive and controversial land-reclamation and construction program has included the construction of radar facilities at most disputed South China Sea locations on which it has built. As the accompanying map shows, the radars are located a long way away from China, with the Cuarteron Reef radar facility, which is believed to contain both high-frequency air search and regular multi-mode radars, located approximately 675 miles from Hainan. When fully operational, those radars are expected to provide an air picture of the South China Sea unmatched by any of its claimants.

Additional radar coverage is provided by rotational deployments of PLANAF Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft to Hainan, with Shaanxi KJ-200 AEW aircraft regularly observed on the ground at Lingshui. Together, these radars will be able to provide China with an early warning capability unmatched by rival claimants, and will certainly complicate even U.S. air and naval freedom of navigation operations.

The KJ-200s were seen during the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff, operating alongside a handful Shaanxi Y-8J/X maritime patrol aircraft. These aircraft normally belong to the 2nd Naval Aviation Division based at Laiyang or Tuchengzi with the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, but appear to be semi-permanently attached to the SSF.

Taken together, these developments would appear to indicate that, should China declare a South China Sea ADIZ, it is well on its way to being able to properly police and enforce it, unlike the case with its East China Sea equivalent. As noted by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, the development of new runways and air-defense capabilities appear to be part of a long-term anti-access strategy by China which “
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joshuatree

Captain
They should declare an MPA, ala UK/US strategy.

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About 30 Taiwanese fishermen and lawmakers headed for Taiping Island in the South China Sea on Wednesday to support Taiwanese claims to sovereignty and fishing rights in the area.

The fishing boat flotilla and flight by lawmakers comes after an international tribunal last week rejected Taipei’s right to an exclusive economic zone around Taiping, also known as Itu Aba.

“It’s a serious issue to reduce Taiping Island to a ‘reef’,” Central News Agency quoted Cheng Chun-chung, the fisherman spearheading the flotilla protest, as saying.

About 20 Pingtung county fishermen set off at about noon for Taiping in five boats draped in
Taiwanese flags and banners saying: “Safeguard fishing rights in the South China Sea,” and “Protect ancestral assets”. The protesters said they would spend the two-week trip fishing to underscore Taiwan’s sovereignty over the waters.

Ten boats signed up for the trip but five pulled out after warnings from fisheries authorities, organisers said.
Cheng said a fisheries official told him his boat licence would be revoked if he went to the island because his vessel was restricted to sailing between Taiwan, the mainland and Hong Kong. But Cheng said he would not back down.
Taiwanese fishermen display flags and placards in Pingtung before departing to Taiping Island in the disputed Spratly Islands on Wednesday.

A few hours earlier, eight lawmakers from Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party and opposition Kuomintang (KMT) boarded a military aircraft for a flight to Taiping, landing on the island at about 10.50am, CNA reported.

The legislators visited military facilities and a weather station on the island, and inspected solar power and satellite equipment before returning to Pingtung in the afternoon.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on July 12 that Taiping was a rock rather than an island and was therefore not entitled to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone under international law.
Taipei to hasten frigate patrol for Taiping Island in wake of South China Sea ruling

An island must be able to sustain human habitation or economic life, according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

KMT legislator Johnny Chiang Chi-chen, who headed the group, said the lawmakers sampled coconut juice from trees planted on the island.

Another lawmaker on the trip, Wang Ding-yu, said a well and solar power facilities had been established on the island, proving Taiping was habitable and could sustain human life.

Chiang also criticised Taiwan’s government for not taking substantial action to defend the island’s sovereignty in the region.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen called the Hague ruling unacceptable and said it was not binding on Taiwan.

Taiwan did not take part in the Hague proceedings.
 
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If you looked at the another way, PCA's decision on Itu Aba Island is actually a big win for China and Taiwan in the Pacific Oceans in gaining fishery grounds because Japan, France and United States would loose a lot of EEZ:

China Has Much to Gain From the South China Sea Ruling
The decision regarding Itu Aba allows China to challenge excessive EEZs claimed by Japan, the U.S., France, and others.

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In its entirety the PCA Spratleys ruling was designed to sow as much discord among local claimants as possible while giving the greatest maneuvering space to external expeditionary powers for gunboat diplomacy aka military freedom of navigation.

The technical claim that the particulars of this ruling can be used as lawfare to challenge or limit other island or EEZ claims elsewhere by other powerful countries is bogus as these rulings are made on a case by case basis and the dominant countries in other cases can and do ignore rulings disadvantageous to them.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Exactly, also, what that article suggested might seem like helpful advice for China, but it's in fact a trap.

To use the ruling to challenge other EEZs, China must first accept the ruling, thereby invalidating its entire SCS claim.

I can pretty much gaurentee you that if China did that in order to use the ruling to challenge the EEZs of, say Japan or the US, the PCA's original ruling would be overturned so quickly and comprehensively it would make your head spin.

Only by that time, China would have had to have accepted the original bogus ruling, and relinquished its claims in the SCS, and now have no way to regain those claims or any means to challenge anyone else's EEZs.

Just to rub salt into the wound, I fully expect the PCA to rule everything that China gave up in the SCS is an island entitled to its own EEZ.

The overwhelmingly biased of the PCA and transparency of that bias is a massive own goal for the west. It's because of how unsound that ruling ways the the ICJ moved with indecent haste to distance itself from the PCA and actively went out of its way to try and counter the deliberate media 'misunderstanding' and spin.

The same media attack dogs will use this ruling as a stick to beat China with, as they do with any and everything they could twist to serve that role. But the reaction of the legal community at large to the ruling has been profound and overwhelming in its total silence.

It seems clear that the western media could not pay even a lawyer of any note to come out and publically support this ruling, or else you would have legal experts of all stripes analysing the crap out of the ruling to explain to us common plebs just what the ruling means. Instead, its staff writers who are doing that, when you can bet they could have killed to be able to quote a legal expert, any legal expert.

That's pretty telling about how much of a kangaroo court this was.

The west has just trashed one of their greatest assets for some pathetically petty gain. Well played. :rolleyes:
 

solarz

Brigadier
In its entirety the PCA Spratleys ruling was designed to sow as much discord among local claimants as possible while giving the greatest maneuvering space to external expeditionary powers for gunboat diplomacy aka military freedom of navigation.

The technical claim that the particulars of this ruling can be used as lawfare to challenge or limit other island or EEZ claims elsewhere by other powerful countries is bogus as these rulings are made on a case by case basis and the dominant countries in other cases can and do ignore rulings disadvantageous to them.

Completely agreed, and it's hilarious to see these western writers tripping over themselves trying to convince China to use the ruling to gain advantage elsewhere. It just shows how desperate their position is.
 

joshuatree

Captain
The technical claim that the particulars of this ruling can be used as lawfare to challenge or limit other island or EEZ claims elsewhere by other powerful countries is bogus as these rulings are made on a case by case basis and the dominant countries in other cases can and do ignore rulings disadvantageous to them.

China doesn't have to go file a case to play this technical claim and counter sow discord. Opponents are always attempting to persuade China to follow the ruling, a simple rebuttal would be "Since you believe in this law so much, the ruling actually means your claim (ie Okinotori, Wake, Johnson, BIOT, etc) would not qualify for an EEZ as your feature does not have a "sustainable community" per the "subject matter expert" judges. Please lead by example and vacate those waters first. Fishing by any nation beyond 12NM of your feature should be immediately allowed as they are international waters." Just keep repeating that at any press function where a journalist or another state's leader/general/dignitary usually gets on their soapbox to shame China. If the law is truly the end all, be all, there should be no double standards.
 

SamuraiBlue

Captain
Looks as if PLA is trying to decelerate threat in the region.

Imagery shows Chinese HQ-9 battery being removed from Woody Island

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Satellite imagery captured on 10 July shows an HQ-9 strategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery on Woody Island in the process of being taken off the island on board a Chinese naval vessel.

The Airbus Defence and Space image revealed that the battery had been removed from its deployment site along the northern coast of Woody Island in the Paracels, a move that coincided with the conclusion of military exercises in the area that took place prior to the Permanent Court of Arbitration's (PCA's) 12 July ruling on the South China Sea dispute.

Imagery taken on 8 July shows most of the dispersed HQ-9 battery components concealed under camouflage netting. Three transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles and the battery's Type 305A target acquisition radar (TAR) remained uncovered.

Imagery captured a day later shows HQ-9 battery components uncovered and garrisoned together near the radar position. On 10 July, subsequent imagery showed a column of vehicles, including probably HQ-9 TELs, parked on a road adjacent to the island's southern harbour.......... to read more
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Looks as if PLA is trying to decelerate threat in the region.

Hard to say if it's because the deployment was temporary due to the limited support structures on the island, or if they're readying for a more consistent presence there in the near future.

But given the fairly high pace of Naval exercises in the last few days prior and shortly after the ruling, I think the overall message is that they're willing to be flexible but also to not push them too much.
 
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