View attachment 14618
Source : Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements for the Twenty-First Century by
Christopher D. Yung (CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Volume 13)
Here is a link to the source document:
And some text analysis corresponding to the chart:
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The Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls: Two Viable Options
This analysis suggests that the Dual Use Logistics Facility and String of Pearls logistics
models are most consistent with China’s longstanding foreign policy principles and can
best support China’s expanding overseas economic and security interests. The third section
of the study examines the ability of the two models to support the most likely PLAN
operations over the next 20 years; the fourth section examines whether the String of Pearls
Model could support higher intensity combat operations as part of a long-term effort to
dominate the IOR.
Dual Use Logistics Facility versus the String of Pearls: The Inductive
Approach
The Dual Use Logistics Facility and the String of Pearls models both appear compatible
with Chinese foreign policy principles and with China’s long-term overseas interests. Both
models would involve the PLA using a mix of commercial and military facilities to project
power farther from China’s shores. China would need to develop close political and strategic
ties with at least some host nations to gain greater access to their commercial and military facilities.
Both models would support increased out of area operations to protect China’s expanding
overseas economic, political, and security interests.
The two models differ in two important respects (other than the site of the bases). First, the
Dual Use Logistics Facility Model is not tied to port access in specific countries, while the String
of Pearls Model requires China to have good political relations with numerous host countries.
The so-called pearls are all associated with specific facilities in specific countries that can be
examined. Second, the String of Pearls Model can potentially provide greater logistics support
for military and combat operations if overt commercial access arrangements are supplemented
with covert prepositioning of munitions and military supplies and secret diplomatic agreements
for base access in the event of a conflict.
If China intends mainly to combat nontraditional threats and develop a modest power projection
capability to respond to a relatively small-scale overseas contingency, such as a noncombatant
evacuation operation (NEO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions,
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China Strategic Perspectives, No. 7
low-intensity conflict, counterterrorism, or protection of PRC expatriates, the Dual Use Logistics
Facility is sufficient. China could use dual use facilities as forward operating logistics platforms
to engage in nontraditional security operations (including special forces operations ashore) to
combat terrorists and other threats to China’s overseas operations and citizens. However, if China
seeks the capability to conduct major combat operations in the Indian Ocean, the String of Pearls
Model is more plausible.
This section explores the ability of these two models to support the most likely PLAN operations
in the Indian Ocean (excluding major combat operations) by examining the physical
characteristics of sites supposedly associated with the String of Pearls and studying the patterns
of current PLAN operational behavior overseas. The potential ability of the String of Pearls
Model to support the force structure China would need to dominate the Indian Ocean is explored
in the next section
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This is by far the most objective analysis regarding the real and potential Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, still tinged with hostility towards China but that is the trend in US policy circles these days.
My opinion is that the entire concept of China "expanding" into the Indian Ocean, and especially suspicions that China seeks to somehow dominate the Indian Ocean, is merely part of a broad, deep, and persistent misinformation campaign targeting an Indian audience by those who are already hostile to China.
Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is limited to transiting, resupplying for missions farther afield, MOOTW and related military exercises such as humanitarian assistance or SAR. There are no reasons for that to change unless India or the US chooses to threaten China's SLOC's through the area.
There is the potential for low intensity Chinese offensive military operations after transiting the Indian Ocean and arriving in the Middle East and Africa but unless Chinese foreign policy drastically changes to abandon non-interference this would be limited to evacuations, maybe a hostage rescue, or in support of a UN mandate. For these missions China may deploy up to several LPD's, a LHD would be handy if they eventually acquire one, with escorts but they would not be sufficient to pose a threat to India or the US presence in the Indian Ocean.
On a related note, this is why China is more likely to build LHD's rather than CV's. A Chinese fleet far from home with a LHD fits much better with China's range of needs and core policies while one with a CV only fits well for a narrow set of scenarios.