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the most recent news:
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source:
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and here's what SECNAV had to say:
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Congress doesn’t trust the Navy to keep its
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in service,
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acknowledged this afternoon. But they don’t have to trust anybody: They make the law.

Let Congress pass whatever law it likes compelling the Navy to keep and modernize the ships, Mabus told reporters here. “I’m willing to accept any sort of mandatory language that says we’ve got to do this,” he said. “Mandate us to buy all the modernization stuff — with the exception of
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because that’s going to change so much — up front. Mandate that we sign contracts with the shipyard that would cost us money if we backed out of ’em. There are ways you can do this.”

But — and this is a big but — whatever you do, just don’t make us modernize the cruisers at the accelerated pace that
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yesterday.
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: “If it’s done under the congressional plan, the one that’s being put forward now, we’re not going to have enough money,” Mabus said.

Taking a cruiser out of service for four years, as in current law, lets the shipyards schedule the work efficiently and lets the Navy dissolve the crew, thus saving personnel costs. Taking a cruiser out for only two years, as the HASC bill would require, means the shipyard work costs more and the crew has to stay on the payroll. As a result, the special fund set aside for cruiser modernization will run out sooner, in 2018, and “we’ll just have to come back” and ask for more money for the rest of the ships, Mabus said.

How much more, a reporter asked after his speech? Hundreds of millions? “More,” said Mabus.

Mabus doesn’t have a problem with most of the provisions in the HASC mark-up of
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. “Overall,” he said, “[in] the Navy and Marine Corps, we’re relatively, relatively happy about the mark. In terms of the cruisers, I really do think it’s a matter of just not quite trusting us.”

“Not quite” is quite an understatement, at least when it comes to some House members. “The question is whether we just let the Navy run the clock out and leave these cruisers up on the dock where we never use them again,” fumed the
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, Rep. Randy Forbes, at yesterday’s markup. “If you pass this language, two years from now, we’ll have a couple of modernized cruisers,” he said, arguing for the accelerated modernization plan. If the Navy’s allowed to take longer, Forbes said, it’ll slow-roll Congress and do nothing: “Several years from now,” Forbes said, “the Navy’s going to tell you, ‘we’re sorry, we can’t do the modernization.'”

“If you’re going to do any kind of program the Navy is serious about, they’re would have had put money in their Future Years Defense Program [FYDP],” Forbes said. For cruiser modernization, he said, “they not only haven’t put a dime in, they’re not going to do it.”

“None of those things is correct,” Mabus said mildly. He and
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, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, are “100 percent” committed to modernizing the cruisers, he said. “Now, three or four years ago, [that was] not the case,” Mabus acknowledged. “We did put in a budget that had some cruisers decommissioned,” he said, adding with a chuckle, “That was not my idea.”

The Navy’s current plan does not decommission any cruisers, Mabus hammered home. “They will still be under the command of the CNO, they will never go out of commission, and if we needed to put ’em back to sea — except for the ones in deep modernization — we could. We would just get a crew on ’em and take ’em out.”

(Mabus seems awfully optimistic here about the Navy’s ability to put a crew together on short notice. Imagine how hard it is to get a pick-up basketball team together. Then imagine that team has
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who must operate everything from 2,500-horsepower turbines to
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).

What about the FYDP? Why hasn’t the Navy allocated funding for cruiser modernization in the outyears? “It’s because of the — what’s the name of that fund?” Forbes said. “SMOSF, whatever that means.” (It means “Ship Modernization, Operation and Sustainment Fund,” and SMOSF is pronounced to rhyme with “Joseph”). As a special fund, SMOSF doesn’t show up in the FYDP the way a normal program would. It’s also going to run out ahead of schedule if Congress accelerates the modernization.

“We thought we came up with the best way to keep the most cruisers in for the longest time in the most affordable way, but obviously
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get the last word,” said Mabus.
source:
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I found out a moment ago
House panel blocks A-10 retirement
The House Armed Services Committee has approved a plan to keep the A-10 in the air.

The committee passed an amendment late Wednesday from former A-10 pilot Rep. Martha McSally, R-Ariz., to block any attempt by the Air Force to cut any Warthogs. The amendment is on top of language in the defense authorization bill to authorize about $682 million to keep the A-10s flying.

"Not only does [the amendment] prohibit the retirement of any A-10s, it prevents any additional back door attempts at mothballing these aircraft, such as placing them in backup status," McSally said in a statement. "I'll continue to work with my colleagues to make sure our troops on the ground have the support they deserve and that we don't retire this critical capability without a replacement."

The amendment and the full bill now head to the full House floor for a vote, and the Senate will mark up its version of the bill later this year. Multiple senators, including Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., have vowed to protect the jet.

The vote came as the Air Force rescinded a warning that keeping the A-10 would delay the deadline of making the F-35 deployable.

McSally presented the amendment late into the evening Wednesday. She held up an inert round for the Warthog's .30mm GAU-8 Avenger gun, which she said is key to the jet's ability to provide close air support.

The committee rejected an amendment from Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., a Marine Corps veteran of the Iraq War. His amendment would have let the Air Force retire about half of its 283 A-10 aircraft fleet.

Debate on the bill lasted into early Thursday, with the final gavel falling at about 4:40 a.m.
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Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
I found out a moment ago
House panel blocks A-10 retirement

source:
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Article said:
"Not only does [the amendment] prohibit the retirement of any A-10s, it prevents any additional back door attempts at mothballing these aircraft, such as placing them in backup status," McSally said in a statement. "I'll continue to work with my colleagues to make sure our troops on the ground have the support they deserve and that we don't retire this critical capability without a replacement."

The vote came as the Air Force rescinded a warning that keeping the A-10 would delay the deadline of making the F-35 deployable.

So, most of us expected this.

The A-10 is the best at what it does. They will not take it away until the F-35 developes and then is operational with its capabilities for CAS.

I thought it was interesting that the USAF "rescinded" it's warning about simply having the A-10 delaying the F-35. It is clear now (and it was to me at the time) that that was really just an attempt to influence the vote, and not something that was factually accurate or necessary.
 

Zetageist

Junior Member
Global Strike Command is USAF's new weapon against China: expert
  • 2015-04-28
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A pure bomber command is likely to be established for the first time in US military history after the Air Force made the announcement last week to reassign all its heavy bombers to the Global Strike Command last week, James Hasik, a senior researcher from the Washington-based Atlantic Council wrote in a piece for National Interest magazine.

The USAF put the nuclear-capable B-52Hs and B-2As bombers of the 8th Air Force and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 20th Air Force under the Global Strike Command in 2009. However, the de-nuclearized B-1B bombers stayed with the Air Combat Command's 12th Air Force. Such policy reconfigures the newly established Global Strike Command as a Bomber and Missile Command according to the author.

Hasik said that the consolidation of heavy bombers under the Global Strike Command will provide a single organizational home to all big bomber crews, including those of the forthcoming Long-Range Strike Bombers. "With that art of the possible emerging, the organizational heft of this new 'Bomber Command' may then spur some really new thinking, which the USAF genuinely needs for dealing with the mounting threat from China," Hasik said.

James Schlesinger, former deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, suggested the creation a single bomber command in a report to President Nixon in 1971, said General Mark Welsh, chief of staff of the USAAF. During the Cold War, the Strategic Air Command was responsible for command and control of the US military's land-based strategic bomber aircraft and ICBMs. However, it was not a unified bomber command.

A press release from the USAF said it is believed that a single commander can provide a unified voice to maintain high standards of training for penetrating and long-range combat missions. "It's not that a Fighter and Bomber and Everything Else Command can't do that; the thinking is simply that a single Bomber (and Missile) Command might do so better, and possibly by adding a literal dash of esprit de corps," the report said.

Unlike the Strategic Air Command, the nuclear mission will no longer dominate this newly established Bomber Command under the name of Global Strike Command. At the same time, the Long-Range Strategic Bomber may bring more combat capabilities than simply bombing targets. Like the F-35, they may be deployed as a flying frigates with reconnoitering, surveillance and bombing abilities. They could perhaps even be used to shoot down enemy fighters, Hasik said.
 

Bernard

Junior Member
Some interesting opinion pieces about the LRS-B competition. Maybe we should start a thread for this? They put together some good arguments for each.

Part 1 of 2 different opinion pieces.

Opinion: Stealth And Integration Experience Point To Northrop Grumman LRS-B Advantage

The U.S. Air Force soon will select a prime contractor to develop and build its stealthy Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), an aircraft critical to ensuring the nation’s capability to project military power at any time, and at any place. On the surface, industry analysts have characterized the competition between the team of
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-
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and the one led by
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as a toss-up. However, a deeper dive into Air Force requirements and the teams’ capabilities establishes Northrop Grumman as an overwhelming favorite to produce the LRS-B. Here’s why:

The ability to focus and prioritize. Owing to the missteps characterizing the acquisition of the
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fighter and
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tanker, the Air Force needs to be assured of a prime contractor willing to focus its attention, resources and advocacy on the new bomber. However, the Boeing/Lockheed Martin team is overwhelmed with trying to fix other Air Force priority programs. Boeing finds its military business distracted by a surprisingly painful tanker program, while Lockheed Martin is consumed by F-35 delays and substandard performance. Consequently, an LRS-B in development would be seen as a lower priority for the Boeing-Lockheed team when the KC-46 and F-35 are in their production phases, finally generating profits.

Recent history supports this contention. When the Air Force push for more
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threatened F-35 revenues, Lockheed Martin’s support for the F-22 quickly evaporated. Similarly, it is improbable that Lockheed would give up some F-35s or Boeing would slow the KC-46 line to keep the LRS-B on track—making the LRS-B a billpayer for those troubled programs. In contrast, Northrop Grumman is focused on the bomber and positioned to deliver on time and on budget.

The relevant experience needed to deliver. The Air Force procurement chief testified to Congress that the cap on the cost of each bomber previously established—$550 million per aircraft in 2010 dollars—will be retained in this competition. Northrop Grumman is the only company to develop, build, field and sustain a stealthy, long-range strike aircraft—the B-2 bomber. That experience of reducing sustainment costs, which can total up to 80% of a weapon system’s life-cycle cost, has resulted in the B-2 costing less per aircraft than other large Air Force aircraft of similar fleet size. Sustain a B-2 for less than an RC-135? Northrop’s experience enables it. In contrast, although the Boeing/Lockheed team will tout its experience in building large commercial airliners and fighter aircraft, producing and sustaining an advanced bomber is a complicated enterprise demanding relevant leadership and engineering talent. Past performance matters. Building a B-2 is a far more complex undertaking than modifying a commercial aircraft into a tanker, yet Boeing is still struggling to deliver the KC-46 a decade after initiating development.

The capability to integrate stealthy subsystems.The Air Force understands that stealth is a combination of technology and tactics, calling for the integration of subsystems enhancing the aircraft’s low observability. Here Northrop shines with its stealth subsystems credentials. When Lockheed needed such systems, it turned to Northrop Grumman for stealth radar on the F-22 and F-35, stealthy communications links for the two fighters, and the F-35’s communications-navigation systems, infrared sensors, and center fuselage with its stealthy engine inlets. The
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also will push an unmanned variant of the LRS-B; Northrop Grumman’s experience with the Air Force
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and Navy’s stealthy unmanned X-47B places it well ahead of the competition.

Why Northrop Grumman will win. The Air Force needs a contractor dedicated to bringing in the LRS-B on time and on budget, yet Boeing and Lockheed are teamed because neither is positioned to win alone. Boeing lacked stealth credentials, while Lockheed faced pushback on the F-35.

In the matter of all-aspect stealth, where design is everything, how would Boeing as prime contractor give design authority to a subcontractor? For that matter, why would Lockheed share its stealth fighter design experience with Boeing in the LRS-B program and jeopardize its advantage over Boeing in the next, “sixth-generation” fighter competition?

The lack of stealth bomber experience, the management risks associated with the Boeing/Lockheed team, and the dedication of those companies’ resources to other Air Force priorities make them an unwise choice to produce the nation’s next long-range strike bomber. Northrop Grumman leads a team with the experience, portfolio, dedication and focus to affordably develop, field and sustain the new stealth bomber. That’s why it will win.

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Bernard

Junior Member
Opinion: The Boeing-Lockheed Team Is The Most Qualified
Apr 30, 2015
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| Aviation Week & Space Technology

The U.S. Air Force has said little in public about the performance requirements for the Long-Range Strike Bomber, and the two industry teams vying for the contract are mum about their proposals. There’s no way an outsider can evaluate which offering has greater merit. However, it is feasible to assess which team is more qualified to execute the program.

So let’s assume we are a source-selection authority charged with selecting not a bomber, but a bomber team. The choice is between a group led by
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on which
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is the primary teammate, and one led by
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. Which team is most qualified, based on relevant experience, current capabilities, financial resources and performance?

Relevant experience. During the last three decades, Boeing and Lockheed Martin together have been lead integrators for 95% of the Air Force’s bomber and strike aircraft, including such well-known airframes as the
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,
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,
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and
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fighters, and the B-1 bomber. Between the two of them, the companies have delivered more than 3,000 aircraft to the service since 1980. They continue to be the lead suppliers of fixed-wing aircraft to the joint force today, delivering over 300 fighters, airlifters and reconnaissance planes in 2014 alone.

By comparison, Northrop Grumman has been a relatively minor player. In recent years, Northrop Grumman has delivered fewer than 10 fixed-wing airframes per year to customers, typically manned turboprops and the
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unmanned aerial system (UAS). Its main role in military aviation today is building subassemblies for aircraft integrated by Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

Current capabilities. Boeing operates production lines for fighters in St. Louis and for large military aircraft such as the
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in the Seattle area. It also is the world’s biggest producer of commercial transports. Lockheed Martin operates the only fifth-generation fighter line in the world, at Fort Worth, turning out the triservice F-35 fighter—an aircraft derived in part from the Boeing-Lockheed collaboration on the Air Force’s F-22 air-superiority fighter.

This high level of ongoing activity enables the two companies to sustain a huge workforce of engineers and technical specialists, a global supply chain and a sprawling maintenance network. Lockheed Martin has the only productionized low-observable-edge manufacturing capability in the industry, and the most advanced software-generation skills of any aircraft company. Boeing has more expertise than any other company in using advanced composites to manufacture large aircraft.

Northrop Grumman has nothing like this. Its main aircraft facility in Palmdale, California, is engaged in building UAS, modifying existing airframes and turning out subassemblies. Because it is not engaged in high-rate production of finished aircraft, Northrop Grumman does not have the articulated supply chain or cost-control systems developed over many decades by its competitors. It also lacks the kind of risk-management skills for which Lockheed’s Skunk Works has become famous.

Financial resources. Boeing and Lockheed Martin together generated $136 billion in revenues last year. Northrop Grumman generated $24 billion, marking its fourth straight year of shrinking sales. The huge disparity in revenues—over 500%—between the two teams means Boeing and Lockheed Martin are far better equipped to deal with any changes in Air Force bomber plans. When Boeing was faced with a demanding Air Force customer in the second round of competition for the
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tanker, it doubled down; Northrop Grumman pulled out, citing potential risks to its bottom line.

Past performance. Northrop Grumman cites its experience in building the B-2 bomber as a prime qualification, neglecting to mention that it features antiquated technology and is an upkeep nightmare (18 hr. of low-observables maintenance for every hour of flight). It also neglects to mention that at the height of production, B-2 was Boeing’s biggest defense program, employing 10,000 people; Boeing built the B-2’s outboard wing, aft center fuselage, landing gear, fuel system and weapons delivery system. Boeing then went on to work with Lockheed Martin on the first fifth-generation fighter, the F-22, which was a more advanced aircraft.

The Long Range Strike Bomber will be more capable than the B-2 in nearly every measure, including stealth. It will satisfy key performance parameters largely by adapting mature technologies and processes from other aircraft that Boeing and Lockheed Martin developed. Because Northrop Grumman has not been as intimately engaged in developing stealth or software for the F-35, or pioneering composite production techniques for large aircraft, it would have to play catchup in a wide range of skills.

The conclusion is obvious: Boeing and Lockheed Martin comprise the most qualified team to develop a new bomber, and selecting Northrop Grumman would entail a far higher level of risk.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
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nssn-11.jpg

Naval Today said:
The US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus hosted a ship-naming ceremony recently to announce that SSN 793, a Virginia-class attack submarine, will bear the name USS Oregon.

During the ceremony held at The Battleship Oregon Memorial in Tom McCall Waterfront Park, Mabus announced the submarine will be named to honor the long-standing history its namesake state has had with the Navy. Mabus also recognized USS Portland (LPD 27) which he named last year in honor of Oregon’s largest city.

The next-generation attack submarines will provide the Navy with the capabilities required to maintain the nation’s undersea supremacy well into the 21st century. They will have enhanced stealth, sophisticated surveillance capabilities and special warfare enhancements that will enable them to meet the Navy’s multi-mission requirements.

These submarines will have the capability to attack targets ashore with highly accurate Tomahawk cruise missiles and conduct covert long-term surveillance of land areas, littoral waters or other sea-based forces. Other missions include anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare; mine delivery and minefield mapping. They are also designed for special forces delivery and support.

Each Virginia-class submarine is 7,800-tons and 377 feet in length, has a beam of 34 feet, and can operate at more than 25 knots submerged. It is designed with a reactor plant that will not require refueling during the planned life of the ship, reducing lifecycle costs while increasing underway time. The submarine will be built in partnership with General Dynamics/Electric Boat Corp. and will be built by Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut.
 

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
Um, wouldn't the bombers be geared primarily towards Russia?
Its a opinion piece from want China times Sky its going to be targeted by that. Reality is that the LRS-B is likely to be aimed a bit at both and beyond. In operations the LSR-B will be both a tactical and strategic bomber meaning it's to be used for air support over asymmetric and lower intensity as a sledge hammer against hardened insurgents, a low signature anti shipping platform, a nuclear deference mission and opening strike platform and maybe even more.
All of that means that it's scope has to be very wide.
 
and here's what SECNAV had to say:
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source:
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the follow-up (by Congressman Forbes):
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he cruiser war continues. With House seapower subcommittee chairman
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declaring the Navy has “no credibility” when they promise to modernize aging
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, House Republicans and Navy leaders are accelerating towards a public collision.

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, Forbes rolled out legislation requiring the Navy to modernize the cruisers twice as fast as planned, in just two years per ship instead of four. On
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, the
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urged Congress to get rid of Forbes’ provision, saying the faster pace it mandates would cost an extra $300 to $400 million. On
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, the full
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sided with Forbes against the Navy.
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, Navy Secretary
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suggested several ways that Congress could make sure the cruisers got modernized without having to accelerate the pace. This afternoon, Rep. Forbes told me Mabus’s alternatives weren’t good enough.

“I think he misses the point,” Forbes told me when I summarized what Mabus had said. There are things the Navy could do to give Congress confidence on cruiser modernization, Forbes said, but they aren’t the measures Mabus suggested yesterday.

“There are two steps they could have taken,” Forbes said. “One could have been to start to do the modernization.” So far, work hasn’t begun. “The second thing they could have done is show that they’ve put money in the FYDP [Future Year Defense Plan]. They can’t come over here to us and say, ‘oh yes, it’s our plan to do this,’ but we’re not going to put it in the five-year FYDP.”

Cruiser upgrades are paid for from a special Ship Modernization, Operations and Sustainment Fund — which was created by Congress in 2013 because it didn’t trust the Navy to spend money from its regular accounts on the Ticonderogas. SMOSF (rhymes with “Joseph”) will run out in 2018 or 2019: ’18 on the faster two-year-per-ship plan Forbes prefers, ’19 on the slower four-year-per-ship plan the Navy prefers. Both date are within the five-year planning window of the current FYDP, so either way, the Navy’s five-year budget plan should show an infusion of money to replenish the fund and finish the work on the remaining cruisers — but it doesn’t.

“They have no credibility,” Forbes said. “They’ve got to show where they’ve put some money to do it.”

Of course, there are political reasons for the Navy not to commit the money. I’ve heard two main ones from knowledgeable sources. First, it could be a ploy to make Congress cough up the money as a plus-up to the Navy budget: You want the cruisers so darn much, you find a way to pay for ’em, because we aren’t cutting any of our other programs to do it.

Second, it could be a signal the Navy wants to reopen the whole issue of the modernization timeline. The Navy’s original plan wasn’t to modernize a few cruisers at a time, taking four years per ship. It was to take 11 out of service at once and slowly modernize them over 11 years. The service estimates this slow-motion modernization would save some $4.5 billion
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for top-priority programs like new
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and
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. It’s a plan that Navy leaders still say is their
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.

“The Navy wants to continue the discussion on CG [cruiser] modernization and advocate for the PB-15 plan to modernize 11 CGs over a phased modernization period [of 11 years],” a defense official told me. “The
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clearly articulates the benefits for the Navy’s proposal and
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the service would welcome congressional language that held the Navy accountable for executing its original plan.”

But Forbes thinks the Navy proposals are simply ways to slow-roll Congress until the admirals can scrap the aging and expensive-to-operate warships. After all, in past years, the Navy had proposed retiring up to seven cruisers to save money for higher-priority programs.

“They really don’t want to do the modernization,” Forbes told me. “What the Navy really wants to do is what they did from day one: They want to take seven of these cruisers out of commission and destroy them.” When Congress rejected that proposal, he said, “then they came back with this Disney type of fairy tale[:] ‘What we meant to say is we don’t want to kill them, we just want to put them in a deep sleep.'”

Forbes thought the Navy’s 11-year modernization plan was a backdoor attempt to decommission the ships. He thinks the current four years-per-ship plan is still too slow and leaves the Navy too much room to slow-roll Congress. That’s why he wants the acceleration to two years per ship: It will force the Navy to get started.

The Navy argues that going from four years to two doesn’t give the
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enough leeway to manage their workflow, resulting in lower efficiency and higher costs. Forbes doesn’t agree and says the shipyards don’t either: “The shipyards are not buying what they’re trying to sell there,” he told me, “[but] they [the Navy] right now are putting pressure on these yards not to say what they can do with these cruisers.” If the Navy opens the bidding to yards on both coasts, there should be someone somewhere who can do it efficiently and inexpensively.

“If you want to just do away with the cruisers, we will save money,” Forbes said. “But strategically you pay
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.”
source:
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