Significance of the Chinese military contribution to World War 2 disputed.

solarz

Brigadier
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Both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung had been farsighted in planning their "joint" struggle against the Japanese. Each had realized that the Japanese would ultimately be defeated by the Allies and that the crucial struggle for control of China would be between themselves.

The above statement summarizes the dynamics of the CCP-KMT relationship in the war against Japan. While both Jiang and Mao were right in their predictions, Jiang made a fatal mistake in his calculations.

The KMT were the established government of China. They could not afford to choose their battle grounds like the CCP could. They were the ones with the responsibility to lead China to victory against the Japanese invaders, regardless of what the CCP did.

Jiang did not rise to the occasion. Instead, he was stuck in his narrow mindset of warlordism. He chose to respond in kind to the CCP's so-called "provocations", acting like a school child instead of a leader.

Had the KMT put their entire support in the KMT-CCP cooperation, addressed CCP grievances fairly, and supported the Communist Forces as diligently as their own, the CCP would not have gained nearly as much influence as they did.

For in the end, the people of China saw the Nationalist forces as an army who kept losing city after city to the Japanese, while the Eighth Route Army fought on in the heart of Japanese-occupied territory, matching the Japanese blow for blow.
 

Mightypeon

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Were they truely that certain of victory?
Has that been before or after Stalingrad/Moscow (meaning USSR would not fall) or Pearl Harbor (meaning that Japan just inserted its private parts into a hornets nest)?

I do not know a lot about the details of the Chinese theatre, but from Khalkin Gol over lake Kazan over August Storm, the Japanese do not strike one as overly competent compared to the Russians/Germans.
 

Lezt

Junior Member
Were they truely that certain of victory?
Has that been before or after Stalingrad/Moscow (meaning USSR would not fall) or Pearl Harbor (meaning that Japan just inserted its private parts into a hornets nest)?

I do not know a lot about the details of the Chinese theatre, but from Khalkin Gol over lake Kazan over August Storm, the Japanese do not strike one as overly competent compared to the Russians/Germans.


I am pretty sure Mao and Chang was sure the allies would win. It is a simple equation, Germany in order to fight the UK will have to sink American shipping. Japan to survive as a maritime nation needs the dutch new indies for oil - which the US will not allow Japan to do (who would let their potential enemy build up for war?) in both cases, many American will die and when American dies, America goes to war.

Khalkin Gol is one example, but it is more due to inferior arms than inferior men - a smaller Japanese force attacked a larger soviet one and caused more casualties to the Soviets than the Soviets caused the Japanese. It is technically a stalemate as well as the Japanese retreated not achieving their objectives, while the Soviets did not pursue.

Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, Indonesia, New Guinea, Solomons and Philippines were all Japanese victories over contemporary European/American armies.
 

delft

Brigadier
This is not how Khalkin Gol is generally described. The usual story is that, although must farther from their rail head, the Soviets were able to provide much more heavy weapons and ammo to the front as well as to achieve air superiority. The Japanese were then crushed in a Blitz Krieg attack. At the same time the European part of WWII was started by Hitler and it was prudent for the Soviets not to pursue the matter. At any rate the campaign was successful in that Japan chose to make war in the direction of Sumatra to cover its oil needs rather than East Siberia.
 

Lezt

Junior Member
This is not how Khalkin Gol is generally described. The usual story is that, although must farther from their rail head, the Soviets were able to provide much more heavy weapons and ammo to the front as well as to achieve air superiority. The Japanese were then crushed in a Blitz Krieg attack. At the same time the European part of WWII was started by Hitler and it was prudent for the Soviets not to pursue the matter. At any rate the campaign was successful in that Japan chose to make war in the direction of Sumatra to cover its oil needs rather than East Siberia.

Well yes that is what been taught in history, but if we think about it, isn't it too perfect a story? for example, the campaign was to eject the Japanese invaders and they at that time cannot know how the Japanese would respond - yet in history we are taught that the soviet won because the Japanese decide not to go north.

Deep Battle, the soviet version of Blitzkrieg was written by Vladimir Triandafillov and Mikhail Tukhachevsky - both of whom died before ww2. Coupled with stalin's purges, the red army is unlikely to be able to perform it.

Zhukov, historically had been a pusher general who fails to exploit any break through. To claim that he have successfully implemented blitzkrieg is far fetch. As unlike the theory of Blitzkrieg and Deep Battle, where enemy units were unable to escape and therefore destroyed, Zhukov have a tendency to let his enemy retreat and regroup. That is why the Japanese casualties were so light at Khalkhin Gol, and German casualties are so light later in the war.

Germany and the SU had an non-aggression pact then Aug 1939, the Tripartite pact was signed in September 1940. To claim that Germany pressurized the SU to withdraw is far fetched as Khalkhin Gol began in may of 1939 and ended Sept 1939. Germany wsa not allied with Japan when hostility ceased and the SU have a nonagression pact with Germany already.

The german invasion of poland started in sept 1939, after the battle in Khalkhin Gol was already decided. So the dates are close, but they do not really overlap nor contribute to each other.
 

delft

Brigadier
The soviets didn't want to be at war in the east while they saw the war in Europe coming, not because Hitler asked so kindly.
They moved their own borders west in Europe to increase their strategic depth, in Poland, Bessarabia, Karelia, in the expectation of an eventual war with Germany. That they expected that war in 1942 while it came in 1941 is a later mistake.

Besides there were summer wars when Japan attacked the Soviet Union in 1938 ( Lake Khasan ) and Khalkin Gol in 1939 but not in 1940 or 1941, so the defeat of 1939 was decisive.
 
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bladerunner

Banned Idiot
I watched a Amercian documentary of the Sino Japanese war from 1937 to 45. It contained some interesting film with dogfights between the Nationalist biplanes and the japanese mono winged ones.
The film acknowledges the contributiontowards the war made by the nationalist forces, but during the whole 2hrs running time the communist word/forces was never mentioned.
 

delft

Brigadier
@Lezt
This off topic, but, a question, how did you come to your eccentric vision on the Khalkin Gol war?
 

Lezt

Junior Member
The soviets didn't want to be at war in the east while they saw the war in Europe coming, not because Hitler asked so kindly.
They moved their own borders west in Europe to increase their strategic depth, in Poland, Bessarabia, Karelia, in the expectation of an eventual war with Germany. That they expected that war in 1942 while it came in 1941 is a later mistake.

Besides there were summer wars when Japan attacked the Soviet Union in 1938 ( Lake Khasan ) and Khalkin Gol in 1939 but not in 1940 or 1941, so the defeat of 1939 was decisive.

Yes every country expected war, the SU wanted to attack Germany in 1942, Poland was preparing for 1942 - there is plenty of opportunity to land grab northern china from 39-42.

@Lezt
This off topic, but, a question, how did you come to your eccentric vision on the Khalkin Gol war?

no probs, lets just say it is human nature for generals to have fought battles they wish they have fought. The Chinese saying of "Succeed and be king, fail and knell" or the western version, the victor writes history plays an important role.

Stalin is renowned to make up stats and he needed a Red Napoleon and so he had Zhukov. reading the research soviet archives - the soviet population was inflated by maybe 30%, The soviet divisions in Europe was deployed in attack formation (having supply depots up front and all formations bunched up near the border). Yet history teaches the Soviets were unprepared for war? While the soviets in reality were unprepared for the preemptive strike Germany delivered.

And being a person with good math and stats, i find it too convenient that the German claim of soviet casualties was similar to the soviet loss claim. While we know all destroyed claims are generally inflated in war. That the total war loss covers to the population inflation before war the war. While tank loss and tank production evens out? We are told that soviet man power was inexhaustable, but the number of men under arms during ww2 was similar to the amount Germany had and that the SU had to arm women to make up the deficit.

Every general have his style: Monty, Zhukov, was a arty+push general; Napoleon was a bait and hammer general; Baiqi and Wellington is a lure and decapitate general. Rommel and Guardian are fast tactical generals. Zhukov is hard to fight blitzkerig because 1) it is not his style, 2) his command was too purged for such a complex maneuver to occur.
 
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