PLA ICBM Force in 2016
- Thread starter Su-34
- Start date
Re: Rankings of world nuclear (thermonuclear/hydrogen P-5 and atomic/fission) powers
of course not.
a strict no first use + minimum deterrence is what PLA aims for.
as Martian's post points out.
infrastructure matters too.
if china plays a successful shell game it would a heck alot cheaper than buy bunch of missiles that require extensive $$$ to maintain and field. while achieving the same end: make whoever think twice and three times before they launch nukes at china.
of course not.
a strict no first use + minimum deterrence is what PLA aims for.
as Martian's post points out.
infrastructure matters too.
if china plays a successful shell game it would a heck alot cheaper than buy bunch of missiles that require extensive $$$ to maintain and field. while achieving the same end: make whoever think twice and three times before they launch nukes at china.
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
India is scaring herself shitless for nothing. they are spend alot of money buying fancy weapon systems that has questionable utility in front of a concerted chinese assault. If china chooses to go offensive in any scenario.
Those money spent that would other wise boost her economy and her people's living standard.
China's build up is clearly not aimed at India.
I mean,
to deter india with nuclear weapons there is no need to build these facilities.
the facility in Hainan is not aimed at India, it is clearly aimed at having a second strike capability against what they call the "World Hegemon". or else they wouldn't go to the trouble of fielding JL-2+ missiles.
a couple of old-IRBMs would be have bigger tonnage than the tonnage of the entire India nuke force.
India is scaring herself shitless for nothing. they are spend alot of money buying fancy weapon systems that has questionable utility in front of a concerted chinese assault. If china chooses to go offensive in any scenario.
Those money spent that would other wise boost her economy and her people's living standard.
China's build up is clearly not aimed at India.
I mean,
to deter india with nuclear weapons there is no need to build these facilities.
the facility in Hainan is not aimed at India, it is clearly aimed at having a second strike capability against what they call the "World Hegemon". or else they wouldn't go to the trouble of fielding JL-2+ missiles.
a couple of old-IRBMs would be have bigger tonnage than the tonnage of the entire India nuke force.
Last edited:
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
one more thing,
Those new SLBMs that will be/are deployed with the new subs in Hainan, I think they have more range than people give them credit for. to this date there have been only 2-3 high apogee launches and no full range tests.
the requirement was always to have a second strike capability. that means reach most of NA. from the base in Hainan to let's say atlanta GA it is about 14000 km.
Trident II is about 11000 km but that was with a big throw weight.
they can easily trade for war heads for range if they opt for some cheap decoys instead of mirvs.
one more thing,
Those new SLBMs that will be/are deployed with the new subs in Hainan, I think they have more range than people give them credit for. to this date there have been only 2-3 high apogee launches and no full range tests.
the requirement was always to have a second strike capability. that means reach most of NA. from the base in Hainan to let's say atlanta GA it is about 14000 km.
Trident II is about 11000 km but that was with a big throw weight.
they can easily trade for war heads for range if they opt for some cheap decoys instead of mirvs.
IronsightSniper
Junior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
I don't understand how China nuking Russia will trigger Russia nuking world. Most likely Russia will nuke China and the U.S. will be like
and Russia will be like, "what?"
I don't understand how China nuking Russia will trigger Russia nuking world. Most likely Russia will nuke China and the U.S. will be like
and Russia will be like, "what?"
Martian
Senior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
There are three continent-sized major powers in the world. Of those three, two are very advanced technologically.
Currently, the most advanced technological country is the United States. Fearing being overtaken by China, this has led to speculation that the United States fantasizes about nuking China.
It is true that China has less ICBMs than the United States. However, this situation is a three-man Mexican standoff. If the United States attacks China then China has nothing to lose. China will unleash its thermonuclear SRBMs and IRBMs on the Russians. The Russians have an excess of thermonuclear weapons. They have plenty of thermonuclear SRBMs and IRBMs for China and ICBMs for the United States.
After an overwhelming Chinese thermonuclear strike from approximately 60 nuclear launch pads in Tibet alone, Russia will have nothing to lose. Knowing that China will already be devastated by the United States, the only logical course of action for Russia is to unleash its thermonuclear ICBMs on the United States. Any Russian attack on China will be redundant and pointless.
No matter how you simulate the scenario for an U.S. first strike, there will be a worldwide nuclear holocaust. Upon immediate detection of American ICBMs or massive incoming warheads, both Russia and China will launch every thermonuclear weapon in their arsenals. This is the principle of "use them or lose them."
In conclusion, Russia, the United States, and China are all sitting in one thermonuclear boat. If any of the three continent-sized superpowers believe that they are under attack, they will launch every thermonuclear weapon in their arsenals. This is called "mutually assured destruction" or MAD. Hence, under MAD, China is safe from American nuclear attack.
I'm surprised that the computer W.O.P.R. in WarGames was able to figure this out, but you apparently have not.
----------
My final point is that China's vulnerability in lacking an overwhelming thermonuclear retaliatory strike on the United States may last for only nine more years. By 2020, China may no longer need to rely on the Russians for an indirect "mutually assured destruction" deterrence against the United States.
Has China "crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon"?
The old projections may have to be revised in the face of new information. Well-known analyst Richard Fisher, Jr. states: "While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020."
DF-31As camouflaged
"FISHER: China and START
Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize
By Richard D. Fisher Jr. - The Washington Times 5:56 p.m., Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Might China someday have more nuclear warheads than the United States? Than Russia? Inconceivable as it may sound, this could come to pass, because China may just be starting a period of double- or triple-digit annual growth in its warhead numbers as the Obama administration sets its sights on further U.S. warhead reductions, with little hope that China will join a regime of negotiated nuclear stability. But even if it did, would nuclear "parity" with China be in America's interest?
The new START Treaty signed in May commits the United States and Russia to a "parity" that reduces deployed nuclear warheads from 2,200 to 1,550 and reduces to 700 the number of deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. However, President Obama has made clear his intention to seek further reductions; late 2009 leaks to the press suggested further goals of 1,000 warheads or even fewer.
Since it started deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1980s, China has refused to join in nuclear weapons negotiations. This did not matter as long as China deployed a small number, about 20 liquid-fueled 13,000-kilometer-range DF-5s with single warheads, until early this decade. Furthermore, China had lulled many analysts by regularly suggesting that it adheres to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" that abjures U.S.- or Russian-level warhead numbers. But China has also rejected U.S. and Soviet levels of nuclear "transparency" as part of its deterrence calculus, with the result that nobody knows its nuclear force goals.
China began modernizing its nuclear missile forces by mid-decade, replacing early DF-5s with a similar number of improved DF-5A missiles based in stationary silos and deploying the new 7,000-to-8,000-kilometer-range, solid-fueled and mobile DF-31 and the larger 11,200-plus-kilometer-range DF-31A. In its latest report to the Congress on China's military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year's report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.
In addition, China may be close to fielding two more long-range nuclear missiles. First is the new 7,200-plus-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Though reported to be experiencing developmental challenges, when completed, 12 each will go on the new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarine, which the Pentagon estimates will number at least five, for a potential total of 60 missiles. Then there is a new yet-unidentified larger ground-mobile ICBM which has been revealed in Chinese Internet-source images since 2007, but which the Pentagon did not publicly acknowledge until its latest China report. The distinguishing feature of the "DF-XX" is its use of a large 16-wheel Russian-style transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), likely derived from Russian-Belarus technology imported in the late 1990s.
But here is where the real danger begins: The Pentagon also notes this new ICBM is "possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)." Starting in 2002, the Pentagon's China report noted the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) interest in developing multiple warheads, with more explicit language being used in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Might some PLA ICBMs already have multiple warheads? This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new "DF-XX" may carry a similar number of warheads.
While it is not possible to confirm these disclosures from open sources, they point to an alarming possibility: China has crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon and, with the possibility that it can build one brigade of DF-31A and DF-XX ICBMs a year, could be capable of annual double- or triple-digit increases in its deployed nuclear warheads. Chinese sources also suggest interest in developing longer-range versions of the JL-2, which could also be MIRV-capable. While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020.
In addition, China may also be on its way to fielding a national missile-defense system by the 2020s. Its recent, successful Jan. 11 missile warhead interception test marks the culmination of China's second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program; the first was ordered started by Mao Zedong in 1963 and was pursued until 1980. This stands in contrast with years of howling complaints by Chinese diplomats against American missile-defense programs and their fervent campaigning to ban outer-space weapons. Was this merely deception designed to limit American defensive programs while China gathered the capacity to pursue its own ABM and space-warfare programs?
These potential trends would logically cause one to ask: Why not talk to the Chinese about their nuclear strategic plans? Indeed, the administration's April Nuclear Posture Review calls for "strategic assurance dialogues" with China. However, not only has China traditionally rejected any "negotiations" regarding its nuclear forces, it won't even send its main nuclear missile forces commander on a courtesy visit to the United States. Normal military-to-military dialogue is regularly held hostage to Washington ending arms sales to democratic Taiwan.
But there is a deeper basic conflict: China wants to displace U.S. strategic leadership in Asia and is building military forces capable of defending its global interests, even if that means challenging the United States well beyond Asia. So until China achieves its desired level of global power, which may not include concepts of "parity," China may have no interest in "negotiations" that limit or even inform others about its nuclear weapons plans.
But even if the United States and China could agree on nuclear parity, that may come at the cost of America's Asian alliances. A larger and defended Chinese nuclear arsenal could greatly undermine the U.S. ability to extend its nuclear deterrent, accelerating the process of decoupling the United States from key allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia. America's ability to deter China will decline further when the administration implements its Nuclear Posture Review decision to retire U.S. nuclear-armed TLAM-N cruise missiles carried by secure U.S. submarines, replacing them with tactical nuclear bombs carried by more vulnerable U.S. jet fighters. And then one must consider Russia and its increasing political-military cooperation with China. Might Russia someday "tilt" its nuclear forces with China's to dissuade the United States from defending a future vital interest?
Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India are today facing increased Chinese military pressures. They and the United States are also increasingly pressed to fund conventional military forces needed to deter China. It is indeed legitimate to ask if the current START Treaty gives the United States the ability to deter both Russia and a China just starting its strategic nuclear buildup. Furthermore, might START and intended follow-on agreements bring Asia closer to an era of nuclear proliferation and unforeseen instability?
Richard D. Fisher Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center and author of "China's Military Modernization, Building for Regional and Global Reach" (Praeger, 2008)."
I don't understand how China nuking Russia will trigger Russia nuking world. Most likely Russia will nuke China and the U.S. will be like
There are three continent-sized major powers in the world. Of those three, two are very advanced technologically.
Currently, the most advanced technological country is the United States. Fearing being overtaken by China, this has led to speculation that the United States fantasizes about nuking China.
It is true that China has less ICBMs than the United States. However, this situation is a three-man Mexican standoff. If the United States attacks China then China has nothing to lose. China will unleash its thermonuclear SRBMs and IRBMs on the Russians. The Russians have an excess of thermonuclear weapons. They have plenty of thermonuclear SRBMs and IRBMs for China and ICBMs for the United States.
After an overwhelming Chinese thermonuclear strike from approximately 60 nuclear launch pads in Tibet alone, Russia will have nothing to lose. Knowing that China will already be devastated by the United States, the only logical course of action for Russia is to unleash its thermonuclear ICBMs on the United States. Any Russian attack on China will be redundant and pointless.
No matter how you simulate the scenario for an U.S. first strike, there will be a worldwide nuclear holocaust. Upon immediate detection of American ICBMs or massive incoming warheads, both Russia and China will launch every thermonuclear weapon in their arsenals. This is the principle of "use them or lose them."
In conclusion, Russia, the United States, and China are all sitting in one thermonuclear boat. If any of the three continent-sized superpowers believe that they are under attack, they will launch every thermonuclear weapon in their arsenals. This is called "mutually assured destruction" or MAD. Hence, under MAD, China is safe from American nuclear attack.
I'm surprised that the computer W.O.P.R. in WarGames was able to figure this out, but you apparently have not.
----------
My final point is that China's vulnerability in lacking an overwhelming thermonuclear retaliatory strike on the United States may last for only nine more years. By 2020, China may no longer need to rely on the Russians for an indirect "mutually assured destruction" deterrence against the United States.
Has China "crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon"?
The old projections may have to be revised in the face of new information. Well-known analyst Richard Fisher, Jr. states: "While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020."
DF-31As camouflaged
"FISHER: China and START
Missile buildup may surpass U.S., Russia as they denuclearize
By Richard D. Fisher Jr. - The Washington Times 5:56 p.m., Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Might China someday have more nuclear warheads than the United States? Than Russia? Inconceivable as it may sound, this could come to pass, because China may just be starting a period of double- or triple-digit annual growth in its warhead numbers as the Obama administration sets its sights on further U.S. warhead reductions, with little hope that China will join a regime of negotiated nuclear stability. But even if it did, would nuclear "parity" with China be in America's interest?
The new START Treaty signed in May commits the United States and Russia to a "parity" that reduces deployed nuclear warheads from 2,200 to 1,550 and reduces to 700 the number of deployed nuclear delivery vehicles. However, President Obama has made clear his intention to seek further reductions; late 2009 leaks to the press suggested further goals of 1,000 warheads or even fewer.
Since it started deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1980s, China has refused to join in nuclear weapons negotiations. This did not matter as long as China deployed a small number, about 20 liquid-fueled 13,000-kilometer-range DF-5s with single warheads, until early this decade. Furthermore, China had lulled many analysts by regularly suggesting that it adheres to a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" that abjures U.S.- or Russian-level warhead numbers. But China has also rejected U.S. and Soviet levels of nuclear "transparency" as part of its deterrence calculus, with the result that nobody knows its nuclear force goals.
China began modernizing its nuclear missile forces by mid-decade, replacing early DF-5s with a similar number of improved DF-5A missiles based in stationary silos and deploying the new 7,000-to-8,000-kilometer-range, solid-fueled and mobile DF-31 and the larger 11,200-plus-kilometer-range DF-31A. In its latest report to the Congress on China's military released on Aug. 16, the Pentagon says there are less than 10 DF-31 and "10-15" DF-31A ICBMs, up to five more than reported in the previous year's report, covering 2008. However, in the 2010 issue of "Military Balance," Britain's International Institute of Strategic Studies notes there is one brigade of 12 DF-31s and two brigades or 24 DF-31A ICBMs, indicating a possible increase of one new brigade from 2008 to 2009.
In addition, China may be close to fielding two more long-range nuclear missiles. First is the new 7,200-plus-kilometer-range JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Though reported to be experiencing developmental challenges, when completed, 12 each will go on the new Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarine, which the Pentagon estimates will number at least five, for a potential total of 60 missiles. Then there is a new yet-unidentified larger ground-mobile ICBM which has been revealed in Chinese Internet-source images since 2007, but which the Pentagon did not publicly acknowledge until its latest China report. The distinguishing feature of the "DF-XX" is its use of a large 16-wheel Russian-style transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), likely derived from Russian-Belarus technology imported in the late 1990s.
But here is where the real danger begins: The Pentagon also notes this new ICBM is "possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV)." Starting in 2002, the Pentagon's China report noted the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) interest in developing multiple warheads, with more explicit language being used in the 2009 and 2010 reports. Might some PLA ICBMs already have multiple warheads? This analyst has been told by Asian military sources that the DF-31A already carries three warheads and that one deployed DF-5B carries five or six warheads. These sources speculate the new "DF-XX" may carry a similar number of warheads.
While it is not possible to confirm these disclosures from open sources, they point to an alarming possibility: China has crossed the multiple-warhead Rubicon and, with the possibility that it can build one brigade of DF-31A and DF-XX ICBMs a year, could be capable of annual double- or triple-digit increases in its deployed nuclear warheads. Chinese sources also suggest interest in developing longer-range versions of the JL-2, which could also be MIRV-capable. While a worst-case estimate, there is good reason to consider that China's warhead numbers could exceed 500 by 2020.
In addition, China may also be on its way to fielding a national missile-defense system by the 2020s. Its recent, successful Jan. 11 missile warhead interception test marks the culmination of China's second anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program; the first was ordered started by Mao Zedong in 1963 and was pursued until 1980. This stands in contrast with years of howling complaints by Chinese diplomats against American missile-defense programs and their fervent campaigning to ban outer-space weapons. Was this merely deception designed to limit American defensive programs while China gathered the capacity to pursue its own ABM and space-warfare programs?
These potential trends would logically cause one to ask: Why not talk to the Chinese about their nuclear strategic plans? Indeed, the administration's April Nuclear Posture Review calls for "strategic assurance dialogues" with China. However, not only has China traditionally rejected any "negotiations" regarding its nuclear forces, it won't even send its main nuclear missile forces commander on a courtesy visit to the United States. Normal military-to-military dialogue is regularly held hostage to Washington ending arms sales to democratic Taiwan.
But there is a deeper basic conflict: China wants to displace U.S. strategic leadership in Asia and is building military forces capable of defending its global interests, even if that means challenging the United States well beyond Asia. So until China achieves its desired level of global power, which may not include concepts of "parity," China may have no interest in "negotiations" that limit or even inform others about its nuclear weapons plans.
But even if the United States and China could agree on nuclear parity, that may come at the cost of America's Asian alliances. A larger and defended Chinese nuclear arsenal could greatly undermine the U.S. ability to extend its nuclear deterrent, accelerating the process of decoupling the United States from key allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia. America's ability to deter China will decline further when the administration implements its Nuclear Posture Review decision to retire U.S. nuclear-armed TLAM-N cruise missiles carried by secure U.S. submarines, replacing them with tactical nuclear bombs carried by more vulnerable U.S. jet fighters. And then one must consider Russia and its increasing political-military cooperation with China. Might Russia someday "tilt" its nuclear forces with China's to dissuade the United States from defending a future vital interest?
Countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India are today facing increased Chinese military pressures. They and the United States are also increasingly pressed to fund conventional military forces needed to deter China. It is indeed legitimate to ask if the current START Treaty gives the United States the ability to deter both Russia and a China just starting its strategic nuclear buildup. Furthermore, might START and intended follow-on agreements bring Asia closer to an era of nuclear proliferation and unforeseen instability?
Richard D. Fisher Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center and author of "China's Military Modernization, Building for Regional and Global Reach" (Praeger, 2008)."
Last edited:
IronsightSniper
Junior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
But that doesn't answer my question. If Russia is nuked by China, and China is nuked by the U.S., why would the Russians out of the blue, nuke the U.S.? They'll most likely dump their arsenal (in a limited retaliatory strike) on China to take out the entire PLA and maybe even kill a couple hundred of millions of people along the way. I really don't see why Russia will nuke the U.S. It, in fact, would not be logical for the Russians to just nuke everybody because "they have nothing to lose", in fact, they do. People don't see the world as something you can just nuke, Russia no doubtedly would only nuke the perpetrators of their nuking, i.e. China. Again, I stress, "I don't see a reason why Russia would nuke the world." Like you said, the Russian arsenal is larger than the U.S.'s in tonneage, it'll be logical for the U.S. to, in a series of precision strikes, wipe out all PLA facilities, and for the Russians to wipe China off the map as a whole. A 20 megatonne warhead from the SS-18 Satan can flatten either Beijing/Shanghai/Hong Kong/Chengdu/etc, and the Russians have many of those.
But that doesn't answer my question. If Russia is nuked by China, and China is nuked by the U.S., why would the Russians out of the blue, nuke the U.S.? They'll most likely dump their arsenal (in a limited retaliatory strike) on China to take out the entire PLA and maybe even kill a couple hundred of millions of people along the way. I really don't see why Russia will nuke the U.S. It, in fact, would not be logical for the Russians to just nuke everybody because "they have nothing to lose", in fact, they do. People don't see the world as something you can just nuke, Russia no doubtedly would only nuke the perpetrators of their nuking, i.e. China. Again, I stress, "I don't see a reason why Russia would nuke the world." Like you said, the Russian arsenal is larger than the U.S.'s in tonneage, it'll be logical for the U.S. to, in a series of precision strikes, wipe out all PLA facilities, and for the Russians to wipe China off the map as a whole. A 20 megatonne warhead from the SS-18 Satan can flatten either Beijing/Shanghai/Hong Kong/Chengdu/etc, and the Russians have many of those.
Martian
Senior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
I'm not getting through to you. After being nuked by China, the Russians do no want to be ruled by a superpower United States. Capiche? Why is that so hard to understand?
After a thermonuclear war, the Russians aspire to rule the world. The only method to achieve Russian ambition and independence is to destroy the remaining military and economic superpower. Actually, the Russians will nuke every country in the world to ensure a fair playing field in the post-thermonuclear war world. Otherwise, the Australians will become the world's de facto superpower.
Let's assume that the Soviet Union and the United States had a thermonuclear exchange. Would the Soviets and the Americans leave the Chinese alone with a big smile on their faces? Of course not. Similarly, the Russians will not leave the Americans with a giant grin on their faces either. This is called competition among nations.
The rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia does not end with a thermonuclear war. It's almost a certainty that all three countries have extensive underground facilities to enable their survivors an opportunity to dominate the post-thermonuclear war world.
After 2020, let's assume that China has 500 ICBM thermonuclear warheads. For whatever reason, let's assume that China and the United States engage in an all-out thermonuclear exchange. Will China and the United States leave Russia in a pristine state? That will never happen. Both China and the United States will take Russia with them.
I'm not getting through to you. After being nuked by China, the Russians do no want to be ruled by a superpower United States. Capiche? Why is that so hard to understand?
After a thermonuclear war, the Russians aspire to rule the world. The only method to achieve Russian ambition and independence is to destroy the remaining military and economic superpower. Actually, the Russians will nuke every country in the world to ensure a fair playing field in the post-thermonuclear war world. Otherwise, the Australians will become the world's de facto superpower.
Let's assume that the Soviet Union and the United States had a thermonuclear exchange. Would the Soviets and the Americans leave the Chinese alone with a big smile on their faces? Of course not. Similarly, the Russians will not leave the Americans with a giant grin on their faces either. This is called competition among nations.
The rivalry between the United States, China, and Russia does not end with a thermonuclear war. It's almost a certainty that all three countries have extensive underground facilities to enable their survivors an opportunity to dominate the post-thermonuclear war world.
After 2020, let's assume that China has 500 ICBM thermonuclear warheads. For whatever reason, let's assume that China and the United States engage in an all-out thermonuclear exchange. Will China and the United States leave Russia in a pristine state? That will never happen. Both China and the United States will take Russia with them.
Last edited:
IronsightSniper
Junior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
I understand that part, but what possible proof is there that the U.S. would want to rule the Russians? Afterall, even in a limited nuclear strike on China to wipe out their people, Russia still has more nukes than anybody else, combined. Therefore, even though their economy is wrecked, they still have a big card to play, an ace of spades per se.
Really, the theory of "superpowers" and "global dominance" or even "competition among nations" is obviously wrong. If I got nuked, all I want to do is nuke the guy that nuked me. If I am not to be the super power anymore, does that really matter anyways? At least I still have this and that and my enemy got what was coming.
The fallacious thought that, "China f&#ked us, U.S. f#^ked China, lets f&!k the U.S.!" is incredibly naive, and in reality, if China nukes Russia, Russia nukes China. Just because you're not as strong as you used to be doesn't mean the other guy is stronger.
I understand that part, but what possible proof is there that the U.S. would want to rule the Russians? Afterall, even in a limited nuclear strike on China to wipe out their people, Russia still has more nukes than anybody else, combined. Therefore, even though their economy is wrecked, they still have a big card to play, an ace of spades per se.
Really, the theory of "superpowers" and "global dominance" or even "competition among nations" is obviously wrong. If I got nuked, all I want to do is nuke the guy that nuked me. If I am not to be the super power anymore, does that really matter anyways? At least I still have this and that and my enemy got what was coming.
The fallacious thought that, "China f&#ked us, U.S. f#^ked China, lets f&!k the U.S.!" is incredibly naive, and in reality, if China nukes Russia, Russia nukes China. Just because you're not as strong as you used to be doesn't mean the other guy is stronger.
Martian
Senior Member
Re: China's Nuclear Strike Force
I believe that you are incredibly naive. However, there is nothing that I can do to elevate your level of understanding. The relationships between nations, in both economic and military terms, are complex.
In your response of "I don't get it," you have refuted the maxims of "use them (e.g. thermonuclear weapons) or lose them," "mutually assured destruction," and "nationalism/primacy of my country." There have been endless books written by scholars, military generals, and think-tanks on these subjects.
If you believe that I am in error, I suggest you offer a plausible explanation as to why China has not been in a rush to build a massive ICBM force during the last 44 years. China has possessed the technologies, finances, and manufacturing capability to build as many thermonuclear warheads as she desires.
I believe that you are incredibly naive. However, there is nothing that I can do to elevate your level of understanding. The relationships between nations, in both economic and military terms, are complex.
In your response of "I don't get it," you have refuted the maxims of "use them (e.g. thermonuclear weapons) or lose them," "mutually assured destruction," and "nationalism/primacy of my country." There have been endless books written by scholars, military generals, and think-tanks on these subjects.
If you believe that I am in error, I suggest you offer a plausible explanation as to why China has not been in a rush to build a massive ICBM force during the last 44 years. China has possessed the technologies, finances, and manufacturing capability to build as many thermonuclear warheads as she desires.
Last edited: