Commentary: America Risks an AI Bubble While China Risks Falling Behind
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Published: Jul. 24, 2026 5:56 p.m. GMT+8
The United States and China are running neck and neck in the global artificial intelligence race. Yet beneath the surface of this technological rivalry, a stark divergence is emerging: China’s capital expenditure on AI is falling significantly behind that of the U.S. This investment gap reveals fundamental differences in how both economies are funding the next technological revolution, and it carries profound implications for the future of global AI supremacy.
To understand why this matters, we must recognize that the AI era is fundamentally different from the internet boom. The digital economy of the past two decades was defined by light-asset platforms. Companies capitalized on the non-rivalrous nature of data, where user expansion brought marginal costs close to zero. The platform with the strongest network effect won, capturing massive profits.
Generative AI, however, is a heavy-asset endeavor. The scaling laws of large language models demand immense and continuous investments in computing power, data and electricity. Merely maintaining technological parity requires exponentially increasing resources. Furthermore, unlike the traditional internet, AI models incur substantial variable costs with every query. Running these models is hardware-intensive, leading to rapid physical depreciation and relentless upgrade cycles.
Crucially, the value creation of AI far exceeds its value capture. Because large models lack the monopolistic network effects of social media or search platforms, their economic benefits will likely spill over into the broader economy rather than accumulating solely in the hands of the model developers. From a macroeconomic perspective, this positive externality usually leads to underinvestment by private entities, as the societal return outweighs the private return.
This is where the U.S. and China diverge dramatically. In the U.S., an explosion of AI capital expenditure has bypassed traditional cost-benefit constraints. In the first quarter of 2026, AI-related capex accounted for nearly half of U.S. GDP growth and two-thirds of total demand growth.
Despite high interest rates, which typically suppress corporate investment, U.S. markets are gripped by what John Maynard Keynes famously called “animal spirits.” A profoundly optimistic market is subsidizing American AI development. U.S. equity risk premiums have effectively dropped to zero, signaling that investors are willing to fund massive cash-burn operations on the promise of future breakthroughs.
In contrast, China’s AI investment engine is sputtering. By the first quarter of 2026, AI-related capex contributed a mere fraction of a percentage point to China’s GDP growth. Several factors explain this sluggishness.
First, U.S. export controls on advanced graphics processing units have severely restricted hardware procurement, creating a bottleneck for willing Chinese buyers. Second, China’s capital markets remain subdued. Unlike the euphoric American stock market, Chinese equities still carry a noticeable risk premium, reflecting a more cautious investor base.
Third, labor cost differentials play a role. With lower average wages than in the U.S., the immediate economic incentive to replace human cognitive labor with AI is less pressing in China. Finally, China’s broader macroeconomic environment, burdened by a prolonged property slump and weak domestic demand, has compressed corporate profit expectations across the board.
These divergent paths mean Washington and Beijing face vastly different challenges. The U.S. faces pressure at the back end. The risk is that the euphoric expectations driving AI investment fail to materialize quickly enough. If high interest rates eventually exhaust investor patience and cash flows dry up, the resulting burst of the AI bubble could trigger massive capital destruction, similar to the dot-com crash.
China, conversely, faces pressure at the front end. If its current investment slump persists, the compounding nature of AI development means China risks falling permanently behind the U.S. technological frontier. Put simply: America’s risk is overinvestment and a popped bubble; China’s risk is underinvestment and technological obsolescence.
For China, the imperative is clear: it must urgently catch up in AI capital expenditure. The U.S. stock market bubble is currently serving a vital economic function by correcting the natural private underinvestment in a technology with massive social externalities. Because China lacks a comparably hyperactive equity market, it must rely on a different mechanism: industrial policy.
To bridge the gap, Beijing must aggressively mobilize state-backed financial resources, integrating bank credit with targeted industrial policies to fund AI infrastructure, such as advanced computing centers. While direct government investment and policy-driven lending carry their own risks of inefficiency and redundant projects, these are acceptable costs. In the current geopolitical climate, the dangers of technological stagnation far outweigh the costs of potential micro-level inefficiencies.
Recent policy signals suggest China is awakening to this reality, and domestic AI capex is poised for a rebound. But ensuring this investment boom takes root will require more than just targeted subsidies. It demands a broader macroeconomic pivot. Accommodative monetary policy must support fiscal expansion to revive domestic demand, creating the fertile, dynamic economic environment that true innovation requires.
Peng Wensheng is Chief Economist and Head of Research at CICC.
The views expressed in third-party articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Caixin.