Infantry Combat Equipment (non-firearm): Vests, Body Armor, NVGs, etc.

James Zhen

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Given the scenarios you mentioned it does make it logical on why the PLAGF isn't getting new Infantry kit but rather PAP and Police forces because if China does gets into a insurgency, PLAGF will not be the frontline force but rather PAP which is why they get the modernization rather PLAGF.
This is how the Chinese security forces operated since Xinjiang Conflict and HK 2019 riots.
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The average PAPF rifleman is armed with the same/nearly the same equipments as a normal PLAGF, PLANMC or PLAAF foot soldier???

also blud doesnt know about the papf tz getting lost in the mountains and they had to call the army tz in for the manhunt.

blud doesnt know papf gets hand-me-downs. blud doesnt know the reforms on PLASOFs.
 

Acauntis

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I don't think it's a very good example, at that time Chinese peacekeepers were already equipped with an IOTV like body armour, and those two specific peacekeepers were killed by mortar rounds. Thus, I really doubt if it could have been avoided
In that scenario its not like they were killed on the spot or suffered from extremely critical injuries like having limbs dismembered or anything like that. They were under extensive care in the medbay yet despite this they were victim to incompetence and under-training for medical emergencies by the base staff, at one point they even had to video call doctors from the mainland for advice as depicted in the documentary
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.

That is just for one scenario where UNPK suffered from injuries from a mortar shell. Imagine a broader scenario where the PLAGF will directly see action. Death from fragmentations was one of the major causes of death in the 80s Vietnam border skirmishes, imagine a world now where the FPVs you guys love to soy over is proliferated.
 

Heliox

Junior Member
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In that scenario its not like they were killed on the spot or suffered from extremely critical injuries like having limbs dismembered or anything like that. They were under extensive care in the medbay yet despite this they were victim to incompetence and under-training for medical emergencies by the base staff, at one point they even had to video call doctors from the mainland for advice as depicted in the documentary
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.

That is just for one scenario where UNPK suffered from injuries from a mortar shell. Imagine a broader scenario where the PLAGF will directly see action. Death from fragmentations was one of the major causes of death in the 80s Vietnam border skirmishes, imagine a world now where the FPVs you guys love to soy over is proliferated.

Do you have more info on this?

Based on a superficial reading, the size of the peacekeeping detachment was a Battalion sized unit?
Based on my own experience within my own country, organic to a Battalion is a Battalion Medical section with 1 doctor and approx. 12 other medical orderlies. The Battalion Casualty Station is NOT equipped to handle major surgery - the BCS role is to stabilise casualties for further evacuation to higher echelon medical stations at the Brigade/Division level which will have full Operating Theatre facilities to handle major trauma.

So then the question is more of what other (higher level) medical facilities were available in theatre to the Chinese Peacekeepers?
- was a higher level medical unit attached to them?
- was there an evacuation plan that included evacuation to civilian facilities?
- was there existing evacuation plans to evacuate critically wounded soldiers back to mainland (the way you see injured US servicemen being evacuated to Germany-Ramstein for instance)

It is hard to argue that video calling for "advice" is indicative of medical "incompetence and under-training" unless we can first set out the facts of the AAR - a battlion MO being underequipped to deal with major trauma is probably by design and so a lack of higher level support is indicative of under-planned support rather than incompetence of personnel on station. Even then "under-planned" may be harsh if there are constrains that limit the level of support that can be deployed.
 

James Zhen

New Member
Registered Member
Do you have more info on this?

Based on a superficial reading, the size of the peacekeeping detachment was a Battalion sized unit?
Based on my own experience within my own country, organic to a Battalion is a Battalion Medical section with 1 doctor and approx. 12 other medical orderlies. The Battalion Casualty Station is NOT equipped to handle major surgery - the BCS role is to stabilise casualties for further evacuation to higher echelon medical stations at the Brigade/Division level which will have full Operating Theatre facilities to handle major trauma.

So then the question is more of what other (higher level) medical facilities were available in theatre to the Chinese Peacekeepers?
- was a higher level medical unit attached to them?
- was there an evacuation plan that included evacuation to civilian facilities?
- was there existing evacuation plans to evacuate critically wounded soldiers back to mainland (the way you see injured US servicemen being evacuated to Germany-Ramstein for instance)

It is hard to argue that video calling for "advice" is indicative of medical "incompetence and under-training" unless we can first set out the facts of the AAR - a battlion MO being underequipped to deal with major trauma is probably by design and so a lack of higher level support is indicative of under-planned support rather than incompetence of personnel on station. Even then "under-planned" may be harsh if there are constrains that limit the level of support that can be deployed.
Ranger regiment has seen like significantly more intense fighting in an actually direct manner with infinitely greater frequency and hasn't had blood loss deaths in like decades or something btw due to proliferation of advanced CUF/TCCC down to lowest levels and it tbh with that situation it wasn't about major surgery capabilities at bn level in terms of criticism but rather ill preparation and training for stabilizing the casualties at the lowest level

Also why are medics for you a battalion asset? PLA, BAF, CAF and USAA are Coy levels.
 

Heliox

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Ranger regiment has seen like significantly more intense fighting in an actually direct manner with infinitely greater frequency and hasn't had blood loss deaths in like decades or something btw due to proliferation of advanced CUF/TCCC down to lowest levels and it tbh with that situation it wasn't about major surgery capabilities at bn level in terms of criticism but rather ill preparation and training for stabilizing the casualties at the lowest level

Yes but what is (to the PLA) likelihood that they will have Ranger regiment type of engagements against largely irregular(?) forces. Also, is this need adequately served by kitting out and training earmarked "Ranger" equivalent units as opposed to homogenously making all PLA units Ranger equivalent (which some posters seem to be using as a benchmark)

Also why are medics for you a battalion asset? PLA, BAF, CAF and USAA are Coy levels.

Medics go down to platoon level, some units - section level.
But the first appearance of Medical Officer level medical staff is at Battalion level.
Below that, the Combat Medics are EMT/first-responder equivalent in capabilities and expectations.

Also, medical equipment at Coy level and below is very limited. Pretty much what the Medic can carry on themselves. It is only at the Battalion level and above that an actual Medical post, truck ported, is available with very limited surgical capabilities.

This is trying to set expectations as to whether a Battalion medical staff (be it MO or Medic) seeking a video consult is indicative of widespread ineptitude - which IMO is not, if these are the facts of the China South Sudan Peacekeeper incident.
 
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James Zhen

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Registered Member
Completely misses the point of the first sentence. best sinodefenseforum user.

Firstly, in no way did I in anywhere imply that just because RR was doesn't automatically mean I said PLA, and um yes, actually, so believe it or not, warfare can be different :eek:, shocker right?? The PLA can get into high intensity fights whether at a peer, near-peer or irregular level... and mass causalities and accounting trauma can and will happen at anytime to anyone anywhere.

Yes, the medics are usually (especially at Coy levels for the PLA) a single man or a 3 man squad assigned to the units needs. They, like you mentioned, carry whatever supplies on them. The idea of these medics within the Section/Squad up to Coys is that you have the trained personnel to stabilize the patient during the fighting before he is casevac to a higher field of treatment.

I am sure you understand this very well given the very intriguing questions you've posted already, but with the onset of drones, which is one of the key driving forces many users on this forum use to deter the absolute horrific state the PLA is in with its equipment and training, is that stabilizing and evacuating the injured are two separate things, treatment is also another thing on its own, you probably know this too. Ukraine, once again, one of the other points that people use, has shown time and time again, casevac is sometimes nearly impossible because of drones and other elements in war making the key golden hours wasted. This could easily apply to the PLA, especially in a Taiwan scenario.

The UNPK thing is bit complex, I am not deeply agitated by it as others are. (For those that are lurking, I am referring to the 2016 incident.) The ZSL92 gunner took most of the fragment since; he practically took the hit from the mortar directly as it hit the rear-roof of hull, including the turret.

At a near-death state he was placed back at the PK's medical triage department and was stabilized, but the blood loss and other injuries took a toll on him by the time he was casevac'd and sadly he passed away later. Could they have evac'd him to a higher level? Maybe? different UN camp wouldn't have made a difference, the in-theatre UN's resources are under-prepped and attached PLA medical unit could only do so much. The doctors were worried and had a video conference with their counter-parts in the mainland. Does that show ineptitude? Probably not. The doctors clearly cared deeply and wanted the best solutions with other experts but like, per PLA, these UNPK units go through selections and considered a higher readiness and better trained portion of the force.
 

Blitzo

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People clown PLAGF on infantry equipment but don’t dare to clown NATO troops for their inexperience and lack of investment in FPV/small combat drones. If I have 10,000 dollars to invest, I’d rather put it in the latter than the former.

I think there are less "flavour of the month" deficiencies in NATO military forces that can be observed, rather than FPV/small combat drones.

Tube arty, rocket arty and recce are arguably more significant issues for most (barring a few) of the non-US NATO armies, and a relative strength (or at least, an area of rightful focus) for the PLAGF in recent years. Organic AAD is a similar element as well. And if one goes multi-domain (as one inevitably must), air power and op-fires/missile forces are even more stark in difference.


Battles involving infantry (either small units of infantry, or combined arms/mechanized ops including infantry as support) certainly matter, but the high yield returns to precede that stage is to prevent the enemy from getting to the theater to begin with, degrade their in theater resupply/logistics, target their operational depths C4I and basing, target their tactical depths ammo dumps and unit congregations, harass their movement to the "frontline" (such as it may exist), and out-attrit them at every stage ideally before you get within even non-LOS of the enemy, and then by the time you come into LOS "contact" with the enemy as many stages of the advantages are stacked in your own favour as possible such that the ground warfare element is a formality.

Alternatively, if the enemy has been able to get their ground forces within LOS "contact" of your own, then in the most important conflict scenarios that the PLA are interested in, it probably means either you have already lost the war and you're on your final losing breaths, or it means you've already basically won the war and the enemy is on their final losing breaths.
 
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Tube arty, rocket arty and recce are arguably more significant issues for most (barring a few) of the non-US NATO armies, and a relative strength (or at least, an area of rightful focus) for the PLAGF in recent years. Organic AAD is a similar element as well. And if one goes multi-domain (as one inevitably must), air power and op-fires/missile forces are even more stark in difference
Well non-US NATO ground forces are miniscule, with army personnel not exceeding 200k. Outside of Turkey and possibly France, non-US NATO armies are just too small to engage in independent ground combat operations along any non-trivial front. Doesn't matter how advanced their gear is- they would just get encircled.
 

Wrought

Captain
Registered Member
I'd be surprised if actual front line infantry totalled anything like 500k. More like 1-200k actual footsloggers. Rest is arty, armour, loggies, int/comms, engineers, aviation, MPs, service support, etc.

Most—not all—of PLAGF maneuver strength is in the 13 group armies, each of which has six combined arms brigades (plus support brigades). Quick napkin math gives us 13 * 6 * 5000 = 390k frontline troops, or somewhere in the ballpark thereof. Not counting the combined arms divisions or legacy divisions or assorted odds and ends.

Note that artillery, logistics, communications, engineers, aviations, MPs, and service support are not included in that total. However, armour is.
 

drowingfish

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Registered Member
Most—not all—of PLAGF maneuver strength is in the 13 group armies, each of which has six combined arms brigades (plus support brigades). Quick napkin math gives us 13 * 6 * 5000 = 390k frontline troops, or somewhere in the ballpark thereof. Not counting the combined arms divisions or legacy divisions or assorted odds and ends.

Note that artillery, logistics, communications, engineers, aviations, MPs, and service support are not included in that total. However, armour is.
are Xizang and Xinjiang MR included in this count?
 
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