Correct. This is not to mention Golden Dome is a systems-of-systems that is vulnerable at the individual-node level. For example, the interceptors have to communicate with the data transport layer which then has to communicate with fire control and ground stations. Of course then the solution would be to move those elements into orbit too which would incentize the adversary to do increasingly escalatory things in space.
US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter tphuang
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Correct. This is not to mention Golden Dome is a systems-of-systems that is vulnerable at the individual-node level. For example, the interceptors have to communicate with the data transport layer which then has to communicate with fire control and ground stations. Of course then the solution would be to move those elements into orbit too which would incentize the adversary to do increasingly escalatory things in space.
Not exactly. GBMD is designed for the mid-course coasting phase, so it has to deal with possible space decoys. GD is designed for the boost phase, or just right after that. No decoys to contend with, but a much shorter window of opportunity for your kill vehicle (you literally need to be already very close to have any chance of intercepting).
Both capabilities have merit and can work very well together, but as we said they are not an answer to a peer force in a massive nuclear exchange.
I always wonder if the DoD & IC advisors who actually do the daily reporting to the White House are more the sober, frank at least somewhat reality conveying ones like him or more the delusion & superiority peddling chauvinists, like what most of the senior brass of the services still seem to be or who Putin probably had around him before Feb 2022. Because whether reality can even partially break into their information bubble vs if those positions are all occupied by the ubiquitous lie peddlers in DC would have a huge impact on their decisionmaking.
For example, I frequently hear DoD leadership who ought to know better more than anyone else parrot literal tabloid/twitter-tier disinfo headlines about the PLA or their exported products, often times things even people here have easily & thoroughly debunked, if Trump is getting fed by people like them well he's in for the loudest kinetic bitchslap of human history.
Not surprisingly, Anduril didn't have many successful projects—well, almost none.
The CEO is a tech bro grifter. It's to be expected. Their VR helmet project seems to be at least doing okay, but it's also marred by numerous problems.
Not much different from the other tech bros making cheap drones using parts from alilibaba and promoting it like the next big invention to parasite off the US budget.
Lethe
Captain
I read talk positing Lockheed Martin's MMSC design that is currently being built for Saudi Arabia as a possible path forward for USN in the wake of the ignominious cancellation of Constellation, as one of the few pathways to render plausible SecNav Phelan's commitment to grow the fleet faster.
The MMSC is, of course, a juiced-up Freedom-class LCS. Similar concepts directly competed for the FFG(X) contract, and variations on the theme had been pitched for some years prior to the formalization of that requirement. So if MMSC is the path forward, or at least part of the path forward, then USN would essentially be returning to a path considered and rejected many years ago -- to the obvious delight of Lockheed Martin's shareholders.
CDR Salamander attributing blame re: the fate of the Constellation program:
Yet this unsparing assessment returns us to something I wrote back in June:
Institutional resistance to FFG-62 (I suspect the term "malicious compliance" may be applicable here) is not particularly surprising. More surprising is that FFG-62 ever got off the ground in the first place. This calls for a deeper dive into the persons, interests and institutional circumstances that contrived to make first the shift away from LCS and its corporate interests possible, followed by the serious consideration and eventual selection of a large, expensive and foreign frigate design, and the subsequent shifting of those more-or-less political grounds over time, leading to the present juncture and the uncertain fruits thereof.
I'm also wondering what lessons, if any, the history of older USN projects can impart. We often talk about FFG-51 as the archetypal Cold War frigate, but in fact its genesis under CNO Admiral Zumwalt was fiercely contested. I don't suppose that anyone has a copy of Norman Friedman's U.S. Destroyers to note how extensively it covers that program?
The MMSC is, of course, a juiced-up Freedom-class LCS. Similar concepts directly competed for the FFG(X) contract, and variations on the theme had been pitched for some years prior to the formalization of that requirement. So if MMSC is the path forward, or at least part of the path forward, then USN would essentially be returning to a path considered and rejected many years ago -- to the obvious delight of Lockheed Martin's shareholders.
CDR Salamander attributing blame re: the fate of the Constellation program:
Yet this unsparing assessment returns us to something I wrote back in June:
Institutional resistance to FFG-62 (I suspect the term "malicious compliance" may be applicable here) is not particularly surprising. More surprising is that FFG-62 ever got off the ground in the first place. This calls for a deeper dive into the persons, interests and institutional circumstances that contrived to make first the shift away from LCS and its corporate interests possible, followed by the serious consideration and eventual selection of a large, expensive and foreign frigate design, and the subsequent shifting of those more-or-less political grounds over time, leading to the present juncture and the uncertain fruits thereof.
I'm also wondering what lessons, if any, the history of older USN projects can impart. We often talk about FFG-51 as the archetypal Cold War frigate, but in fact its genesis under CNO Admiral Zumwalt was fiercely contested. I don't suppose that anyone has a copy of Norman Friedman's U.S. Destroyers to note how extensively it covers that program?
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So if the US Navy wasn't in dire straits before, the cancellation of the Constellation class surely is a five alarm fire! I mean, what do they do now? They have to put something into production immediately. The only options they have are the two LCS hulls (Freedom and Independence) along with the Legend Class cutter from the Coast Guard.
I guess the question becomes which one of those hulls can, with the minimal amount of work, be transitioned into a sort of frigate? Lets be honest, none of them are going to be great, but designing a clean sheet hull would take waaaaaayyyy too much time.
I think the best best would be take one of those pre-existing hulls and strip anything that doesn't contribute to anti-surface warfare. Get rid of helicopter hangers, main guns, etc. I mean strip them down to the bone for a specific role and do so with a minimally viable product. Try to build 20 or so hulls at a rapid pace, then move to a slightly more complex design still based on the same hull form. Eventually, if the hull supports it, it can have sort of a more multi-mission design, but I think the focus should be ASuW then other capabilities added in further flights after maybe 20 or so hulls are made. The goal should be to produce at least 50 of these "frigates" in short order.
At the same time, they should be designing a next generation frigate that would enter service around something like 2037 or so. Something that is much more muti-role while also having good superior sensors, power generation, etc.
I guess the question becomes which one of those hulls can, with the minimal amount of work, be transitioned into a sort of frigate? Lets be honest, none of them are going to be great, but designing a clean sheet hull would take waaaaaayyyy too much time.
I think the best best would be take one of those pre-existing hulls and strip anything that doesn't contribute to anti-surface warfare. Get rid of helicopter hangers, main guns, etc. I mean strip them down to the bone for a specific role and do so with a minimally viable product. Try to build 20 or so hulls at a rapid pace, then move to a slightly more complex design still based on the same hull form. Eventually, if the hull supports it, it can have sort of a more multi-mission design, but I think the focus should be ASuW then other capabilities added in further flights after maybe 20 or so hulls are made. The goal should be to produce at least 50 of these "frigates" in short order.
At the same time, they should be designing a next generation frigate that would enter service around something like 2037 or so. Something that is much more muti-role while also having good superior sensors, power generation, etc.
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I like how DPP bought hundreds of them already.
Take the Arleigh Burke hull, strip majority of the sensors and weapon systems from it and call it a frigate.