China Flanker Thread III (land based, exclude J-15)

Heliox

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Most aircraft never even get to "true" combat. Peacetime interactions(including their outflows into real combat) aren't unimportant.

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Here is wast majority of modern air to air combat. Pay attention to vector, range and altitude.

Is the above indicative of an engagement with HOBS and LOAL missile against a peer adversary fighter jet?
My understanding is that the above is from a F-16 engagement of a drone/cruise missile with a AIM-9M?

If the above missile is not capable of HOBS LOAL engagement, then how is this indicative of what a merge with modern WVR missiles will be like?

If the target is not even a peer adversary fighter jet, then how is it indicative of what modern air-to-air combat is?

Unless you wish to say that modern A2A engagements are primarily against drones/cruise missiles ... in which case, even more so maneuverability to get on a boey's six is even less a factor than before?
 

Gloire_bb

Major
Registered Member
Is the above indicative of an engagement with HOBS and LOAL missile against a peer adversary fighter jet?
My understanding is that the above is from a F-16 engagement of a drone/cruise missile with a AIM-9M?
It's indicative of actual practice. And especially vector, because it shows that normal offbore targeting struggled to lock the (right) target, and drone is engaged instead using AMRAAM's own seeker in reserve mode (which is directly ahead).

Like, what's the point of waiting for True Daylight battlefleet engagement like Italian navy in ww2, when actual practice was midnight teeth and nails, point blank?
If the target is not even a peer adversary fighter jet, then how is it indicative of what modern air-to-air combat is?
Through practice. One of basic traits of peer long range combat appears that it's indecisive, and decisive action role increasingly gets transferred to those who can.
Threat posed by current AAMs is such that only very unpeer engagements with long range engagements are decisive.
Otherwise, sides exchange blows, maybe lose a few aircraft if they overestimate themselves, and that's it.
Unless you wish to say that modern A2A engagements are primarily against drones/cruise missiles ... in which case, even more so maneuverability to get on a boey's six is even less a factor than before?
You need to take firing position from a vector conductive to successful engagement, against slow target flying very low, often hiding in local terrain, trees, buildings and so on.
One may say, that Ukrainians and Americans aren't using best sensors and seekers possible. Counterargument is that shahed isn't even close to the level of mass produced stealth drone modern dark factory can manage.
Imagine hunting waves of cooled electric jet flying wings with return of around -70dB.
Offbore targeting in this situation will mostly kill local infrastructure rather than targets. Which, by the way, already happened with Dutch F-35 against a foam drone over Poland.
 

siegecrossbow

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Not necessarily totally cope.

My view is that peacetime intercepts are a really bad read on capabilities. If DACTs are to be taken with a pinch of salt due to lopsided scenarios and asymmetric ROEs, then peacetime intercepts need to taken with a whole bag of salt.

A sub tails a ship for days. A pilot gets to within stone throw distance of a OPFOR plane. A soldier stands nose to nose with the "enemy" across a LOC ... all these scenarios can only possibly occur during peacetime and only because one or more parties are simply told to ease off and not respond/retaliate.

I've been involved in opposed Exercises as light infantry. Just like DACT, even these come with some form of scripting to enable the exercise to achieve set objectives. Soldiers being soldiers, men being men, no one likes to roll over and play dead. So everybody plays fast and loose and pushes the ROE and exercise parameters as far as we can. Sure as night follows days, this builds frustration and ultimately results in actual coming to blows when Blue force comes within clubbing distance of Red forces. Now imagine this where parties are not even on the same side and are armed with live shots. Scary.

Infantry exercise may not be quite the same as air intercepts but you can imagine the potential for an international incident if one side does not back off and both sides does not want to "lose" face/bragging rights.
(though I wouldn't mind a F-35/22 being forced to land on Hainan and being sent back to the US in cut segments, preferably with no loss of life like the P-8 incident)

Ultimately, the ability of of a J-11 to outmaneuver a 5th gen F series means zero given the nature of modern Air-to-Air combat. BVR abilities means you are unlikely to merge. Even if you do merge, HOB LOAL abilities means that WVR combat is also less about getting on someone's six.

I wouldn't read too much into this other than for some internet bragging rights.
We all know that, and PLAAF wouldn’t have centered the doctrine around PL-15/16/17 if it didn’t value it.

I just find it extra funny since a lot of the YouTube pilots love bragging how they’ll be able to shoot down J-36 in dogfight and/or Chinese pilots are no good because they fly conservatively in airshows.
 

Blitzo

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Through practice. One of basic traits of peer long range combat appears that it's indecisive, and decisive action role increasingly gets transferred to those who can.
Threat posed by current AAMs is such that only very unpeer engagements with long range engagements are decisive.
Otherwise, sides exchange blows, maybe lose a few aircraft if they overestimate themselves, and that's it.

I wouldn't say peer long range combat is indecisive.

We have yet to see what a true peer large scale air war looks like where both sides have the will and the fleet size to suffer casualties in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Arguably the greatest example of what a modern peer air war would look like is the PAF-IAF clash earlier this year, and despite the engagement only lasting for less than a night, it was fairly tactically decisive. The major reason it wasn't operationally or strategically decisive is because neither side had the fleet size and the will/rationale to continue putting their aircraft in harm's way of the other side's aircraft, arguably because the initial round of losses was too devastating.

But for a true high intensity conflict where each side wants to gain air superiority and have the resolve and fleet size to push into theater, I expect true large scale peer air war will be devastating and decisive, and the outcome will be determined by the ability to generate high quality sorties capable of out BVR-ing the other side (as the most desirable set of traits inclusive of weapons, sensors, networking, stealth, sufficient kinematics to leverage BVR) en masse, which will prove the highest yield force.
Shorter range, WVR engagements and encounters will only occur in rare occasions if the most devastating rounds of BVR exchanges already occur and there are still enough surviving aircraft on both sides that both make the decision to risk pushing forwards rather than retreat.


All of which is to say, Heliox is right to say that the these sort of WVR peacetime intercepts and tactical cat and mouse games are not that useful in factoring in the most important ways in which a true large scale peer air war would look... however Siege is also correct in that for the purposes of trying to "dunk" on one side or another, that "WVR/dogfight/cat-mouse game" outcomes is instructive to the common denominator and your pedestrian drive-by person who knows nothing about the PLA.

My question is more why those people's "copes" had to be "dunked" on to begin with.

You need to take firing position from a vector conductive to successful engagement, against slow target flying very low, often hiding in local terrain, trees, buildings and so on.
One may say, that Ukrainians and Americans aren't using best sensors and seekers possible. Counterargument is that shahed isn't even close to the level of mass produced stealth drone modern dark factory can manage.
Imagine hunting waves of cooled electric jet flying wings with return of around -70dB.
Offbore targeting in this situation will mostly kill local infrastructure rather than targets. Which, by the way, already happened with Dutch F-35 against a foam drone over Poland.

You are not describing a modern peer air war, you are describing defensive anti-cruise missile CAP.

Instead, think about an air war where each side has hundreds of 5th gen and 4.5th gen fighters contesting a theater of airspace supported by plentiful AEW&C, EW, and in the near future, CCAs and UADFs, where high end BVR and highly networked air to air engagements is not exceptional but rather the baseline ticket for entry to begin with.


We all know that, and PLAAF wouldn’t have centered the doctrine around PL-15/16/17 if it didn’t value it.

I just find it extra funny since a lot of the YouTube pilots love bragging how they’ll be able to shoot down J-36 in dogfight and/or Chinese pilots are no good because they fly conservatively in airshows.

I agree with that, but I also feel like even bringing up the matter of said "cope" to "dunk" on them is detrimental to these flagship threads.

I've written many times about why posting those youtube videos and articles or NAFO equivalents is a waste of time for us, because it just ends up mocking their cope and saying why they are stupid for having poor opinions.
Do we really need to reference them when talking about this news, when we all know that PLA pilots have quite good flight hours and are perfectly competent at BFM? IMO actively using effort to avoid/ignore their opinions is more beneficial to us.
 
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Gloire_bb

Major
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Arguably the greatest example of what a modern peer air war would look like is the PAF-IAF clash earlier this year, and despite the engagement only lasting for less than a night, it was fairly tactically decisive. The major reason it wasn't operationally or strategically decisive is because neither side had the fleet size and the will/rationale to continue putting their aircraft in harm's way of the other side's aircraft, arguably because the initial round of losses was too devastating.
It was indecisive as heck.
One side tried to be tactical and decisive, flew flying colours into WEZ. Got bloodied, and went into safe mode for the rest of the conflict, throwing absolutely safe weapons from deep interior. First day, as much a spectacle it was, accounted for ~1% of Indian air TAF even per most optimistic claims.

After that engagenemt, no one was shot down for the rest of the war...

But for a true high intensity conflict where each side wants to gain air superiority and have the resolve and fleet size to push into theater, I expect true large scale peer air war will be devastating and decisive, and the outcome will be determined by the ability to generate high quality sorties capable of out BVR-ing the other side (as the most desirable set of traits inclusive of weapons, sensors, networking, stealth, sufficient kinematics to leverage BVR) en masse, which will prove the highest yield force.
I may be relying too much on WW2 maritime history as example, but rule of thumb is that for all the decisive preparations, rarely sides truly risked attritable assets (and when they did, more often than not it didn't really end well).
Occasional blood noses for expensive units, and most of war fighting done by attritable/disposable assets.

Because, even for 2 largest modern forces, which both stand at sub 2000 fleet(and production at below 200 mark, i.e. 2 aircraft per 3 days; lower rate for fighter pilots), throwing aircraftat a peer enemy isn't exactly acceptable.
To compare, for WW2, loss rates of couple of thousand aircraft per month and comparable number of crews was like...norm (and even that broke down Luftwaffe and japanese services).
Russia lost several dozen aircraft during spring 22(iirc something around 1 aircraft/day, which is a highly optimistic assumption v US/China), i.e. 1 year of its a/c production in theory(~60 for modern Russia). In practice, much more, because losses weren't spread evenly, and even after campaign switched into indecisive archery phase, additional losses continued.

You are not describing a modern peer air war, you are describing defensive anti-cruise missile CAP.

Instead, think about an air war where each side has hundreds of 5th gen and 4.5th gen fighters contesting a theater of airspace supported by plentiful AEW&C, EW, and in the near future, CCAs and UADFs, where high end BVR and highly networked air to air engagements is not exceptional but rather the baseline ticket for entry to begin with.
I am merely describing majority of actual engagements of last ~2 years. Which are emerging more and more urgent, as these "cruise missiles" collect spectral intel, engage targets of opportunity through AI, mesh/satellite datalinks, drop drones and supplies for sabotage teams...
It's super dangerous to split "lowly" and "knightly" air defense, because at current point "low altitude air economy" simply creates another layer of air superiority, detached from the upper one. Which really questions value of singular focus on upper layer of air dominance - what good is it on its own?

Assuming both sides use effective means of forming airspace picture and weapons - that's exactly where indecisiveness comes from. Especially since defender, usually, has basic WEZ advantage.
Decisive action can come either when (1)side are determined that intensive, risky campaign will be more beneficial to them than to the enemy, and(1.1) it actually turns out this way, and (1.2)enemy can't disengage(which land air force in a big war almost always can). Or (2)when weapons used by one of sides are actually ineffective.
Basic assumption for peer conflict is that they're effective, or effective enough.

I.e.,
plentiful AEW&C, EW, and in the near future, CCAs and UADFs, where high end BVR and highly networked air to air engagements
I think when both sides keep to this level, it leads to a stalemate, not the other way around.
The way to achieve initiative is when there's a viable path to make opponent blind, or his weapons - ineffective. If sides are peers...risktaker just loses.
 

Heliox

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You need to take firing position from a vector conductive to successful engagement, against slow target flying very low, often hiding in local terrain, trees, buildings and so on.
One may say, that Ukrainians and Americans aren't using best sensors and seekers possible. Counterargument is that shahed isn't even close to the level of mass produced stealth drone modern dark factory can manage.
Imagine hunting waves of cooled electric jet flying wings with return of around -70dB.
Offbore targeting in this situation will mostly kill local infrastructure rather than targets. Which, by the way, already happened with Dutch F-35 against a foam drone over Poland.

I appreciate that Blitzo has said most of what needs to be said as a counterpoint to what you raised. Not going to confuse the argument by wading in.

We may be in a Vietnam situation here, where theory crafting (again) is that engagements, despite the proliferation of VLO platforms both manned and unmanned, will be successfully concluded at BVR ranges until it isn't and then the mad scramble for WVR weapons and skills ensues. We haven't really seen anything in recent years that will suggest one or the other is more likely.

One other thing, what is this F-35 taking out infrastructure you speak of? I'm only aware of an AMRAAM crashing into a farmhouse in Poland (launched by an F-16) that in no way demonstrates a HOB targeting failure.
 

Blitzo

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It was indecisive as heck.
One side tried to be tactical and decisive, flew flying colours into WEZ. Got bloodied, and went into safe mode for the rest of the conflict, throwing absolutely safe weapons from deep interior. First day, as much a spectacle it was, accounted for ~1% of Indian air TAF even per most optimistic claims.

After that engagenemt, no one was shot down for the rest of the war...

That's why I said the first night was decisive, but it was only indecisive because neither side had the resolve or fleet size to commit their aircraft.
Putting it another way, the fact that neither side went to continue their sorties is an example of how lethal and decisive a modern BVR air war can be.


I may be relying too much on WW2 maritime history as example, but rule of thumb is that for all the decisive preparations, rarely sides truly risked attritable assets (and when they did, more often than not it didn't really end well).
Occasional blood noses for expensive units, and most of war fighting done by attritable/disposable assets.

Because, even for 2 largest modern forces, which both stand at sub 2000 fleet(and production at below 200 mark, i.e. 2 aircraft per 3 days; lower rate for fighter pilots), throwing aircraftat a peer enemy isn't exactly acceptable.
To compare, for WW2, loss rates of couple of thousand aircraft per month and comparable number of crews was like...norm (and even that broke down Luftwaffe and japanese services).
Russia lost several dozen aircraft during spring 22(iirc something around 1 aircraft/day, which is a highly optimistic assumption v US/China), i.e. 1 year of its a/c production in theory(~60 for modern Russia). In practice, much more, because losses weren't spread evenly, and even after campaign switched into indecisive archery phase, additional losses continued.

What you are describing is all writing in support of the lethality and decisiveness of a modern air war, not detracting from it.

The reason why nations might be more reluctant to participate in a large scale modern BVR air war isn't because that style of war itself is indecisive, but rather it is because it is too decisive, therefore nations and air forces prefer to conserve as much of their forces as practically possible and lose them gradually with more conservative ROEs than to use them in a large scale standing match.


The problem for a high end BVR air war for us -- which, let's be honest is just the PLA and US in a westpac conflict -- is that there are many viable circumstances where multiple hundreds of sorties can be fielded by one or both sides in pursuit of geopolitical objectives.




I am merely describing majority of actual engagements of last ~2 years. Which are emerging more and more urgent, as these "cruise missiles" collect spectral intel, engage targets of opportunity through AI, mesh/satellite datalinks, drop drones and supplies for sabotage teams...
It's super dangerous to split "lowly" and "knightly" air defense, because at current point "low altitude air economy" simply creates another layer of air superiority, detached from the upper one. Which really questions value of singular focus on upper layer of air dominance - what good is it on its own?

Assuming both sides use effective means of forming airspace picture and weapons - that's exactly where indecisiveness comes from. Especially since defender, usually, has basic WEZ advantage.
Decisive action can come either when (1)side are determined that intensive, risky campaign will be more beneficial to them than to the enemy, and(1.1) it actually turns out this way, and (1.2)enemy can't disengage(which land air force in a big war almost always can). Or (2)when weapons used by one of sides are actually ineffective.
Basic assumption for peer conflict is that they're effective, or effective enough.

I.e.,

The Russian and Ukrainian conflict is a very good example of how neither side has the ability to fight a true proper modern air war commensurate with the quality of sensors, weapons and geography that exists.
So, the engagements you are describing are not relevant to a high end BVR air war between peers.

If anything it is better to start with a clean slate rather than have the sample be polluted by irrelevant data points.


As for "decisiveness" -- you are talking about the human/command decision to commit to an engagement or to preserve their forces, in leading to "indecisiveness".
I am saying that once committed, a modern BVR peer air war itself is likely to be very very decisive.

That is why the India Pakistan conflict is arguably the best example of how a modern BVR peer air war would look like -- brutal, short, and devastating. If each side had continued throwing up sorties at the other, it would not have taken long (a few days?) for one side to prevail over the other through sheer loss of airframes.


I think when both sides keep to this level, it leads to a stalemate, not the other way around.
The way to achieve initiative is when there's a viable path to make opponent blind, or his weapons - ineffective. If sides are peers...risktaker just loses.

When both sides commit to what I described, it leads to one side rapidly losing their forces (because one side will inevitably have the totality in advantage of sensors, networking, weapons, fleet size) and non-graceful degradation of their sortie generating capabilities while the other side's sortie generating capability (i.e.: air frame losses) are kept at a minimum.
 
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