J-35A fighter (PLAAF) + FC-31 thread

[gelgoog]

China can just degrade the J-35 in its export version if necessary.

 

[Phead128]

In my opinion, as long as Pakistan is still semi US ally, selling J-35 and other advance tech to them would be very irresponsible.
Plus the unintended consequences of pushing India into upgrading/joining the F-35 camp.

Even selling J-35 to Egypt is risky since it might up in Western hands. Iran as well; they have too much Israeli infiltration within.

Unless Pakistan establishes very close military relationship with China--ie naval port or bases in Pakistan--or India acquires 5th gen (not likely for a very long time), PLA should hold off from exporting to them.

The FC-31 is designed specifically for export, so there's no major concern about leaking sensitive information. It's an export variant, and any related intelligence risks can be managed through post-sale measures.

 

[Aval]

The FC-31 is designed specifically for export, so there's no major concern about leaking sensitive information. It's an export variant, and any related intelligence risks can be managed through post-sale measures.

The question is thus: How similar (or different) are the non-downgradable characteristics of the J-35AE vs the J-35A and J-35?

This isn't the JF-17, where the entire design just isn't in service with the PLA at all, and as such is not a security risk if leaked.

Even if you downgrade the radar, avionics etc. of the J-35AE, you can't change its frontal stealth shaping or perhaps even the engines much from the J-35A, which would pose a security risk if details are leaked to the West. The J-35A is looking to become the Lo and hence numerical backbone of the PLAAF, and its close sibling will be the premier fighter of the PLANAF. How different can the J-35AE really be, and thus not risk important military secrets for these two jets expected to be fielded in great numbers for the PLA?

 

[CMP]

The question is thus: How similar (or different) are the non-downgradable characteristics of the J-35AE vs the J-35A and J-35?

This isn't the JF-17, where the entire design just isn't in service with the PLA at all, and as such is not a security risk if leaked.

Even if you downgrade the radar, avionics etc. of the J-35AE, you can't change its frontal stealth shaping or perhaps even the engines much from the J-35A, which would pose a security risk if details are leaked to the West. The J-35A is looking to become the Lo and hence numerical backbone of the PLAAF, and its close sibling will be the premier fighter of the PLANAF. How different can the J-35AE really be, and thus not risk important military secrets for these two jets expected to be fielded in great numbers for the PLA?

RAM coatings could be another variable to change for export variants, no?

 

[Aval]

RAM coatings could be another variable to change for export variants, no?

I considered that, but RAM coatings don't make up the majority of stealth effect IIRC. But it really depends on the magnitude.

I suppose if the difference is significant (lets peg it to an arbitrary number like 25%, so the RAM coating on the J-35 family makes up 25% of the total RCS reduction) and the RAM coating on the export model is half the effectiveness (=12.5% of total RCS reduction)) then that might be sufficient to differentiate the J-35AE from the J-35/A, but if its less than that (e.g., RAM is 10% of the total, so at half effectiveness its just 5% difference) then it might be too close for comfort.

Does anyone have an estimate/sources that suggest how much of RCS reduction is attributed purely to RAM coating? (I'm not expecting any, since it should be highly classified information).

 

[CMP]

I also want to add that the US managed this risk despite exporting F-35 to numerous other countries, so there should be ways for China to do the same.

 

[AndrewS]

The question is thus: How similar (or different) are the non-downgradable characteristics of the J-35AE vs the J-35A and J-35?

This isn't the JF-17, where the entire design just isn't in service with the PLA at all, and as such is not a security risk if leaked.

Even if you downgrade the radar, avionics etc. of the J-35AE, you can't change its frontal stealth shaping or perhaps even the engines much from the J-35A, which would pose a security risk if details are leaked to the West. The J-35A is looking to become the Lo and hence numerical backbone of the PLAAF, and its close sibling will be the premier fighter of the PLANAF. How different can the J-35AE really be, and thus not risk important military secrets for these two jets expected to be fielded in great numbers for the PLA?

Whilst the J-35A is the "lo", I don't see the J-35A becoming the numerical backbone of the PLAAF.

Local defence isn't a big problem anymore, so the next step is distant power projection into the First Island Chain and the Western Pacific.

For this, the larger and longer-ranged J-20 is a better option.

 

[Aval]

I also want to add that the US managed this risk despite exporting F-35 to numerous other countries, so there should be ways for China to do the same.

The US has much more draconian control over its "allies". A key inherent weakness of China's geopolitical strategy pertaining to military exports is that it doesn't have much oversight of the weapons it sells to other nations, nor much way to inflict punishment should contracts be broken or simply failed to be defended from powerful American intel services.

I'm not here to comment on if China should adopt a US-style geopolitical approach (that is outside the scope of this thread), but the reality is that the US cannot be used as an example for sensitive military exports. The Soviet Union/Russia is a much better example, and the whole world knows the ins-and-outs of Flankers now. If the Su-57/E is genuinely exported then its true RCS will be known within the year.

 

[Aval]

Whilst the J-35A is the "lo", I don't see the J-35A becoming the numerical backbone of the PLAAF.

Local defence isn't a big problem anymore, so the next step is distant power projection into the First Island Chain and the Western Pacific.

For this, the larger and longer-ranged J-20 is a better option.

Power projection far from China's homeland will actually be conducted primarily by the naval J-35, which is naturally at risk if the characteristics of the J-35AE are leaked and the differences between the models isn't made sufficiently significant.

The J-20 is kept close to the chest because its for China's greatest struggle, that being reunification. Beyond that, I can't see much use for the J-20 just like the F-22 has greatly reduced relevance in the same hypothetical conflict due to its short legs and inability to be launched from aircraft carriers. For the J-20 to actually be used for any conflict other than over Taiwan and SCS (and maybe Japan and the Philippines), it would need to be stationed in military bases on foreign soil, which I doubt China will do from a strategic standpoint (its global power projection strategy is likely to be carrier-heavy and light on bases).

Furthermore, the J-35A is literally being procured by the PLAAF to bulk-up its stealth fighter fleet. Given its late entry onto the scene its numbers might not eclipse or even exceed that of the J-20/A, but we should expect at least a significant chunk of the fleet (>33%) to be J-35As. That's a huge number of airframes at risk of having their key characteristics known (to some close degree of accuracy) by hostile forces.

The only "out" that I can see is if China's unique 6th-gens are expected to be inducted far sooner than thought. The sensitivity around the J-35AE (downgraded from the J-35A and in turn from the J-35) would indeed be greatly reduced if next-gen J-36 and naval J-50s are flying.

 

[CMP]

Power projection far from China's homeland will actually be conducted primarily by the naval J-35, which is naturally at risk if the characteristics of the J-35AE are leaked and the differences between the models isn't made sufficiently significant.

The J-20 is kept close to the chest because its for China's greatest struggle, that being reunification. Beyond that, I can't see much use for the J-20 just like the F-22 has greatly reduced relevance in the same hypothetical conflict due to its short legs and inability to be launched from aircraft carriers. For the J-20 to actually be used for any conflict other than over Taiwan and SCS (and maybe Japan and the Philippines), it would need to be stationed in military bases on foreign soil, which I doubt China will do from a strategic standpoint (its global power projection strategy is likely to be carrier-heavy and light on bases).

Furthermore, the J-35A is literally being procured by the PLAAF to bulk-up its stealth fighter fleet. Given its late entry onto the scene its numbers might not eclipse or even exceed that of the J-20/A, but we should expect at least a significant chunk of the fleet (>33%) to be J-35As. That's a huge number of airframes at risk of having their key characteristics known (to some close degree of accuracy) by hostile forces.

The only "out" that I can see is if China's unique 6th-gens are expected to be inducted far sooner than thought. The sensitivity around the J-35AE (downgraded from the J-35A and in turn from the J-35) would indeed be greatly reduced if next-gen J-36 and naval J-50s are flying.

I think your "out" is likely to end up being the case. India isn't likely to have 5th gen anytime soon, and so there is no rush on getting those to Pakistan. As such, the question of exporting it can probably wait until Chinese 6th gen become the mainstay.