PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

Blitzo

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That's not my argument. Read again 2nd to 5th paragraph but not as separate statements but as single continuous line of reasoning.

It's the problem of troop morale like when you order an infantry charge at enemy positions defended by artillery but have no artillery of your own. The effectiveness of that charge is determined by morale, and morale is determined by the emotional state of the troops. Planners know this and also can relate to this - hence "emotional reasoning".

That is essentially what I described, but fine, to go by how you phrased it here and in paragraphs 2-5 of that reply -- my point is that I disagree that the case for H-20 can be argued to be driven by "emotional reasoning" on the basis of "morale".



First of all the requirement is a "want" category not a "need" category in military terms and becomes "need" once it goes out to decision makers who approve the budget.

Secondly we're talking about a delay of approximately five years which will affect the extremely volatile period between 2025 and 2029 i.e. the next US presidential term. That factor adds weight to the rumour.

Our perceptions of what is a "want" and a "need" probably depends on how we view the strategic priorities of China/PLA.

And yes, I am aware that we are talking about a prospect of a delay of five years -- and yes that will affect the volatile period between 2025-2029.
There are a number of platforms during the 2025-2029 period where procuring them into commissioning in that period is unwise -- one of those are additional CVs/CVNs.

However I view H-20 as being a platform where entry into service in the 2025-2029 period as not only valuable, but also very important into the immediate post 2030 period. After all, a five year difference in time scale means a big difference of in service aircraft in the early 2030s, for a very important platform.


While your focus is naturally China, mine was Russia and I've been watching the developments in the theater and the ongoing war very closely since before 2014. All I can say is that the war blew everyone's expectations out of the water and often in ways that very few people expected. Most of it is very mundane and won't draw attention from military (equipment) enthusiasts but nevertheless it consumes resources in the same way that a flashy program like H-20 or J-20 do. It's true for NATO as well as for Russia and I refuse to acknowledge that China miraculously made all the right calls. Some decisions that we've been able to see were correct, but some were not (in retrospect) and now everyone has to adjust on short notice. This urgent necessity would very likely be responsible for delay to H-20 if it occurs.

Right now PLA is preparing to fight without the H-20 and that is likely the current plan for the rest of the decade as fielding a completely new platform requires testing and development of tactics which takes time. USAF has the advantage of having experience with both proper long-range bombers like B-52 and B-1 and VLO bombers like B-2. PLAAF/PLANAF have experience with H-6 which has half the range of B-52 and limited aerial refueling opportunities. Aerial refueling is crucial because of larger payload, lower altitude and a flight path that is more complex to avoid detection. This means that the likelihood that PLA would have H-20 available in any meaningful number (16+ in active service) before 2029 is extremely low. Because of that and the Ukraine war strategic priorities could have been shifted and I would consider that delay a prudent decision if it came to that.

On the other hand, my view is that even a relatively low number of H-20s before 2029 (such as 10-16) could play an outsize role in a westpac high intensity conflict if it occurred due to the unique mission profile they would offer. More improtantly, in the immediate post 2029/2030 period, if peace occurs, then having it ready by then means they are able to upscale the production pace of H-20 to get more into service in the early 2030s.



C-5 or An-124 are not a global capability but an oversize capability. There are certain payloads that can't be airlifted by Y-20 at all - often due to volume rather than mass - and others that can't be airlifted without excessive range loss and those payloads may or may not be relevant to whatever CMC is assuming as likely to occur in some future timeframe.

Everyone is focusing on WestPac but since Russia's terrible blunder in Ukraine a different strategic scenario has become a possibility - a proxy land war between US and China in/around Russia and/or in the Middle East.

This scenario has an added benefit of entangling the EU and potentially shifting the dynamic away from WestPac to Eurasia in part or in entirety. That's obviously Washington's highest preference because WestPac conflict is a death sentence to US in economic terms while Eurasian conflict is economically manageable because it drags everyone down with the US. Hegemonic conflicts are about survival of spheres of influence, not survival of the state. Spheres of influence are all about relative strength of countries, not absolute. If everyone is weaker, change may not occur or may not occur to the same extent.

One hint that this may be a possibility is the scale of military expansion that Poland is currently engaged in. While it is still a hypothetical until the election later this year it may be an indication that another land war is envisioned in the timeframe of about one-two decades. Considering rational forecasting and Russia's current economic condition the kind of army that Poland is planning is excessive. And certainly China using Russia as a convenient proxy is a possibility due to the fundamental change in the relationship between the two.

In such scenarios being able to quickly shift large payloads at significant distance is very useful and China lacks that capability. At the same time H-20 stops being very relevant for many reasons that I won't get into here. In proxy wars direct kinetic power projection is not a priority like in direct conflicts such as WestPac.

Another thing that suggests alternative scenarios is AUKUS. The planned SSN base in Australia is at the coast Indian Ocean. Even for SSNs that plays a role. Paired with the timeline that indicates something different that most people focus on today - at least for me.

WestPac is largely decided in terms that matter to Washington so I would be surprised if there weren't efforts to invent a more convenient alternative.

I agree that large transports like C-5/An-124 are for outsize payloads, but at the same time their use is in longer distance transport missions usually (I used the term global, but to be more accurate at minimum they are usually transcontinental distances).
If you view China as needing to intervene and deploy in Russian territory or central asia or the middle east for a proxy war, then yes a large strategic transport would be very useful. But I also think China would be very hesitant to get involved in such a manner, and the sheer number of large strategic transports needed to be useful (and the requisite expeditionary basing, airspace passage rights, and expeditionary force structure generation) is such a massive task that it amounts to adding an entirely new strategic mission to the PLA as a whole.

And if Russia was at risk of experiencing instability such that it becomes the theater of a proxy war, then China has much bigger issues to worry about that cannot merely be dealt with by a fleet of C-5 equivalents.


Nobody is claiming otherwise. I only provided an explanation for why the delay would occur if at the same time J-20 and Y/YY-20 were given greater priority - as Deino's follower suggested. Because a delay to H-20 without boosting J-20 and Y/YY-20 is better explained by technical challenges. However when viewed in tandem with that specific choice it opens up a possibility for rational planning. I gave my understanding of what could be the cause in such scenario.

Also this is another argument in support of calculated delay:



The only situation where that doesn't apply is a pre-emptive strike which is a strategic consideration. If CMC decides that it allows US to take that position as more convenient strategically then no first strike is necessary and VLO loses its most crucial advantage while numbers matter always.

No offense, but there may be all manner of valid explanations for why H-20 could be delayed if it is.

There is no particular reason to give extra credence to the message Deino received unless there is a reason to believe they have a viable track record.

We can literally brainstorm any number of equally legitimate sounding theories ourselves.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

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Firstly, some disclaimer:
fourislandchainpacific.jpg
1IC = 1st Island Chain
2IC = 2nd Island Chain
3IC = 3rd Island Chain

Other than the three island chains mentioned above (which all of us should be familiar with by now), there is one more island chain of which I believe that while not being mentioned a lot in publications - Is still pretty crucial for the Island Chain Strategy and the overall war effort of both sides in the Pacific.

This island chain should be called the Second-and-half Island Chain, or the 2.5IC (in short). The 2.5IC includes the islands and atolls that are located to the near-east of the 2IC, with (from north to south) the Komandorski Islands, Midway Atoll, Wake Atoll and the Solomon Islands as the key points of this island chain.

~~~

With that clarified, let's continue.

TBH, in case the Operation AR leads to an all-out total war between China and the US & Lackeys Co. (US&LC from now on, since I'm lazy to type long) - Any and all kinds of platforms, equipment and systems that can lead to achieving the ultimate victory for China will be procured - Both the expensive ones and the cheap ones.

You don't see the US and Imperial Japan stopped building warfighting assets that are deemed "expensive" or "limited usage" during the Pacific War, just because they were in the midst of fighting a world war spanning across the largest ocean on the planet - They did both simultaneously. The more accurate description is that they choose to print out more and more warfighting assets that are useful towards the war effort.

However, during the beginning stage of the all-out war, I do envision that China will be engaged in mainly-defensive posture against the US&LC.

This is mainly because the PLA certainly isn't going to - And also incapable to - Land on the beaches and capture islands as far as Guam, Palau or Iwo Jima at that stage of the war, for instance. The most that PLA can realistically capture in this stage would be Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Batanes and Jeju.

The PLA's goal by then would be to hold and protect these islands against offensive actions by the US&LC, which would act as the umbrella in protecting China's industrial and R&D concentrations that are mainly located within 1500 kilometers of the Chinese coastline.

IMHO, this stage must be accomplished in order to buy enough time for China to conduct:
1. The throughout war mobilization of the entire Chinese population;
2. The complete rearrangement and redistribution of the nationwide human, financial and materiel resources towards supporting the war effort; and
3. The rapid rearmament and expansion of the PLA and other armed forces of China in order to fight the war and bring ultimate victory.

In the meantime, however - I believe that capturing and holding the 2IC and 2.5IC should be one of the ultimate objectives for the entire war. In fact, the 2IC and the 2.5IC should become the ultimate frontlines for China's own expanded strategic depth spanning across the WestPac and CentPac in order to safeguard the safety and security of China's population, economic, industrial and R&D centers for the long-term future, which are largely located east of the Heihe-Tengchong line.
 
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MarKoz81

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I entirely expect H-20 to be built close to B-21 numbers over its life time.

Which is irrelevant to my reasoning as I'm still continuing the original line of argument that seeks to rationalize a 5-year delay to introduction of H-20 in favour of greater production of J-20, Y-20, YY-20 and starting development of C-5 clone as suggested by one of Deino's followers. I'm considering this particular case only and attempting to ground it in data to see if it's plausible.

It seems like you are arguing for the need to procure large number of H-6s.

I'm not. The number of H-6 is sufficient. ~200 airframes carrying 4 to 6 missiles is 800-1200 missiles total. This is an equivalent of 67-100 Tu-160s.

This can greatly benefit from systemic multipliers of range extension and better ground target recon. Those will expand the capabilities of all H-6 while fast introduction of H-20 will create a two-tier fleet with small number of high-end platforms and large number of low-ends. Even later integration of H-20 as a C4 node for the H-6 formation will be more productive with range and recon multipliers being already in service.

I also do expect H-20 to play a great role in C4 since it will be expected to do bombing runs into Darwin, Diego Garcia & Alaska. It will also be expect to fly over Japan (after hypersonic missiles overcome initial air defense) and keep Japanese defenses off line.

It will absolutely not. Using a VLO bomber to maintain SEAD is the exact opposite of correct employment of such asset.

There is a significant difference between how air operations are conducted and how the public thinks they're conducted due to the influence of propaganda and industry PR. The employment of F-117 in Iraq and Serbia is also commonly misunderstood. Public perception of how and why they were used is very different from reality.

In comparison, if the US gives up Japan, Korea, Taiwan to a Chinese sphere of influence - that is roughly equivalent to half or two-thirds of an entire USA, and the vast majority of the world's semiconductor production.

"Trade" didn't imply "peacefully" and that assumes possible destruction of industrial potential for which alternatives are already being prepared. Korea is not building weapons factories in Poland because of export opportunities. It's a backup.

The US would also primarily extend projection through existing routes like Alaska to Chukotka, Japan to Sakhalin etc. so not all of WestPac would be lost just like not all of Siberia would be gained. Instead both would become destabilized zones.

3. On "dismantling the Russia Federation as China's strategic long-term interest", I would point to the Canadian example.

Canada and US are former British colonies turned decentralized democratic states with common law and English as main language. Canada is not a nuclear power with a centralized authoritarian state. It has also functioned since WW2 as de facto US protectorate.

For Russians that would be return to Mongol yoke and the entire Russian (Muscovite) identity is built around overthrowing it and conquering their former oppressors. The myth of Great Patriotic War is a re-enactment of that foundational myth but you won't know this unless you know Soviet art which I do because I grew up in communist Poland. Russia is not the Soviet Union but it wants people to think that it is and that confuses you about what type of identity you're dealing with.

Russia never stops invoking Mongol yoke because it explains the historical purpose of the Russian state. It is the continuation of the Byzantine empire, a Christian/Orthodox state that defends the faithful against heathen invaders and is led by a leader/head of church/saint in the Byzantine tradition. If you want to know how that is reconciled with current relations with China look to German-Soviet cooperation between the wars.


Therefore, unless China is willing to reactivate the Third Front project once again (or, invade and occupy Siberia + Russian Far East + Central Asia in case of Russia's collapse), the only way left for Beijing to deal with such existential threat is to help Moscow directly in a WW3 against NATO.

To paraphrase the classic adage: The amateur reads the social media, the professional reads the encyclopedia.

Third Front made sense at the time because in 1960 USSR had population of 200 million and China had 650 million. USSR had 1600 nuclear warheads and just launched Sputnik while China didn't even perform its first nuclear test which came in 1964. Et caetera.

And let's not forget about why Third Front became necessary. Sino-Soviet split was caused by Mao and his faction who feared what a shift in ideological thinking could mean for their position inside the CPC especially after the Great Leap Forward. USSR wouldn't invade China any more than NATO would invade Russia but Mao needed the threat to distract away from himself - including in history books.

The same type of thinking informs the notion that China should help Russia in some imaginary war against NATO.

Here's the most important map of Russia - the location of Strategic Missile Troops units.
Strategic Rocket Forces.jpg

Everything east of Urals needs to be secured and there will be no war. Except that NATO will have to deal with a quagmire of 100m people in European Russia while China will be viewed as a protector.

I agree that the argument for China's security is fundamental. However due to shift in technology it now must extend beyond the historical borders of China. This is why I said that in the long term China's sphere of influence and security buffer must extend all the way to the Arctic and Urals. It's not a political argument against Russia but a geographical one for China. Russia is simply in the way and sooner or later that will become an obstacle because Russia won't be able to deliver what China needs. Canada is not a problem because it is a US protectorate under NORAD. Moscow will never agree to that. But the people of Siberia - including Russians - may have another opinion.

Below is a map of expansion of Muscovy renamed after fall of Constantinople as Tsardom of Russia (in 1547) by Ivan IV (died in 1584)
russian_expansion_1300-1914.jpg

Muscovy's expansion into Siberia was a historical aberration that was largely unchecked because there was no reason to do so. The importance of Siberia only changed with the oil and gas industry after WW2 and even then it's largely under-developed with the main areas of exploration lying further west.

Example of historical population beyond Urals:

location189719392021
Vladivostok28 933 206 432603 519
Khabarovsk14 971199 172617 441
Ulan-Ude8 086125 690437 565
Yakutsk6 53552 882355 443
Krasnoyarsk26 700189 9771 187 771
Novosibirsk8 000405 2971 633 595
Omsk37 400288 8551 125 695
Chelyabinsk20 000273 1161 189 525
Yekaterinburg37 399425 5331 544 376
Russia / USSR73 000 000107 000 000144 700 000

The Russians who live in Siberia do so over a weak sociocultural substrate and in poor economic conditions. Their families moved there during WW2 and their "country" is more USSR than Russia. Tell them that they get to keep resource wealth and that you will build them modern infrastructure and they will forget Moscow. The reason why Russia has an authoritarian system under Putin is because the population is seen as not sufficiently loyal to the regime.

By 2050 Russia is projected to shrink from 150m to 130m while all Central Asian republics retain growth. Uzbekistan will have 35m, Kazakhstan 22m, Tajikistan 12m. Pakistan will grow to almost 500m. Iran to over 100m. Afghanistan to 65m. The potential that China can activate by shifting part of global south northward is the key to geopolitical change.

The "decolonization of Russia" is therefore historically inevitable and it will be likely the pivotal conflict of this century that will also involve China as the only power capable of introducing structure and stability primarily due to economic power and expanding infrastructure, less so due to military power. In fact it is a historical necessity because the regime in Moscow has demonstrated its inability to rule competently and responsibly. And that is not a security gain for China but a security cost because of the nuclear potential that should not exist in a client state. Ever.

This scenario should really have a thread of its own. This one is for WestPac. So I will end it here because it's become an obvious OT.

One more thing:

Yet, the people and the support system are equally if not more important to operational success than anything pointy.

No need to be politically correct when it's polite to be correct.
 

Michaelsinodef

Senior Member
Registered Member
This is Russia's main road and rail network. No it's not a joke.
View attachment 116910

All of Russia's periphery that is open to NATO sea and air power projection is devoid of infrastructure that could support defensive action.

At the same time all of these areas are on average ~2000-3000km from China and are accessible primarily by air, especially in rapid deployment.

In such a scenario stabilization of potential breakaway regions is the primary concern. Time of reaction will be decisive and heavy airlift capability and aerial refueling will be of infinitely more value than VLO bombers.

The US will trade current WestPac territory for Siberia because capturing those regions gives it leverage over European Russia and foothold in Asia that opens northern and eastern flank to China.
Erm, while yes, that part of Russia is devoid of infrastructure to support defensive action, but that also applies to offensive actions.
Like yes, air and sea power projection of NATO can reach those areas, but to then establish land control and infrasture to support their army along with further air operations???

I mean, ofc it's not near impossible, but I think it would be a monumental task for NATO (not just US, but whole NATO) to say establish bases and infrastucture to support say some 100k-200k men, and then for them to continue travelling west towards Moscow and south towards China? (not to mention the time required for the above, and how it's unlikely that they would get 'peaceful times' to do it).

Also, I don't think Russia would shy away from throwing nukes on Siberia if NATO invaded, so there's also that.
Increasing production consumes financial resources. The main problem with H-20 will not be design maturation but production capacity. My comment from 29/12/22 on B-21 vs H-20:


It does little good for China to have a working design if it can't maintain sufficiently high production rate from the start. That is also part of R&D in this case because of the unique nature of the airframe. H-20 is J-20 quality at Y-20 scale. It's not something that China is currently capable of mass-producing.
I don't think we can say a lot about potential costs of the H-20, although yes, it would be an expenditure and part of budget, potentially displacing or reducing other stuff.

Although, it's pretty clearly, at the very least, currently in development and we really can't say much about what Deino heard in regards to it being delayed (unverified rumour we should throw aside until more similar rumours and stuff appears).
It has some advantages but volume is still decisive. What works in WestPac fantasy scenarios on SDF doesn't work in others in real world.

H-20 is not B-21. B-21 plays a greater role as a C4 node due to distance. The US has to overcome distance to enter theater. China is already here. VLO and other capabilities come as addition to range + volume. H-20 in the near term will be primarily a payload delivery system and in that it can be replaced by H-6 in multiple scenarios particularly over land.
And like others have pointed out, while China is already at the theater, it might want to strike targets that are further away, in which case, the H-20 would be useful (although I suppose one can argue, that if such a need arises, the PLA might already have 'pacified'/beaten down the nearer targets, which does open up farther targets, but the PLA might already kind of have already half won at this stage?)
Russia is just one possible scenario. Also: India-Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran, Myanmar etc. The paradox of H-20 is that until it arrives in greater numbers it is at a disadvantage vs more numerous and cheaper systems like H-6 + YY-20 with the exception of a few specific scenarios that happen to be in SDF's field of view to the exception of everything else.
Wouldn't nearly basically any new platform/system be 'disadvantageous' against older platforms/systems right when the new system gets inducted (due to the older being more numerous and cheap)?
I imagine, this would also be the case for like the J-20 when it was like below the 20 digits, or like the first few years.

PS. Maybe this thread could be renamed to be a more general China vs US? It's basically about China and US fighting, and I don't see the reason for it to be contained to only talk about westpac.
 

tphuang

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A few things since replying to all of markoz commentary is too long.

I actually meant he is in favor of greater procurement of h20. I think 200 h6k type is enough of what they need to do.

As for other how long it would take them to introduce h20, that's a matter of program maturity. If the aircraft is ready in 5 years, then you produce it, but I wouldn't push something that's in development.

In terms of its missions. I certainly don't have pla planning, so just going by my own intuition here.

If you look at distance for a particular h6k base to northern Japan, it's really not particularly close. Even in a degraded air defense environment, sending h6k would require escort and yy20. Given the distance to Japan, it takes careful more planning to flying h6k close enough to attack with anything other than 1000km ranged cruise missiles. Economics would dictate that you would rather be attacking with pgms. I do think using h20s for this mission would make mission planning a lot easier. Of course, you may not have enough h20s to be able to use them for this mission when certain missions can only be done with h20s.

And the above argument also applies to Guam.
 
D

Deleted member 24525

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The concept of an amphibious NATO invasion of Russia via the Arctic is beyond ridiculous. Why is this even being entertained?
For the sake of argument let's make the wild assumption that Russia's nuclear deterrence has completely broken down, okay. Well western forces are going to be landing in tundra with no infrastructure to speak of and at least 1000 miles until the nearest meaningful population center. They will have to be resupplied over a considerable stretch of ocean, and their supplies will first have to be transported across at least several hundred miles of zero-road tundra before actually getting to the front. All of NATO's war production centers are 4000+ miles and the entire arctic ocean away.

Meanwhile, we are assuming China intervenes to protect Russia. Alright. Being located to the south of Russia, its supplies will be able to take paths with roads to the front, they will not have to cross any ocean to get there, and its war production will be thousands of miles closer, not to mention 5+ times greater than NATO's.

Guess who has the advantage here?

And this is when you ignore the nukes! If even one borei is left alive after a NATO first strike, or 15 or so mobile MIRVs, the USA is not going to meaningfully exist anymore.

So how about we get off of Mr Dugin's wild ride and return to reality?
 

AndrewS

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"Trade" didn't imply "peacefully" and that assumes possible destruction of industrial potential for which alternatives are already being prepared. Korea is not building weapons factories in Poland because of export opportunities. It's a backup.

The US would also primarily extend projection through existing routes like Alaska to Chukotka, Japan to Sakhalin etc. so not all of WestPac would be lost just like not all of Siberia would be gained. Instead both would become destabilized zones.

This comment on the US trading East Asia (Taiwan/Korea/Japan) for Siberia still doesn't make any sense. Weapons factories are not relevant here. Look again at Semiconductor production.

Approximately 80% of global semiconductor production occurs in China/Taiwan/Korea/Japan.
If anything, we'll see this figure increase by 2030 because:

1. China will expand as much as possible, and they account for over 50% of semiconductor demand (whether domestically consumed or contained in exported goods)
2. Taiwan/Korea/Japan aren't particularly interested in setting up semiconductor fabs elsewhere, unless there are really big subsidies. In any case, they views semiconductor (and their trade secrets) as a valuable domestic industry and don't want to give these away.

There is no alternative that the US/Europe can prepare.

Again, if WestPac semiconductor production is destabilised, then the US destabilises its own industries. The governments in WestPac know this, so they want to keep semiconductor production locally for jobs and as a strategic bargaining chip. This is the same reason why China would also prefer a stable Westpac, because China also needs semiconductors for its domestic economy.



Canada and US are former British colonies turned decentralized democratic states with common law and English as main language. Canada is not a nuclear power with a centralized authoritarian state. It has also functioned since WW2 as de facto US protectorate.

For Russians that would be return to Mongol yoke and the entire Russian (Muscovite) identity is built around overthrowing it and conquering their former oppressors. The myth of Great Patriotic War is a re-enactment of that foundational myth but you won't know this unless you know Soviet art which I do because I grew up in communist Poland. Russia is not the Soviet Union but it wants people to think that it is and that confuses you about what type of identity you're dealing with.

Russia never stops invoking Mongol yoke because it explains the historical purpose of the Russian state. It is the continuation of the Byzantine empire, a Christian/Orthodox state that defends the faithful against heathen invaders and is led by a leader/head of church/saint in the Byzantine tradition. If you want to know how that is reconciled with current relations with China look to German-Soviet cooperation between the wars.

From the current Russian perspective, what is the stronger narrative and myth?
The Mongol Yoke or the Great Patriotic War (which in its modern incarnation is Ukraine)

And we already see an integrated Russian-Chinese ballistic missile warning system, which is all the military capability that China really needs from Siberia
 

aqh

Junior Member
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I feel like a lot of these threads get derailed rapidly.

Let's think of a west pac conflict from the perspective of the US. Your main ways of projecting airpower in west pac is through bases and CVNs. With China's long range strike capabilities its highly likely that China will be able to generate more sorties over the relevant areas than the US would provided the PLA have the YY-20.

One thing I have been thinking about is if I was the US and the majority of my Ashcm are harpoons with tiny ranges their only way to survive in west pac is standoff B-21s with JASSM-ERs. Can anyone else think of a way the US could counter China in west pac other than standoff B-21s (which have their own various issues) and Virginias?
 

BoraTas

Captain
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@Patchwork_Chimera

What is your opinion on the Shahed-136? Is it really a good use of resources? I have my own suspicions as the only good thing about the Shahed is its price. And they still require extensive facilities and personnel to maintain and use.
Even in this forum, I started to see arguments like "China will just launch 3000 Shaheds every day and Japan will return to stone age". If it was this simple why China, or any other country for that matter, are still pursuing expensive missiles full of dedicated military hardware? Something doesn't add up.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
Let's think of a west pac conflict from the perspective of the US. Your main ways of projecting airpower in west pac is through bases and CVNs. With China's long range strike capabilities its highly likely that China will be able to generate more sorties over the relevant areas than the US would provided the PLA have the YY-20.
One problem - Out of all three of the H-6's K, J and N variants, only the N variant has mid-air refueling capability. The K and J variants cannot refuel mid-air.

And there aren't a lot of H-6Ns in the PLAAF either - The estimate likely hovers around 10 units this year.

Therefore, until the H-20 (which I believe is certain to be equipped with mid-air refueling capability from the get-go) is introduced into PLAAF service in large enough numbers, or at least retrofit the H-6's K and J variants with mid-air refueling capability - China's long-range strike capabilities up against the 2IC is still rather limited by payload capacity.

One thing I have been thinking about is if I was the US and the majority of my Ashcm are harpoons with tiny ranges their only way to survive in west pac is standoff B-21s with JASSM-ERs. Can anyone else think of a way the US could counter China in west pac other than standoff B-21s (which have their own various issues) and Virginias?
JASSM-ER has a range of ~1000 kilometers, while the JASSM-XR has a range of ~1900 kilometers.

At these (standoff) ranges, even the non-stealthy B-52 and the less-stealthy B-1B can do the job. Heck, even the non-stealthy C-130s and C-17s can do the job with the Rapid Dragon (of which the USAF does have a lot of at their disposal). Same goes for the USN's Arleigh Burkes.

Then there's also the LRHW with ranges of ~2700-3000 kilometers, which puts the coastal regions of China within range of Guam, or deep into China's interior if stationed on the Ryukyu Islands or Japan.

Last but not least, worth mentioning being the Tomahawks, with the later variants having ranges of ~1600-1800 kilometers.

Sure, apart from the LRHW, all other missiles are subsonic. But we do expect them to be utilized in the forms of missile swarms against the PLA, which is still a considerably significant threat when launched in large enough numbers to attack from multiple directions, alongside with allied EW jamming support.
 
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