Dear Lezt, it seems like we won't get anywhere near a common conclusion as long as it seems we have different POV. So let's be clear, the US has strong economic ties with China and benefits from these. The backbone of US profits is their naval might that gives them the leverage to engineer global trade according to their will. However their naval might is not the only tool in the world for this task and China and other countries have different tools. My point was to highlight how the naval extortion racket works and how the old continental extortion racket has been outlawed.
Kurt, I agree with you that naval extortion as you called it works, and that the British, Dutch, Japanese and even the Chinese have been using it successfully for centuries if not millennia. But my point in saying that you have a very western centric view is that naval and continental racketeering as you name them wax and wane accordingly and does not simply follow a linear progression. Just as the Chinese naval racketeering of ~1421 under admiral Zhenghe (his fleets accounted for maybe 80% of the tonnage afloat around the world then) forced all of south east Asia into the Chinese tributary system (which we shall discuss later on) and therefore trade on the Chinese' terms. So did the naval power fail due to the destruction of the fleet by internal politics and new priorities. This is true that the Royal navy today is a shadow of its former self, so is the spanish fleets and the french fleets. There is nothing to say that will not happen to the American fleets as well with the passing of time.
Naval assets are very expensive to maintain, naval assets are also very susceptible to destruction. Ships which do not sail do not control sea which it is supposed to overlook. While men on the ground require much less maintenance; such that PLA units in the 1970s grew their own food and provided for their own substance to an extent - men who would require force to displace and therefore will maintain a level control of where they were stationed.
Thus, if Mexico and Canada was as strong as lets say France and hostile to the USA, could the USA maintain her fleets or do you think she will have to deploy more troops in the US proper? The US naval supremacy is dependent on the continued friendiness of mexico and canada, while keeping hostile south american regimes weak. Should this status quo change, so would the USN; and therefore the era of naval racketeering will go back to the way of continental racketeering.
Besides, the US have already used continental racketeering installing friendly US government in panama circa 1991 with a ground invasion - when the USSR was weak.
Concerning my POV, I wouldn't consider someone who repeatedly points out the brilliance and right steps of Chinese naval build up as a pro American POV person. It's rather the case that I'm one of the few guys who studied maritime warfare issues at a deeper level than others.
I don't think you can make that claim that you have studied maritime warfare at a deeper level than others, or maybe I feel the term not broad enough is more accurate. I really don't see you basing your comments on the Chinese and Korean naval actions of the first Korean war 1592, nor the Song naval campaign against the mongols, how the salamis applies or even the multiple sino-vietnamise conflicts stretching back thousands of years.
Naval racketeering had traditionally not been that successful against continental powers. This is what the Sino-Nippon wars, Vietnam, Korean war, US war of independence, Crimean war, French Revolution War have shown - it was a powerful too, but by no means the decisive too.
I sincerely believe that you cannot make a statement saying that you are at much deeper level than others regarding naval warfare, I digress. To make such a claim is to state that you know everything another person knows and to have sufficient understanding of his point of view to come up with a judgement that your understanding are deeper. I would find that rather insulting in a civilized forum consisting of mainly proficient peers.
Note I said you were american centric with western philosophies; I never said you were pro american. It is definitely unwise to use such blanket "I am superior" statements especially when it coincides with the lack of wisdom in seeing the difference between pro-american and american centric point of view.
That's the major problem, if I highlight naval warfare strategies I speak a very foreign languange for most readers and they try to reply at a level of their knowledge on a totally different field.
Again, I am not against you, but why don't you try to convince these "people" with a proper argument instead of belittling them? Besides, this is a open forum and everyone is entitled to their own opinion, if you can point out the flaws in their argument - great; but I haven't really seen you do that.
Besides, does this not suggest that your believes are too limited? that you want to have a scenario play out with conditions you set. Fact is, every country is going to fight in a way that give them an edge or minimizes their weaknesses. Mahanism is dead, why would anyone fight in a way which the USA excels at?
Other's, including the PLA, have emphasized that US influence to twist the world to their own ends depends on their global presence and interaction based on their global naval power. I just repeated this correct PLA stance and explained how economic gain derives from such a position and did for centuries, it's the very naval power strategy to aggrandize their economic clout by engineering contracts. This is at odds with the continental view I replied to.
This is what I disagreed, Every sufficient navel power in history is a substantial continental force with an army of substance. Infact you can say that a strong army is a prerequisite of a strong navy. In fact, you need a strong continental force to protect your naval shore facilities from raiding parties or invasion forces which if successful in destroying sufficient naval shore facilities will render the navy useless in a very short time. Every navy first empire, have a substantial army backing it - from Athens to the USA. Therefore, Naval power projection is an extension of the continental view and not contrary to it.
The Chinese tribute system wasn't about trade rights, but about recognizing souvereignity of the emperor of heaven. The trade rights were the carrot to achieve that end and Chinese invasions were the stick. The Vietnamese and Thai fled from genocides in China, conquered a new home and had to pay tribute to their former and new overlords. In Korea the Chinese territorial grab had been repelled earlier, but in order to remain free they also had to pay their racket. Of course, the exchanges between these cultures included much more than racket extortion, but you should be careful to embellish the picture. That's no defense of the US racket and it doesn't mean that modern China will be a racket. But you can't dissipate fears that they could be if they have the power and often people prefer the scroundels they know to the ones they don't know.
That I would disagree, what is written in dynasty texts is purely just that - glorified history. Just quickly rumble through wikipedia you will find. China refused to trade with Japan during the Chousen-Nippon war which the Ming was allied with the Koreans; and it is only after the war when the Shogun submitted Japan to the Chinese tributary system (as the subject of the Emperor of China, the king of Japan, while still the subject of the Japanese emperor) did trade resume. As you can see from the wording, the Japanese emperor did not submit himself, his sovereignty to China. So did Russia pay tribute to the Qing after the Manchu-Russian Amur war of 1727 to continue trade and definitely did not concede her sovereignty.
Foreign states wanting to trade with China had to pay tribute to the emperor at specified ports of call (Canton being the designated locale for envoys from Southeast Asian states)
Paying a tribute is a prerequisite of trade with China. Although symbolically it represent Chinese overlord ship, reality dictates that the relationship is generally symbolic – why would Syria pay tribute to Ming China when there is literally no way for China to invade Syria; if not for trade?
You interpretation of the Chinese Tribute systems is mainly western, steming from reports like the British whom refused to kowtao to the Chinese emperor and the subsequent flood of western media which reported on the backwardness and obsolesce of the Chinese people and culture.
If you know the Chinese people, they are not easily intimidated, Did Mao fear a US invasion of China during the Korean war? Did Deng fear the soviet threat of nuclear war when he invaded Vietnam? Did Chaing actually concern himself with the invading Japanese? China, historically, have been very resilient – maybe to a fault – to foreign intimidation; I doubt that the USA will be any different as the dispairity between the US military and the Chinese military is much less than it is when Mao defied the USA to enter the Korean war.
Concerning the Soviet and Chinese missile approach, I consider the trajectory of a missile irrelevant because the trajectory is only meant for the best approach, either high or low. The relevant part is rather using guided missile long range strikes and not manned platforms.
Why would you consider it the same? Let me put it in lamen terms, a missile traveling at mach 1 being intercepted by CWIS systems firing bullets at mach 3 will have an engagement time of around lets say 30 minutes, where the radar needs to detect, be authorized to engage, predict flight path and engage. A sunburn traveling at mach 5 will have an engagement time of 6 minutes. An ASBM travelling at Mach 15 will have a engagement time of 2 minutes. Even if you detect the launch of the missile, the total flight time is ~7 minutes.
Now if you consider that the CIWS needs to spool up for around 30 sec, you can see how small the engagement time frame is. This is before considering that you are trying to hit something really fast with something 1/5th of its speed. Try throwing a snow ball at a speeding car, you will know how hard it is.
Now the trajectory makes a hell lot of difference. A flat trajectory like a sea skimming missile can be intercepted by missile or gun fire which has a higher engagement speed as gravity is not working against it. Engaging something upwards would also mean that the mach 3 Phalanx bullet may be traveling at mach 1.5 at the engagement zone and that the incoming missile is also inbound with the aid of gravity. The last thing is, most warships do not have high resolution directly above scanning radar. To detect, locate and to intercept is much more of a challenge.
So now do you understand it is a completely different animal?
