Why russia going ballistic over BMD in europe

Last week russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov lashed out against the deployment of BMD systems in europe. Reading between the lines, russia seems genuinely frightened by this, which is somewhat contradictiory of official position that BMD is not a threat to them.

Keep in mind, russian worldview has been shaped by two cruel invasions up to the gates of Moscow. This has deeply affected their military thinking and will still continue to generate (irrational) fear of surprise attack.

Below, I try to summarize what the russians are afraid of:

Russian defence doctrine - in nuclear weapons we trust

Russian military has been decaying steadily for past 20 years. As a consequence, they have relied heavily on nuclear weapons as a gurantee of national security. By removing the soviet-era "no first use" - policy and publishing national security doctrines which emphasize early adoption of nuclear weapons in any conflict threatening russian motherland, they have sent a clear message: We will use nukes as a ultimate gurantee of our soveriginity, regardless of the costs.

Yet, even the russian nuclear arsenal is rusting away. Every part of the strategic triad has been reduced, especially their second-strike capability with decomissioning of soviet-era ballistic missile subs. This has far-reaching counsequenses, as described below.

End of deterrence?

Last summer Foregin Affairs - magazine (published by Council of foregin relations) released a detailed study of the . It bluntly states that russian nuclear forces are in such a dire condition, that US first stike would effectively destroy all their weapons and delivery systems. In other words, russian defensive doctrine is anulled in certain aspects.

Enter the BMD in europe

If and when the planned limited BMD systems are deployed into europe, the miniscule russian retaliatory capability that could survive from the first strike would be rendered useless. Sure, the BMD can't destroy tens or hundreds of missiles, but one or two it can knock down. In essence, it would negate the whole russian deterrence and thus opening a window of vulnerability.

Conclusion

As russian defence is totally dependant on nuclear weapons, their strategic planning is already in jeopardy. This generates more fear in security apparatuses, which are currently holding the political power and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Thus it becomes a top national priority to strenghten the nuclear triad to counter this perceived weakness.

It bluntly states that russian nuclear forces are in such a dire condition, that US first stike would effectively destroy all their weapons and delivery systems.

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-That's wrong assumption, motivated by internal Russian politics-don't believe this nonsense!
For one thing, RVSN (RUSSIAN STARATEGIC ROCKET FORCES) have many mobile ICBMs at any given time hiding in Siberian taiga/Northern Russia's forests (in addition to 1-2 SSBNs under Polar ice cap) that will survive the 1st strike. Besides, a few minutes before American ICBMs are to arrive there is a procedure in place for the retaliatory strike to commence- by the time they detonate their silos and in-port SSBN's missile tubes they were aiming at would be empty!

The Gremikha SSBN Base at Kola peninsula of Russia has huge SSBN “pens” blasted out of granite rocks of the adjacent cliffs to ensure the survival of the Typhoon Class ballistic missile submarines. ..the Russian SSBN force is capable of striking most of the CONUS from pier-side, reducing the need to deploy well away from Russian shores.

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Despite what the Russians may claim about the dire situation their nuclear arsenal is in, it is highly unlikely that any nation would invade because the consequences of that information being incorrect would be disastrous.

That said, strategies used in the Cold War - MAD and massive retaliation both were somewhat lacking in credibility precisely because each called for a massive response to even a minor violation of territory. When the provocation is small the threat of nuclear holocaust is not credible, and this is indeed one strategy that could be used against Russia even more so than other countries because the conventional military has declined so much.

The_Zergling said:

Despite what the Russians may claim about the dire situation their nuclear arsenal is in, it is highly unlikely that any nation would invade because the consequences of that information being incorrect would be disastrous.

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Yep, I agree on this one. However, russian national defence is almost solely counting on nuclear deterrence and they seem to be very worried that it's not foolproof anymore. And they don't have much alternatives to turn to.

Cold war paranoia has surely disappeared from the west, but russia is now led by the siloviki (ex. military and intelligence people) who seem to be fixed on the past somewhat.

Let's put it another way: Any major power woud be worried if their immunity status would be even theoretically possible to be limited or anulled by anyone.

BLUEJACKET said:

-That's wrong assumption, motivated by internal Russian politics-don't believe this nonsense!
For one thing, RVSN (RUSSIAN STARATEGIC ROCKET FORCES) have many mobile

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ICBMs at any given time hiding in Siberian taiga/Northern Russia's forests (in addition to 1-2 SSBNs under Polar ice cap) that will survive the 1st strike. Besides, a few minutes before American ICBMs are to arrive there is a procedure in place for the retaliatory strike to commence- by the time they detonate their silos and in-port SSBN's missile tubes they were aiming at would be empty!

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Well, according to the :

Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days.
...
What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.
...
The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. ... Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets.
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Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.

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This definately seem to counter your claims. Pretty pic, tho

Imho in surprise first-strike scenario they would have something left to fire back (yep, I've even read rumours about some dead-hand-system) but the limited counterstrike could be intercepted by european based BMD.

No one is insane to bet on that one and try it out, but the russians sure don't seem to like the situation.

Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base.

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- I don't think it's possible to execute 100% surprise attack- any 1st strike will be preceded by political & military developments that will raise tensions and/or be detected. Then the bombers & warheads can disperse to forward bases in a matter of hours, and even without starategic the /s, the TU-22Ms can reach portions of CONUS-including Montana & N.Dakota / along with Bangor, Bremerton, and Everett,WA- home of 2 CVNs SSBN - unrefueled (see post #51). Using , they can also destroy ABM radars from 300km away.

Some recent evidence is indicating that Russia may be considering use of the Backfire bombers in a strategic role. The new missile Kh-101 with 5,000-[5,500]km range is intended for use also on Tu-22M3..Also Tu-22M3 planes are included into an upgrading program making it as Tu-22M5. It can carry four KH-101/[2]s but its main missile will be the

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. [with

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-600km range. It helps to know Russian!]

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Some 170 launchers remain in Russian territory, of which 10 were deactivated but not dismantled. In December 1995 Strategic Rocket Forces Commander Colonel General Igor Sergeyev announced a policy under which the service life of the SS-19 would be extended from 10 years to 25 years. The missiles will remain on alert at least through 2005, and the missiles that were deployed in the early 1980s will serve beoynd this. ..
Under the treaty provisions a total of 105 of the UR-100NUTTH missiles can be retained provided they are downloaded to carry only one warhead instead of six.

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They may have , but how about using some of as ?
Do you think the Chinese and N.Koreans won't share their intel. if their sattelites &/or radars detect something the Russian ones didn't? The Russians are now building a new powerful radar to cover those gaps as you read this (sorry, can't find link in English).

He spoke harshly against the possible deployment of elements of an American missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, scoffing at US claims that they would be aimed at intercepting possible missile attacks from Iran and saying Russia would take unspecified retaliatory measures.
“We consider such claims unfounded, and, naturally, that directly concerns us and will cause a relevant reaction,” he said, suggesting Russia will continue to develop weapons that would iron out what Russian military officials have said would be a strategic imbalance.
He said that while missile defence systems under development will only be capable of tackling ballistic missiles, Russia is developing new weapons that will be capable of changing the altitude and direction of their flights on their way to targets.
“Missile defence systems are helpless against that,” Putin said.

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Also, even those SSBNs that are no longer seaworthy could still be put on alert and launch their missiles from Russia's Arctic and Pacific costs. The strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) Dmitri Donskoi could be again armed with 20 SLBMs should a crisis occur.

Reliability of Missiles for Delta-class Subs Confirmed
On September 9, and 10, 2006, just days after the failure of Bulava, the Russian Navy scored two successes. The Yekaterinburg, a Delta-4 class (Project 667 BDRM) submarine, launched the new Sineva SLBM, an updated version of the SS-N-23, a three-stage, liquid fuel system, with a range of 8,300 kilometers, which carries four warheads. The following day, the St. George the Victorious, a Delta-3 class (Project 667 BDR) boat, successfully fired an SS-N-18 (RSM-52), an older two-stage, liquid fuel system, with a range of 6,500 kilometers, which carries three warheads. The success of the SS-N-23 test was particularly important for the Navy, which had experienced two failed launches of the system in February 2004. Although subsequently, in March 2004 and August 2005, SS-N-23s were launched successfully, the earlier failures cast doubt on the reliability of the Delta-4’s missile complement, and the new success appears to have strengthened confidence that the earlier failures were not systemic in nature.
The September 2006 Sineva and SS-N-18 launches were unusual because the two missiles were fired from the Arctic Ocean to the Kizha missile range, which is located on a narrow point of land, known as “Kanin Nos” in northwest Russia. For the past 15 years, the Russian Navy has traditionally launched missiles toward a test range in Kamchatka, in the Russian Far East. The test from the vicinity of the North Pole apparently sought to master launching from a region with a complex magnetic environment, where controlling trajectories is regarded as particularly difficult. [8] While there has been no official explanation for the new trajectory, an unnamed official in the Ministry of Defense “did not exclude” that it was related to reported American plans to deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland. Although his comment was cryptic, he may have been referring to Russia’s desire to master trajectories that might be of value in suppressing the proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland, should Russia adopt this strategy. Moscow has been concerned about the placement of missile defenses there because it is believed that such a system could intercept strategic missiles deployed in western Russia at the early, “boost” phase and invalidate Russian efforts to overcome U.S. missile defenses by exploiting maneuverable warheads after the boost phase. Following the test firing, the captain of the Yekaterinburg, which launched the Sineva, reported his success directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin – a clear sign of the high value Russian leaders accorded that particular launch.

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True, their missile forces aren't as they used to be, but don't forget about that could be used against US bases and forces on Russia's periphery in the Atlantic, Pacific, Med. Sea and the Near East. Moreover, / can strike land targets in CONUS with their 550km-3,000km range SLCMs- and many of them .
A few such subs patrolling off the US West/East/Gulf Coasts would have all lower 48 states covered with their missiles. And I mentioned the potential of arsenal aircraft on other treads already- see post #16.

The only way to effectively deal with cruise missiles is to use AWACS to guide in fighters. Even then its hard for the fighters' AAMs to engage the missiles. Trying to intercept cruise missiles over land is a difficult challenge for the defending side.

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So, don't underestimate the Russians- even with reduced capabilities they always keep a few tricks up their sleeve!

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also, see post #46 last quote.