US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Jura said:

LRS-B news:
Air Force Plans Bomber Contract for September
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A top House defense Democrat wants answers from Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James about costs

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, which is supposed to be built at a fixed price of $500 million a copy.

“Given the importance of this issue and the magnitude of the discrepancy, the Air Force must explain the nature and cause of this error,” says the letter from Speier, who is the top Democrat on the House Armed Services oversight and investigations subcommittee. Spear’s office shared the letter with us with an eye on this afternoon’s press conference (3:30 pm EST) with James and Air Force Chief of Staff Mark Welsh.

The Air Force recently estimated the 10-year costs of the aircraft at $41.7 billion, a considerable variance from last year’s $33.1 billion and from this year’s $58.4 billion contained in reports about the Defense Department’s nuclear capabilities.

These reports included inaccurate numbers, but the Air Force says this in reply:

“The 10-year cost estimate provided by the Air Force for LRS-B in Table 4 of the FY2015 and FY2016 Section 1043 Report was incorrect. The correct 10-YEAR cost entry for both the FY2015 and FY2016 reports is $41.7B. Again, the program costs have remained stable,” Air Force spokesman An Stefanek says in an email.

In what could be considered a note to Rep. Speier, Stefanek also says: “The Air Force is working through the appropriate processes to ensure the Section 1043 Report is corrected, and that our reports in subsequent years are accurate.”

As Breaking D readers know, the Air Force cost estimates for LRSB have been the

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among some experts for some time.

The contract award for the bomber program looked to be set for late August but has now reportedly slipped to as late as October. One of six questions Speier asks James to answer is what was the original award date and why did it change. The other five include why do we have new cost estimates and which ones are accurate. And my favorite question: “Given that the B-2 program faced extensive cost overruns after being developed in secret, how much do you envision declassifying once the LRS-B contract is ultimately awarded?”

The Air Force has disclosed the existence of this new program, as well as the target cost per plane for the 80 to 100 aircraft that will be bought, but few other details have been released so it’s very difficult to tell just how much complex or advanced it will be. Senior service officials have said it will largely be based on existing technologies, will be stealthy, will be modular and will be optionally manned, but they have also said it will be a system of systems.

Frank Kendall, the head of Pentagon acquisition, has also said the Pentagon

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So it looks as if Boeing-Lockheed and Northrop Grumman will compete for the first 80 to 100 planes, and then upgraded versions will be open to competition.

Only those read in on the classified details know anything beyond those pretty fuzzy outlines.

For those readers who may not know, rumors have been swirling for weeks that Northrop Grumman has won the LRSB contract — but no matter how many usually reliable sources we have heard this from, those reports remain rumors.

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The US Air Force’s botching of a 10-year cost estimate for its next-generation bomber two years in a row has been corrected and will not impact the service’s planning for the program, according to US Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James.

“The mistake was a regrettable error, but it has been corrected, so it is not going to affect us internally,” James said Monday during a press conference at the Pentagon.

James’ remarks come as the Air Force scrambles to do damage control after reports emerged of massive cost discrepancies in the service’s most recent cost estimates for the long-range strike bomber. Last year, the Air Force estimated costs for the LRS-B from fiscal years 2015 to 2024 at $33.1 billion. This year, the service pegged costs for fiscal 2016 to fiscal 2025, a similar 10-year period, at $58.2 billion.

The mistake occurred partially due to human error and partially due to “process error,” James said.

“A couple of our people got the figures wrong and the process of coordination was not fully carried out,” James said. “Coordination of course means other people are providing a check and balance and looking at the numbers, so that typically is how something like this would get caught.”

The Air Force has notified Congress of the error, James added.

“We also notified them that we are counseling the people involved and that we’ve tightened up on the process of coordination to make sure that something like this doesn’t occur again,” she said.

But members of Congress are already coming out of the woodwork to

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.

Rep. Jackie Speier, a California Democrat and the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on oversight and investigations, called the discrepancies “alarming” in an Aug. 24 letter.

“This sudden 76 percent increase in estimated cost is alarming, because it raises questions about the management of a crucial program that lacks transparency, on which we cannot afford serious cost overruns, development errors, and reduced production numbers that would deprive the United States of one of its core military capabilities,” Speier wrote.

The Air Force has since said the true cost estimate for both 10-year periods should be $41.7 billion.

The service also double checked all of the other figures in the report “out of caution,” and verified that the remaining numbers are accurate, James said.

“We were surprised by the numbers as well,” Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh said during the press conference, adding that the Air Force has been using the cost estimate contained in the service’s five-year budgeting plan. This number accurately reflects the bomber's 10-year cost estimate, he said.

James noted that the contract award for the bomber would be awarded “soon,” but did not give additional details.

And despite congressional murmurs of a

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, the bomber should be insulated from the worst impacts of a stopgap measure to fund the government, James said.

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The U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) has awarded Oshkosh Defense, LLC, an Oshkosh Corporation company, a $6.7 billion firm fixed price production contract to manufacture the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV program fills a critical capability gap for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps by replacing a large portion of the legacy HMMWV fleet with a light tactical vehicle with far superior protection and off-road mobility. During the contract, which includes both Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP), Oshkosh expects to deliver approximately 17,000 vehicles and sustainment services.

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Scratch said:

..., I would think that being able to engage a hostile fleet from 450nm away can still be usefull.
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This year, the U.S. Navy’s surface force is

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concept in order to fairly evaluate its potential benefits, risks and costs.

In seeking to increase the unit lethality of as many surface ships as is practicable, and then operating them in surface action groups (SAGs) —among other innovative adaptive force packages—more widely dispersed from other concentrations of naval power, the surface force aims to provide combatant commanders with an array of options for Phase 0 and 1 responses against high-end opponents, and options for Phase 3 operations geared toward conflict termination.

Those options, which preserve other elements of the force for other demanding tasks while laying before an adversary numerous operational targeting and surveillance challenges, force that adversary to devote resources to a naval force that is in totality, more powerful, from more attack angles than today’s force.

In addition to complicating an adversary’s operational problem, the imperative for distributed lethality rests on at least three other assumptions.

The first imperative for distributed lethality concerns Phase 0 (shaping)/1 (deterrence) operations, and that is the deterrent value of a more powerful surface force capable of holding more and more diverse adversary targets at risk.

In an approach reminiscent of the conclusion of the 1983 thriller War Games—in which the anthropomorphic computer concedes that the “only way to win is not to play”—deterring conflict with a great power should be considered the one of the most important—if not the most important—goal of conventional naval forces. By arraying more powerful surface forces and operating them as part of a multinational deterrence posture, the opportunity for maintaining conflict at Phase 1 increases, creating decision space for national leadership by delaying or negating the transition to what could be a ruinous war.

Obviously, surface forces would be part of a larger joint deterrence campaign, but as it is, the lethality gaps in the force result in considerably less combat power than could relatively easily be gained by an opportunistic pursuit of the instruments of distributed lethality.

The second imperative follows from the first, and that is, if deterrence fails, forward deployed surface forces must be capable of “fighting their way out” of a demanding anti-access area denial (A2/AD) environment. An element of this imperative is resident in the common refrain of critics that the surface force is not “survivable” in this element, a charge which, while generally fair, ignores the fact that virtually everything else in that element is also not survivable. Additionally, the fact that well-intentioned post-Cold War fleet architectural planning devalued the very weapons and sensors that previously buttressed surface force lethality, offers the path and opportunity to mitigate this vulnerability through additional Surface Force hardening.

Simply put, if conflict with a high-end adversary commenced with little warning, much of the deployed joint force—not just surface forces–would initially be at risk. The mobility of surface forces provides them with a measure of safety and survivability, and it is reasonable to assume that standing toe to toe with an A2/AD adversary in an unattrited information surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) environment would be unwise. These surface forces would in all likelihood, sortie to areas of less dense weapon and sensor coverage, out of effective range of the opponent’s striking force, there to await the follow-on campaign to reverse the aggression already under way.

Yet if those forward deployed U.S. forces were under active surveillance by the adversary’s fleet at conflict start, their largely unarmed (with effective anti-surface weapons (ASuW)) condition renders them especially vulnerable. Shift ahead ten years from now, to a surface force in which forward deployed combatants (both small and large) field a range of both supersonic and subsonic ASuW missiles capable of targeting opponents out to 1,000 nautical miles, investing that force with the ability to destroy elements of the adversary fleet and valuable land targets while redeploying for follow-on tasking.

The final imperative for Distributed Lethality is the impact that a more lethal and distributed surface force would have on conflict termination. Actual high-end warfare with a peer competitor is likely to be nasty business, and a good bit of that combat—while combatant forces remain generally well matched—will be conducted by the Navy’s submarine force (as part of a joint campaign).

Once the tide has turned and the adversary’s ISR complex is attrited to the point that a broader, combined arms naval campaign can be waged, lethal and dispersed surface forces – along with carrier strike groups—will play a tremendous role in taking the fight to the adversary, enabling joint operational access, tightening the noose of distant blockade, and generally accelerating the prospects for victory. Again—seizing this advantage requires a sea-change in thinking, one in which empowered (by doctrine and capability) commanding officers and crews, given broad mission type orders, exploit opportunities gained earlier in the campaign.

It is essential that defense planners thoroughly evaluate the imperative for distributed lethality and ensure that programs and budget submissions are consonant with these imperatives. Warfighters and planning staffs at the Naval Component Commands need to begin to think differently about how surface forces can and should be employed, and how hardening surface forces can gain valuable time early in a conflict while providing for effective conflict termination later in the fight.

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navyreco said:

Oshkosh L-ATV Tactical Vehicle Selected to Replace U.S. Army & Marine Corps HMMWV Fleet

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So HMMWV replacement is essentially a modified M-ATV MRAP.
Somehow, I really thouht Lockheed would clinch this one...

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kwaigonegin said:

When the most basic vehicle in inventory is essentially a small AFV there is a major problem. This vehicle will be average in almost everything but good in none. The weight, the size, the complexity defeats the purpose of the idea of such vehicles.

If the situation warrants it there are MRAPS and Bradleys.

There is nothing basic or certainly nothing light about the JLTV. We need to keep the basic transport.. well basic!.

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Naval Today said:

US Coast Guard rescue crews medically evacuated a 23-year-old male Tuesday at approximately 10:40 p.m from USS James E. Williams, 220 miles off the coast of Chatham.

Coast Guard 1st District Watchstanders received notification from Navy Fleet Forces that a crewmember had a medical condition that required immediate attention at approximately 9:45 p.m.

Coast Guard Air Station Cape Cod launched a MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter with a health care specialist aboard. In addition, an HC-144 fixed-wing airplane provided air support.

At approximately 11:15 p.m. the MH-60 Jayhawk landed on the deck of USS James E. Williams, refueled and recovered the patient along with a Navy escort.

The Jayhawk crew transferred the patient to awaiting EMS. His care was continued at Massachusetts General Hospital.

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