055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[Lethe]

The large combatant force structure thing is possible but it will also depend on how the USN modifies it's force structure. I expect the USN to induct larger combatants by the late 2020s to 2030s as well that will drastically change their force structure by mid century too.

Well, in the medium-term USN's force structure is becoming lighter by inducting increasing numbers of LCSs, and a future "Small Surface Combatant". In any case, mid-century is too distant for useful projections, I only chose it in my previous post to get away from the restrictions of the present and therefore illustrate my concept in a 'pure' form.

That said I think saying having a fleet "comparable" to XYZ's navy only really makes sense if we are talking in terms of overall capability, overall force structure or maybe overall tonnage. I don't see how anything else could reasonably work in that case.

I am referring to overall capability (although tonnage probably works as well, at least with respect to surface combatants and submarines), which is really a simplification of a range of capabilities in a range of contexts. I expect China to have greater total numbers of surface combatants (and submarines), whilst having fewer large combatants (and fewer nuclear submarines). In certain contexts -- i.e. within China's regional environment, where all her forces can (at least in theory) be brought to bear -- such would translate to a comparative advantage for China (in a direct comparison with USA). In other contexts, e.g. the South Atlantic, it would not. Note that this division of strengths and weaknesses reflects the differing strategic interests of the nations involved. Another way of looking at it is that China would have more "raw capability", but that capability would degrade more rapidly with distance from China than USN's does with distance from USA.

 

[Blitzo]

Well, in the medium-term USN's force structure is becoming lighter by inducting increasing numbers of LCSs, and a future "Small Surface Combatant". In any case, mid-century is too distant for useful projections, I only chose it in my previous post to get away from the restrictions of the present and therefore illustrate my concept in a 'pure' form.

Sure, fair enough. My caveat regarding the idea of the Chinese Navy becoming "heavier" by mid century relative to the USN was just to point out that the 2050s is indeed quite far away and by then the USN will likely also adopt a heavier class of surface vessel by 2030 (future surface combatant) to complement their Burkes and LCS/SSCs, so the Chinese Navy won't be the only one becoming more heavy between now and 2050

I am referring to overall capability (although tonnage probably works as well, at least with respect to surface combatants and submarines), which is really a simplification of a range of capabilities in a range of contexts. I expect China to have greater total numbers of surface combatants (and submarines), whilst having fewer large combatants (and fewer nuclear submarines). In certain contexts -- i.e. within China's regional environment, where all her forces can (at least in theory) be brought to bear -- such would translate to a comparative advantage for China (in a direct comparison with USA). In other contexts, e.g. the South Atlantic, it would not. Note that this division of strengths and weaknesses reflects the differing strategic interests of the nations involved. Another way of looking at it is that China would have more "raw capability", but that capability would degrade more rapidly with distance from China than USN's does with distance from USA.

I think capability and tonnage should include all major combat vessels, that is to say including carriers and potentially "F-35B" LHA/D carriers as well.

But yes, if one is talking about deployable combat capability in the westpac that include not only naval forces but also air and missile forces, then I think in the given timespan we're talking about the Chinese side may be able to achieve a relative advantage.

However, in terms of overall capability of each side's navy in an absolute sense I do not expect the Chinese Navy to be comparable to the USN, nor do I expect the overall Chinese navy to be comparable to the USN in terms of tonnage.

 

[Deino]

Was this already posted ?

 

[jobjed]

Was this already posted ?

View attachment 38902

Yes, but yours is clearer.

 

[timepass]

Was this already posted ?

View attachment 38902

By having a look at this dry dock, feels that they could accommodate 2 more 055s easily at the forward section...

 

[Iron Man]

Another way to look at it: PLAN is increasingly modeled after USN and it will only be the US that can seriously threaten China's security - it makes sense to benchmark PLAN against USN. It's not unreasonable to believe PLAN will aim at its fleet at about 1/2~2/3 of the USN with similar force structure. Specifically, my speculations are in medium term as defined above, the PLAN will have about 6 carriers, 50~60 modern cruisers/destroyers, 50~60 modern frigates (excluding 056's), 20~30 SSN, 10~12 SSBNs, 8~12 LPDs, 6~8 LHDs as well as other support ships.

I think 7 carriers is a more logistically sound number. This number will support 2 on station at all times whereas 6 carriers will leave gaps in coverage at certain times.

China should, and I think does, consider its needs and not model its fleet on USN.
Industrially China has the advantage that its naval yards are also building merchant vessels and can switch capacity and personnel, to some limited extend, from one side to the other ( except for the nuclear submarine building ). That's an advantage that USN doesn't have and which makes its ships more expensive.

It certainly does not model itself after the USN; otherwise it would have stopped building 054As long ago and focused its money on destroyers. The USN itself has of late recognized its own hubris in focusing on high displacement high end destroyers and cruisers to the neglect of frigate-sized ships and will soon refocus resources on the lower end, though Congressional machinations will probably make sure this is a less than efficient allocation of resources. IMO overall in the medium term the USN's average tonnage per surface combatant will actually shrink. Its total number of large surface combatants will also probably shrink when the Flight I/II Burkes retire en masse in the mid 2020s and 2030s and the non-upgraded Ticos start retiring by the end of this decade with no replacement planned until the 2030s, with build rates almost certainly not matching retirement rates; same goes for Flight III builds vs Flight I/II retirements. As for the PLAN I think a reasonable and sustainable annual build rate for surface combatants would be something like 1-2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 4 frigates, 1 SSN, and 1-2 SSKs. This combined with its current burst production of surface combatants will make the PLAN a near-peer to the USN by the middle of the century, assuming nothing catastrophic happens (which it probably will).

 

[Blitzo]

I think 7 carriers is a more logistically sound number. This number will support 2 on station at all times whereas 6 carriers will leave gaps in coverage at certain times.

Elaborate in terms of where/what the station is? i.e.: in blue water such as the pacific beyond first island chain or Indian Ocean, vs non blue water like just being stationed within first island chain?

I imagine 6 carriers could provide 2 carriers on station at blue water distances (generally for blue water deployments I think it's 3 ships needed to have one deployed; 1 in refit or maintenance, 1 in training, 1 deployed), but of course 7 carriers would help to ease the 3 to 1 cycle a little bit.


That said, I don't imagine China would be interested in deploying more than 1 carrier in blue water during peacetime in the medium term, and instead retain most of their carriers near home/westpac either in a state of local water/first island chain patrols/deployments, or under training/surge readiness, or of course the much needed refit/maintenance that some will have to be in.

With 6 ships, in peacetime I envision 1 carrier being constantly on station in blue water for a long duration deployment, with 5 carriers at home. Based on that kind of peacetime baseline, I consider two deployment scenarios. One is to be able to either deploy 1 carrier to blue water for an equally long duration deployment... The other is to be able to surge deploy up to 3 carriers (out of 5 carriers at home) exclusively near home waters for a short duration, high intensity conflict.
In the first deployment scenario, it would be a situation where China needs the capability of two carriers either for a single relatively expansive low to medium intensity operation, or for two less expansive low to medium intensity operations. The foe in this case would likely be a non-state actor or perhaps a low capability state actor, but not one of high military technology or capabilty.
In the second deployment scenario, it would be a situation where China has to face a high intensity, likely to be short duration conflict against a high tech and powerful foe near China's peripheries. In this scenario, the lone single carrier in blue water would either be recalled home in the lead up to conflict breaking out, or if it is unable to go back home it would either try to conduct independent operations near whichever region it is stationed at, or more likely try to find a neutral port to stay in and avoid hostilities, or at worst it would be sunk.

Obviously with 7 carriers or if we go even higher, it will allow a greater flexibility and greater capacity to either deploy ships to blue water or to waters near home, during peacetime, during a blue water low/medium intensity extended operation, or during a regional high intensity conflict.
However, in the immediate to medium term future I foresee China to retain most of its carrier fleet at home, and only occasionally deploying a carrier for temporary blue water operations/exercises, or even once China has 6 carriers or so in service, I expect the greater majority to keep their peacetime presence near Chinese waters rather than blue water.

 

[Iron Man]

Elaborate in terms of where/what the station is? i.e.: in blue water such as the pacific beyond first island chain or Indian Ocean, vs non blue water like just being stationed within first island chain?

This question is essentially irrelevant, especially if we are talking about Westpac or even Indian Ocean. Transit time compared to time on station, maintenance, training, etc. is miniscule, a matter of days compared to several months for the other categories. At a leisurely speed of 18 knots it takes less than 9 days to sail from Hainan to the middle of the Arabian Sea, and less than 10 days if you want to stop at Gwadar. It takes less than 5 days to sail from Hainan to right off the coast of Guam, 4 days to sail to within sortie range.

If you are talking about an "emergency" recall, Gwadar to Hainan can be accomplished in 7 days at 25 knots, or if you want to ditch the 901 you can shave the travel time to just over 6 days at 28 knots if your logistics planning is right (i.e. have an oiler meet the CBG on the way back).

With 6 ships, in peacetime I envision 1 carrier being constantly on station in blue water for a long duration deployment, with 5 carriers at home. Based on that kind of peacetime baseline, I consider two deployment scenarios. One is to be able to either deploy 1 carrier to blue water for an equally long duration deployment... The other is to be able to surge deploy up to 3 carriers (out of 5 carriers at home) exclusively near home waters for a short duration, high intensity conflict.
In the first deployment scenario, it would be a situation where China needs the capability of two carriers either for a single relatively expansive low to medium intensity operation, or for two less expansive low to medium intensity operations. The foe in this case would likely be a non-state actor or perhaps a low capability state actor, but not one of high military technology or capabilty.
In the second deployment scenario, it would be a situation where China has to face a high intensity, likely to be short duration conflict against a high tech and powerful foe near China's peripheries. In this scenario, the lone single carrier in blue water would either be recalled home in the lead up to conflict breaking out, or if it is unable to go back home it would either try to conduct independent operations near whichever region it is stationed at, or more likely try to find a neutral port to stay in and avoid hostilities, or at worst it would be sunk.

Obviously with 7 carriers or if we go even higher, it will allow a greater flexibility and greater capacity to either deploy ships to blue water or to waters near home, during peacetime, during a blue water low/medium intensity extended operation, or during a regional high intensity conflict.
However, in the immediate to medium term future I foresee China to retain most of its carrier fleet at home, and only occasionally deploying a carrier for temporary blue water operations/exercises, or even once China has 6 carriers or so in service, I expect the greater majority to keep their peacetime presence near Chinese waters rather than blue water.

As I said, deploying to "blue waters" vs near waters is a non-issue for the PLAN, whether for active deployment or for surge purposes. It's just not very relevant. There certainly doesn't need to be any kind of distinction in terms of deployment patterns to either. You would have to intellectually spindoctor a scenario where a few days makes all the difference in your "short duration" high intensity conflict. Carriers operate on an on-station, maintenance/reduced readiness, and training/surgeable cycle, each of which are roughly equal in duration if using a 24-month cycle (currently USN carriers are on a 32-month cycle so the times are not as equal; in addition, carriers are routinely deployed for 1-2 months longer than originally scheduled). One carrier is always in dry dock undergoing a multi-year upgrade. This carrier is the reason 7 carriers is more logistically desirable than 6. 7 allows for 2 on station with 2 more surged on short notice, as in 30 days or less per USN definition of "surgeable". Reduced readiness surge capability is defined as ready to sail in 90 days or less; these are the ships in maintenance/refueling that have just come off of deployment.

 

[Blitzo]

This question is essentially irrelevant, especially if we are talking about Westpac or even Indian Ocean. Transit time compared to time on station, maintenance, training, etc. is miniscule, a matter of days compared to several months for the other categories. At a leisurely speed of 18 knots it takes less than 9 days to sail from Hainan to the middle of the Arabian Sea, and less than 10 days if you want to stop at Gwadar. It takes less than 5 days to sail from Hainan to right off the coast of Guam, 4 days to sail to within sortie range.

If you are talking about an "emergency" recall, Gwadar to Hainan can be accomplished in 7 days at 25 knots, or if you want to ditch the 901 you can shave the travel time to just over 6 days at 28 knots if your logistics planning is right (i.e. have an oiler meet the CBG on the way back).

That is true, however I suppose what is implicit and unsaid in "blue water deployment" is that the length of time for such a deployment would be on the order of quite a few months, versus deployments near China's home waters/first island chain which would likely not be anywhere near the length of being at sea continuously for the same time.
The idea being that carriers deployed in near waters with the associated short at sea deployment lengths would be more able to do surge operations, where having a large number of carriers that are deployable at once, even if it is during a relatively brief period, would be desirable. OTOH, if more carriers are deployed in blue water, it is likely that those carriers would be at sea continuously for a longer duration and would've been away from home naval ports for a more extended period, and overall reducing the number of carriers that can be surged.

As I said, deploying to "blue waters" vs near waters is a non-issue for the PLAN, whether for active deployment or for surge purposes. It's just not very relevant. You would have to intellectually spindoctor a scenario where a few days makes all the difference in your "short duration" high intensity conflict. There certainly doesn't need to be any kind of distinction in terms of deployment patterns to either. Carriers operate on an on-station, maintenance/reduced readiness, and training/surgeable cycle, each of which are roughly equal in duration if using a 24-month cycle (currently USN carriers are on a 32-month cycle so the times are not as equal; in addition, carriers are routinely deployed for 1-2 months longer than originally scheduled). One carrier is always in dry dock undergoing a multi-year upgrade. This carrier is the reason 7 carriers is more logistically desirable than 6. 7 allows for 2 on station with 2 more surged on short notice, as in 30 days or less per USN definition of "surgeable". Reduced readiness surge capability is defined as ready to sail in 90 days or less; these are the ships in maintenance/refueling that have just come off of deployment.

So the idea of having 7 carriers rather than 6 is to account for another one undergoing a multi-year upgrade? Okay, that's a fair idea.

As for deployment to blue water vs near waters, I think implicit in that as I wrote above, is that a blue water deployment is likely to be more of a multi month long deployment virtually constantly at sea and quite far from a home naval port with their associated support facilities, whereas I do not imagine near water deployments to be anywhere near as long in terms of continuously being at sea nor spend anywhere near as much time away from home naval ports.
Deployment patterns for blue water vs near water IMO is thus important because during peacetime I think each may have different duration of being continuously at sea and length of time away from home naval ports, thus having quite different requirements in terms of their overall maintenance demands and access to support facilities, and with different ability to surge carriers for a westpac/high intensity conflict scenario.


[Also, come on why do you use the word "spindoctor"? It's such an accusatory word and implies there's some kind of malice or ulterior motive to my conclusion or logic. I'm not too offended by this choice of word but it's a bit confusing because I'm not sure if you think I have some kind of ulterior motive or if it's just an unintentional word choice.]

 

[Iron Man]

That is true, however I suppose what is implicit and unsaid in "blue water deployment" is that the length of time for such a deployment would be on the order of quite a few months, versus deployments near China's home waters/first island chain which would likely not be anywhere near the length of being at sea continuously for the same time.
The idea being that carriers deployed in near waters with the associated short at sea deployment lengths would be more able to do surge operations, where having a large number of carriers that are deployable at once, even if it is during a relatively brief period, would be desirable. OTOH, if more carriers are deployed in blue water, it is likely that those carriers would be at sea continuously for a longer duration and would've been away from home naval ports for a more extended period, and overall reducing the number of carriers that can be surged.

So the idea of having 7 carriers rather than 6 is to account for another one undergoing a multi-year upgrade? Okay, that's a fair idea.

As for deployment to blue water vs near waters, I think implicit in that as I wrote above, is that a blue water deployment is likely to be more of a multi month long deployment virtually constantly at sea and quite far from a home naval port with their associated support facilities, whereas I do not imagine near water deployments to be anywhere near as long in terms of continuously being at sea nor spend anywhere near as much time away from home naval ports.
Deployment patterns for blue water vs near water IMO is thus important because during peacetime I think each may have different duration of being continuously at sea and length of time away from home naval ports, thus having quite different requirements in terms of their overall maintenance demands and access to support facilities, and with different ability to surge carriers for a westpac/high intensity conflict scenario.

Nah, I don't see any reason why a near seas deployment should have to involve any less time than a far seas deployment or spend any significantly less time at sea. There is also no point to actively "deploy" a carrier to just mostly sit at a home port. Who even does that? A near seas deployment would involve the southern part of the SCS, the Philippine Sea, or the east side of the Ryukyu Islands. Any closer and there is no point; you would have land-based fighter coverage already. A carrier's job is power projection, not baby-sitting its home naval base. That's just below the level of usefulness as compared to deploying a carrier into the Taiwan Strait.

[Also, come on why do you use the word "spindoctor"? It's such an accusatory word and implies there's some kind of malice or ulterior motive to my conclusion or logic. I'm not too offended by this choice of word but it's a bit confusing because I'm not sure if you think I have some kind of ulterior motive or if it's just an unintentional word choice.]

Notice that I used the phrase "you would have to", not "you have been trying to". And that is in fact what you would have to do in order to make a few days matter in a conflict scenario in which more distantly deployed carriers are somehow less available to the PLAN than nearby deployed carriers.