Thunder Run and Battle for Grozny

In the taking of Baghdad in 2003, two armored battalions and an infantry battalion conducted two operations that effectively ended Iraqi resistance in Baghdad. These two operations - Thunder Runs, consisted of armored columns driving straight through the South western corner of Baghdad, were immensely successful. The first Thunder Run linked up US troops at the Airport with troops south of the city. The second Thunder run captured Saddam's Palace and held it overnight, effectively holding off any Iraqi counterattacks and crushed resistance in the city.

In the First Battle of Grozny in the First Chechen War, the Russians initially planned for four armoured columns to be thrust into central Grozny, capture the Presidential Palace, and seize the city. This goal was somewhat similar to the US objective in the second Thunder Run, to capture and hold Saddam's Palace. However, Russian forces were bogged down and slowly annihilated inside the city as Chechen forces and its RPG teams deployed to ambush the Russian armour. In the end, when the Russians came back to Grozny, they had to fight a Stalingrad-style house by house battle to win Grozny.

In both operations, the attacker enjoyed total firepower superiority and air superiority. In both operations, the attacker carried out a bold plan of armoured thrusts through the hostile city. What exactly caused such staggering difference in results? Was it the broad streets and low-rise buildings of Baghdad that favoured armour more than Grozny? Was it the tactics used by the Iraqis versus the Chechens?

Obcession said:

In both operations, the attacker enjoyed total firepower superiority and air superiority. In both operations, the attacker carried out a bold plan of armoured thrusts through the hostile city. What exactly caused such staggering difference in results? Was it the broad streets and low-rise buildings of Baghdad that favoured armour more than Grozny? Was it the tactics used by the Iraqis versus the Chechens?

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Great thread. There's not enough real tactical discussion on this forum, and someone's got to remind the fanboys that equipment doesn't actually count for that much.

I've read Thunder Run, about the 3rd Infantry Division's (the 3rd IIRC) successful seizure of Saddam's palaces, and I've read pretty extensively about the various battles of Grozny. I think that there's a couple of important differences between the two.

First off, the forces involved were entirely different. In Baghdad, the US forces were far more professionally trained and led. Their equipment was superior to the equipment the Russians had in Grozny, and was in far better condition. They had better intelligence about what to expect (if anything they were told to expect more resistance than actually showed up). At Gronzy, the Russian forces were made up almost entirely of poorly trained conscripts who hadn't been payed and were led by officers that were wholly incompetent. The Russian forces suffered from pretty high levels of drunkenness and corruption. Their equipment wasn't in very good shape and the conscripts were sent into the city after being told that resistance would be light,and they didn't have clear orders. M1 Abrams and M2/M3 Bradleys are also far more able to take hit from an RPG than T-72s and BMP-1s. That's just a fact.

So the Americans were very well prepared for the battle and the Russians were not at all prepared.

The defending forces were also quite different. The Iraqis had very low morale, most of their forces melted away when confronted with the oncoming American tanks, or tried to engage them with small arms, got sprayed with coax and 25mm rounds and then ran away. The Baathist leadership tried to control the forces defending Baghdad centrally. They could not; there was very little communication and coordination in the defense of Baghdad. The Chechens didn't try to centrally control the defense. Instead they used their lack of coordination to their advantage, and the Russians had to deal with dozens of largely independent groups of Chechen fighters attack from all directions. Chechen morale, equipment, and training were all at least marginally better than that of the Iraqis. Many of the Chechens had been trained in the Soviet army.

I think the terrain of the cities does have something to do with it as well. Baghdad doesn't have very many tall buildings, so the problems those pose to tanks were less severe. Also the US foresaw the problems that complicated highway junctions could cause, and secured them with infantry to allow the tanks to pass freely.

Ultimately the biggest difference is the quality of the attacking forces. I'm not saying that this is a simple case of "America good, everyone else bad". If the US had been up against the level and skill of resistance the Chechens provided, they would have suffered much heavier casualties. The Russian Army in 1993 and 1994 was in terrible shape, and has vastly improved since. Also the Russians went first, so the Americans had the opportunity to consider the lessons of Grozny.

I think your absolutely right! I respect the courage and toughness of the Russian soldier. I think it was the only bright spot in the battle of Grozny. Baghdad was more a series of heavy skirmishes then a battle. Fallujah would have been a better comparison to Grozny.

With the high casualty on the first time, no wonder the Russian chosen to flatten the city with artillary on the second time.

Excellent points Finn as usual, however, I think something else you might have considered was the comparative weapons available to the opposing sides.

During Grozny, the Chechens were equipped with weapons that were standard issue for the Russians themselves. During the second Gulf War, the Iraqi gear was decades obsolete and had no chance of harming American armor other than through sheer blind luck.

Had the Iraqis been equipped with anti-tank weapons capable of penetrating M1s or the Chechens were restricted to weapons that could not reliable take out T72s, I dare say the results would have been a little different.

PS, something else I remember reading about was that at the time, the Russian T72s had no back up power generator (that's OTTOMH, and its been many years since I read it so the exact bit of kit might be misremembered), but the point is that meant that Russian tanks had to keep their engines on at all times. This with poor co-ordination and rebels hitting logistic support meant a lot of T72s ran out of fuel and had to be abandoned, or were attacked when they were out of fuel and effectively defenseless. The article I read claimed that a significant proportion of the total number of Russian tanks lost was a result of this. So the total numbers may be misleading when assessing just how well/poorly the Russians faired in combat.

I think the defenders of Grozny also put more effort in their undertaking. Defending the capital in that small country was the make or brake point from the beginning, so the defenses were set up there with some focus.
In Iraq, however, much of the Iraqi army was already mauled in the previous weeks of combat and there was simply nothing much left to put up any organized defense of the city. There was no insurgency yet, the remaining Iraqi Army units were simply overrun, if they chose to even stand.
Fallujah is an interesting topic here, I think. It was not defended by a conventional army, but completely by an organized insurgency, wich in the end led to a guerrila like fight to wich Grozny was closer in style than to the Thunder Runs.
I've read local commandars actually wanted targeted raids on suspected insurgent leadres initially. Higher HQ rather decided to do a full scale assault to effectively establish controll over the city. With an inconclusive end, the events led to the Second Battle of Fallujah half a year later.
This time the city was heaviliy defended with lots of weapons, booby traps and strongholds. Only after intensive ISR (something the Russian's definitely lacked in Grozny) and an opening barage of Artillery, Mortar and Aerial fire (again most likely less effective in Chechnia) did a diversion and then the actual assault begin. As was to be exspected in MOUT, it resulted in very intense fighting, with some describing it as the bloodiest fighting for US forces since Vietnam.
Well coordinated, the operation was more or less successfull, though still costly. Luckily, the defenders still had no state of the art Anti-Tank weapons, otherwise it would have been even more difficult. And the assaulters I guess would have had to rely more on infantry and light, quick vehicles.
I believe that would have meant less crushing the enemy, but more bleeding it out with snipers hiding in buildings and slowly suppressing enemy movement in the citiy to allow street by street clearing.

Scratch said:

Well coordinated, the operation was more or less successfull, though still costly. Luckily, the defenders still had no state of the art Anti-Tank weapons, otherwise it would have been even more difficult. And the assaulters I guess would have had to rely more on infantry and light, quick vehicles.
I believe that would have meant less crushing the enemy, but more bleeding it out with snipers hiding in buildings and slowly suppressing enemy movement in the citiy to allow street by street clearing.

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If you watch combat videos from Fallujah, you can see that the Americans used tanks and armored vehicles very conservatively. They moved slowly and were always totally surrounded by infantry to the rear and sides. To engage targets, they peeked out from around corners and then blasted buildings that were providing resistance. Then the infantry would go forward and clear. Then the tank moves up and blasts/suppresses the next building, allowing the infantry to move up, clear it, then do it again. That's how you win an urban battle.

"The Russian Army in 1993 and 1994 was in terrible shape, and has vastly improved since" (Grozny attack).

Why do you make this statement? Do you have links, to first-hand sources, that can prove the Russian Army is in great shape compared to '93? Their recent attempt to create the beginnings of a professional Army have failed completely. I understand they have TWO, count 'em, two, fully-equipped full-strength Army divisions, that's it! And those sit @ Moscow, in case of rebellion or coup, as the Tsars always did. I think the Russian Army is in just terrible shape, not ready to field even one Brigade to help their Ossetian allies; who asked for help, & got none as the Russians really couldn't provide even a small force....

firefox007 said:

"The Russian Army in 1993 and 1994 was in terrible shape, and has vastly improved since" (Grozny attack).

Why do you make this statement? Do you have links, to first-hand sources, that can prove the Russian Army is in great shape compared to '93? Their recent attempt to create the beginnings of a professional Army have failed completely. I understand they have TWO, count 'em, two, fully-equipped full-strength Army divisions, that's it! And those sit @ Moscow, in case of rebellion or coup, as the Tsars always did. I think the Russian Army is in just terrible shape, not ready to field even one Brigade to help their Ossetian allies; who asked for help, & got none as the Russians really couldn't provide even a small force....

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Did you miss that whole Georgia war or what?

solarz said:

Did you miss that whole Georgia war or what?

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That war was fought with masses of poorly-trained conscripts who were promised by Putin they would not be sent to a war zone. They were not ready to fight, were not properly equipped, and did not fare well in the fighting. Russian soldiers are often not paid on time, or not paid for months, endure savage beatings at the hands of the older soldiers, suffer greatly from alcoholism and health neglect. That the Russian Army can attack and eventually wear down the tiny Georgian army, is no proof of their fighting abilities. Their Army is in the sorriest shape it has ever been in; conscription is widely hated & avoided, or bribed out of.