The Tank Troop/Platoon: Three, Four, or Five?

Norfolk

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During the First World War, tanks were typically organized into Sections of 3 tanks each. The Tank Section typically operated in the following manner: leading the infantry, the Tank Section would approach the enemy entrenchments, at which point one of the Section's three tanks would peel off and drive parallel to the trench, shelling or machine-gunning its length while doing so. Upon reaching the second line of enemy entrenchments, the second tank in the Section would likewise peel away and shell or machine-gun the trench along its length, and so on with the third tank in the Section.

In the Second World War, the British Army organized its tanks into Troops of 3tanks each, and trained its crews to fire at a rapid rate while on the move. Wartime experience, however (and given the lack of reliable main armament stablization for fire control systems at the time - for those few tanks that actually had it fitted) compelled the British to increase to a 4 tank Troop. The Soviets similarly organized their tanks into Platoons of 3 tanks each, and the Russian Army (with some exceptions) continues the practice to this day. Both the German Army and the US Army (and USMC) organized their tanks into Platoons of 5 tanks each, and the latter did so (for units still using the M-60) until the 1990's. Since then, however, the German Army now resorts to 3tanks in a Platoon (as Israel is doing, though it used to employ 4 or 5 tanks per Platoon), and the British Army seems to be considering or even resorting to it as well. The US Army changed to 4 tank Platoon with the M-1 in the 1980's.

One reason (amongst others) that 4 or 5 tanks were typically assigned to each Tank Troop/Platoon was to give it an internal capacity for fire-and-movement, that is, to allow one section of 2 or 3 tanks to take cover and to maintain suppressive fire on known or suspected enemy targets while the other section of 2 or 3 tanks moved. The latter section would take up covered firing positions and lay down suppressive fires while the former section moved, and so on. And of course, this system of fire-and-movement could be used by teams of 2 tanks, one covering while the other moved, etc. Despite the ability to fire accurately while moving at a relatively "high" speed cross-country, modern tanks atill find it useful to employ fire-and-movement. Another reason for 4 and especially 5 tanks per Troop/Platoon was to give it a capacity to sustain losses while still remaining effective.

But moves since the Second World War (such as in the German Army, going from 5 to 3 tanks per Platoon) and especially in more recent years that have seen many armies drop the size of their Tank Troops/Platoons from as many as 5 to as few as 3 tanks each have often been justified on tactical grounds. When the M-1 entered service in the US Army in the 1980's, it was considered to provide so much of an improvement upon the M-60 that 4 instead of 5 tanks per Platoon could be gotten away with. The Israeli Army has traditionally featured 4 or 5 tanks in its Platoons, but is now reducing that to three in order to increase the number of tanks on the actual firing line in each Tank Company. I am unclear as to how reducing the number of tanks per platoon will actually accomplish this.:confused: By reducing to 3 tanks per Troop/Platoon, such units lose much of their internal capacity for fire-and-movement in the face of the enemy.

Are these reductions in the sizes of the Tank Troop/Platoon tactically justified? Has the ability to fire accurately while on the move skewed some Armies' perceptions as to the tactical usefulness of fire-and-movement for Armour units?
 

Norfolk

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There is a good deal more at stake in the issue of whether a Tank Troop/Platoon has 3,4, or 5 tanks than even its ability to conduct internal fire-and-movement or to sustain losses in battle. There are at least two other critical issues involved: fire control (and planning), and arcs of fire (and observation). In addition, some expansion on the subject of fire-and-movement is also necessary.

The Tank Troop/Platoon lays its fires (ideally) according to fire control orders given by the Troop/Platoon commander, who is also responsible for the pre-planning of fires when it is possible for him to do so (ideally always). The number of tanks he has at his disposal greatly affects this. With only 3 tanks, the Troop/Platoon may not be capable of successfully engaging and destroying the enemy by itself, and may require a second Troop/Platoon to assist it. Therefore, a job that is possible for a Troop/Platoon of 4 or 5 tanks, once assigned to a unit of only 3 tanks, may either have to assume an otherwise unecessary level of risk in undertaking its assigned tasks, or the operation may become in effect an Armoured Squadron/Tank Company level task, with at least two 3 tank units being required to accomplish the task. The very idea that a 3 tank unit can do the same job as a 5 tank unit (the Israeli Army for example, or the German Army of post WWII compared to the German Army of WWII) strains credulity. Curiously, while many Western countries are reducing the asize of their Tank Troops/Platoons, the PLA seems to be adopting the 4-tank Platoon in at least some units, rather than the 3-tank Platoon it had originally used.

For example, say two Tank Troops/Platoons equipped with the same tanks manned by crews with the same level of competence, and all other things being equal, are each given the same mission. Both advance/move-to-contact to their assigned objective, and each encounters an enemy tank unit along the way. Rather than a meeting engagement (whose obvious characeristics would place the 3 tank unit in a more difficult position than a 5 tank unit, being greatly reduced in its capacity for internal fire-and-movement to allow it either to seek to break contact and withdraw, or to either attack by fire or even to assault) let's suppose that the two troops each come upon an enemy tank column from the flank. Even when they have the advantage of surprise, having only 3 tanks considerably reduces that advantage compared to having 5 tanks when engaging an enemy tank column the size of a Troop/Platoon or for that matter Squadron/Company. The number of tanks the Troop/Platoon commander has affects the ability of the tanks to carry out his fire control orders before the enemy tank column can react effectively - it may even affect the fire control order given and the pattern of fire used. Having fewer tanks also increases the likelihood of the Troop/Platoon commander himself having to attend to his own crew instread of having more time to control his Troop/Platoon. It also increases the likelihood of the commander being killed, with the accompanying potential for loss of control in the Troop/Platoon, even temporarily.

With only 3 tanks, a Troop/Platoon commander may have to either forgoe or to expose his command to otherwise unnecessary risk some pre-planned fires that a unit of 4 or 5 tanks could use. For example, say a Tank Company is assigned to hold a terrain feature against an enemy Armoured Force. The axis of advance of the enemy force appears to be a highway that passes between two hills or ridges, one running roughly parallel to the highway, and one running partially perpendicular, partially diagonal, to said highway. One troop/platoon of tanks takes up a hull-down position on the parallel hill/ridge, while another takes up a position more or less directly across from it on the other hill/ridge (partially perpendicular/diagonal to the highway). A third troop/platoon takes up a position on the near end of one of the two hills/ridges. Depending upon whether the Squadron/Company has 3 (German Army, US Army, USMC), or 4 Troops/Platoons (Australian/British/Canadian Armies), the pre-planned fires (and therefore the fire control orders and the chosen distribution of fires used) will also be affected.

The plan is to engage the enemy armoured force with the two troops/platoons in positions closest to the approaching enemy force ideally in a crossfire at at least two different points, before the troop/platoon in reserve farthest from the enemy opens fire the the second fire point, permitting the most exposed of the two troops/platoons to break contact and move around behind the hill/ridge it was positioned on, and assume a blocking position astride the highway to the rear of the two hills/ridges that are adjcent to the highway (the enemy axis of advance) on either side. The fire control orders will specify a particular pattern of fires to be used by each platoon at each pre-planned fire point. Now, 3 tanks will be able to engage an enemy Squadron/Company (10-19 tanks) with greater difficulty than 4 or 5tanks, even if they have the advantage of surprise. Depending upon the fire pattern used (and possible given the number of tanks available), the 3 tank platoon will only have one tank each to enagage the furthest and nearest enemy tanks, and one tank (probably the commander's own) to engaged the middle tanks. Had 4 or 5 tanks been available, the commander could have weighted his fire pattern by assigning at least a second tank to engaging the middle targets (thus relieving some of the pressure on the commander and giving him a little more opportunity to control his command, as well as decreasing the likelihood of his being engaged by the enemy's middle tanks and being killed), and a fifth tank could have weighted the fires at either end, wherever the commander saw fit. Plus, 4 or 5 tanks is that may more dispersed targets for the enemy to locate and react to, whereas three tanks are much easier to deal with. Finally, when the time comes to break contact and to maneouvre to a blocking position in fulfillment of the Squadron's/ Company's plan, the 3 tank Troop/Platoon has little internal fire-and-movement capacity to cover its own withdrawal and must depend largely upon the other troops/platoons in its sqadron/company to do so (even as they are engaged in their own fights). The 4 or 5 tank unit however, can cover its own withdrawal in order to fulfill the Squadron/Company battle plan and move to its blocking position largely unaided.

As for advance/movement-to-contact, the 3 tank Troop/Platoon has greater difficulty covering its arcs of fire and observation than a 4 or 5 tank Troop/Platoon. In column, the lead tank will cover the front, while the next two tanks will cover opposite sides, and the last tank, the rear. A fifth tank can weight the most likely direction of encounter with the enemy, or relieve the troop/platoon commander of sole responsibility for one of the arcs and allow the commander to concentrate more on control of his command. A 3 tank unit, of course, allows none of this. The lead tank in a column takes the front arc, while the other two must cover both sides and the rear. In wedge- or v-formation, the 3 tank platoon gives effective coverage to the front and side, but so do the 4 and 5 tank units, and loss of one tank does not necessarily expose the rest of the troop/platoon on that side. Of course, the same conditions for internal fire-and-movement apply here as mentioned elsewhere.

Clearly, the 3 tank Troop/Platoon is tactically inferior to the 4 or 5 tank Troop/Platoon. That said, the 3 tank unit is not necessarily tactically useless, and a Tank Section (not Troop/Platoon) of 3 tanks each (as originally used by the British Army in the First World War) has some real merits. The Soviet and now Russian Armies still use (and some PLA units also still use) a 3-tank Platoon, but as part of a 10-tank company that performs as more of a large tank platoon than a tank company. More on that next time.
 

zraver

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4 tanks as used by the US and some Russian formations is the ideal. It keeps the magic 2 tanks per section 2 sections per platoon set up so everyone has a buddy and 4 tanks with 4 man crews can dish out platoon maintenance functions like ramming tubes and blowing V-packs quickly.

The maneuver you talked out is the bounding over watch, and there is also the leaping over watch where the tanks never stop moving they just alternate which section is dashing so the formation is never stopped.

One other thing about the base 2x4 set up is the huge number of tanks in a US Battalion. each company has 3x 4 tank platoons and a 2 tank command element. Each battalion also has 4 companies and a command element for a total of 58 tanks. A 3 tank battalion running 3 companies of 11 tanks each with a 2 tank command element will only field 35 platforms making it far less durable and less powerful.
 

Norfolk

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I very much tend to agree with you zraver. The PLA, the US Army and USMC, and now the Russians (seem to be adopting, at least to a limited degree) prefer the 4-tank platoon, and there is no question that it works nicely (that said, I have to express a personal preference for the German 5-tank platoon in a 4-platoon tank company through 1943, but I'm an infantry man, not a tanker, so I must defer to those who are the pros in this regard).

At the end of my previous post I stated that a number of Armies use the 3-tank platoon (the PLA and Russia still use it, but are converting to the 4-tank platoon) while previous users of the 4- and 5-tank platoons (Britain, Germany, and Israel) are converting to the 3-tank platoon. I would argue that the 3-tank "platoon" is really a return to the old British Army tank section of World War I with its 3 tanks. After all, the 3-tank unit only has internal fire-and-movement capability to the extent that two tanks cover while a third either moves, or if all three are moving, one tank dashes ahead of the other two which are moving more slowly.

- By the way zraver, thanks for telling me about "Leaping Overwatch", I had never even heard of it before; I was used to the two that the Infantry use - Travelling Overwatch (exclusive of just plain Travelling) and Bounding Overwatch. -

Anyway, I have to admit that I am somewhat intrigued by the 3-tank platoon concept, particularly as it relates to the organization and tactics of the tank company. One of the articles (and this is an excerpt from it) that I have read about this was "The Merits of a Four-Tank Platoon in Urban Combat" from Defense Update.com - it's short, sweet, and to the point, but interesting:

Quote:

In most modern armies, the standard post WWII five tank platoon organization has been changed to either four or three vehicles per platoon/troop. The original concept behind the five tank platoon was to have two separate fire and movement sections, with the platoon leader joining one at will, as required by the combat situation. Postwar developments envisaged not only a shortage of tank crews, but also a significant reduction in funding, both requiring restructuring of tactical sub-units. Moreover, the technological advances made in modern battle tank design have allowed a reduction in the number of vehicles, while maintaining the same, or even superior battlefield performance.

The Israeli army, which has had substantial experience with tank warfare in the post WWII period, has shifted from five to four and finally three tanks per basic platoon, in order to increase the number of gun tubes deployed per tank company. The original IDF tank unit structure, which was developed for open desert tank warfare, was an 11 tank company (3 tanks x 3 platoons + 2 HQ tanks) allowing IDF tank units to have 8 gun tubes firing and three tanks moving at all times. This structure proved particularly suitable for high attrition tank versus tank engagements. Under the current IDF reorganization program, there have been some thoughts of reducing the Merkava Mk4 companies to seven vehicles. (1 HQ vehicle) This structure, made possible by these tank’s advanced technology and enhanced capabilities, is being considered because it would allow two tank sections to operate autonomously.
The US Army has adopted the four tank platoon, rejecting the three-tank solution in order to maintain the two sections of two tanks support mode.

The German Bundeswehr has shifted from four tanks in its platoons and 13 Leopard 2A4 tanks (4 tanks x 3 platoons + 1 command tank) per company used under Army Structure 3, to its new 13 Leopard 2A6 company with only three tanks in each platoon (3 tanks x 4 platoons + 1 command tank) in its latest organization (Army Structure 5N).


The basic Russian T-72/80/90 tank platoon is still their traditional three vehicle formation, however, there are reports of a new concept being examined, under which a five AFV platoon will be established, with four tanks and a BMPT as the fifth vehicle. The BMPT is an entirely new class of vehicle known as a Tank Assistance Combat Vehicle. The Russians claim that this vehicle, by supporting the MBTs, increases their combat efficiency by 30%. The BMPT deals with all secondary targets, allowing the MBTs to focus on engaging the ‘heavy’ targets, which their main armament is designed for. The BMPT, based on T-72/-90 hulls, mounts an array of advanced anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons. These weapons systems include eight launchers mounting a combination of AT-9 Ataka guided anti-tank missiles or Igla short range air defense missiles, 30mm automatic cannon, multiple 30mm automatic grenade launchers and 7.62 machine guns.

Combat experience in urban fighting has clearly demonstrated the advantages of the four tank platoon. Fighting through narrow alleys, where tanks operate in two tank sections supporting infantry, a three tank platoon would not only be inadequate, but also uneconomical, as the remaining single vehicle would in most cases be left behind, or not effectively used by the infantry commander, making it highly vulnerable to enemy tank killer teams. The alternative would be to use all three tanks of the platoon together, which would probably provide more firepower and more control problems than necessary. In addition, although the infantry commander may have the best intentions, his true function, and the one he has spent the most time training for, is controlling his own troops, not a tank or group of tanks temporarily assigned to his unit.
From a purely economical viewpoint, reverting to the four tank platoon and 13 tanks per company would eliminate the second HQ tank, leaving a single tank for the company commander. The second HQ vehicle could be replaced by an APC or AIFV, capable of fighting and moving with the company, but with superior C4I facilities on board.

The British army tank squadron has a 14 tank structure with four troops (platoons) of 3 Challenger II tanks and two tanks in the HQ section. These four troop squadrons give the squadron leaders the choice of forming two-tank sections, although in some cases with the two tanks coming from different platoons, without creating too much degradation in the squadron command structure, or leaving single tanks vulnerable, as might happen with a three-tank by three platoon company.

-Unquote

I find the Israeli proposal to possibly reduce to a 7-tank company of 2 3-tank platoons and an HQ tank very intersting, especially as it seems to be a throwback to the original Germany Army 7-tank platoon of the mid-1930's. Next, the new British armoured squadron of 4 3-tank troops and 2 HQ tanks even more interesting, as not only does it, in effect, lend itself to forming 2 7-tank "platoons" (a la proposed Israeli style) each composed of 2 3-tank "sections" and an HQ tank, but in effect still allows for the creation of ad hoc 4-tank platoons as the squadron commander sees fit. Very interesting.

Such a tank company could place 2 3-tank "sections" forward with 1 HQ tank (organized in effect into an ad hoc "platoon" of 7 tanks), and keep the other half in reserve, or bound them past one another on the offense, or alternatively organize itself into 3 4-tank platoons and resort to sending one platoon forward with the other two behind in the offense.

In the defense, similar corresponding combinations would be possible. For example, a blocking force of 2 3-tank "sections" with an HQ tank could form an initial line of defense, and then break contact at the critical moment and bound back behind the other half of the company and so alternate - well, I suppose this is really just a delaying action or glorified screening role than a blocking role - but for the latter, the one half of the company could take up a blocking position while the other is kept in reserve for a counter-attack at the critical moment (or to counter an unexpected threat). Of course, organizing such a company into 3 ad hoc 4-tank platoons allows for more traditional defensive tactics.

I'm not saying that I necessarily favour such organizations of either the tank platoon or the company. But I think that the possibilities that such organizations offer are certainly worth considering and contemplating.
 
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Norfolk

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At the end of Post#2, I proposed a discussion of the Soviet 3-tank platoon, 10-tank company. Given that the German and Israeli Armies have adopted the same structure, and the British Army a similar structure (but with 4 troops/platoons per squadron/company), a discussion of some analyses of the 3-tank platoon are in order.

In 1980, the German Army Generals Balck (who commanded up to Army Group level in WWII) and von Mellenthin (Balck's chief of staff) were invited to a conference and war games by the US Army with divisional and corps commanders present by then TRADOC commander General William N. DuPuy to determine the best way to deal with a hypothetical Soviet attack through the Fulda Gap (Read especially Page 41:

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(Because this link is not working, just go to Google and type in the search box : "Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine." - something will pop up.)

Amongst other things, General Mellenthin stated that the best tactics used two elements for fire and suppression while a third element was used for manoeuvre and assault. General Balck himself described an ideal Tank Battalion that consisted of 3 companies with 10 tanks per company organized into 3 tanks per platoon and an HQ tank at company HQ. When asked whether such an organization would suffer too many losses, Balck responded "smaller units suffer smaller losses".

General DuPuy tested the 3-tank platoon against the then standard 5-tank platoon of the US Army and found that, after an initial period of superior performance by the 5-tank platoon (attributed to the fact that the US Army tank platoon's tactics were then based on 5, not 3 tanks), once the 3-tank platoons adapted to new tactics for 3 tanks, the 3 tank platoon demonstrated a dramatic superiority to the 5 tank platoon. General Paul F. Gorman wrote in "The Secret to Future Victories" (See especially Part III, Section C.):

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that the 3-tank platoon inflicted a 4-to-1 kill ratio upon the enemy, while the 5-tank platoon inflicted only a 1-to-1 kill ratio upon the enemy. Furthermore, as the 3-tank platoon improved its tactics, in its fourth defense, it destroyed all enemy tanks without loss to itself. These tests used lasers to determine hits, and an Israeli Army veteran of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was present and said that the tactics of the 3-tank platoon used in US Army testing were similar to the used by the Israeli 3-tank platoons in the 1973 war.

In a 2001 US Army report entitled "Tank Battalion Final Study Report" (See especially Pages 7 and 11):

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(Because this link too, is not working, just go to Google and type in the search box "Tank Battalion Final Study Report" and something will pop up here too.)

tested the current US Army standard 4-tank platoon against a 3-tank platoon. The tests pitted a standard US Army Tank Battalion of 44 tanks organized into 3 companies each of 14 tanks with 3 platoons each of 4 tanks (with 2 company HQ tanks) against a Tank Battalion of 44 tanks organized into 4 companies of 10 tanks each with 3 tank platoons each of 3 tanks (and 1 tank in company HQ) (presumably the remaining 4 tanks were at Battalion HQ). Both battalions were tested in Central European and Desert scenarios.

The testing and analysis yielded the following results:

1. The 3-tank platoon was 8.5% more survivable in Central European scenarios and 26.2% more survivable in Desert scenarios than the 4-tank platoon.

2. The 10-tank company of 3x3-tank platoons killed an average of 8.5 tanks in Central Europe scenarios and 3.75 tanks in Desert scenarios compared to 9.25 and 3.0 for 14-tank company of 3x4-tank platoons respectively.

3. To do so, the 3-tank platoon fired an average of 26.5 shots in Central Europe scenarios and 24.75 shots in Desert scenarios to achieve those kills compared to 26.75 and 41.25 shots for the 4-tank platoon, respectively.

4. In Central European scenarios, the 3-tank platoon held a 14.3% wider frontage than the 4-tank platoon, while the 4-tank platoon held a 12.2% greater frontage than the 3-tank platoon in the Desert scenarios.

Curiously, despite the demonstrated superior survivability and efficiency of the 3-tank platoon (and the 10-tank company in a battalion of 4 companies) the report concluded that it was unnecessary for the US Army to change to this organization from its current one of 4-tanks per platoon (and a 14-tank company in a battalion of 3 companies).

As such, the 3-tank platoon (and possibly the 10-tank company for that matter) is clearly superior to both the 5- and the 4-tank platoon. This is demonstrated both by testing (two separate tests conducted by US Army), the testimonials of war veterans (Generals Balck and von Mellenthin), and wartime performance (Israeli Army). I still maintain, however, that the 3-tank platoon is not a platoon, it is a tank section, does not need to be commanded by a commissioned officer, and that the 10-tank "company" is really the Tank Platoon (commanded by a single commissioned officer).
 
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zraver

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I disagree that an oddman out formation will survive in combat. I think every element should have a wingman. Tank companies that do this effectively halve the commanders tactical load while doubling the company maneuver elements. If you use three tanks then some one is unsupported. Plus a 2 tank command element means the CO and XO can either split duties, subdivide the command, or spell each other as needed. A company commanders location on the front is always the main effort, but it might not be the only effort. Having a senior Lt with an established rapport with the crews and the commander avaible in a tank to direct the secondary effort helps mitigate the effects of a green horn 2nd Lt fresh from Armor Officers Basic Course at Ft Knox, who might not yet know how to listen to thier senior NCO's.
 

Norfolk

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You raise some very critical issues zraver, and I have to admit that I'm still digesting all this 3-tank platoon stuff and trying to work it out in a way that makes tactical sense. I must say that the entire 3-tank platoon concept strikes me as not only going against much of what I learned (as an infantryman mind you) but as downright counter-intuitive.

Still, there must be something to it if not only experienced WWII Panzer generals favour it, but the Israeli Army has used it for over a generation now (since before the 1973 war) and a number of other Western countries have tried it or permanently adopted it, such as the British Army. Mind you, both the Israeli and British Armies retain 2 tanks in the company/squadron HQ, and the British squadron has 4, not 3, platoons/troops.

For the British Army, this is something of a change yet again, as they went from the old Commonwealth Armoured Regiment organization of 4 Tank Squadrons each of 4 Tank Troops (4-tanks each) and 3 tanks in the Squadron HQ (for OC, 2i/c, and Battle Captain) and the same for Regt HQ (CO, 2i/c, RSM), to the US Army M-1 Abrams-organization for a Tank Battalion (you know that organization well) to the present one of 3 Squadrons each with 4 Troops of 3 tanks each (and 2 tanks in Squadron HQ). The Canadian Army (doctrinally at least) still uses the old structure with a paper strength of 79 tanks.

That said, the 4 Troops of 3-tanks in each British Tank Squadron does serve to mitigate the potential for lone tanks being left out to hang in the breeze (but not without on-the-spot reorganization of the Squadron, so this is something that must be trainined for in peacetime to ensure efficient 2-tank teams when the Squadron OC sees fit to do so). And of course, as doctrine in any English-speaking army says, the tank platoon/troop is the basic fire unit of the tank company/squadron, but the tank company/squadron is the basic manoeuvre unit on the battlefield.

Well, theory and practice being what it is, I still see a lot of room for arguments either way, whether for the 3- or 4-tank platoon. As I said in one of the earlier posts on this thread, I was personally in favour of the old pre-1944 German Tank Company organization of 4 platoons with 5 tanks per platoon with 2 tanks in Coy HQ (personally I would prefer 3 in coy HQ - OC, 2i/c, and BC). But the publications that I have read recently have certainly startled me so to speak, and I find myself strongly inclined to consider them, though not without doubts.

One of those publications even mentioned that Gen. Bill DuPuy (certainly an interesting character, and whatever one may think about his ideas, he was certainly rigorous) when he was TRADOC CinC even said that we was in favour of the US Army converting to the 3-tank platoon, but under the existing manpower constraints (1970's), he didn't think that there were enough tankers and especially offficers and NCOs to go around to make such a conversion possible, so they stuck to the 5-tank platoon until the 80's (and of course the M-1).

I think that it all comes down to the purpose of the 3-tank platoon. It is intended to fight 1-up and 2-back whenever possible, so that there are always at least 2 tubes on the gun line for every tank that is moving. I took particular interest in this, because I figured that if the 3-tank platoon was designed to move in this way, the effect would to make it doubly slow as that as only 1 tank at a time was ever in motion; and as a result, that the surprise, speed, momentum, and shock effect of armour would be compromised.

Given that the Israeli Army's 3-tank platoon and 11-tank company was designed especially for mobile defensive operations, I feared that this was so. But according to the US Army Tank Battalion Final Study Report (2001), the 3-tank platoon was found during testing to move nearly as rapidly as the 4-tank platoon (I don't remember what page that was on, but I'm guessing somewhere around Page 11). I can't say that I am fully convinced by the arguments and evidence for the superiority of the 3-tank platoon over the 4-or 5-tank platoon, but more and more the evidence I find tends to support that conclusion. I'm going to look further into this.

In trying to explain the apparent success of the 3-tank platoon in the US Army testing, I think that it breaks down into two things:

1. When used as intended (1 moving, 2 covering), the 3-tank platoon has double the number of guns covering each moving tank as the 4-tank platoon covering and moving by 2-tank sections. In addition, as with the Israeli example of its 11-tank company (Defense Update), the normally only one 3-tank platoon moves at a time, leaving 8 guns on the firing-line to cover the move of 3 tanks. Compare this to the 14-tank company of US Army with three 4-tank platoons and only one platoon may be in a fire base with the other two moving, or the platoons themselves may cover and move by alternate 2-tank sections. It boils down to a greater proportion of guns covering the 3-tank platoon' movements compared to the prportion covering the 4-tank platoon's movements.

2. When travelling, the speed of neither the 3- or 4-tank platoon is affected, but when in travelling overwatch, when the enemy is possible threat, the 4-tank platoon is likely faster. However, in bounding overwatch, when the enemy is expected, the greater speed of the 4-tank platoon potentially lends itself to a lack of caution; the 4-tank platoon, whether it is bounding by 2-tank sections or by platoons, may become a victim of its own momentum, and speed into an enemy kill zone before it has really had time to observe what's going on. The 3-tank platoon, as it has to advance more methodically in bounding overwatch, with only one tank moving at any one time, and longer halts between bounds while waiting for the other two tanks, has potentially more time to observe the situation as well as proportionately more firepower per moving tank for covering fire than the 4-tank platoon.

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I still very much have doubts about calling a 3-tank unit a "platoon", let alone having an officer command it. As you pointed out zraver, a young officer needs the presence of an experienced professional to guide him and instill some good sense into him, and this certainly requires a 2nd tank in the HQ. I just disagree about where to put him, at "platoon", or at "company". As I disagree in the first instance that a 3-tank "platoon" is even that, as it is basically a fire unit and as such is properly a "section", not a manoeuvre unit as it lacks at least a 4th tank to allow for balanced internal fire-and-movement.

The 3-tank "platoon" concept still requires more research to satisfy my questions about it, but I am surprised by its appeal to me.
 

Norfolk

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Some clarification about the tactical use of the 3-tank platoon is in order here. I think that the term "Platoon" that is used is misleading when applied to the 3-tank unit, and I have argued that it is the 3-tank Tank Section of old. Really, the 3-tank "platoon" (actually "section") is just the big brother of the 2-tank section in the 4- and 5-tank platoons. Otherwise, one is almost inevitably led to consider the use of a 3-tank unit as a platoon, that is, with internal fire-and-movement by breaking down into sections with one 2-tank section covering whiel the other 2-tank section is moving. The 3-tank platoon/section does nt work that way.

It goes back to basic armour doctrine: the platoon/troop is the basic fire unit, but the company/squadron is the basic manouevre unit. In the Israeli Army Tank company (11 tanks) one 3-tank platoon moves while the other two 3-tank platoons (and 2 Coy HQ tanks) cover. The 3-tank platoon does not break down into smaller elements for fire-and-movement. This appearent rigidity is its strength however, as never fewer than 3 tanks are in motion during travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch, and they are always covered by at least twice their own number when doing so.

And of course, 3 tanks (operating under cover of the other 2/3rds or so of their company) are better able to cover their arcs of observation and fire than a section of just 2-tanks, not to mention that if one of them is knocked out, there are still two more left to fight (and, I would argue, they would still consitute an effective, if diminished, tank section). The 2-tank section has no such capacity to sustain losses - if one is knocked out, there's only a lone tank left.

I think that this is the key to the superior performance of the 3-tank platoon over the 4-and 5-tank platoons that was discovered during the two US Army tests (and validated by Israeli Army battle experience, not to mention its recent adoption by the British Army - albeit with 4 troops of 3 tanks in each squadron).
 
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Norfolk

Junior Member
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The PLA is, apparently, converting some of its tank units from more of a Soviet-style organization, with 3 tanks per platoon, 10 tanks per company, and so on, and moving to a German-style organization with 4 tanks per platoon, 13 tanks per company, and so on. This is interesting, particularly as Germany had been using the 3-tank platoon in its tank companies for several years, before recently returning to the 4-tank platoon that it had used for decades after WWII (and using 5-tank platoons in that war). This reorganization of some of its elite armour formations will have real repercussions on the manning, training, and tactics of PLA tank units.

Manning and Training:

For one thing, since 1999, PLA enlisted tankers only spend two years on active duty before they are automatically demobilized into the Reserve, unless they are one of the few who are selected for NCO training after their first two years. During those two years, six months of each year are dedicated to collective training (unit-and formation-level). That leaves 6months per year for individual training of armoured crewmen. The first two months of those six months are devoted either to Basic Training of new recruits, or for 1-3 months NCO training for serviemen who have just completed their 2 year tour and have been selected to be NCOs; this requires either the unit concerned to detach many of its officers and NCOs to training schools for those purposes, or to turn itself into a training unit for a few months each year. Given that the PLA (since 1999) no longer allows troops below NCO level to perform or receive training for, technical tasks, it seems likely that only NCOs serve as tank gunners, thereby relieving the burden of learning on 2-year enlistees who barely have time to master a crewman's tasks, let alone a gunner's. However, this places a heavy burden on the PLA's still developing professional NCO Corps, and this is where the 4-tank platoon comes in.

With the 3-tank platoon, one tank was commanded, obviously, by an officer, leaving only two other tanks to be commanded by NCOs. Until 1999, when PLA enlistment was reduced from 3 years (and Basic Training from 3 months) to 2 years (and Basic Traiuning to 2 months), there was enough time to train some enlisted men as tank gunners, and spare some or all of the NCOs that burden (even if you didn't necessarily get the most practiced gunners going), but since then, junior NCOs (although this will definitely improve gunnery skills) must serve as gunners, and senior NCOs serve as tank commanders. Add to this the conversion of some PLA tank units from the 3-tank to the 4-tank platoon, and while the number of officers remains the same, the number of NCOs required rises dramatically. This is particularly hard on an NCO Corps while is still fully establishing itself, though it may have long-term benefits as far as leadership goes.

The pre-1999 3-tank platoon required one officer and two NCOs, while its post-1999 counterpart required one officer and five NCOs; the new 4-tank platoon requires one officer and no less than seven NCOs. Adding five NCOs to the tank platoon in only a few years is a tremendous strain - for now - but later, there could be a big pay-off in professional skill and tactical leadership, particularly given that entry-level officer training since 1999 is not necessarily as long and as thorough as it was before hand.

That said, given the requirement of the 4-tank platoon for two additional NCOs over the five required for the 3-tank platoon, some quality may have to be sacrificed in the selection of NCO candidates in order to fill that many more NCO slots. This may be a problem, given that PLA recruitment is still proportionately more from the rural areas, while the PLA is receiving proportionately fewer (but much sought after) recruits from the urban areas. In all honesty, despite the often lower educational level of rural recruits, they probably tend to make rather better soldiers anyway, so a system of in-house schooling (and this the PLA already has, and perhaps should develop further) would go a long way to remedy educational deficiencies in those less-educated soldiers who might not pass NCO selection due to said deficiencies, but who are identified by their officers and NCOs as having real, but underdeveloped, potential. If the PLA as a whole converts to a 4-tank platoon, such a course of action should be undertaken without hesitation.

Tactics:

While the conversion to a 4-tank platoon may result in substantial and long-term benefits in terms of leadership and even technical skills in the Armoured Corps, it will do so only by placing considerable additional strain on the PLA's already heavily-burdened, nascent NCO Corps. It may have less than desirable tactical results, however. Now, 4 tanks per platoon gives said platoon the ability to use fire-and-movement in both attack and defence by splitting into two 2-tank sections, with one section providing suppressive fires on the enemy, while the other section moves to a new firing position before returning the favour in kind. Compared to a 3-tank platoon, the 4-tank platoon appears on the surface to possess a clear advantage, given that the 3-tank platoon cannot split into balanced sections and engage in fire-and-movement in the same way. At best, it can advance or retreat by having one tank move while the other two provide suppressive fires. But this apparent weakness too, is illusory.

First of all, it is best to rid oneself of the notion that the 3-and 4-tank platoons are comparable, and that the principle difference between them is a single tank. They are not comparable. The counterpart of the 3-tank platoon is not the 4-or 5-tank platoon, but the 2- or 3-tank section (as in the "light" and "heavy" Tank Sections of the old 5-tank platoon, or the original 3-tank Section of WWI). Just as the 2-Tank Section is reluctant to divvy up, unless necessary (in street fighting, for example), so the 3-tank platoon is likewise not intended to be divided up into smaller chunks. Right now, US Army trainers are having a very difficult time trying to convince Iraqi Army tankers that it's okay to divvy up their traditional 3-tank platoons, while the Iraqi tankers are quite insistent upon their platoons' tactical indivisibility, and quite rightly.

As I have argued several times before, I think that the 3-tank platoon really is best called a section. This helps to eliminate the confusion as to the tactical role of a 3-tank unit; the consequences of formally designating and re-roling the 3-tank platoon as a tank section are profound (for not only the platoon, but the rest of the Armoured Corps), but for the purposes of this post on the PLA tank platoon, I will simply stick to the designation and role of a "platoon".

As I wrote in the previous post (and perhaps my post before that), the Tank Platoon is, doctrinally, the basic "Fire" unit, whereas the Tank Company (composed of 3-4 Tank Platoons with 1-3 tanks in the Company HQ) is the basic "Manoeuvre" unit. Tank Platoons, crudely speaking, either move to a fire position, or provide suppressive fires upon the enemy from a fire position in order for other Tank Platoons to move to a new fire position, and so on. The 3-tank platoon in the PLA was part of a 10-tank company (3 platoons and 1 HQ tank), whereas the 4-tank platoon in the PLA appears to be part of a 13-tank company (3 platoons and 1 HQ tank). In effect, the 10-tank platoon appears to be outnumbered by the numerical equivalent of an extra platoon in the 13-tank company. But this does not necessarily work out in practice.

The reason has to do with the tactical employment of the 4-tank platoon. As stated before, the 4-tank platoon possesses internal fire-and-movement capability that the 3-tank platoon does not possess. By splitting into two equal sections, with one covering and one moving whilst either expecting or actually in contact with the enemy, the 4-tank platoon does not necessarily require other tank platoons to provide suppressive fires upon the enemy while it manoeuvres. In practice, a typical 3-tank platoon of 4-tanks each will usually have two platoons moving while one platoon provides covering suppressive fires on the enemy. The two tank platoons that are moving may themselves split into sections, alternating fire-and-movement between sections. This is generally held up to be the strength of the 4-tank platoon; rather it is its undoing.

The 3-tank platoon operates quite differently. As it does not normally break down into sections due to its uneven composition, the 3-tank platoon must depend upon the rest of the 10-tank Company to provide for fire-and-movement. As one 3-tank platoon moves, the other two 3-tank platoons, plus the HQ tank, provide covering, suppressive fires upon the enemy positions. Almost never more than one tank platoon is ever moving and exposing itself to enemy observation and fire. Two other tank platoons are always providing suppressive fires from behind cover. It is easier for the 3-tank platoon to find suitable cover, given its smaller size than the 4-tank platoon.

This, taken with the fact that no less than 7 gun tubes are covering just 3 tanks moving in the 10-tank company compared to only 5 gun tubes covering no less than 8 tanks moving (albeit half of them stopping while the other half moves, but still doing so under enemy observation), the apparent tactical advantages of a 4-tank platoon over a 3-tank platoon (even when the Tank Company of the former is larger overall than the latter) evaporates in the face of tactical realities.

This is further emphasized when comparing the 2-tank section of the 13-tank company (organized into 4-tank platoons) to its true counterpart, the 3-tank platoon in the 10-tank company (organized into 3-tank platoons). The 3-tank platoon moves with 3 tanks, not 2 as the 2-tank section does, and so it moves with an additional tank to observe and cover another arc, and it can absorb the loss of a tank and still be an effective fighting unit. The 2-tank section can only cover two arcs of observation and fire, and if it loses even one tank, then a lone tank is left to carry on as best it can. Moreover, the 3-tank platoon is moving while covered by the guns of the rest of its company; the 4-tank platoon is moving while covered by the guns of only one platoon plus the HQ tank, and these 5 tanks have to divide their cover fires between enemy positions facing the other two platoons.

Even with one 2-tank section covering the other section in each of the two platoons on the move, the suppressive fires of the two tank sections covering the two on the move are divided between supporting two separate platoons. This is at the very least tactically inefficient, at worst downright pointless. The 3-tank platoon suffers no such dispersion of covering fires; the firepower of the entire company is concentrated upon covering just that one 3-tank platoon.

The danger of the 4-tank platoon is the very tactical flexibility (and therefore advantage) that it is perceived to offer by its ability to split into 2 evenly balanced sections thus providing its own internal fire-and-movement capability. When such an an apparent advantage is perceived to exist, it will be used by those who have not been thoroughly disabused of that illusion. By contrast, the 3-tank platoon appears inflexible, rigid even, and is subsequently perceived to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the 4-and of course 5-tank platoons. This is a mistake. The 3-tank platoon is far more tactically efficient than the 4- or 5-tank platoon, and when used as intended as part of the tank company, outperforms even larger tank companies composed of the same number of platoons with 4- or 5-tanks each. The PLA was onto a good thing with the old 3-tank platoon, and it shoud not persist with the 4-tank platoon in certain units (mind you, it should add a second HQ tank at Company); its advantages are largely illusory.

For official US Army studies that demonstrate the superiority of the 3-tank platoon over both the 4-and 5-tank platoons, go back to Post#5 on this thread and try either the links there or follow the directions given under the links that are not working to access the reports and sources cited.
 

zraver

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Some clarification about the tactical use of the 3-tank platoon is in order here. I think that the term "Platoon" that is used is misleading when applied to the 3-tank unit, and I have argued that it is the 3-tank Tank Section of old. Really, the 3-tank "platoon" (actually "section") is just the big brother of the 2-tank section in the 4- and 5-tank platoons. Otherwise, one is almost inevitably led to consider the use of a 3-tank unit as a platoon, that is, with internal fire-and-movement by breaking down into sections with one 2-tank section covering whiel the other 2-tank section is moving. The 3-tank platoon/section does nt work that way.

I agree that a 3 tank platoon is really a section+

It goes back to basic armour doctrine: the platoon/troop is the basic fire unit, but the company/squadron is the basic manouevre unit. In the Israeli Army Tank company (11 tanks) one 3-tank platoon moves while the other two 3-tank platoons (and 2 Coy HQ tanks) cover. The 3-tank platoon does not break down into smaller elements for fire-and-movement. This appearent rigidity is its strength however, as never fewer than 3 tanks are in motion during travelling overwatch or bounding overwatch, and they are always covered by at least twice their own number when doing so.

And of course, 3 tanks (operating under cover of the other 2/3rds or so of their company) are better able to cover their arcs of observation and fire than a section of just 2-tanks,

It might seem counter intiuitive since you have more guns covering, but moving 1/3 of the force at a time vs half will slow you down. This gives the enemy more time. A tanks biggest weapon is mobility. As tough as they are they can be killed if the enemy can localize them. Moving your force 1/3 at a time presents several problems.

1- What if the increased time lets the enemy drop a FASCAM fiedl between your maneuver groups. You've lost 1/3 of available force your force. The 6 tanks on one side of the field can still fight, but the 3 on the other side are nearly useless.

2- Company team tactics, 3 tanks and 8-12 IFV's is an okay screen for a mech inf force, but 6 tanks-4 IFV's is not enough mass for a tank heavy force.

3- A 3 tank section that loses 1 member looses 1/3 of its firepower and half its over watch ability and each remaining tank now has 17%% more coverage to watch. A 4 tank platoon that loses one only loses 25% of its power and over watch ability only gains 7% to its coverage area.

4- A 3 tank section is over stressed in coverage it can watch front, right, left but cannot double up on threat areas like a 4 tank platoon can. A 4 tank platoon can watch front, front, left, right or left left, front, right etc as needed the extra thermal on the most likely threat area may be the difference between life and death.

I think that this is the key to the superior performance of the 3-tank platoon over the 4-and 5-tank platoons that was discovered during the two US Army tests (and validated by Israeli Army battle experience, not to mention its recent adoption by the British Army - albeit with 4 troops of 3 tanks in each squadron).

I think a scripted exercise (move from A to B) may have something to do with it. Israeli Army experience isn't really all that worthwhile. They have never faced an equal foe on and equal footing. The closes tthey came were the Jordanians and they ended up getting roughly treated by them when comapred to the Egyptians and Syrians.
 
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