The Rifle Squad/Section - Part 3
The Present Problem and How it Came to Be:
As stated in the previous post, most armies (with the main exception of the USMC with its also successful yet unique rifle squad organization) ended WWII with a rifle squad/section composed of a 3 or 4 man machine gun team/group/automatic rifle team (the number of men being necessary to provide for continuous resulppy of ammunition and local security) and a 7 or 8man rifle team/group (that number necessary to sustain losses in the assault without breaking down). The former established a base of fire to suppress the enemy while the latter used cover and concealment to reach a position on the enemy flank from which to assault the enemy. This was considered to be almost universally satisfactory for infantry offensive operations. The Korean War subsequently was waged with much the same organization.
That said, the appearance of two machine guns in the German rifle squad in the closing years of WWII as the squad's strength fell from up to 12 down to 8 due to manpower losses and the emphasis on firepower to replace those losses whilst conducting defensive operations had an effect upon other armies. Granted, infantry tend to "acquire" rather more than their authorized establishment of machine guns in wartime (they'll strip everything from knocked-out tanks to supply vehicles carelessly left unattended by their crews of machine-guns, or anything else the infantry may find useful or amusing), and the rifle squad/section often adapted accordingly. However, infantry manpower losses in the Allied armies had become acute towards the end of the war, and in the US Army in particular, facing the Germans in Europe (whose own depleted rifle squads now possessed two machine guns), eventually began issuing an extra BAR to each rifle squad (later supplanted by the Browning M-1919A6 "Light" Machine Gun). After the end of the war, however, the US Army reverted to a 12, then 9 man rifle squad with one 3 man BAR team and a 6 man rifle team after the US Army Infantry School investigated and analyzed the lessons of the war.
The US Army entered the Korean War with this organization, but as the war dragged on and infantry losses mounted, and UN forces were largelyengaged in defensive operations, a second BAR was added to the rifle squad. The British Army entered the war with its WWII rifle section (one 3 man Bren LMG group, one 7 man rifle group), and the Canadian Army initially entered with the US Army-pattern 9 man rifle squad, then changed to the British organization, then switched to an 8 man rifle section with two Browning "Light" Machine Guns. Offensive operations were relatively rare and defensive frontages (with often considerable gaps between battalions, companies, and even platoons) wide. North Korean and Chinese "human wave" attacks were beaten off mainly with massed firepower, and relatively little maneouver was attempted in the difficult terrain. Mechanization, even by WWII standards, was sparse. When the war ended, the armies involved reverted to their pre-war rifle squad/section organizations. The USMC rifle squad remained essentially unchanged throughout the war and afterwards.
However, during the mid-1950's the concept of Battle Drill (pioneered by the British Army in WWII) and the experience of using (and facing) two automatic rifles or machine guns in each rifle squad/section led some in the US Army to consider and experiment with the Fire Team concept pioneered by the USMC in WWII. For the next 30 years the US Army would examine, tinker, and otherwise change this way and that, the standard rifle squad. Though the veterans of Korea were happy with the 9 man squad with one BAR (except for its vulnerability to losses compared to WWII's 12 man squad), its offensive potential was little needed, and as losses drained establishment strengths, the added firepower of another BAR increased its defensive power.
Battle Drill, as originally developed by the British Army in the early years of WWII for its Rifle Sections, functioned both as an instructional method to indoctrinate recruits in the basics of infantry combat before moving on to more advanced subjects and as sort of a set of Immediate Actions (IA) to be performed in the absence of orders. Some US Army units adopted Battle Drill in Europe, and some of the officers from those units would, over the following decades, introduce Battle Drill into the US Army Infantry overall. The German Army never adopted Battle Drill, nor even fire teams per se.
There were some critical differences though, in capabilites between British, American, and German rifle squads/sections, and these arose in part from differences in leadership as much as differences in doctrine. The British rifle section was led by a single NCO, a corporal, and asisted by a lance-corporal, whilst the US Army rifle squad was led by a staff sergeant and assisted by a sergeant or corporal. Nevertheless, the British section typically outperformed the American squad, because the British corporal received substantial formal NCO training in addition to the Battle Drill taught to all British and Commonwealth infantry, whereas neither the American staff sergeant nor his sergeant of corporal assistant received any NCO training, nor in most cases did American infantry receive Battle Drill training until late in WWII. Indeed, the main ctriticism of the WWII US Army 12 man rifle squad was the difficulty of controlling it in battle, and the Infantry School used this in its justification of reducing it to 9 men in 1946. In fairness, no-one, not even the squad's leaders actually had formal infantry leadership training, so it is not surprising that control was difficult.
Curiously, the German Rifle Squad, led by a sergeant assisted by a corporal typically outperformed the British rifle section, though the Germans did not use Battle Drill. However, in addition to the superb training that German infantry received until late in WWII, each NCO (corporal or sergeant)received six month's special training, and each private soldier was trained to function two ranks above his own - thus a private was trained to take command of a squad if necessary, and a sergeant was trained to command a platoon or even company if necessary. German infantry leaders (and soldiers) were trained to think quick on their feet and issue orders and lead actions according to the situation - no Battle Drill and no Fire-Teams necessary. Interestingly, the Wehrmacht's successor, the Bundeswehr still uses a (non-mechanized) rifle squad equipped with one MG 3 (MG 42 converted to NATO 7.62 mm) in a machine gun team supporting a rifle team.
The introduction of Battle Drill in US Army rifle squads starting from the mid-1950's, as WWII veterans who served in those units that had received it reached positions of command, rather than necessarily improving rifle squad performance, instead progressively degenerated over decades into a "one size fits all forumula" appraoch to infantry offensive tactics. In the absence of good leaders with extensive formal training, the potential of Battle Drill was often wasted as rather than serving as a teaching aid and guide to Rifle squad attacks, it ossified into a series of drills to be followed by rote. Formal NCO training, though attempted from the 1950's onwards, did not really take off in the US Army until the 1980's, and even then did not usually approach the standards set elsewhere in the English-speaking world.
Battle Drill, left in the hands of leaders who did not often did not know what to do with it, was joined in short order by the Fire Team concept. The USMC Rifle Squad, 13 men strong, composed of well-trained marines and schooled NCO's organized into 3 4 man fire team each with an automatic weapon and (ideally) and junior NCO, all commanded by a senior NCO, and proven again and again in war, first adopted Fire Teams late in the Second World War. But in the hands of US Army NCOs, with little or no formal leadership training and already shackled to Battle Drills they may not be able to use to full advantage as a result of the lack of that training, this led to whole that was rather less than than the sum of its parts.
Still, this conditions were imposed by senior officers who themselves seemed rather unaware of the problems that were creating. This was the time of the (spectacularly failed) Pentomic Division concept and the inroads into military thought (and doctine)of civilian "experts". As Colonel David Hackworth, an infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars in "About Face", recounted, the military in the 1950's and 1960's was overruled (with the blessing of its own senior officers) in its approaches to war by efficiency experts and systems analysts who engaged quantitative analysis as the means by which to determine solutions to military problems, even tactical ones. Colonel Hackworth attended one such conference in which the use and scale of issue of infantry machine guns was the topic; the military officers present meekly gave way to the civilians' analysis - until Hackworth himself grilled the civilians who admitted they didn't understand anything themselves about machine guns or their use, just that their quantitative models produced such and such a result - and subsequently, US Army infantry units were reorganized with machine guns issued on the basis of the civilians' quantitative analysis of battlefield tactics.
The end result of these experimentations and the new weapons developed and issued to that end was an 11 man rifle squad, led by a staff sergeant and composed of two 5 man fire teams, each based upon an automatic rifle (M-14 with bipod, later replaced by M-16 with bipod). The squad could be reinforced with one of its platoon's light machine guns (Browning M-1919A6, later M-60) to provide a supplement to the squad's own organic base of fire.
Typically, the rifle squad in the attack was expected (after winning the firefight) to provide a base of fire with one fire team while the other moved, alternating fire and movement between the fire teams as they assaulted the objective. The squad leader moved between fire teams as he saw fit, and controlled any attached weapons (especially machine guns) attached to the squad from the platoon. In the hands of highly trained professionals (or at least self-taught, experienced long service NCO even without formal training), this squad could be effective provided that it always had one of the platoon's two machine guns attached.
This ideal was not possible, however, as relatively untrained leaders tied to Battle Drill tended to engage in frontal assaults in peacetime training, simply alternating fire and movement between fire teams, who, with only automatic rifles (instead of even one full-fledged machine gun) for a base of fire lacked real suppressive fire capability and who alternatively lacked enough riflemen in either fire team (only 5, including the Automatic Rifleman, compared to 6 to 8 in the rifle team/group of WWII) to conduct a successful assault despite sustaining (practically inevitable) losses in that assault. A fire team depleted by losses in the assault could not be reasonably sure of even taking the enemy position, let alone providing enough men to hold off enemy counter-attacks while the rest of the squad joined it. Moreover, even with a platoon machine gun team attached, the two fire teams tended to be used in alternate fire and movement anyway, exposing themselves to the enemy throughout the assault, rather than using cover and concealment in order to approach the enemy and find a suitable position from which to assault as the old 6-8 man rifle teams/groups did.
Offensive infantry operations in the Vietnam War, which were frequent, soon revealed the 11 man rifle squad, as organized and intended to operate, to be a paper tiger. The only major initial change to the rifle squad was the very successful addition of the M-79 40 mm grenade launcher, one to each squad, relieving some of the presure to close within hand grenade range to engage fixed defenses or groups of enemy in the open. Even in close country as well as open country, the 11 man squad was found to quickly break down. The problems described in the previous paragraph were revealed and exacerbated by infantry manpower losses and especially a growing shortage of NCOs (especially those few with long experience or formal training). The rifle squad, in the heat of battle was found to require the fire suppressive capability of one of the rifle platoon's two M-60 machine guns (thus depriving the 3rd squad of direct fire support) as its own automatic rifles were completely inadequate to the task (by now the M-14 firing NATO 7.62mm, including the 2 in each squad issued with bipods had given way to the M-16 A1 firing 5.56mm, including the 2 in each squad issued with bipods), and as squad losses reduced its strength to 8 or fewer men, the fire teams were disbanded and the squad in effect reverted to a WWII or early Korean War organization and concept of offensive operations, with a de facto organization of a machine gun team (attached from platoon HQ) providing suppressive fires whilst the remaining riflemen effectively formed a rifle team that used cover and concealment inorder to reach a position from which it could assault the enemy position.
Meanwhile, other armies were watching. The Canadian Army moved a small distance towards the US Army, reorganizing its Rifle Section into a Light Automatic Rifle Group (3 man Bren Light Machine Gun Group with one LMG replaced by two FN FAL automatic rifles with heavy barrels, bipods, and high capacity magazines) and a Rifle Group (7 Lee-Enfield Mk 4 rifles replaced by 7 FN FAL battle rifles [British SLR]) that could be broken down into two 3-man rifle teams. Otherwise, the Candian section operated much as it had in WWII and for part of Korea. The British Army eschewed the US Army experiment with fire teams and automatic rifles, retaining its WWII and Korea rifle section mostly intact, replacing the Bren LMG with the FN MAG GPMG and its Lee-Enfields with FN FAL battle rifles (British SLR). This organization and the tactical concepts of offensive operations were used with success by the British Army well into the 1980's, notably in the Falklands War. In this last war, many British Army rifle sections received the M-79 40mm grenade launcher successfully used by the Americans in Vietnam, and one Royal Marine Commando even featured rifles sections bolstered by the additional of a Bren LMG to the rifle team. Otherwise the old WWII and Korean War organization and concept worked, and worked well.
Emerging from Vietnam, the US Army 11 man rifle squad was retained, although veterans insisted on the permanent inclusion of an M-60 machine gun in each rifle squad - something that, officially at least, was not to be.
The problems went largely unresolved until the 1980's when formal training of NCO's really began in earnest. Unfortunately, even as this improvement was made, two more strokes were delivered to the rifle squad. Firstly, the 11 man squad was reduced to 9 men due to Army manpower limitations, thus reducing its sustainability after suffering even minor losses even further (the number 8 and below having been found in Vietnam to be the level at which the squad could no longer conduct fire-and-movement).
And secondly was the baleful effects of mechanization, as the M-113 APC capable of carrying an entire 11 man rifle squad gave way to the M-2 Bradley IFV with its capacity for only 6 or 7 troops. Granted, size and weight restrictions (and MONEY) were factors in this regard, but so was peacetime innovation. The US Army looked at the Bundeswehr (whose motorized infantry rfile squads were largley similar to those in WWII, except that they rode around in wheeled APCs) whose armoured (mechanized) infantry rifle squads numbered only 7 riflemen composing a rifle team (with a Panzerfaust) dismounting from the powerful Marder MICV with crew of 3 (and with a 20mm automatic cannon) taking the place of the squad's machine gun team. The US Army reorganized its mechanized infantry along similar lines. There was a problem, though - IFVs could not always go where the infantry went, thus depriving them of their base of fire in such cases - but this was not as bad as another problem that arose. IFVs were supposed to allow armoured/mechanized infantry to fight from inside their vehicles, only getting out on the ground when they really needed to (and doctrine was fuzzy on when this was supposed to occur). The beating that Soviet-made BMPs of Arab armies took in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 went some way to demonstrating the futility of such tactics, but this lesson was not necessarily taken to heart elsewhere. Israel (though it had to make do for years with the M-113)ultimately decided to mount its mechanized infantry (full size rifle squads) in converted MBT hulls and designed the Merkava MBT to carry half a dozen infantrymen for short periods of time.
As the 1980's progressed, the US Army replaced the 2 M-16's fitted with bipods in the rifle squad with 2 FN Minimi LMGs (US M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon), one for each fire team in non-mechanized units and mechanized units still mounted in the M-113 APC. The mechanized infantry squad (and platoon) underwent several dubious reorganizations and so on into the 1990's as it reequipped with 2 FN Minimi LMGs per squad and all rifle squads replaced the M-79 grenade launcher with the M-203 underslung the M-16 rifle with two per squad. Finally, in the 2000's the mechanized rifle squad organization was discarded and all US Army infantry rifle squads were composed of 9 men, led by a staff sergeant, and composed of two 4 man fire teams, each led by a sergeant (or corporal) and equipped with an LMG, one grenade launcher, and 3 automatic rifles. As before, Battle Drill remained and fire teams were in practice (even though doctrine theoretically allowed for flanking and envelopment) expected to alternate between fire and maneuver in full face of the enemy (though independent and enterprising NCOs might be expected to act otherwise on their own initiative). Mechanization, however, often required rifle squads/sections to operate in full view of the enemy regardless of preference, and to conduct rifle squad/section full frontal attacks with one part of the squad/section providing covering fire while the other moved, and alternating throughout until the objective had been taken and consolidated.
And it was under these conditions that the rifle squad/section could suffer catastophic losses, even if it had the leadership, training, and firepower to conduct a "perfect" attack. The Canadian Army, having come increasinlgy under the influence of the US Army since the 1970's, reorganized its rifle section in the 1980's into a configuration similar to its US Army counterpart. With 8 men commanded by a Sergeant (who also led one of its two assault groups), it was composed of two identical 4 man Assault Groups, each composed of two 2 man Fire Teams. Number 1 Assault Group comprised Alpha Team (Section commander with M-16 A2 rifle [Canadian C-7] and No.1 Rifleman with M-16 A2, later with IPM-203 40mm grenade launcher), and Bravo Team (No.2 Rifleman with M-16 A2 and No.1 Machine gunner with FN Minimi LMG [Caandian C-9]). Number 2 Assault Group comprised Charlie Team (which acted as a scout team on patrol and as a hand grenadier team in assault with No.3 Rifleman with M-16 A2 and No.4 Rifleman with M-16 A2 [later IPM-203]), and Delta Team (Section second in command, a Master-Corporal with M-16 A2, and No.2 Machine gunner with FN Minimi LMG). As with the 9 man US Army Rifle Squad, the Candian Army 8 man Rifle Section, upon winning the firefight, was to advance in the full view of the enemy in a frontal attack (though doctrine officially stated that flanking and envelopment attacks were possible, though this was rarely performed in peacetime training), alternating fire-and-movement between assault groups, and as the range close to the objective, fire teams within each assault group, upon order, would so alternate with one another, until finally the individual members of each fire team would alternate between firing and moving, with (ideally) one member of Charlie Team hand grenading the enemy position whilst covered by fire by his teamate, then spraying it with automatic rifle fire, bayoneting the enemy inside, changing magazines, securing the trench, and giving the thumb's up for his teammate and the rest of the section to join in and consolidate and reorganize to face an enemy counter-attack, or to continue the assault.
This is organziation and concept of offensive operations for the Rifle Squad/Section that my section commander told us would result in 60% losses within the first day of offensive operations. Not only do the US Army and the Canadian Army use this, but, inexplicably to me, so does the British Army now, which has gone so far as even to use the US term Fire Team in its rifle sections (the British Rifle Section is almost a carbon copy of the Canadian Rifle Section, though it uses the L-85 rifle instead of the M-16 A2 and 2 Light Support Weapons in addition to the Minimi LMG). Why the British Army abandoned the tried-and-true rifle section it had for one that is almost certain to result in unnecessary losses and even defeat I can only put down to peacetime experimentation and cost-cutting. The major English-speaking countries appear attached to this delusionary organization and concept of offensive operations for the Rifle Squad/Section, and mechanization has only contributed to its entrenchment.
By contrast, the USMC remains committed to its 13 man Rifle Squad, and infantry across the world look at that squad and drool, imagining what they could do with that kind of organization. It possesses unmatched ability to take losses, well-trained troops and leaders, and an organization that gives it the ability to operate much like the Rifle Squads/Sections of old, using tried and true methods. Its squad leader can move between fire teams and direct suppressive fires on the enemy and even do so with weapons attached to the squad by the platoon , though with its own organic light machine guns and grenade launchers, one each per fire team, it does not routinely need to do so, unlike the US Army Rifle Squad of Vietnam War vintage. Each Fire Team (with a LMG and grenade launcher, comparing handsomely to the machine gun teams/groups of old) possess sufficient firepower to provide adequate supressive fire for an assault while the other two fire teams, with a combined total of 8 men, easily match the rifle teams' groups of old in their ability to launch assaults even when sustaining losses. The USMC, admittedly, is not as directly affected by mechanization as the Army, but the need for infantry to close with an destroy the enemy is unchanged in any army. With USMC rifle squads frequently down to 6 men in operations in places like Fallujah, US Army rifle squads operating under similar conditions could at best be described as fire teams.
As in my first post on this subject, I identified one other Rifle Squad organization that possessed three, rather than two fire teams. The PLA organizes its Rifle Squads with 10 men and into 3 teams: the Squad Leader and 3 other men carry assault rifles and an RPG, while another 3 man team carries assault rifles and an RPG as well, with the third team also of three men with assault rifles but a light machine gun instead of an RPG. Some may see in this the same 3 man "Cell" organization that was used by the VC and NVA in the Vietnam War. While this squad does not have the same capacity to sustain losses as the USMC rifle squad, it does allow the squad leader to lay down suppressive fire with one light machine gun team while allowing the other two teams to assault. Quite how the Chinese carry out such an assault, I do not know, although their organization appears to allow for the possibility that the two teams (a total of 7 men) equipped with RPGs may use cover and concealment to maneouvre to a flank (or both flanks) for the assault while the team with the light machine gun (with 3 men) provides suppressive fire, thus avoiding frontal assault in full view of the enemy.
To give an idea of the potential of such a Rifle Squad, the example of a Rwandan Army Rifle Squad attacking a rebel position in a house in the civil war of the 1990's will be given. A Canadian Army officer attached to the UN witnessed a Rwandan Rifle Squad of 10 men organized into one team with a light machine gun and an RPG provided supressive fire on the house while two other identical teams armed with assault rifles assaulted the rebel position in the house from both flanks. The rebels, pinned down and suffering losses in the house as a result of light machine gun and RPG fire from the one team, could not effectively react as the other two teams closed in on them from either side. Needless to say the rebel position was hopeless, as they were pinned down, under assault, and cut off from retreat or relief. The rebels were wiped out completely with few losses to the Rwandan rifle squad (it's been a decade since I read this, and I don't remember the figures). The Canadian officer, writing in the Infantry Journal about what he had witnessed, proceeded to question the make up and effectiveness of the Candian Army's rifle section. Since the Canadian Rifle Section remains effectively unchanged, his plea evidently fell upon deaf ears.
Conclusion:
The English-speaking countries, in the main, possess Rifle Squads/Sections whose composition and offensive tactics ignore wartime experience and are tied by Battle Drill, the inappropriate use of the Fire Team concept successfully pioneered by the USMC, and the perceived demands of economy to establish the smallest possible Rifle Sections/Squads to charge, pepperpotting all the way, straight into the teeth of the enemy defenses, attacking their strongest points, and exposing themselves to such casualty rates of up to 60% in the first 24 hours of offensive operations. Their wartime predecessors, by contrast, sought to supress the enemy with fire from one position, whilst maneouvring to assault from another position using cover and concealment, and taking the enemy from an unexpected direction, thus maximizing the possbility of success and minimizing the potential for losses. Mechanization, which is heavily influential in Western and especially English-speaking countries further aggravates this situation, with limited space for troops available in armoured vehicles and the fact that mechanized infantry often must engage in frontal assaults whether they want to or not, as they operate in open country where concealment is difficult or even impossible.
By contrast the USMC, though it is less affected by mechanization, possesses a Rifle Squad that other armies only dream of. It has consistently proven itself in wartime for 60 years, and has remained largely unchanged in its essentials. The PLA likewise, has a three-team rifle squad that is larger than those of Western armies, though smaller and less heavily armed than that of the USMC. As the PLA mechanizes, it would do well to bear in mind the problems that have arisen in Western armies Rifle Squads/Sections, and, if possible, proceed in the direction of the USMC.