The Best Defence is a Good Offence (China in the Americas)

(cont2)

5. Chinese anti-surface warfare
Closer to Mainland ChinaTaiwan Scenario Farther from Mainland ChinaSpratly Islands Scenario
1996 2003 2010 2017 1996 2003 2010 2017
Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Approximate Parity Chinese advantage Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Approximate Parity

The PLA has placed as much emphasis on putting U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs) at risk as it has into efforts to neutralize U.S. ground-based airpower. China has developed a credible and increasingly robust over-the-horizon (OTH) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. It launched its first operational military imaging satellites in 2000 and deployed its first OTH skywave radar system in 2007. The skywave system can detect targets and provide a general, though not precise, location out to 2,000 km beyond China's coastline. The development of China's space and electronics sectors has enabled it to increase the pace of satellite launches and deploy a wider range of sophisticated ISR satellites.

China's development of anti-ship ballistic missiles—the first of their kind anywhere in the world—presents a new threat dimension for U.S. naval commanders. That said, the kill chain for these missiles will pose great difficulties for the PLA, and the United States will make every effort to develop countermeasures. Anti-ship ballistic missiles therefore may not pose the kind of one-shot, one-kill threat sometimes supposed in the popular media. At the same time, however, the ongoing modernization of Chinese air and, especially, submarine capabilities represents a more certain and challenging threat to CSGs. Between 1996 and 2015, the number of modern diesel submarines in China's inventory rose from two to 41, and all but four of theses boats are armed with cruise missiles (as well as torpedoes). RAND modeling suggests that the effectiveness of the Chinese submarine fleet (as measured by the number of attack opportunities it might achieve against carriers) rose by roughly an order of magnitude between 1996 and 2010, and that it will continue to improve its relative capabilities through 2017. Chinese submarines would present a credible threat to U.S. surface ships in a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.


6. U.S. anti-surface warfare
Closer to Mainland ChinaTaiwan Scenario Farther from Mainland ChinaSpratly Islands Scenario
1996 2003 2010 2017 1996 2003 2010 2017
Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage

We also assessed Chinese amphibious capabilities and the ability of U.S. submarine, air, and surface forces to sink Chinese amphibious ships. We found that the U.S. ability to destroy Chinese amphibious forces has declined since 1996 but nevertheless remains formidable. China's total amphibious ship capacity is on track to double between 1996 and 2017. China has also deployed larger numbers of more sophisticated anti-submarine warfare helicopters and ships. Largely as a function of the greater number of target ships, RAND modeling suggests that the expected damage that U.S. submarines might inflict has declined since 1996. Even by 2017, however, U.S. submarines alone would be able to destroy almost 40 percent of Chinese amphibious shipping during a seven-day campaign, losses that would likely wreak havoc on the organizational integrity of a landing force.

U.S. aircraft and surface ships armed with cruise missiles would likely also participate in anti-surface warfare. The development and deployment of new classes of U.S. anti-ship cruise missiles remained a relatively low priority for some years after the end of the Cold War, and U.S. advances in this area did not keep pace with those elsewhere in the world. Over the past several years, however, the U.S. military has refocused on developing missiles better suited to the high-threat environment. Although U.S. capability against Chinese amphibious forces has declined somewhat, a combination of submarine, air, and surface attacks would nevertheless pose a serious threat to Chinese amphibious forces and their ability to conduct or sustain an amphibious invasion.

(cont3)


7. U.S. counterspace
Closer to Mainland ChinaTaiwan Scenario Farther from Mainland ChinaSpratly Islands Scenario
1996 2003 2010 2017 1996 2003 2010 2017
Chinese advantage Chinese advantage Approximate Parity Approximate Parity Chinese advantage Chinese advantage Approximate Parity Approximate Parity

The United States, with 526 operational satellites, has a far more extensive orbital infrastructure than does China, with 132 satellites (as of January 2015). However, China has been accelerating its space efforts. Its average rate of satellite launches in 2009–2014 was more than double that of 2003-2008, and more than triple that in 1997–2002. The United States has historically been hesitant to deploy operational counterspace capabilities, in part because it fears legitimating such deployments by others and because of its own dependence on space support for other types of military operations. In 2002, however, Washington changed course and approved funding for selective counterspace capabilities. In 2004, the Counter Communications System, designed to jam enemy communication satellites, reached initial operational capability.

The U.S. military could also potentially utilize experimental or dual-use systems. Laser ranging stations could provide accurate position data to other counterspace systems. More powerful lasers, such as the High-Energy Laser system, could potentially be used to dazzle Chinese satellites' optical sensors. Finally, the U.S. military could potentially use improved ballistic missile interceptors as kinetic weapons, though practical and political considerations would weigh strongly against such destructive attacks. Overall, although the United States leads in the use of space to support terrestrial operations, its counterspace capabilities remain relatively underdeveloped.


8. Chinese counterspace
Closer to Mainland ChinaTaiwan Scenario Farther from Mainland ChinaSpratly Islands Scenario
1996 2003 2010 2017 1996 2003 2010 2017
Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Approximate Parity Approximate Parity Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Approximate Parity Approximate Parity

China has pursued an extensive range of counterspace capabilities. It demonstrated a kinetic anti-satellite capability in 2007 with a missile test against a nonoperational Chinese weather satellite at an altitude of 850 km. At that altitude, many U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) would be vulnerable. China has also announced three tests of ballistic missile defense interceptors, the latest in July 2014. These tests apparently took place at similar altitudes to the ASAT test and almost certainly employed technologies that could also be employed in anti-satellite weapons or roles. Ultimately, political considerations, the fear of escalation, and the vulnerability of Chinese systems to debris may deter the PLA from employing kinetic attacks. Arguably more worrisome are the PLA's Russian-made jamming systems and high-powered dual-use radio transmitters, which might be used against U.S. communication and ISR satellites. Like the United States, China operates laser-ranging stations, which might be able to dazzle U.S. satellites or track their orbits to facilitate other forms of attack.

In addition to Chinese offensive capabilities, the degree of threat posed to specific U.S. satellite constellations depends on the altitude, number, and orbit of satellites in those constellations and the ability of U.S. systems to maintain functionality in the face of attack. We evaluated threats posed to seven distinct U.S. space-based functions. The degree of threat to most of them is increasing. Threats to communication satellites (which are subject to jamming) and imaging systems (which are small in number, with four in LEO) are particularly severe. In two cases, the U.S. Global Positioning System and missile warning systems, upgrades or improvements to satellite function and numbers may mitigate risk substantially.

9. U.S. vs. China cyberwar
Closer to Mainland ChinaTaiwan Scenario Farther from Mainland ChinaSpratly Islands Scenario
1996 2003 2010 2017 1996 2003 2010 2017
Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage Major U.S. advantage U.S. advantage U.S. advantage

China's cyber activities have become a major source of concern in the United States and allied countries. There is strong evidence that many of the hostile cyber espionage activities emanating from China are tied to the PLA. The PLA has maintained organized cyber units since at least the late-1990s, while the U.S. Cyber Command was only formed in 2009. Nevertheless, under wartime conditions, the United States might not fare as poorly in the cyber domain as many assume. Cyber Command works closely with the National Security Agency and can draw heavily on the latter's sophisticated toolkit.

Moreover, in evaluating the likely relative impact of cyber attacks, the target user's skills, network management, and general resiliency are at least as important as the attacker's capabilities. In all of these areas, the United States enjoys substantial advantages, though Chinese performance is improving. Chinese cyber security is suspect, and its civilian computers suffer from the world's highest rate of infection by malware. Both sides might nevertheless face significant surprises in the cyber domain during a conflict, and U.S. logistical efforts are particularly vulnerable, since they rely on unclassified networks that are connected to the Internet.


10. Nuclear Stability
Country 1996, 2003, and 2010 2017
China Low confidence Medium confidence
U.S. High confidence
The nuclear scorecard evaluates crisis stability in the bilateral nuclear relationship rather than the advantage enjoyed by one side or the other. Specifically, the scorecard examines the survivability of both sides' second-strike capabilities in the face of a first strike by the other. When both sides maintain a survivable second-strike capability, the incentives for both the stronger and weaker parties to strike first diminish and stability is, in that sense, enhanced. The scorecard analysis considers the number, range, and accuracy of both sides' offensive weapons, as well as the number, mobility, and “hardness” of nuclear targets.

China has modernized its nuclear forces steadily since 1996, increasing their quantity as well as improving quality. It has improved survivability through the introduction of the road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-9) and DF-31A ICBMs and the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBNs), capable of carrying 12 modern JL-2 sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of approximately 7,400 km. In April 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense said that China has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles to some of its DF-5 missiles, and China is currently developing next-generation road-mobile ICBMs, SSBNs, and SLBMs. The United States has committed major funding to modernize its nuclear arsenal but, in keeping with both START and New START commitments and in contrast to China, is reducing the number of operationally deployed warheads and strategic delivery systems (Heavy Bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs).

Despite additions to the Chinese nuclear force and U.S. reductions, even by 2017, the United States will still enjoy a numerical advantage in warheads of at least 13 to one. A Chinese first strike could not plausibly deny the United States a retaliatory capability in any of the snapshot years considered. For its part, Chinese survivability has improved significantly. Nuclear exchange modeling suggests that, as late as 2003, only a handful of Chinese systems might have survived a U.S. first strike—and even this outcome would have depended largely on China deploying its single, unreliable Xiaclass SSBN (ballistic missile submarine) prior to an attack. In the 2010 and 2017 cases, more Chinese warheads survive, and no foreign leader could contemplate a disarming first-strike against China with any degree of confidence.

Thank you Hendrick for the post, but I am gonna need the weekend in order to get a chance to read the entire report.

Ok here is the summary. glad you appreciate it Even the summary is long
It is a long and exhaustive analysis. Here is the conclusion Basically it said that the trend is works against the US and time is on China side Well we know that.
In conflict scenario close to China assuming it occur today, US will have a lot of trouble because of long supply line
But further afield work in US advantage But even this is only temporary advantage
It is good that this people are much more sober than the warmonger.Rand is very instrumental in every war preparation that the US undertake. You can call them the private war planner
The scorecards show not that China has caught up to the United States but that it does not have to do so to mount a serious challenge to U.S. forces near the Chinese mainland. Taipei is roughly 11,000 km from San Diego (and more than 8,000 km from Honolulu) but only 160 km from the closest point on mainland China.

Fighting in China’s front yard endows Chinese forces with enormous advantages. From secure bases on the mainland, China can target U.S. forward bases in Asia with large numbers of accurate ballistic and air-launched cruise missiles. While the United States could retaliate with air and missile attacks of its own, there are 39 PLA air bases within 800 km of Taipei (roughly the range of unrefueled fighter aircraft), whereas there is only a single U.S. Air Force base (Kadena AB) within that distance—and only three within 1,500 km.

The effective loss of a single U.S. air base, therefore, would be far more consequential to the United States than the loss of a single Chinese air base (or even several) would be to the PLA.

Proximity would give China advantages in other realms as well, such as communication and logistical support. While U.S. forces would be largely dependent on satellite links for their communication, Chinese forces in a 7 The language of this section title is borrowed from Thomas Christensen, though it is used here to highlight a different range of issues than those raised in Christensen’s article. See Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” 2001. 328 The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces,

Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 Taiwan conflict could rely on land-based communication, which is far less vulnerable to disruption. As the scorecards illustrate, the Chinese military does not necessarily have to overtake the U.S. military in terms of quality, or even the number of high-end naval or air systems, to challenge it and potentially emerge victorious. Indeed, in the Taiwan scenario, the U.S. military would find itself hard-pressed even today.

Conclusion Rand Score card

Wednesday, February 8, 2017
9:16 PM

Trend Lines Are Moving Against the United States The military equation in East Asia has changed dramatically since 1996. By that year, China had already reformed many aspects of its antiquated Maoist military system. It was beginning to take delivery of advanced military systems imported from Russia. And it stood on the cusp of rapid military budget increases that would allow it to import and, ultimately, produce a much wider array of modern military equipment.

But the immediate reality for Chinese military leaders in 1996 was that the overwhelming preponderance of its equipment was obsolete. The large majority of its air and naval platforms were only partially modernized versions of systems that had entered Soviet service in the 1950s and early 1960s. Since 1996, however, China has increased its real (inflation-adjusted) military spending by an annual average of 11 percent.

It has concurrently reduced the size of its forces and streamlined procurement, enabling the PLA to modernize virtually every aspect of its capabilities. As this report has emphasized, with increased resources, the PLA has rapidly replaced much of its obsolete equipment with modern systems. The proportion of modern, fourth-generation fighters in the inventory rose from less than 1 percent in 1996 to 29 percent in 2010 and 51 percent in 2015.2

There is less agreement on what constitutes “modern” naval craft, but according to one (arguably liberal) definition, the proportion rose from 7 percent of the surface fleet in 1996 to 41 percent in 2010 and 68 percent in 2015.3 The newest Chinese warships are armed with a variety of modern close- and long-ranged SAMs, sophisticated supersonic ASCMs, and improved (though still not state-of-the-art) anti-submarine warfare systems.

In terms of attack submarines, the proportion of modern boats rose from less than 3 percent in 1996 to 48 percent by 2010 and to 66 percent in 2015.4 China has also 2 Aircraft generations are commonly defined against the most advanced aircraft of particular eras, beginning with the advent of the first jet fighters. See, for example, Joe Yoon, “Fighter Generations,” Aerospaceweb.org, June 27, 2007. 3 Here, we employ a relatively liberal definition of modern, categorizing the Sovremenny (DDG), Luhai (DDG), Luyang (DDG), Luzhou (DDG), Jiangwei (FFG), and Jiangkai (FFG) classes as modern ships, and the Luda (DDG), Luhu (DDG), Chengdu (FFG), and Jianghu (FFG) classes as legacy ships.

Modern naval platforms must have sensors and weapons to survive and fight in a combat environment. Such systems generally include advanced radar systems, such as planar arrays; long-range SAMs; and point defenses capable of protecting the ship from aircraft and missile attack.

(cont)
Most modern ships also have at least some defenses against submarines, including active and passive sonar and helicopters that can attack subs. Flexible and rapid-reloading vertical-launch missile systems for both defensive and offensive missiles are also becoming standard.

There is, however, no standard definition of modern in the naval realm, so we focused primarily on modern, long-range air defenses and anti-ship missiles. 4 We categorize Romeo-, Ming-, and Han-class boats as legacy craft and Kilo- (877 and 636), Song-, Yuan-, and Shang-class boats as modern. Apart from age and noise levels,

China’s legacy diesel submarines had angular hulls (designed for cruising on the surface), rather than the teardrop shape associated with most boats designed since the mid-1950s, and they lacked the cruise missiles that would allow long-range engagements. The Han-class SSN lacks adequate shielding around its reactor and poses a health threat to its crew. China’s newer classes of SSKs borrow a variety of design features from the Russian Kilo class and are armed with modern ASCMs.

For more 324 The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 added capabilities in entirely new areas. In 1996, the PLA was just beginning to develop conventionally armed ballistic missiles and had only a few dozen relatively inaccurate conventionally armed short-range missiles that could reach targets in Taiwan or Korea, but not U.S. bases in Japan.

By 2015, however, the PLA’s Second Artillery had deployed more than 1,200 conventionally armed ballistic missiles, including the DF-21C with the range to attack targets throughout Japan. Perhaps more importantly, accuracy had increased dramatically, with CEPs falling from several hundred meters in the 1990s to as few as 15 feet, transforming China’s theater ballistic missiles from largely indiscriminate weapons to systems capable of severely and reliably damaging U.S. facilities.5 By 2015,

China had also deployed hundreds of ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, further complicating the defense of U.S. and allied rear areas. The United States has also improved its military capabilities over the period considered in our study. U.S. military spending surged after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, rising from $316 billion in 2001 to $691 billion (including supplemental spending) in 2010, before falling to $560 billion in 2015.

Much of the additional budget over this period went to fund operations in the Middle East, and U.S. military procurement priorities over this period have focused largely on systems designed for low-intensity conflict, not the kinds of high-intensity operations likely in East Asia. Increased funding since 2001 did, nevertheless, bring improvements to U.S. conventional warfighting capabilities, including significant advances in netcentric warfare and joint operations. In several areas, the U.S. military has deployed next-generation military equipment, while Chinese modernization has focused more on systems comparable to U.S. equipment that came of age during the 1980s and 1990s.

Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track developments in the Asian military situation on an ongoing basis, the speed of change revealed by the analysis of retrospective data was striking. Typically, U.S. military equipment has advanced by one generation over the entire period (e.g., from fourth- to fifth-generation fighter aircraft), while Chinese capabilities advanced farther from a more primitive base (e.g., from second- to fourth-generation aircraft).

Trends Vary by Mission Area Although overall trends are running against the United States, these trends are not uniform. Moreover, some scorecard themes are more important than others and have significant spillover effects into other areas. Two areas of particular concern are threats details on Chinese submarines generally and noise levels in particular, see Office of Naval Intelligence, People’s Liberation Army Navy, 2009. 5 Vitaliy O. Pradun, “From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy Against U.S. Military Intervention,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2011, p. 14.

The Receding Frontier of U.S. Dominance 325 to U.S. forward air bases and the U.S. surface fleet, especially aircraft carriers. Accurate ballistic missiles and surface- and air-launched cruise missiles pose a serious threat to U.S. bases in Korea and Japan, as well as some threat to Andersen Air Base on Guam (see Chapter Three, scorecard 1).

U.S. aircraft at these locations are largely unprotected, and Chinese missiles could cause widespread destruction against deployed assets. Similarly, the modernization of the Chinese submarine fleet, combined with maritime strike aircraft and improved maritime ISR, poses increasing challenges for U.S. surface ships operating within 1,500 km of the Chinese coast (see Chapter Seven, scorecard 5). While the U.S. military will develop countermeasures against threats to both air bases and aircraft carriers, the PLA will also continue to improve its offensive power.

(cont3)
Geography and the PLA’s development of redundant capabilities make it unlikely that, barring a revolutionary technological breakthrough, these threats will diminish. The PLA’s ability to hold land bases and carriers at risk compounds the problems faced by U.S. forces in the air superiority battle, which would be challenging even in the absence of threats to bases (see Chapter Four, scorecard 2). U.S. aircraft will either face the risk of destruction at forward bases or fly from more distant bases to get into the fight, reducing the total number of sorties and loiter times once on station.

As the air superiority battle becomes more competitive and airspace is contested, a host of other missions will also become more difficult. To cite but one example, U.S. anti-submarine warfare efforts, which rely heavily on large, lightly defended airborne platforms, would be substantially hampered in contested airspace.

Although the trend lines are negative in most areas, they do vary substantially. In some cases, U.S. relative capabilities remain robust, either because the Chinese have made relatively less effort in those areas or because the United States has taken measures to mitigate or reverse Chinese gains. For instance, as discussed in Chapter Five, scorecard 3, the Chinese introduction of double-digit SAMs and fourth-generation fighters has compromised the ability of U.S. legacy aircraft to penetrate Chinese airspace.

But the combination of stealth and a larger, more capable inventory of precision standoff weapons has resulted in a net improvement in the U.S. capability to attack certain types of targets in mainland China, though these gains might not hold in a protracted conflict that exhausts the available stock of standoff weapons (see Chapter Six, scorecard 4). Similarly, despite improvements to Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities, the U.S. submarine fleet remains capable of doing extensive damage to China’s surface fleet (see Chapter Eight, scorecard 6).

Although expected U.S. submarine losses have grown somewhat over the period considered, they remain low, at least in the context of a war between major powers.6 6 Expected U.S. losses in a seven-day campaign against a Chinese amphibious fleet in the Taiwan Strait rose from roughly 0.5 submarines in a hypothetical 2003 conflict to 1.8 submarines in 2017. These modeling results should be treated as merely illustrative of general trends, rather than precise predictions. 326 The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017

Finally, for some scorecards on which overall U.S. capabilities are slipping relative to those of China, developments at the system level are better than others. For example, although the air superiority battle is becoming more challenging, the introduction of the F-22 and F-35 will likely ensure that, in combat between forces approaching even numbers, U.S. air forces will continue to achieve high kill ratios.

Similarly, while Chinese counterspace capabilities are improving overall, the threat to some satellite constellations may be significantly mitigated by ongoing improvements to particular U.S. satellite systems, especially those associated with PNT and missile warning. Distances (Even Relatively Short Distances) Matter Not only do the results vary by mission area, but they also vary across the two scenarios.

The assessment of the Taiwan and Spratly Islands scenarios suggests that Chinese power diminishes rapidly across even relatively modest distances. The U.S. basing structure is not optimized for operations in the South China Sea, and both sides would be able to bring less to the Spratly Islands fight than they would in the case of Taiwan. But Chinese capabilities suffer relatively more, as China currently lacks the support structure necessary to sustain significant combat forces at a distance from its coast, and its current land reclamation efforts and the construction of new infrastructure on the islands would be of only modest benefit in a high-intensity war.

Although China is extending the range of its conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missile forces, the numbers it can deliver at longer ranges will be far smaller than those capable of striking closer targets in the Taiwan scenario. Modeling of the air superiority battle suggests that the U.S. fighter inventory required to prevail in a South China Sea scenario would be roughly half that required in a Taiwan scenario. And as the analysis of U.S. attacks on Chinese air bases suggests (see Chapter Six, scorecard 4),''

China’s basing options would be severely constrained in the case of a Spratly Islands scenario, enabling the United States to focus its high-value aircraft and munitions on a smaller target set, increasing the impact of its attacks. As in the case of the Taiwan scenario, the trend lines are moving in a negative direction for the United States in the Spratly Islands case. Further improvements in relative Chinese capabilities can be expected, but with less asymmetry in the geographic dimension, these improvements may come at a higher cost to China. They will require China to invest relatively more in support capabilities (e.g., tankers, SATCOM, basing infrastructure), which will compete for defense resources with fighters, warships, and other combat assets.

China Can Pose Problems for the United States Without Catching Up To say that the United States would have difficulty achieving a variety of critical missions in particular scenarios is not to imply that the Chinese military has “caught up” The Receding Frontier of U.S. Dominance 327 to the U.S. military in overall quality, sophistication, or numbers of high-end systems.7 By many standards, the PLA continues to lag far behind the U.S. military. It is only now readying its first aircraft carrier, while the United States operates ten full-sized carriers plus nine additional amphibious assault ships capable of supporting fixed-wing aircraft. The U.S. Air Force’s first purpose-built stealth combat aircraft, the F-117, entered IOC in 1983.

As of 2015, the United States had deployed ten squadrons of F-22s—by far the most advanced fifth-generation aircraft in the world. The PLAAF, for its part, conducted its first test flight of a stealth aircraft, designated the J-20, in January 2011 and tested a second model, the J-31, for the first time in October 2012. Despite these tests, China is likely years from fielding an actual capability, much less one that matches the F-22. The United States also maintains far more (and far more capable) support aircraft, such as tankers and AWACS, and enjoys a similar lead in deployed satellite capabilities, attack submarines, and anti-submarine platforms. To take one example, China operates a total of ten tanker aircraft (all converted H-6 airframes) and is currently taking delivery of an additional three Il-78M tankers from Ukraine.

The U.S. Air Force has 475 larger and more capable tanker aircraft in its active and reserve components. However, the overall balance of forces is only an abstract concept. When armies clash in the physical world, operational factors, such as the objectives of the two sides, the available time for mobilization, the distance between various operationally relevant points, and the movement speeds of the assets involved, can have a decisive impact.

The scorecards show not that China has caught up to the United States but that it does not have to do so to mount a serious challenge to U.S. forces near the Chinese mainland. Taipei is roughly 11,000 km from San Diego (and more than 8,000 km from Honolulu) but only 160 km from the closest point on mainland China.

Fighting in China’s front yard endows Chinese forces with enormous advantages. From secure bases on the mainland, China can target U.S. forward bases in Asia with large numbers of accurate ballistic and air-launched cruise missiles. While the United States could retaliate with air and missile attacks of its own, there are 39 PLA air bases within 800 km of Taipei (roughly the range of unrefueled fighter aircraft), whereas there is only a single U.S. Air Force base (Kadena AB) within that distance—and only three within 1,500 km.

The effective loss of a single U.S. air base, therefore, would be far more consequential to the United States than the loss of a single Chinese air base (or even several) would be to the PLA.

Proximity would give China advantages in other realms as well, such as communication and logistical support. While U.S. forces would be largely dependent on satellite links for their communication, Chinese forces in a 7 The language of this section title is borrowed from Thomas Christensen, though it is used here to highlight a different range of issues than those raised in Christensen’s article. See Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up,” 2001. 328 The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces,

Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 Taiwan conflict could rely on land-based communication, which is far less vulnerable to disruption. As the scorecards illustrate, the Chinese military does not necessarily have to overtake the U.S. military in terms of quality, or even the number of high-end naval or air systems, to challenge it and potentially emerge victorious. Indeed, in the Taiwan scenario, the U.S. military would find itself hard-pressed even today.

Equation said:

Thank you Hendrick for the post, but I am gonna need the weekend in order to get a chance to read the entire report.

Click to expand...

LOL 490 pages dude and i check if you read all this great stuff haha
Actualy reading that goodness and checking number ofc i have see some errors hehe

BTW i don' t think possible have a fair neutral conversation instructive here... damage but !

I add for your info coz the report is not complelety affiramtive for date, years reasons :
Chines Navy have 2 Bns with 16 HQ-9s to Hainan, Sanya and surely a 3rd deployed sometimes in Spratley islands infos from " SOC " irrefutable.

And China have a total of at less about 178 HQ-9s,
AF at less 136 but at less 48 in interior not usable on the coast and i have tale a look on GE possible also 2/3 Bns now replace HQ-2s.
Navy have 32 with 24 i have mentionned and 8 others to Ningbo
We can guesstimate 16 HQ-9s are delivered each year.

You can read the maps i have udapted here for completed your opinion
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/pl...-4-strategic-regions.t7913/page-7#post-437642

FORBIN said:

I add for your info coz the report is not complelety affiramtive for date, years reasons :
Chines Navy have 2 Bns with 16 HQ-9s to Hainan, Sanya and surely a 3rd deployed sometimes in Spratley islands infos from " SOC " irrefutable.

And China have a total of at less about 178 HQ-9s,
AF at less 136 but at less 48 in interior not usable on the coast and i have tale a look on GE possible also 2/3 Bns now replace HQ-2s.
Navy have 32 with 24 i have mentionned and 8 others to Ningbo
We can guesstimate 16 HQ-9s are delivered each year.

You can read the maps i have udapted here for completed your opinion
https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/pl...-4-strategic-regions.t7913/page-7#post-437642

Click to expand...

How did you arrive at that number by counting the brigade and multiplying it by how many each brigade has HQ9?
That is unrealistic. did you ever hear of stockpile, inventory, reserve?
I bet their production is more than 16 HQ/year. That is for sure
Here is a good graphic on the missile coverage around china courtesy of in4ser