055 DDG Large Destroyer Thread

[plawolf]

Operating costs and crewing requirements should only see a marginal increase of less than 10% from the Type-52D to Type-55. There are just so many items on a warship that have a fixed cost and crew requirement - irrespective of whether the hull is 7500 tons or 11000 tons.

That seems exceptionally optimistic. The Tico class' average annual operating cost is around $28m, whereas the Burke's is $20m, representing a 40% difference.

Granted the Burke is newer than the Tico, but still, to go from 40% to less than 10% seems way too good to be realistic.

The Type-55 should be LESS of a logistical burden than the Type-52D because it will have more space for fuel, supplies, spares and repair workshops.

For consumables like fuel and supplies, sure, the 055 will be able to carry more, so can last longer without needing resupply. However, that cuts both ways, because the 055, being a bigger displacement ship with larger crew, will consume more fuel and supplies per unit of distance/time traveled, so once an 055 does need a resupply, it will take a much bigger bite out of a supply ship's stocks compared to a smaller 052D for example.

Again, China already has 20+ destroyers in the Type-52 weight class which is more than adequate to bridge any possible mission gap between the Type-54 frigate and the Type-55 large destroyer.

So it would simply be more efficient to migrate fully from the Type-52 hull to the Type-55 from both a cost and capability point of view. And if a yard can build a Type-52D, it most assuredly has the capability to build a Type-55 which is just a larger version with the same subsystems.

Well, I think we differ on just what the 055 will be like. If it is indeed just a bigger Type 052D, then yes, it makes less sense to make both in parallel.

However, I think the 055 will be more of a step up than just an enlarged 052D, with more of a baseline technological jump, and future growth potential.

As you yourself have noted, China has already been making incremental field testing of many next gen technologies and systems on smaller ships and test platforms, so I think there is a good chance those new systems and technologies will go mainstream sooner than some would expect. Remember, it's not just the direct production labour of shipyards that are affected by the massive reduction in civilian work. Marine architects and designers would need work to both maintain their core competencies, as well as develop new skills and keep current with the latest global developments.

The way I see it, there are major confluences of forces and interests that favour the 055 being a bold leap rather than a timid nudge forwards as would be the case with merely taking the 052D systems and technology and putting them in a bigger hull as you seem to believe.

Bigger leap also means bigger risks, so a slower, more conservative initial roll out would leave more time and room for further 052D builds, while keeping that type in production also maintains a viable back up in case things go badly wrong with the 055.

Whilst the shipyard *crisis* played a big part in the current naval construction boom, I also think that the current procurement rate is sustainable because of the large increase in military budgets we've already seen and are likely to see in the future. Eg. a minimum 20% increase in the next 3 years.

More than doubling the rate of expansion of the military budget seems like a very big jump compared to historical trends, especially given the economic climate. So I would be interested in knowing your thinking behind that figure.

 

[AndrewS]

Yes, future variants of new build Type-55s would likely have IEPS, railguns, lasers etc.

But when this technology matures and ships come in for their mid-life update, the Type-52D powerplant is going to have a lot less power available than the Type-55 powerplant.

So the Type-52D will be less effective as a combatant and more likely to become obsolete.

Also remember that the reported cost of the Japanese and Korean Burkes is between $1.1billion and $1.3billion - so $1billion for the Chinese Type-55 is not unreasonable.

 

[Blitzo]

$38 million for an extra 1.6million man-hours of labour
$45 million for an extra 3600 tons of displacement for hull and equipment
$90 million for an extra 6 VLS modules with 8 cells each
$27? million miscellaneous

Total: $200million extra

All these figures are calculated from the Type 54 detailed cost breakdown and the known displacement/cost/labour for the Type-55 and the Burke.

You are ignoring the two extra QC-280, the extra cost and R&D cost of additional sensors on 055 which 052D will not have (including X band AESA, and aft L band AESA), the extra cost of enhanced command capabilities (like facilities for a flag officer and their staff) which would likely include additional combat management hardware (such as larger CIC) and software.
055 will also likely displace an additional 6000 tons more than 052D (13,500 tons vs 7,500 tons) rather than only 3,600 tons.

To be honest it seems like we have very differing views as to what kind of ship 055 class will be, and if we cannot agree on that then it will be difficult to discuss comparisons between 055 and 052D.

Miscellaneous includes the SWOP of 2 diesel engines for QC-280 gas turbines and should cover the other stuff that you mentioned, with the exception of the additional helicopter. The combat management system and radars should be the same as the Type-52D, and they should share the same software upgrade cycle to add new capabilities.

Equating the cost of diesel engines for QC-280 isn't exactly logical given the sheer difference in power output and complexity between the two types of powerplants.

It has been persistently said that 055 will have a new X band AESA as well as an aft radar that could operate in the L band. And those are only the main active sensors that have been mentioned. ESM, EO/IR sensors, ECM, datalinks must all in turn be considered.

055 is also said to field much enhanced command capabilities and it would be very reasonable to expect that it would field a more capable combat management system and hardware such as CIC.

All of these things add significant cost to the ship.

Also remember that additional air assets vastly increase the air and sea control bubble that the ship can monitor and therefore defend.

And even if the Type-55 is at the high end of your cost estimate and is 50% more expensive, it still has at least 75% more VLS cells and 100% more helicopters. Again, it is still worth going with the Type-55 instead of the Type-52D.

It goes without saying that a single 055 will be more capable than a single 052D, the question is how much more capable and flexible an equivalent dollar amount of 055s will be compared to 052Ds.

One must also factor in the the 055 class's operating cost, in addition with its procurement cost relative to 052D (factoring in things including the 055's additional subsystem number and types but also that it may have some automation capabilities which will reduce operating cost a little but also increase procurement cost etc)

Once we have the total procurement+operating cost of each type of ship, we can then judge the capability and the the flexibility each offers when bought with the same amount of money.

E.g.: the operating cost of an 055 is potentially double that of the 052D (not unreasonable given it will have almost double the amount of subsystems to look after requiring more spare parts and more crew to look after them), and if an 055 is 150% the cost of an 052D (so say, 3 052Ds for the cost of 2 055s), and if the Navy planned on buying a large number of only 055s then it would make sense to no longer procure 052Ds.
But if the Navy felt like it valued having greater flexibility (such as what three ships could offer versus two ships) and if the Navy knew it would not be able to afford a large fleet of only 055s (that is to say, if they bought only 055s due to a smaller than preferred budget they would not be able to meet their availability requirements), then they may be forced to continue buying 052Ds.

That is to say, if the Navy was given X sized budget, even if the absolute firepower of a mixed 052D+055 fleet is potentially lower than a full 055 fleet (both being bought with X sized budget), if the full 055 fleet is unable to meet availability and flexibility requirements then they may quite reasonably judge the mixed 052D+055 fleet better suits their needs.

The two sliding scales we must look at include the Navy's budget, as well as the Navy's requirements, and the point where those two lines intersect will be the ships they end up buying.

 

[AndrewS]

That seems exceptionally optimistic. The Tico class' average annual operating cost is around $28m, whereas the Burke's is $20m, representing a 40% difference.

Granted the Burke is newer than the Tico, but still, to go from 40% to less than 10% seems way too good to be realistic.



For consumables like fuel and supplies, sure, the 055 will be able to carry more, so can last longer without needing resupply. However, that cuts both ways, because the 055, being a bigger displacement ship with larger crew, will consume more fuel and supplies per unit of distance/time traveled, so once an 055 does need a resupply, it will take a much bigger bite out of a supply ship's stocks compared to a smaller 052D for example.



Well, I think we differ on just what the 055 will be like. If it is indeed just a bigger Type 052D, then yes, it makes less sense to make both in parallel.

However, I think the 055 will be more of a step up than just an enlarged 052D, with more of a baseline technological jump, and future growth potential.

As you yourself have noted, China has already been making incremental field testing of many next gen technologies and systems on smaller ships and test platforms, so I think there is a good chance those new systems and technologies will go mainstream sooner than some would expect. Remember, it's not just the direct production labour of shipyards that are affected by the massive reduction in civilian work. Marine architects and designers would need work to both maintain their core competencies, as well as develop new skills and keep current with the latest global developments.

The way I see it, there are major confluences of forces and interests that favour the 055 being a bold leap rather than a timid nudge forwards as would be the case with merely taking the 052D systems and technology and putting them in a bigger hull as you seem to believe.

Bigger leap also means bigger risks, so a slower, more conservative initial roll out would leave more time and room for further 052D builds, while keeping that type in production also maintains a viable back up in case things go badly wrong with the 055.



More than doubling the rate of expansion of the military budget seems like a very big jump compared to historical trends, especially given the economic climate. So I would be interested in knowing your thinking behind that figure.

Note that the Arleigh Burkes and the Ticonderogas actually have almost the same displacement, but have a different configuration. So the difference in operating costs can't be attributed to displacement.

The Type-55 is bigger, but larger hulls have less water resistance for their displacement, and therefore are more efficient overall. It's the same reason why commercial ships keep getting bigger and bigger.

What I'm saying is that in the long-run, producing the Type-52D and Type-55 simultaneously doesn't make sense. Build a few Type-55s, make sure they work, then cease Type-52Ds and switch entirely to Type-55s.

The Chinese military budget is still growing at 7%+ per year. It means it doubles in only 10 years which is the sort of planning horizon that the navy can plan for.

 

[AndrewS]

You are ignoring the two extra QC-280, the extra cost and R&D cost of additional sensors on 055 which 052D will not have (including X band AESA, and aft L band AESA), the extra cost of enhanced command capabilities (like facilities for a flag officer and their staff) which would likely include additional combat management hardware (such as larger CIC) and software.
055 will also likely displace an additional 6000 tons more than 052D (13,500 tons vs 7,500 tons) rather than only 3,600 tons.

To be honest it seems like we have very differing views as to what kind of ship 055 class will be, and if we cannot agree on that then it will be difficult to discuss comparisons between 055 and 052D.





Equating the cost of diesel engines for QC-280 isn't exactly logical given the sheer difference in power output and complexity between the two types of powerplants.

It has been persistently said that 055 will have a new X band AESA as well as an aft radar that could operate in the L band. And those are only the main active sensors that have been mentioned. ESM, EO/IR sensors, ECM, datalinks must all in turn be considered.

055 is also said to field much enhanced command capabilities and it would be very reasonable to expect that it would field a more capable combat management system and hardware such as CIC.

All of these things add significant cost to the ship.




It goes without saying that a single 055 will be more capable than a single 052D, the question is how much more capable and flexible an equivalent dollar amount of 055s will be compared to 052Ds.

One must also factor in the the 055 class's operating cost, in addition with its procurement cost relative to 052D (factoring in things including the 055's additional subsystem number and types but also that it may have some automation capabilities which will reduce operating cost a little but also increase procurement cost etc)

Once we have the total procurement+operating cost of each type of ship, we can then judge the capability and the the flexibility each offers when bought with the same amount of money.

E.g.: the operating cost of an 055 is potentially double that of the 052D (not unreasonable given it will have almost double the amount of subsystems to look after requiring more spare parts and more crew to look after them), and if an 055 is 150% the cost of an 052D (so say, 3 052Ds for the cost of 2 055s), and if the Navy planned on buying a large number of only 055s then it would make sense to no longer procure 052Ds.
But if the Navy felt like it valued having greater flexibility (such as what three ships could offer versus two ships) and if the Navy knew it would not be able to afford a large fleet of only 055s (that is to say, if they bought only 055s due to a smaller than preferred budget they would not be able to meet their availability requirements), then they may be forced to continue buying 052Ds.

That is to say, if the Navy was given X sized budget, even if the absolute firepower of a mixed 052D+055 fleet is potentially lower than a full 055 fleet (both being bought with X sized budget), if the full 055 fleet is unable to meet availability and flexibility requirements then they may quite reasonably judge the mixed 052D+055 fleet better suits their needs.

The two sliding scales we must look at include the Navy's budget, as well as the Navy's requirements, and the point where those two lines intersect will be the ships they end up buying.

I'm using a baseline comparison which looks strictly at the effect of a larger Type-55 hull with additional VLS modules. The swap of the engines actually looks like it would cost the same, as diesel engines are a lot larger but more fuel efficient. Also, operating cost does not scale directly with size or number, as there are efficiencies.

All the additional stuff you've mentioned like X-Band radars, L-Band radars, C&C improvements, ESM, datalinks - would be judged separately on cost-effectiveness.

Simply put, if the Chinese navy finds that it has doesn't need these features on all the Type-55s, then it can simply skip the installation on a bunch of ships. But if the Chinese navy does find it needs these features, the Type-52D cannot easily accommodate them in a retrofit. Given that F-35 stealth aircraft are going to be common soon, the lack of an L-Band anti-stealth radar on the Type-52D is probably unacceptable going forward.

Remember that the Chinese Navy will already have a significant fleet of Type-52s before it switches over to Type-55 entirely. And if we look to the future size of the combined Type-52 and Type-55 fleets, that fleet will easily have the flexibility to cover all the geographical requirements.

I think we also have a significant difference in what the Chinese naval budget will look like in 10 years time.

 

[Blitzo]

I'm using a baseline comparison which looks strictly at the effect of a larger Type-55 hull with additional VLS modules. The swap of the engines actually looks like it would cost the same, as diesel engines are a lot larger but more fuel efficient

All the additional stuff you've mentioned like X-Band radars, L-Band radars, C&C improvements, ESM, datalinks - would be judged separately on cost-effectiveness.

Simply put, if the Chinese navy finds that it has doesn't need these features on all the Type-55s, then it can simply skip the installation on a bunch of ships. But if the Chinese navy does find it needs these features, the Type-52D cannot easily accommodate them in a retrofit.

No, we cannot simply use what you call a "baseline comparison" -- we must also look at the likely additional
If the point of this exercise is to compare the procurement cost and operating cost of an 055 vs an 052D then we need to be relatively comprehensive and make some estimates based on present information which we know at this stage.

And at this stage, all the "additional stuff" I mentioned are intrinsic to the 055 class. If future information or rumours changes that information we have then we can change our estimates but until then they cannot simply be waved away.
All of these additional subsystems I've mentioned will increase the 055's capability beyond that of 052D by a large margin, that goes without saying. But it will also incur additional costs on 055 compared to 052D as well.

The question is how large the Navy's budget is vs what the Navy's requirements (including outright capability, firepower but also things like availability and flexibility) are, and the intersection between those two lines will determine whether the Navy continues producing 052D (or a successor class) alongside 055 and its own future variants.

Remember that the Chinese Navy will already have a significant fleet of Type-52s before it switches over to Type-55 entirely. And if we look to the future size of the combined Type-52 and Type-55 fleets, that fleet will easily have the flexibility to cover all the geographical requirements.

I think we also have a significant difference in what the Chinese naval budget will look like in 10 years time.

The 052D will eventually be superceded by the 055 in production, that is to say eventually the 052D will cease production given there will be enough 7000 ton class combatants in the Navy's orbat that they will not need to produce a new class of vessel in that weight range, but there will be a period of time in which 052D production will occur in parallel along 055 class production.

As for whether the fleet will have the flexibility and availability to cover "all" the geographical requirements... that we simply do not know. The Chinese Navy's requirements may expand over the coming years just as its budget expands, or it may shrink, or stay the same, who knows.

The bottom line is that I think at this stage we cannot go ahead and state so confidently that 052D production will cease in favour of 055 the moment 055 production begins. At the very least there will be a period of a few years when JN and DL will continue producing 052Ds while they also produce 055s. Whether the Navy decides to pursue a new class of 7000 ton weight range surface combatants once their 052C/Ds need replacing in the late 2020s is another matter (and by that time the 055 class or advanced variants of it will likely still be in production).

 

[Blitzo]

Regarding surface combatant orbat, I've stated repeatedly before that by the late 2020s I'd like to see the Navy have a 24 x 4 orbat.

that is to say, roughly 24 055/As large DDGs, 24 052C/Ds DDGs, 24 054B/057 FFGs, and 24 054/As FFGs as the core of the Navy's modern, blue water capable surface combatant fleet.

That does not include some 60+ 056/A (or successor class) corvette class vessels for exclusive green water shorter range duties.

 

[Blitzo]

I feel like the discussion of 055 vs 055+052D is a case of deja vu, and in mid December I talked about the same topic, where I more or less outlined the major points I have now in somewhat greater detail.

https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ty...n-destroyer-thread.t6480/page-163#post-378983


the 24 x 4 orbat I also mentioned before, in relation to wartime and peacetime requirements:

Personally I am fond of a 4 x 24 fleet organization, that can potentially emerge in the mid-late 2020s.
24 054As
24 054Bs
24 052D/Es
24 055/As

For such a surface combatant orbat, assuming 1/3 of such a fleet would be in port in refit or giving crew rest/leave at any one time, that leaves 16 of each type of ship available for operations at any one time.

For a wartime situation against a high tech foe in the western pacific, I think the composition of various forces would be intended to have enough large destroyers:destroyers:frigates to have a ratio of 2:4:4 escorts available for a wartime CSG (2 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054A/Bs), with intention for three such CSGs, to operate mostly in westpac during wartime.
2 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054A/Bs may be overkill for the escort of a single carrier, but given the capability of the potential adversaries which the Chinese Navy faces, I think that such an escort during wartime should be quite necessary.

That leaves 10 055/As, 4 052D/Es, 4 054Bs, 4 054As available for other missions, including escorting task groups of lower importance or in conjunction with a wartime CSG (such as an amphibious group which could attach itself to a CSG to become a combined task force); or conducting blue water SAG missions (especially for the 055/As available), or escorting replenishment ships travelling between bases to a CSG in westpac (which would require less of a surface combatant escort, possibly only 2 frigates or a destroyer), or convoy protection, or even conducting closer in naval base and port defence alongside 056 corvettes and land based airpower.
The "excess" of 055/As leftover which are not part of a CSG compared to other ships is deliberate, and reflects my belief that 055/As may operate somewhat independently or in small SAGs among each other to perform supplementary combat actions in conjunction with the rest of the CSGs (and of course land based air power and 2nd Arty) as part of an overall strategic goal. This may include offensive missions such as conducting LACM strikes, or defensive missions to help support a more forward deployed sensor and AAW net from China's coast to provide more safe space for maneuvre for auxiliary ships.

OTOH, in peacetime (or against a low tech foe in blue water long distance missions), I think the 3 CSGs can afford to have a halved escort force of only 1 055/A, 2 052D/Es, and 2 054A/Bs. That leaves a far larger number of ships available for other missions, including 13 055/As, 10 052D/Es and 10 054A/Bs, and such a fleet would conduct a variety of peacetime missions including supporting a few forward deployed amphibious ready groups, conducting showing the flag missions, and general patrol missions near China's coast and in blue water... of course more free ships also means more ships and more crew could be afforded to have downtime on shore at any one time, which during peacetime can probably be afforded.

PS: the "3 CSGs" of course only reflect active carriers that are capable of performing action... I envision a total carrier fleet of 5-6 carriers of which at least 3 are either at sea or capable of being put immediately to sea.
PPS: I may have gotten carried away with my overall fleet vision, but I am firmly of the belief that a wartime CSG against a high tech opponent should optimally have an escort force of 2 055/As, 4 052D/Es and 4 054A/Bs, which I think would provide a balance of sufficientASW capabilities, AAW capabilities, command capabilities... and would also provide sufficient mutual redundancy support in those capabilities if any friendly escort ships are damaged or destroyed during combat actions.

https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/ty...n-destroyer-thread.t6480/page-161#post-378817


Ps: apologies for the triple post, but after twenty minutes we cannot edit a previous post >_>

 

[plawolf]

Note that the Arleigh Burkes and the Ticonderogas actually have almost the same displacement, but have a different configuration. So the difference in operating costs can't be attributed to displacement.

Indeed, which was the point - to show that even a small difference in displacement can mean a significantly higher operating cost. As I already noted, allowances should be made on account of the Burke using newer systems, but given the expected displacement of the 055, it's frankly difficult to see how one could reasonably expect only a less than 10% increase in operating cost, or how such a low figure was even arrived at.

The Type-55 is bigger, but larger hulls have less water resistance for their displacement, and therefore are more efficient overall. It's the same reason why commercial ships keep getting bigger and bigger.

Wrong.

Bigger hulls have better water resistant factors, meaning less water resistance per ton of displacement because water resistance does not increase in proportion to displacement. So a 2 times increase in displacement may only result in a 0.5 times increase in resistance, thus lowering the overall average resistance per ton of displacement. However, it should be pretty obvious that given the same general hydrodynamic shape, a larger object will always have more water resistance compared to a smaller one.

Again, assuming equally efficient engines, it will cost more fuel to push a much larger object the same distance compared to a smaller one. Thus while the per ton fuel cost may well be lower for the larger ship, the absolute amount of fuel needed will still be larger for the larger ship. That's just the basics and undisputed laws of physics for you.

What I'm saying is that in the long-run, producing the Type-52D and Type-55 simultaneously doesn't make sense. Build a few Type-55s, make sure they work, then cease Type-52Ds and switch entirely to Type-55s.

Just repeating the same conclusions without offering any counters to the arguments I and others have laid out against it doesn't lend it more weight.

The Chinese military budget is still growing at 7%+ per year. It means it doubles in only 10 years which is the sort of planning horizon that the navy can plan for.

So how does that translate to minimum 20% year on year growth of the military budget in the next 3 years as you originally mentioned?

 

[AndrewS]

That seems exceptionally optimistic. The Tico class' average annual operating cost is around $28m, whereas the Burke's is $20m, representing a 40% difference.

Granted the Burke is newer than the Tico, but still, to go from 40% to less than 10% seems way too good to be realistic.



For consumables like fuel and supplies, sure, the 055 will be able to carry more, so can last longer without needing resupply. However, that cuts both ways, because the 055, being a bigger displacement ship with larger crew, will consume more fuel and supplies per unit of distance/time traveled, so once an 055 does need a resupply, it will take a much bigger bite out of a supply ship's stocks compared to a smaller 052D for example.



Well, I think we differ on just what the 055 will be like. If it is indeed just a bigger Type 052D, then yes, it makes less sense to make both in parallel.

However, I think the 055 will be more of a step up than just an enlarged 052D, with more of a baseline technological jump, and future growth potential.

As you yourself have noted, China has already been making incremental field testing of many next gen technologies and systems on smaller ships and test platforms, so I think there is a good chance those new systems and technologies will go mainstream sooner than some would expect. Remember, it's not just the direct production labour of shipyards that are affected by the massive reduction in civilian work. Marine architects and designers would need work to both maintain their core competencies, as well as develop new skills and keep current with the latest global developments.

The way I see it, there are major confluences of forces and interests that favour the 055 being a bold leap rather than a timid nudge forwards as would be the case with merely taking the 052D systems and technology and putting them in a bigger hull as you seem to believe.

Bigger leap also means bigger risks, so a slower, more conservative initial roll out would leave more time and room for further 052D builds, while keeping that type in production also maintains a viable back up in case things go badly wrong with the 055.



More than doubling the rate of expansion of the military budget seems like a very big jump compared to historical trends, especially given the economic climate. So I would be interested in knowing your thinking behind that figure.

Indeed, which was the point - to show that even a small difference in displacement can mean a significantly higher operating cost. As I already noted, allowances should be made on account of the Burke using newer systems, but given the expected displacement of the 055, it's frankly difficult to see how one could reasonably expect only a less than 10% increase in operating cost, or how such a low figure was even arrived at.



Wrong.

Bigger hulls have better water resistant factors, meaning less water resistance per ton of displacement because water resistance does not increase in proportion to displacement. So a 2 times increase in displacement may only result in a 0.5 times increase in resistance, thus lowering the overall average resistance per ton of displacement. However, it should be pretty obvious that given the same general hydrodynamic shape, a larger object will always have more water resistance compared to a smaller one.

Again, assuming equally efficient engines, it will cost more fuel to push a much larger object the same distance compared to a smaller one. Thus while the per ton fuel cost may well be lower for the larger ship, the absolute amount of fuel needed will still be larger for the larger ship. That's just the basics and undisputed laws of physics for you.



Just repeating the same conclusions without offering any counters to the arguments I and others have laid out against it doesn't lend it more weight.



So how does that translate to minimum 20% year on year growth of the military budget in the next 3 years as you originally mentioned?

Let me give you another example.

The Type-37 subchasers are being replaced by the Type-56 corvette which have a displacement over 300% greater.

Yet the crew is only increasing by 11% from 70 to 78. Cost will go up, but it does not scale proportionally.

Another example is that the Type-55 is going with 4 gas turbines instead of the Type-52D arrangement of 2 gas turbines and 2 diesels. This removes one set of engineering skills and maintenance spares, so we should actually see a smaller engineering crew and lower maintenance costs for the Type-55.

These sorts of examples happen all the time when you scale up a ship.

You also misunderstand what I meant by fuel efficiency. You correct state that:

"Bigger hulls have better water resistant factors, meaning less water resistance per ton of displacement because water resistance does not increase in proportion to displacement."

But when you look at fuel efficiency per ton of displacement, larger hulls are more efficient because water resistance area increases slower than the volume/displacement. And note that a larger hull carries more weapons per ton of displacement and can also hold much more fuel.

So in summary, a larger hull is more efficient when you look at value for money eg. fuel consumed versus the larger number of weapons and the capability of the sensors carried.

Of course there is a limit where you reach diminishing returns, but there's also no doubt that the Type-52 hull has reached the limits of its displacement and that it has insufficient VLS cells for a balanced multi-mission loadout.

Remember that if the Chinese navy decides to undertake long-term production of the Type-52D and Type-55 simultaneously, then they don't have the numbers to reach economies of scale AND they will face lazy monopolistic suppliers because there aren't enough ship orders to promote competition.

You should note that I've actually done a course module on ship design which looked at the economics, albeit this was many years ago. I don't have the time nor inclination to go into every point I make in excruciating detail, but there are a lot of books and articles that are freely available on this topic if you google.

Note that the 20% figure is the absolute increase in Chinese military spending increases, not a 20% year on year growth figure. Also remember that the Navy is planning on the 10+ year timescale.

And that economic growth of 5-7% per year in China means the economy doubles in size in 10-14 years time. Presumably we can also expect to see military spending double as the baseline.