The Tank Troop/Platoon: Three, Four, or Five?

Norfolk

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I agree that a 3 tank platoon is really a section+



It might seem counter intiuitive since you have more guns covering, but moving 1/3 of the force at a time vs half will slow you down. This gives the enemy more time. A tanks biggest weapon is mobility. As tough as they are they can be killed if the enemy can localize them. Moving your force 1/3 at a time presents several problems.

1- What if the increased time lets the enemy drop a FASCAM fiedl between your maneuver groups. You've lost 1/3 of available force your force. The 6 tanks on one side of the field can still fight, but the 3 on the other side are nearly useless.

2- Company team tactics, 3 tanks and 8-12 IFV's is an okay screen for a mech inf force, but 6 tanks-4 IFV's is not enough mass for a tank heavy force.

3- A 3 tank section that loses 1 member looses 1/3 of its firepower and half its over watch ability and each remaining tank now has 17%% more coverage to watch. A 4 tank platoon that loses one only loses 25% of its power and over watch ability only gains 7% to its coverage area.

4- A 3 tank section is over stressed in coverage it can watch front, right, left but cannot double up on threat areas like a 4 tank platoon can. A 4 tank platoon can watch front, front, left, right or left left, front, right etc as needed the extra thermal on the most likely threat area may be the difference between life and death.



I think a scripted exercise (move from A to B) may have something to do with it. Israeli Army experience isn't really all that worthwhile. They have never faced an equal foe on and equal footing. The closes tthey came were the Jordanians and they ended up getting roughly treated by them when comapred to the Egyptians and Syrians.

I have to admit zraver, you've poked, or rather blasted, some mighty big holes in my arguments for the tactical superiority of the 3-tank "platoon" over the 4- or 5-tank platoon. But, that's what happens when an Infantryman opens fire with a rifle on a Tank - slight mismatch:D!

Yes, I very much agree that a 3-Tank unit can hardly be called a Platoon; it is a Section, and statements to the contrary are statements of (and in, denial), and I don't accept German, Israeli/Russian arguments to the contrary or those same arguments for the necessity of an "officer" to command said "Platoons". Those are conscript Armies whose Lieutenants, good as many may be, are the "rough" equivalent of sergeants in English-speaking professional Armies (and their "sergeants" the "rough" equivalent of our corporals, well, those have have done their NCO course anyway).

Now to the gaping holes you've blown in my arguments zraver:

1. The 3-tank platoon, 11-tank company, used as intended, certainly sacrifices speed during travelling overwatch and it appears to sacrifce speed during bounding overwatch. As to travelling overwatch, the only remedy to that problem that I can see is for the 11-tank company to adopt the traditional "2 up, 1 back", rather than the "1 up, 2 back" tactical concept associated with this organization - with 6 tanks on the move, and 5 covering (2 HQ tanks), this formation achieves the same speed as the 4-tank platoon of the 14-tank company, but it clearly lacks the gun tubes on the firing line if bumped by the enemy that the 4-tank platoon of the 14-tank company has.

As for bounding overwatch, I am of two minds here. As with the travelling overwatch, the 3-tank platoon and the 11-tank company must sacrifice the vital element of speed (an essential component of surprise, and of course shock effect) unless it abandons its 1 up, 2 back formation and goes for the reverse. But once in contact, I suspect that the 1 up, 2 back formation may well pay off in a more successful attack and lighter losses - but I base that upon the two studies I cited in Post#5, and you have doubts about the reliability of those studies. You are the Armor Professional; I lack the professional training and experience you have in armour, and I have no clear sources to prove otherwise in this particular case.

2. You're certainly right about the danger of the moving element being cut off from the covering element by artillery- or aerial-delivered mines. No argument there.

3. Not much of an argument there, either, although if the 3-tank "platoon" and its 11-tank "company" are used as what they really are, a "Section" and a "Platoon" respectively, I suspect that such losses may not necessarily be as grievous as they would be if the 3-tank "platoon" and 11-tank "company" are really employed as just that, platoon and company, respectively. That said, it's one thing for a seasoned, senior sergeant to command a section of 3tanks, quite another for a young, new Lt to commence his armour career commanding 10 or 11 tanks when he's not even fully the master of his own tank and crew yet. 'Nuff said there.

4. Company Team Tactics. There's still a difference here, because in US doctrine, the Company Team is made up of 1-3 platoons of either mech inf or armour, and an inverse proportion of the other. In Commonwealth doctrine, it's a little more involved; a Combat Team may be organized just like as US Company Team, or it may be a full mech inf company anda fulltank squadron, with the infantry company commander commanding the Combat Team in close terrain, etc., and the tank squadron commander commanding the Combat Team in open terrain, etc, the company and squadron commanders switching between overall command of the Combat Team as circumstances require. Also, we still use 19-tank squadrons (4 tanks per troop, 4 troops per squadron, plus 3 tanks in squadron HQ (for Sqn OC, Sqn 2i/c, and Sqn Battle Captain - mech inf coy in Strykers similar). So rather than break up the Tank Squadron and the Mech Infantry Company and cross-attach, we'll just pair them together, less fuss and muss, and a bigger hammer.

When I was in the RCR, the approved basic tactical manoeuvre unit was the Combat Team, with a Mechanized Infantry Company paired with an Armoured Squadron, not that we couldn't or didn't cross-attached platoons between companies, we just preferred to attack an enemy position with both pure (more or less) - more speed and suppression, less disorganization, and everyone knew their place, their role: no confusion. Besides, what enemy platoon likes to be surrounded by a rifle company and a tank squadron? So for a US Company Team, the 3-tank platoon would have a BIG impact; for a Commonwealth Army Combat Team, the impact would be different.

5. I think (4) more or less covers the same ground as what you point out in #3. and #4.

I strongly suspect that your're right zraver, the 3-tank platoon, 10-11-tank company compromises the most powerful single weapon of the tank, speed. And without speed, armour operations aren't much better than foot-infantry operations over open ground. I can't say that I'm totally convinced that the 3-tank platoon is without merit, but, as you point out, the Israelis aren't exactly facing the first team in the Middle East, and the armies that do use the 3-tank platoon (except Brits) are conscript armies seeking simplification at every level for short-service concripts who just don't have the time to learn everything that long-service professionals can.

I guess the 3-tank platoon, 11-tank company is great for what it's designed for: defensive operations against hordes of mediocrely or poorly-trained Soviet-inspired tank formations. Not necessarily applicable to professional, Western armour formations. It's especially interesting that the Germans have given up their dalliance with the 3-tank platoon and moved back to the 4-tank platoon. I would like to know why (just as I'd like to know why the Brits went to a 3-tank platoon).

Good response zraver:D. Now I'll just crawl away to the nearest aid station and tend to these gaping wounds...:eek:
 
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zraver

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I have to admit zraver, you've poked, or rather blasted, some mighty big holes in my arguments for the tactical superiority of the 3-tank "platoon" over the 4- or 5-tank platoon. But, that's what happens when an Infantryman opens fire with a rifle on a Tank - slight mismatch:D!

Not so much a mismatch, but experience. Your information in your area out wieghs my own.

Yes, I very much agree that a 3-Tank unit can hardly be called a Platoon; it is a Section, and statements to the contrary are statements of (and in, denial), and I don't accept German, Israeli/Russian arguments to the contrary or those same arguments for the necessity of an "officer" to command said "Platoons". Those are conscript Armies whose Lieutenants, good as many may be, are the "rough" equivalent of sergeants in English-speaking professional Armies (and their "sergeants" the "rough" equivalent of our corporals, well, those have have done their NCO course anyway).

I touched on this earlier in the thread, and you re-visit it later, but the best small unit leader is a career NCO.

As for bounding overwatch, I am of two minds here. As with the travelling overwatch, the 3-tank platoon and the 11-tank company must sacrifice the vital element of speed (an essential component of surprise, and of course shock effect) unless it abandons its 1 up, 2 back formation and goes for the reverse. But once in contact, I suspect that the 1 up, 2 back formation may well pay off in a more successful attack and lighter losses - but I base that upon the two studies I cited in Post#5, and you have doubts about the reliability of those studies. You are the Armor Professional; I lack the professional training and experience you have in armour, and I have no clear sources to prove otherwise in this particular case.

it's a complex issue, and gets even more complex with US style company teams. Bradleys are just not good at over watch. Thus the formation is moving 1/3-2/3 but has the advantage of always having 50% of its tank cannon on overwatch vs the 33/66% float of the 3 tank section, 11 tank company. I actually prefer the travelling overwatch, given the typical US dominance in tactical recon and modern fire control, it is possible for a US force that practices this maneuver to never stop except when covering a choke point that doesn't already have some sort of US asset watching it.

15-20kph sustained might not seem like much until you look at just how far a force moving at that speed can cover in 4-5 hours. In 91 the VII Corps did this on a massive scale and the Iraqi Republican Guard was never able to react fast enough. The Corps and thier British allies smashed through 5-6 divisions in just a few hours. The US Army force that made the dash to the Karballa Gap in 2003 did the same thing, it never stopped. Although it did have air mobile fuel bladders and extensive screening. Even if the Iraqi's had detected the move across the desert it was moving so fast that they could not react to it.

4. Company Team Tactics. There's still a difference here, because in US doctrine, the Company Team is made up of 1-3 platoons of either mech inf or armour, and an inverse proportion of the other. In Commonwealth doctrine, it's a little more involved; a Combat Team may be organized just like as US Company Team, or it may be a full mech inf company anda fulltank squadron, with the infantry company commander commanding the Combat Team in close terrain, etc., and the tank squadron commander commanding the Combat Team in open terrain, etc, the company and squadron commanders switching between overall command of the Combat Team as circumstances require. Also, we still use 19-tank squadrons (4 tanks per troop, 4 troops per squadron, plus 3 tanks in squadron HQ (for Sqn OC, Sqn 2i/c, and Sqn Battle Captain - mech inf coy in Strykers similar). So rather than break up the Tank Squadron and the Mech Infantry Company and cross-attach, we'll just pair them together, less fuss and muss, and a bigger hammer.

And both systems have proven themselves. Part of the US reliance on its systems are the lessons of WW2, Vietnam, and 1973 Yom Kippur. Isolated armor units are horribly vulnerable to dedicated infantry forces in restrictive terrain. Defensive the tank company team will assign its infantry to cover areas that do not offer a good line of sight or are the least likely to get hit. offensively the infantry does duty as scouts in built up or restrictive areas either way the infantry serves the needs of the tanks. Conversely when the infantry commands and dominates the team the tanks are the supporting arm, the two are never equal.

When I was in the RCR, the approved basic tactical manoeuvre unit was the Combat Team, with a Mechanized Infantry Company paired with an Armoured Squadron, not that we couldn't or didn't cross-attached platoons between companies, we just preferred to attack an enemy position with both pure (more or less) - more speed and suppression, less disorganization, and everyone knew their place, their role: no confusion.
Besides, what enemy platoon likes to be surrounded by a rifle company and a tank squadron?

thats a lot of combat power, how nimble is it. The US team system gives the typical 3 Battalion Divisional Brigade 9-12 maneuver elements. Sounds like the Commonwealth is reducing elements to increase the power of each element.

I strongly suspect that your're right zraver, the 3-tank platoon, 10-11-tank company compromises the most powerful single weapon of the tank, speed. And without speed, armour operations aren't much better than foot-infantry operations over open ground.

Worse, dismounted infantry using decent tactics is dammably hard to kill. However every burning tank is 3-4 men out of action and millions of dollars lost. This is the tanks biggest weakness the sheer concentration of power talent, and cost into a single easily targeted unit. This is why in fact I like the 2 tank section 4 tank platoon. Tanks need wingmen the same way fighters do. The battlefield is likely to be so complex that no one can track everything.
 

Norfolk

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thats a lot of combat power, how nimble is it. The US team system gives the typical 3 Battalion Divisional Brigade 9-12 maneuver elements. Sounds like the Commonwealth is reducing elements to increase the power of each element.

When used either to develop or to make the break-out in offensive operations, or to launch a counter-attack or assume a blocking position in defensive operations, a Combat Team composed of a Tank Squadron and Infantry Company (mechanized) allows it to forego having to internally reorganize each time the terrain changes or a different type of enemy force is encountered (so you can take on both armour-heavy and then infantry-heavy forces in successive turns with hardly missing a beat).

If you hit enemy armour, the your tanks may lure the enemy into a trap laid by the infantry, and once the infantry get a hold of them, the armour counter-attacks. If you hit enemy infantry, the tanks suppress (we used HESH - great stuff) the enemy positions while the infantry make the breech (with a few tanks in support) then assault and fight through and wipe out the enemy position. In either case, once the enemy is disposed off, you just keep going, unless your orders are to hold and of course then you consolidate and lay a trap for the enemy counter-attack.

I think that the general concept dates back to the 1950's when an SS-General (whose Division the Canadians had fought in Normandy) imprisoned in Canada not far from what was then 1st Div HQ began writing to the General Staff all sorts of letters on tactical and operational matters, and after a while the Army sent someone down to the prison to talk to this guy. Over the next few years, the Canadian Army began to rewrite its doctrine along German lines, and an interesting synthesis of British and German tactical and operational thought had taken full form by the 1970's. The Germans do not look kindly upon splitting up companies, and even prefer not to split up battalions, but do so as tactically necessary. The Canadian Army generally agrees doctrinally, but in practice it's hard to achieve given the relative lack of Armour in particular and the paucity of ground forces in general.

Doctrinally, a Mechanized Infantry Battalion is supposed to consist of 4 Rifle Companies, a Combat Support Company (Recce, Assault Pioneer - now deleted I think, Anti-Armour, Mortar Platoons), etc., and an Armoured Regiment is supposed to consist of 4 Armoured Squadrons and a Recce Troop. In practice, Battalions rarely have more than 3 understrength rifle companies and an understrength combat support coy, and an Armoured Regiment (until recent years) usually had only 3 armoured squadrons (usually with armoured cars, not MBTs) and the brigade armd recce squadron (including the regimental recce troop). A Brigade would have only 2 mech infantry battalions, so in practice only 1 Combat Team composed of a Tank Squadron and a Rifle Company paired together would be available for a counter-attack or blocking task. Doctrinally, 2 such Combat Teams would be available, and this would allow for a small but genuine offensive capability, in this case perhaps capable of destroying a Soviet force attacking a dug-in battalion.

The general idea of such a Combat Team would be to rapidly overtake, suppress, breach, overrun, and destroy anything that it bumped (and have it done before the enemy could effectively respond), and then just keep going until told to hold or the enemy was all dead.

Combat Teams organized along the same lines as US Army Company Teams would be formed at the discretion of infantry battalion and armoured regiment commanders for the same reasons and depending upon the same factors as their US Army counterparts. But for decisive operations, such as attack and pursuit operations, or counter-attacks or blocking tasks, Combat Teams composed of a both an Armoured Squadron and an Infantry Company would be formed (resources permitting).
 
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zraver

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When used either to develop or to make the break-out in offensive operations, or to launch a counter-attack or assume a blocking position in defensive operations, a Combat Team composed of a Tank Squadron and Infantry Company (mechanized) allows it to forego having to internally reorganize each time the terrain changes or a different type of enemy force is encountered (so you can take on both armour-heavy and then infantry-heavy forces in successive turns with hardly missing a beat).

If you hit enemy armour, the your tanks may lure the enemy into a trap laid by the infantry, and once the infantry get a hold of them, the armour counter-attacks. If you hit enemy infantry, the tanks suppress (we used HESH - great stuff) the enemy positions while the infantry make the breech (with a few tanks in support) then assault and fight through and wipe out the enemy position. In either case, once the enemy is disposed off, you just keep going, unless your orders are to hold and of course then you consolidate and lay a trap for the enemy counter-attack.

I think that the general concept dates back to the 1950's when an SS-General (whose Division the Canadians had fought in Normandy) imprisoned in Canada not far from what was then 1st Div HQ began writing to the General Staff all sorts of letters on tactical and operational matters, and after a while the Army sent someone down to the prison to talk to this guy. Over the next few years, the Canadian Army began to rewrite its doctrine along German lines, and an interesting synthesis of British and German tactical and operational thought had taken full form by the 1970's. The Germans do not look kindly upon splitting up companies, and even prefer not to split up battalions, but do so as tactically necessary. The Canadian Army generally agrees doctrinally, but in practice it's hard to achieve given the relative lack of Armour in particular and the paucity of ground forces in general.

Doctrinally, a Mechanized Infantry Battalion is supposed to consist of 4 Rifle Companies, a Combat Support Company (Recce, Assault Pioneer - now deleted I think, Anti-Armour, Mortar Platoons), etc., and an Armoured Regiment is supposed to consist of 4 Armoured Squadrons and a Recce Troop. In practice, Battalions rarely have more than 3 understrength rifle companies and an understrength combat support coy, and an Armoured Regiment (until recent years) usually had only 3 armoured squadrons (usually with armoured cars, not MBTs) and the brigade armd recce squadron (including the regimental recce troop). A Brigade would have only 2 mech infantry battalions, so in practice only 1 Combat Team composed of a Tank Squadron and a Rifle Company paired together would be available for a counter-attack or blocking task. Doctrinally, 2 such Combat Teams would be available, and this would allow for a small but genuine offensive capability, in this case perhaps capable of destroying a Soviet force attacking a dug-in battalion.

The general idea of such a Combat Team would be to rapidly overtake, suppress, breach, overrun, and destroy anything that it bumped (and have it done before the enemy could effectively respond), and then just keep going until told to hold or the enemy was all dead.

Combat Teams organized along the same lines as US Army Company Teams would be formed at the discretion of infantry battalion and armoured regiment commanders for the same reasons and depending upon the same factors as their US Army counterparts. But for decisive operations, such as attack and pursuit operations, or counter-attacks or blocking tasks, Combat Teams composed of a both an Armoured Squadron and an Infantry Company would be formed (resources permitting).

Given the era it comes out of its ballsy, it is very reccee dependent. It has the ability to overrun just about any smaller force on the attack or defeat any unit up to 1 step larger on the defense but it locks away the Brigade/regimental ability to form reserves if I am reading it right. Thats another area where the American style really shines in doctrine. Every level that has a "commander" (company through Divsion) has an increasing amount of built in reserves. The company has a platoon, the battalion has a company plus a scout platoon, the Brigade has a battalion+ engineers, the Division has 2 battalions plus the divisional cavalry squadron.
 

Norfolk

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Here's an interesting short piece by a US Army Armor officer on how the Bundesheer Tank Platoon uses terrain to its advantage:

CALL 98-12

Quote:

"Driving Where the Water Flows" and
Other Lessons Learned from Our German Allies
by CPT Louis B. Rago, II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent CMTC rotation brought U.S. and German Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) together to assist training a Panzer Battalion (PzBtl). The exercise was a professionally rewarding experience. It was an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Although our doctrine, organization and, to a lesser degree, equipment differ, O/Cs made several significant observations which transcend these differences.
Some of the strongest traits that the German units demonstrated align directly with current U.S. doctrine. Unfortunately, these strengths are often overlooked by many USAREUR battalions rotating through the CMTC. The rotation provided the opportunity for a contrasting view of the CMTC norm in both planning and execution. It is important to evaluate some of these TTPs in an effort to revalidate their use by American tank and mechanized infantry units.

The strength of the PzBtl was at the crew level. The German tankers and panzer grenadiers (mechanized infantrymen) demonstrated superior skill in both crew duties and the operation of their combat vehicles.

The two most significant lessons drawn from the Leopard 2 and Marder crews are the value of terrain driving and continuous scanning.

Terrain driving. German soldiers say, "Fahren wie das Wasser fliesst" to guide the training and execution of terrain driving. It means "Drive where the water flows." This descriptive and effective slogan serves as a rule of thumb for drivers and vehicle commanders when deciding routes of travel. A German crew almost always chooses the longer, concealed route over the most direct route. The average U.S. crew tends to use "speed as camouflage" or fails to adjust their position in the formation when the terrain changes. The PzBtl demonstrated throughout the rotation that a skilled driver significantly increases the crew's survivability by concealing them from enemy view and using cover as protection from direct fire.

Scanning. The German crews also increased their survivability through superior scanning and observation techniques. The old adage, "The tank that sees first, fires first and wins," is proven true rotation after rotation at CMTC. Unfortunately, the victor in most engagements during U.S. rotations tends to be the OPFOR. The tankers of the PzBtl use a few techniques that greatly assist them in gaining the advantage over their enemy.

Techniques:

1. Leopard gunners continuously maintain their scan pattern regardless of whether they are stationary or on the move. Effective scanning and maintaining gun tube orientation while on the move is a difficult task that must be vigorously trained. The Germans obviously make an effort to develop this skill. It pays great dividends. U.S. crews that break the "course road mentality" reap the benefit of "seeing first" in most cases.

2. Both the loader and tank commander (TC) actively participate in observation and acquisition of targets.

a. The loader assumes a sector of responsibility and remains up in the hatch until required to arm the gun or load. The TC rarely limits himself to the Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV), a device available on the Leopard 2A5 of the PzBtl . He remains up in the hatch and scans using binoculars. This technique provides the TC a wider view and quicker response while on the attack.

b. Since USAREUR tankers do not yet have the advantage of the CITV, this technique would seem to be the normal procedure for U.S. Tcs. On the contrary, most observations reveal that TCs tie themselves to the Gunner's Primary Sight Extension (GPSE). They rarely, if ever, use their binoculars on the offense. This is unnecessarily redundant. The gunner and TC scan the same sector and significantly decrease the crews' ability to see the enemy first. Improvement in this area increases crew survivability and the overall effectiveness of the platoon.

PLATOON

At the platoon level, the German tankers routinely used effective techniques normally overlooked by the majority of their American counterparts.

Techniques (Offense): Discipline is the watch word. The platoons of the PzBtl are very disciplined in both the use of terrain and appropriate movement techniques. U.S. tank platoons tend to disregard the use of movement techniques based on the terrain and enemy. Many U.S. platoons rarely bound by section when enemy contact is expected, as specified in our current doctrine.

1. German tank platoons specify movement techniques based on terrain and the templated enemy positions.

2. They execute bounding overwatch at the platoon level as a matter of routine.

RESULTS:

1. The disciplined and deliberate movement of platoons within observation of the enemy proved more effective than the traditional M1-series tanker's use of a fast-moving wedge or combat column formation.

2. The built-in security of bounding overwatch allowed the German platoons to move more safely and to transition into the assault with more tanks surviving the approach. More often than not, this is not the case with many USAREUR platoons that often are rendered combat ineffective during their approach march.

Techniques (Defense): Outstanding use of terrain. They rarely occupied the "normal" battle positions used during U.S. rotations. Since the Bundeswehr doesn't have the frequency of rotations to CMTC that U.S. battalions do, the German tankers were not able to rely on "institutional knowledge."

1. This forced the leaders to conduct thorough terrain analysis, and map and ground reconnaissance.

2. The platoon leaders of the PzBtl established engagement areas and hasty battle positions by the numbers.

RESULT: More effective use of terrain and an overall better defense. In this case, a lack of "institutional knowledge" benefited the German platoons since they were forced to execute based on doctrine rather than taking shortcuts based on past experience.

The experience of nearly every unit that has trained at the CMTC in recent months highlights the importance of security. USAREUR battalions fully understand the need to defeat the OPFOR reconnaissance effort so that they are postured for success. In most cases though, the only active measures to counter enemy reconnaissance are taken at the task force level. Normally a company/team augmented with scouts and other combat support assets is given the mission to screen the task force's main defenses. Unfortunately, company/team commanders tend to believe that this relieves them of responsibility for active security and counter-reconnaissance in their own sector.

In contrast, the German companies always took active measures in addition to those of the battalion. The most common technique was to establish a platoon-sized screen 2,000 meters forward of the company battle positions. This, coupled with dismounted patrolling of the flanks and woodlines, proved quite effective. On two of the three defensive missions executed by the PzBtl, no enemy scouts penetrated the battalion sector to the main defensive belt. Since the German battalion tended not to dig fighting positions to the degree found in American units, this technique was more easily executed than would be possible during a U.S. rotation. But that being said, the technique proved effective and should serve as food for thought.

The previously mentioned TTPs are discussed to encourage thought and to help focus the preparation of USAREUR units' training for combat at CMTC or elsewhere. The PzBtl, like its American sister units, demonstrated both strengths and weaknesses from the individual crew to the company level. But, the strengths of this unit and the lessons learned during this recent CMTC rotation are outstanding training points for any warfighting unit without regard to nationality, organization or doctrine.


Train to Win!

-Unquote

The article did not mention what the size of tank platoon used by the Germans at the time was, whether 3 or 4 tanks. I suspect that would have some impact on the ability of the tank platoon to use ground to its best advantage, particularly when seeking and using firing/battle positions, and of course the distribution of fires subsequently used. Most impressive is the use of bounding overwatch for practically all tactical movement by the German Tank Platoon, not just when contact is expected or thought possible. Judging by this, it seems to indicate that the German Tank Platoon was using 4 tanks rather than 3 at this time, but this is not openly confirmed anywhere.
 
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Norfolk

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This rather dated U.S. Army Field Manual from the 1960's is nevertheless quite quite useful for developing a basic foundation in tank matters, not only for the technical aspects of tank gunnery (albeit doing it the "old" way) but particularly in the tactical aspects of tank gunnery, from tank platoon fire control orders to distribution of fires to firing positions - the fundamentals of these do not change.

The first part of the manual deals mainly with the technical aspects of tank gunnery at the time, which are therefore outmoded; but the latter part of the manual deals with the tactical aspects of tank gunnery, both for individual tanks and for tank platoons (and using the traditional 5-tank platoon at that) - and as mentioned before, these do not go out of date.

FM 17-12 Tank Gunnery (1964):

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Incidently, the manual uses the M-60 MBT (along with the M-48 and refers to the M-41; M-103 Heavy Tank has been deleted by now - 1964) with the 105mm rifled tank gun, both of which are still in (albeit declining) service.
 
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Norfolk

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This is a pretty handy reader, and covers small-unit Armour tactics and operations from the First World War to the Yom Kippur War. Chapter 3 covers the Korean War:

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, US Army Armor School, 1986.
 
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