@ougoah until you realize that the US is currently pursuing efforts to minimize if not outright neuter the threat of ballistic missiles with their grand plans of Orbital, Sea and Land based ABM systems. HGVs are fancy at first glance but only really useful upon the terminal stage of the missiles flight path where they detach from the bus and do their hypersonic, gliding, maneuvering thingy. But mid course interception if not outright boost phase interception would invalidate this line of thinking.
I doubt the US ABM efforts will go anywhere but a confined improvement of ABM density for critical regions (Silo fields, Washington, bomber air bases).
However it's a threat that needs to be accounted for. So weapons like Burevestnik and successor designs account for it by ensuring that after an exchange the destruction of military and soft targets would be ensured regardless of how the initial exchange with ballistic missiles went. Same thing with Poseidon and future derivatives. As in "You can seek to counter ballistic missiles, but you won't be able to counter ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and submersible weapons simultaneously or with degraded defenses". It ensures the threat of nuclear destruction in a period where the US once again strives for strategic invincibility.
The Chinese could perhaps develop such a system, I'm confident they could develop such a system given enough time, resources and priority. But the Chinese approach is for one, simply increasing the volume of ballistic missiles fielded, diversifying launch platforms and on top of that the Chinese are less concerned about genuine WW3 style scenarios, and more about limited exchange in east Asia over regional interests that conflict with the US. Neither being willing to destroy each other in such an exchange. While the Russians and Americans view each other as predestined mortal enemies. And if either goes down, they will take the other with them no matter what. Furthermore simply growing their ICBM and SLBM force isn't viable for Russia because the scale of their strategic forces is already enormous.
In short, it's a diversification of retaliatory platforms meant to ensure robust second strike capability against renewed American interest in strategic ABM efforts. The Russian and Chinese approaches are different but ultimately have the common goal of overwhelming such defenses one way or the other. One isn't correct and the other isn't, it's about what a given nation finds feasible and suitable for the situation they see themselves in.