It was a land-based air superiority fighter, why fold them in the first place?
H-20 bomber (with H-X, JH-XX)
- Thread starter Deino
- Start date
For those who knows the geography of this base, what are the chances that an H-XX prototype is there?
And if it has been built already and flying (which I'm assuming will only be at night), the chance of US satellite grabbing a pic of it is low since I'm also assuming it only comes out after a US or other foreign satellite has passed over.
The base is in Nanjing (an Eastern Theater Command base if I'm correct) and it is a front line base that houses H-6s and the WZ-8 to respond to the Taiwan Strait... Not exactly ideal for test and evaluation I think.
If indeed the H-XX prototype is already up and running, my hypothesis is that it'll be in the production facilities at XAC, which coincidentally is also where the PLA's Central Flight Test Evaluation facility is located. In other words the H-XX still has a couple steps to take on the usual procurement project lifecycle - it should go from XAC/CFTE to Dingxin or Cangzhou for test evaluation and training in order to get the PLAAF/CMC's stamp of approval, and thus allowing the H-XX to become the H-20 (or whatever the official nomenclature designation will be) for production procurement... Only then will we potentially see it introduced to a front line base.
The magazine scan claims the tails are all-moving folding tails.
The notable thing about the magazine proposal is that it apparently shows that the H-20 lacks split elevons, as on the B-2. This may represent a different solution to yaw control than the B-2, using an all-moving folding tail, which may have benefits that the B-2 lacks.
Likewise, the NGAD leak apparently includes a folding rudder for tailless yaw control.
I just can't figure out what aerodynamic or stealth benefits would be provided by choosing a folding tail instead of a split elevon.
@Deino
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Indeed ...
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This is actually less of a mystery than the choice of an all-moving folding tail.
See, the thing is, when you look at the H-20 vs the B-2, it's more obvious that the H-20, unlike the B-2, is less of a flying wing than it is a blended wing body flying wing / body lift aircraft. In that case, the choice of having three angles in the front is a compromise for the lifting body of the main fuselage. The change in sweep presumably energizes air that flows over the lifting body. Likewise, the rear change in angle performs similar functions, or is intended to mirror the front sweep for RCS reduction.
The design proposed, by the way, suggests an anemic weapons payload, but also an aircraft that's optimized for range. Some rumors of the H-20 suggest that it has a combat radius of at least 6,000 km, so the designers would have to make compromises to get there.
One other possibility is that the H-20 is not a single bomber, but rather a family of bombers. The blended wing body / flying wing / lifting body should make it relatively easy to extend the main lifting body as needed, sacrificing range for payload.
The notable thing about the magazine proposal is that it apparently shows that the H-20 lacks split elevons, as on the B-2. This may represent a different solution to yaw control than the B-2, using an all-moving folding tail, which may have benefits that the B-2 lacks.
Likewise, the NGAD leak apparently includes a folding rudder for tailless yaw control.
I just can't figure out what aerodynamic or stealth benefits would be provided by choosing a folding tail instead of a split elevon.
@Deino
===
Indeed ...
View attachment 72155View attachment 72156
This is actually less of a mystery than the choice of an all-moving folding tail.
See, the thing is, when you look at the H-20 vs the B-2, it's more obvious that the H-20, unlike the B-2, is less of a flying wing than it is a blended wing body flying wing / body lift aircraft. In that case, the choice of having three angles in the front is a compromise for the lifting body of the main fuselage. The change in sweep presumably energizes air that flows over the lifting body. Likewise, the rear change in angle performs similar functions, or is intended to mirror the front sweep for RCS reduction.
The design proposed, by the way, suggests an anemic weapons payload, but also an aircraft that's optimized for range. Some rumors of the H-20 suggest that it has a combat radius of at least 6,000 km, so the designers would have to make compromises to get there.
One other possibility is that the H-20 is not a single bomber, but rather a family of bombers. The blended wing body / flying wing / lifting body should make it relatively easy to extend the main lifting body as needed, sacrificing range for payload.
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The H-20 should have done its first flight by now. Otherwise, its initial operational capability will be achieved well beyond 2025. I still feel like we are going to see the H-20 on the CPC centenary. I am probably wrong but there has been a lot of teasing since the last year. I also can't think of a more sensational time to unveil it.
First off my response was in regards to IF a prototype is to be found right now, it won't be in the aforementioned frontline base (Luhe) that was mentioned in the article.
Secondly I don't see the rush to have the H-20 flying in 2025, since Xi's military reforms calls for the PLA to reach the goal of modernization by 2035. Time is certainly of the essence, but we're still a good decade and a half away from that target - might as well wait for the right technology (engines to provide sufficient thrust without penalties on performance or mission capability, sensor fusion avionics, C4ISR capabilities) to be developed before fielding it onto the front lines, it'd make much more sense from an economic and resource allocation perspective too compared to introducing multiple bridge variations of the H-20 with "inferior" technology.
When we first first "heard" about the maiden flights of say the KJ-600, the WS-20 engined Y-20, or the Y-20U, we had a lot more chatter and leaked images (either of the actual plane itself, or of production/maintenance infrastructure of where the plane is being built/kept) from the credible PLA watching community... all we've heard about the H-XX is that it'll be revealed soon, a couple of concept sketches, and a magazine cover - so imho I don't think the H-XX prototype has flown yet. We MIGHT get some news about it in the centenary celebration, but I doubt we'd see any sort H-XX prototype roaring over the skies during the celebration.
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
It's unrealistic to expect H-20 will fly at this year's centenary parade, even if H-20 has already flown (a big if). The H-20 is far from a state where it can be shown publicly in a parade under the most optimistic scenario. The high sensitivity nature of the aircraft also rules out any premature appearance.
However, suggesting H-20 would only be ready by 2035 is probably too pessimistic. Considering Air Force Commander General Ma Xiaotian mentioned to the press back in 2016 Air Force Day that China had been developing its long-range bomber, and thereafter in at least two official promotional videos AVIC & PLAAF dropped hints about the existence of a probable stealth bomber ("The Next"), it's clear H-20 development is well underway. We had a similar experience for J-20 in 2009 when the then Deputy Air Force Commander He Weirong stated in a CCTV interview that a stealth fighter aircraft had been under development and could take the first flight in a few years. We all know J-20 took its first flight in 2011. Judging from that experience and the high-level technology readiness of the major subsystems such as shaping, materials, flight control, avionics and engine, it's not unreasonable to expect that H-20 will take its first flight before 2025, which, admittedly, is already somewhat behind some earlier expectations.
Why do you suppose the bomber would not be ready to fly publically if it has already flown?
in Terms of flight dynamics, a large bomber optimized for high altitude subsonic penetration, even a pure flying wing, is much less complex than a fighter expected to frequently maneuver at the very edge of controllability, such as the J-10 or j-20. If this thing can fly, it can fly at air shows.
Also, I think the desired service date of H-20 would not be governed by Xi’s optimistic scenario of china’s untroubled ascension to global power projection capability. It would be governed by the pessimistic scenario that Taiwan would be successfully encouraged to declare outright independence well before China achieve global power projection capability as a means of discrediting the CCP and thus checking china’s progress towards global power projection capability. So 2025 seems a geostrategic ally very desirable target date.
also, it is reasonable for the Chinese to suppose the greatest geopolitical pressure and ostracization China will face will occur during the period when the threat of China achieving 1) regional conventional parity, 2) second strike nuclear parity with any plausible American led alliance clearly is there, but the actual attainment of that parity has not yet occurred.
Once the parity occurs, the dynamic will change and some sort of detent will no doubt occur.
Before that is achieved the pressure will be all towards squeezing and ostracizing China. So the longer China takes to achieve parity, the longer and more cumulatively damaging the pressure and ostracization campaign will be. So it behoves China to achieve its target of comprehensive regional parity and nuclear second strike parity quickly rather than slowly and deliberately.
in Terms of flight dynamics, a large bomber optimized for high altitude subsonic penetration, even a pure flying wing, is much less complex than a fighter expected to frequently maneuver at the very edge of controllability, such as the J-10 or j-20. If this thing can fly, it can fly at air shows.
Also, I think the desired service date of H-20 would not be governed by Xi’s optimistic scenario of china’s untroubled ascension to global power projection capability. It would be governed by the pessimistic scenario that Taiwan would be successfully encouraged to declare outright independence well before China achieve global power projection capability as a means of discrediting the CCP and thus checking china’s progress towards global power projection capability. So 2025 seems a geostrategic ally very desirable target date.
also, it is reasonable for the Chinese to suppose the greatest geopolitical pressure and ostracization China will face will occur during the period when the threat of China achieving 1) regional conventional parity, 2) second strike nuclear parity with any plausible American led alliance clearly is there, but the actual attainment of that parity has not yet occurred.
Once the parity occurs, the dynamic will change and some sort of detent will no doubt occur.
Before that is achieved the pressure will be all towards squeezing and ostracizing China. So the longer China takes to achieve parity, the longer and more cumulatively damaging the pressure and ostracization campaign will be. So it behoves China to achieve its target of comprehensive regional parity and nuclear second strike parity quickly rather than slowly and deliberately.
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