PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

tphuang

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The last part is key. If there are any competent short-range air defence or anti-drone systems remaining.

Remember that these air defences will have to reveal themselves when they engage.
And presumably the PLAAF will have something like air superiority over the skies of Taiwan and have SEAD assets in play.

If you have drones acting as $10K guided missiles, you don't mind if many get shot down because there are lots more available. If a single J-16 costs $80 Million, you could buy 8000 Mugin 5 drones for example which would be enough to overwhelm any air defence.

I've previously pointed out that the cost of commercial drones is really low and how it would be straightforward to repurpose them for military use.

This type of Mugen drone also has enough range to reach South Korea
And if you made a somewhat bigger drone, it could have a 1000km range which means Japan is now in reach.

Actually, I totally missed that piece of news earlier.

I'm waiting to see Shilao's podcast/talk on this topic. I'm sure PLA is watching closely how its civilian drones are getting used by Russians and Ukrainians. I remember a while back, one of the military analysts on bilibili was boasting how much better DJI drones were than Orlan-10.

There will be massive drone attacks coming in this conflict, but it will most likely be done by China against Taiwan/first island chain bases. I will probably write up a post on this in the UAV thread, but the possibilities are quite broad. Pretty much all the fuel depot, communication centers, power sources in these bases are screwed if China can launch these from land area 700 km away (or from naval ships) and still reach them. It's not hard to see how you can launch a bunch of small and stealthy reconnaissance drones for 24/7 coverage of these island bases. It'd be hard for them to all get shot down. And then with improved material, AI and larger size, you could easily see attack versions acting in suicidal/non-suicidal roles to intelligently pick out weak points of defense and cause greatest damage. For example, you might deal as much damage to a base by having a small drone floating over top of runway repair workers and drop a bomb on them vs causing multiple crates along the runway with several stand off missiles/PGMs.

PLA is probably going to take a lot of lessons from this war. They already have these cheap drones operating off CV-17. You can store 100 of these things in the hangar or weapons room and just use them as things see fit. The attacking prowess shown here by the Ukrainians may get PLA to do a lot of thinking.
 

gelgoog

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China needs a modified mass produced drone but with military grade communication link. Not this civilian fluff which can be jammed or intercepted easily. It would be as simple as software change to the software defined radio.

I would not say the DJI drone is 100% better than Orlan-10 because it lacks the laser target designator. Without the laser designator the accuracy in pointing a target will be a bit hit and miss. The main advantage is it is way cheaper and easier to recover. Likely also more portable. The control unit for Orlan-10 seems to be a laptop. The Russian Army needs to move to ruggedized tablets I think.

Orlan-10's combustion engine will mean it will have more range, but also noisier and likely easier to spot as a result.
 

AndrewS

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Yes, they've actually replaced a few Bdes with DF-17s in the past few years; especially DF-11 and DF-15 Bdes. One of the prevalent thoughts is that they're semi-standardizing their BM fleet. There's a common medium range booster, a common intermediate range booster, and potentially air/naval-launched versions of each (potentially the basis of H-6N's ALBM and the """"YJ-21"""" we've seen). There are also conventional MaRV warheads for both (DF-16 and conventional DF-26), an HGV payload which we know as the DF-17, and an anti shipping payload (potentially CH-AS-X-13 warhead and the DF-26's anti-shipping warhead). This gives each Brigade a lot more versatility in the event of a conflict, and allows for much more rapid retasking of rocket force fires, as all the work to integrate the various warheads can (most likely) be conducted in the Technical Bn/Comprehensive Support Bn's mating facilities.

Wouldn't a DF-17 missile fit on the same launcher as a DF-16?
 

FairAndUnbiased

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China needs a modified mass produced drone but with military grade communication link. Not this civilian fluff which can be jammed or intercepted easily. It would be as simple as software change to the software defined radio.

I would not say the DJI drone is 100% better than Orlan-10 because it lacks the laser target designator. Without the laser designator the accuracy in pointing a target will be a bit hit and miss. The main advantage is it is way cheaper and easier to recover. Likely also more portable. The control unit for Orlan-10 seems to be a laptop. The Russian Army needs to move to ruggedized tablets I think.

Orlan-10's combustion engine will mean it will have more range, but also noisier and likely easier to spot as a result.
What would be nice on a Chinese cheap recon drone is optical telescope and camera, IR telescope and camera, laser designator and a coordinate finder kit (laser rangefinder, Beidou receiver, electronic compass and altimeter to establish 3D position, angle to target and range to target) in addition to a high efficiency rotary engine for long time on station.

This should cost around maybe 60k which is very low, and in exchange get the value of an entire artillery observation platoon.
 

Mohsin77

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In the software Tempest and I built with genuinely awesome folks from 6th Intelligence Squadron (and which we're - as part of that super secret big project - are going to be tidying up and releasing as a public tool/"game" :p),

I'd actually buy that "game", unlike that Command "sim."

So... moral of the story: "in milshit, the answer is almost always 'it's complicated,' and single, public, consistent, and meaningful performance metrics are vanishingly rare."

Thanks for the detailed breakdown. I was surprised that notching is still a thing for the SAM vs CMs scenario (but then again, of course it is, I just never considered it in this context.)

Net conclusion being: Under good conditions, subsonic CMs can run circles around any SAM system and remain a potent threat. But there are conditions in which the ratio flips, and SAMs can achieve a high interception rate, but it all depends on the many parameters and variables of the specific engagement.

This of course, is agnostic of the saturation problem. But for that, case in point:


Not as much as you may think. The need for supporting infrastructure, decent throughput + paved (if overland) + resilient sustainment vectors, radio, satcom, and datalink emissions, topographic challenges (can't launch an IRBM in trees, can't drive a ROGUE fires JLTV over swamplands, and can't improvise an airstrip in hills), and more all make DMO/EABO/ACE+ACO very anemic CONOPs.

I had a good talk with some folks from PACAF a few days ago while I was in DC where we discussed the sustainment requirements for even a single fighter squadron being all but unsupportable even in as ideal of a spot as Luzon. Getting the requisite materiel not only to whatever improvised port is offloading cargo, but doing so in the face of the PLA's anti-shipping complex, but then to transport it inland to dispersed, ostensibly """""concealed""""" forces is a huge logistical obstacle to sortie and fires generation.

The need to support personnel and operations is also a significant challenge. There's a reason PLARF Brigades require such extensive facilities after all. Munition inspection, transport, and mating; vehicle fueling, maintenance, and crewing; and all the other aspects of effectively employing standoff munitions via mobile TELs are the kinds of things that don't come cheap. Not in money, manning, or infrastructure. NMESIS is certainly making strides, but the reality of it is, a 100nm buffer around most landmasses isn't especially big; and the actual, in practice volume of fires that can be generated is not sufficient to seriously impede PLAN operations.

All of the aforementioned emissions are also a problem. ELINT/COMINT is sort of an area in which the PLA excels, and they have an amply large inventory of platforms capable of facilitating it. Command and control of these forces would necessitate them speaking over SATCOM or other very-much-NOT-LPI solution. The cueing process would require either manual programming of the munition with information provided over the C3 network, or the presence of a datalink, which - sadly - would most likely be LINK16; and LINK16 is about as far from LPI as you can get these days, as an omnidirectional not-at-all-inconspicuous xmission. The reason F-22s are only capable of receiving LINK16 data as of Update 6, but explicitly unable to Xmit, is because it would give away their location. Theoretically some more modern LPD waveforms can be integrated into the LINK16 architecture, and that sorta stuff is planned for the future, but we're a ways off.

All of this comes together to create a low-effectiveness, logistically unsustainable, vulnerable, semi-concealed force that can only really operate as a pest/deterrent rather than as a meaningful contributor to local combat power.
As much as I wish you were right, you're not.

The Philippines have explicitly banned US Bases as part of their new constitution, and we're only allowed to set foot on their soil due to the Visiting Forces Agreement. In the 2010s they began allowing the US to use Subic Bay to make port calls as long as we seek and obtain prior approval from the PH government, but that's all. The only notable time we've used it in support of operations has been to host transitory supplies and servicemen for a joint exercise in 2015 In total we have less than 200 servicemen in the Philippines (practically all of whom are there as advisors/trainers to support the PH's fight against ISIS), of which only 10 are from the Navy.

We do not have any major military presence in the PH, and this article (notably by Stripes lol) is just referencing a comment about the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. During a thinktank's discussion on that agreement, the ambassador to the US simply said they "plan" to move fairly quickly. However, that statement doesn't mean very much. The agreement was signed in 2014, and simply allows the US to build facilities for servicemen and supplies in 5 Philippine bases. That never ended up being done, and has been subject to pretty much constant political friction from/in the Philippines - especially lately due to the election.

Perfect. I love being wrong when it helps me lolz

So for the US to amass CMs on these sites is currently very problematic. That's good news. Now, it's going to be up to the US to decide how they wanna deal with this. If this real-estate is turning into a liability, i.e. it is unable to "meaningfully contribute", then it seems like withdrawal from the theater is the rational option. There's not much functional use in keeping token forces in a logistically unsustainable environment where they will just soak up valuable resources and will likely be unsurvivable if the missiles start flying.

The other option would be to double-down and massively re-invest (economically and geopolitically) in this theater, expand operations at all these sites, including Philippines, Okinawa etc. and turn them into a potent forward arsenal which can actually contribute to offensive fires. But that may have an associated cost that is simply unfeasible at this point.

It seems like the US is strategically confused. It doesn't want to withdraw from the theater, but isn't willing to commit to it either (so basically, business as usual for the US.)
 

AndrewS

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All of this comes together to create a low-effectiveness, logistically unsustainable, vulnerable, semi-concealed force that can only really operate as a pest/deterrent rather than as a meaningful contributor to local combat power.

That is interesting.

I've long thought that a DF-26 IRBM could dispense a very large number of tungsten/DU ball bearing submunitions at a target like an airfield.
Enough that you could expect a single DF-26 to theoretically blanket somewhere like Andersen Airbase and ensure every large aircraft (eg. Bomber/Tanker/AEW) left on the ground would be hit at least once.
 
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AndrewS

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This would be funneled into procurement for standoff naval mines (Korea is, kinda humorously, super well positioned to launch large numbers of such systems into the Bohai Sea/East China Sea border with the aim of complicating naval operations), ground launch VLO cruise missile with sufficient range to target Northeastern Chinese critical infrastructure and C2 facilities, and for a production apparatus capable of generating a large inventory of these systems, which will be stored in dispersed locations throughout the country.

This would provide those types of nations with a significant retaliatory capability, ample longevity for it, and would not significantly impede conventional military operation. However, it's a half measure. The 70% of remaining aerial inventory, and the 75% of remaining land force systems are still going to be sitting around, doing next to nothing for the majority of - if not the entire - conflict. I'm sure you see what I'm getting at.

The other point is that if Korea, Japan or Taiwan can launch standoff naval mines and ground-launched VLO cruise missiles at those distances, what is to stop China from doing something similar? Korea, Japan and Taiwan are geographically small island(s) which are critically reliant on seaborne trade, whereas China is a continental-sized nation that can be largely self-sufficient and also has a lot of land borders for trade to flow.

Not as much as you may think. CVNs operating at standoff distance from the PRC are able to generate pretty poor sortie volumes (I wouldn't put it much above 85-100 sorties per day per carrier at surge tempo), and with the majority of closer-in infrastructure destroyed or disabled, there is a very limited amount of basing available for air operations. At this rate, the US is essentially unable to operate in the WESTPAC anywhere near the first island chain. Regardless of initial circumstance, anything other than a ludicrously heavy forward presence, PLA bad luck and poor decision making, and god's blessing will result in the PLA thrashing 7FLT AOR forces, and essentially leaves Guam as the westernmost major military facility (i guess excluding Australia). Whether the US can muster forces and wear the PLA down is somewhat doubtful, but it's essentially the only chance we've got, since the "fast war" concept is a near total losing game.

Currently I don't see China having enough missiles and other long-range systems to keep Guam (and other distant bases) non-operational for a extended war, say lasting over 3 months. Afterwards, that would allow US forces the time and opportunity to concentrate long-range fires on specific targets. So conceivably the US could "win" in a years-long campaign.

But then what? Afterwards you could end up with a situation similar to how Imperial Germany sought vengeance after WW1 and transformed Nazi Germany. In this case, the US had an economy many times larger than Nazi Germany. In comparison, China is already 30% larger than the US overall and conceivably could grow to 3x larger.
 

tphuang

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@Patchwork_Chimera Thanks for joining this forum and providing your thought.

in wondering what you thought about my comments here #386 where I believe that if PLA significantly degrades Guam and then disable Tinian/Wake Island, it would be very hard for USN/USAF to sustain an operation in westpac?

Aside from that, in your opinion, how many missiles are needed to degrade a major base like Anderson or Okinawa to the point where they can't launch aircraft, supply/repair naval ships and adequately defend itself against intruding aircraft for 12 hours? I think the premise of our discussion in this thread has been trying to figure out how many missiles pla would try to launch in the initial barrage. Similarly, if you were usn and we're coming with submarine/b52 and carrier air wing, what would you try to target and disable first?

The way I look at is that china has too many targets in it's navy and mainland itself. It's unclear to me what would give us military the best bang for the buck.
 
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