PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Mr. THAAD Battery provides 48 interceptors in 6 launchers, which is nothing to scoff at, and would probably drag our intercept Pa modifier down to ~.85 or so for a maneuvering RV in a first strike. If we posit (don't know how much is public, so it's not worth the risk to specify) a .9 composite "probabillity of hitting the thing if it gets through the defenses" for DF-26s, that puts us at a total of .765 Pa. Take the max of 90 aimpoints, apply the Pa, and you get 118 DF-26s. The issue is, PLARF IRBM Brigades are only around 18 missiles a pop.

The mooted probability of a successful THAAD intercept of a DF-26 (~15%) is even lower than I expected.

I previously though there was a somewhat favourable exchange ratio in terms of the DF-26 against THAAD.

But we'd actually see a massive advantage in favour of the DF-26, given the economics of an offensive DF-26 missile (cost ~$20 Million) versus 6 THAAD (at 6 x $11? Million).
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
Yea, but the USN has the luxury of nobody expecting them conducting a massive first strike conventional attack on the world's largest economy and the most powerful military in the region lol.
I would dispute this. The PLA would be uncharacteristically foolish not to expect the US to try to sucker punch China.
Airpower-wise, the "buildup" could be conducted literally days if not hours before strike ops began, so wouldn't give enough warning time to meaningfully act upon. Just call it an exercise. Maybe "Able Archer 22" for comedic effect.
A conclusion one draws from your posts is that readiness levels are a crucial determinant an air/missile defense system's success rate. My question is why wouldn't an IADS be put at maximum readiness - or a state of near maximum readiness where transitioning would be very rapid - 24/7/365? Or at least at high readiness whenever enemy forces are surged in the theatre for any reason whatsoever.

A couple of other questions if I might: What are your thoughts on China's missile defense specifically (not air defense, but BMD)? I feel this is topical given the recent test against a (possibly) ICBM-class target. Also, I expect the US, having withdrawn from the INF, to begin fielding theatre ballistic missiles in the coming years so it would be good to have your thoughts on how BMD would fare against them.

Does your modelling incorporate near-future systems like laser-based SHORAD against cruise missiles? We've had indications that the Silent Hunter performed very well for Saudi Arabia against Houthi drones/munitions. Granted that's hardly the most challenging opponent but I still would like to know how big a deal a souped-up version of that system would be in defending important facilities.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
As far as supplies go, yes. We, with our current auxiliary fleet, our current basing and facilities in theater, and our current platforms - are not able to sustain more than about 4, maybe 5 CSGs (depending on composition and number of other forces) in the WESTPAC simultaneously. That's also a fairly generous estimate. For starters, we've only got 4 T-AOEs, of which 2 are in reserve; which means at most 4 (assuming no T-AOEs are sunk in the initial fighting, and all 4 are mission ready) CSGs will host their own supply vessels. However, these aren't enough to continuously supply a CSG operating at wartime tempo. CSGs in peacetime UNREP at least once per week as a rule of thumb, with general/rough averages being once every 3-5 days, even when the gas tank isn't close to empty. At a wartime tempo, this figure changes to every ~3 days @20kts if memory serves. Now, without Guam Naval Base as a forward resupply facility, the nearest intact, friendly ports are Pearl and the facilities in Australia. A T-AOE transiting @ ~20kts can get from the northern portion of that "most permissive operating area" zone from the graphic I posted a few days ago, to Pearl in about a week, and from the southern portion to Pearl in about 10 days. Takes about 8-9 days to get from the southern portion to Australia's nearest viable resupply bases. There are ports along Australia's northern coast (Darwin, Cairns), but those aren't really equipped to resupply large T-AOE/AO/AKEs. To get there from the northern portion requires 9-10 days. Now, a Supply-class T-AOE carries enough DFM for 3 to 4 Burkes or ~3 Ticos (or ~~ 3 Burkes 1 Tico... which, you may have noticed, is a common escort complement for CSGs lol), and enough JP-5 for ~4 days of wartime tempo flight ops. Thus, the shortest route - to pearl - is a 14 to 19 day round trip + a 24h "port" period (to reflect resupply time and other potentially delaying factors), so we'll call it 15-20 days. Thus, for a single wartime-tempo CSG in this sustainment environment, it would require ~3 to 5 T-AOEs. Again, note, we currently have a total of 4 (assuming none are sunk initially) with 2 being reserve ships.

Our other major replenishment vessels are the Henry J. Kaiser class T-AOs and Lewis and Clarke Class T-AKEs, of which we have 15 and 14 respectively. T-AKEs are dry cargo vessels, which are required less frequently than T-AOs, so they won't be our bottleneck. Kaiser Class T-AOs are less impressive than Supply-class T-AOEs, only able to refuel ~2 Burkes or 1 Burke + 1 Tico in a single go. Thus, each CSG requires ~6 to 10 T-AOs to ensure they are being replenished regularly. Thus, @ the 3 T-AOEs @20kts and 6 T-AO @20kts (very high for them lol) requirements, we would be capable of sustaining 3 CSGs at wartime tempo and ~22-25kts cruise speed. Should the CVWs operate at a bit lower of a tempo, operate closer to the 20-22kt region, the T-AOEs transit at their maximum 25kts, we can just barely scrape enough throughput for 4 CSGs. When surviving allied auxiliaries are included, we can afford a couple of 1+2 SAGs, and if European allies provide auxiliary support, we could afford 3 SAGs and have some breathing room, or another CSG, but just barely.

I'd give the CSBA's "Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era" a read if you're interested in learning more about our current shortfalls, and (the main focus) what a future force needs to look like to address them. You can find it
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.

We've seen PLAN Navy ships conduct underway refueling from commercial product tankers, so I assume the US Navy could do something similar.

So if the US Navy were to park commercial tankers 1000km behind Guam and use that as a secure fuel resupply point for the Supply and Kaiser ships.

You could sustain a lot more CSGs that way.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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@Patchwork_Chimera
Thanks for taking time with some very thoughtful and informative responses. I would agree that if USN/Allies are having a large scale exercise in Asia and we are in peace time (Chinese navy is not wartime alert), then a surprise attack would do a lot of damages. But I find the odds of US military launching this kind of egregious unprovoked attack to be quite low. The support for something like this from within America would be very low.

I was originally thinking of a scenario where the tension across the straits is already high and US military took the time to pre-position their ships into westpac. In that case, the likelihood of PLA launching large scale retaliation while facing incoming missiles is quite high.

Funny story. I'm listening to a Chinese podcast now and they are talking about just the firepower of having even 2 Burke class is quite significant. If they each carry 30 Tomahawk missiles, they can launch 60 LACMs in short period of time. And that can do a lot of damage. which brings me back to the topic of PLA threats against Guam. To me, the biggest threat against Guam would be a bunch of 052Ds/055s stationed on the East side of Taiwan and launching LACMs against Guam. They'd be easier to intercept than DF-26s, but 2 055s and 6 052Ds could launch 150 to 200 of these missiles in a very short time. Again, we have yet to really see pictures of a VLS LACM, but if PLA really wants to make live difficult for US military in the region, it would be strange to only concentrate its efforts on expanding ground launch units.

Yes, systems like WZ-8, OTH-Rs, Satellites, MPAs, etc. are certainly capable of cueing DF-21D/DF-26/etc. launches, but that risk is entirely worth it if the alternative is to quite literally do nothing at all. It is simply understood, managed, and mitigated through systems like SM-6, EW, SM-3 (asat, not necessarily in a BMD role), and by still maintaining a significant standoff. A DF-21D Brigade with an 18 munition/salvo bandwidth isn't actually considered likely to penetrate dual carrier formations with ~3/4 CGs and 8-10 DDGs, and even the PLANAF and PLAN's ASuW capabilities are nearing their practical limits in the face of these VLS and sensor densities. Could 3 or 4 AShBM Brigades penetrate these defenses? Yes. However, operating in regions where 3+ brigades performing anti-shipping duties can be avoided. Can 1 AShBM Brigade + a concerted PLAN/PLANAF effort penetrate these defenses? Also yes, however, PLAN surface vessels and PLANAF H-6Js are a good deal slower, and a lot more visible than a DF-26, and thus the CSG can begin taking defensive action and surging DCA presence upon detecting such a force maneuvering to employ their weapons, or flying towards the CSG. Eventually, be it after falling below squadron strength requirements, falling below SM-2/ESSM/SM-6 magazine requirements, or just needing to do that ~2+ hour long, 12-16 knot UNREP in a straight line while being unable to conduct flight ops - the CSG will have to draw back. Yet, for as much as its effectiveness is still greatly reduced, it at least did something.
I see. What level of threats would make USN think that the trouble is not worth it? Would it be facing 100 missile hypersonic salvos and multiple rounds of that? I don't know if you saw my earlier posts, but my personal reading is that the largest threats facing US CSG comes from 055 or even 052D's VLS rather than the ground based launchers.

It seems to me that the relevance of quantity really comes out in all that @Patchwork_Chimera has discussed. the biggest advantage that China has here through geography is quantity. It just has way more missiles, ships, aircraft, sensors and even targets/repair people (orders of magnitude more in this last part) in any possible conflict. I think Shilao podcast mentioned many times that while 052D/054A are not the most advanced ships, just having a lot of them and training the crew member for them allows PLAN to sustain a high intensity conflict. So, while 055 and 054B are nice, we currently see this huge build up in 052D/054A just to achieve decisive numerical advantage around the first island chain. Even the older destroyers/frigates and 056s are targets that USN would have to deal with.

Once a conflict starts, it takes years to replenish the large capital ships you lose along the way. I'm with him in thinking that the conflict is unlikely to last as long as what we've discussed thus far if the initial intensity level is really high and cause huge losses on both sides. PLAN's advantage would be, if it loses the same number of ships as USN and JMSDF, it would still have a huge numerical advantage.

Currently I don't see China having enough missiles and other long-range systems to keep Guam (and other distant bases) non-operational for a extended war, say lasting over 3 months. Afterwards, that would allow US forces the time and opportunity to concentrate long-range fires on specific targets. So conceivably the US could "win" in a years-long campaign.
Guam is not exactly connected to rest of America. If PLA thoroughly destroy the infrastructure there over a couple of weeks, it would take a long time to build that up again. Not everywhere is China where huge infrastructure/repair project can be done overnight. Guam is so far from continental USA where it would take many months to make its infrastructure usable. They'd need to ship over workers and materials from continental USA or Australia.

If China does have a working squadron of H20, I really don't see how they can bring it back online for the rest of the conflict.
 

Michaelsinodef

Senior Member
Registered Member
@Patchwork_Chimera

I kinda have a question(s) for you, which is kinda a bit off topic, but I hope you can answer.

Which is, how do you (guys) follow chinese sources/experts etc.

I suppose dedicated translators? Or maybe some translating software (which can also translate video)?
If so, things are translated and you guys all read it? Or someone/a few reads it, and makes some report or the likes?

---

And what/who do you follow?

From what I saw earlier, it seems like you guys are following Guanqi and Chahua podcasts? But what else besides? Even Xi Yazhou's and Shilao's videos on say Guancha?
I suppose also more official posts and stuff (like reports and publications)? But what other written media?
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Off hand, Matt Pottinger is fluent in Mandarin, having majored in it college, regularly reads original language versions of Xi's speeches, so there are Americans with "rare" language skills.

But that didn't particularly help in the formulation of effective Chinese policy in the US.

Remember that when Pottinger was part of the Trump administration, he was key in driving sanctions against China.
The goal to compel changes in Chinese behaviour and/or impede China's technological development.

On the first goal, this categorically failed to change Chinese behaviour as China simply raised the stakes, knowing that China was already bigger from an economic perspective. Yet the US acted as if it was bigger.

On the second goal, in the short-term you could argue some success. But in the long-term, all it has done is "supercharge" China's technology development as Bloomberg notes. Back then, such a development was obvious to us here, but somehow Pottinger "missed" such a conclusion. Given China accounted for 60% of semiconductor consumption and was also on track to outspend the US on technology R&D (and therefore be able to replace any technology that was sanctioned), what was likely going to happen?

And the added antagonism in China-US relations has simply hastened the day to a post-American world.
For example, if US-China relations were better, I highly doubt that China would have announced a "no-limits" relationship with Russia. Would Putin have gone ahead with the Ukraine invasion without this assurance?

Anyway, back on topic.
 
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ashnole

New Member
Registered Member
Tactical concealment followed by a devastating surprise attack is like the ABC of any war ever fought in modern human history lol.
 

Gloire_bb

Captain
Registered Member
No, I do not underestimate the efficiency and capability of VLO bombers.
I think they can be devastatingly effective, however I believe that during periods of conflict the US would forward deploy extensive assets in the first island chain and second island chain that will be capable of causing attrition against PLA VLO H-20s as they transit from China to the launch area for their weapons against Guam as part of a first wave strike.
If possible, can you please draw it on the map?

How* exactly US can forward-deploy assets(and which assets) to maintain 24/7 patrols over open swaths of the western Pacific?
(and not to get those patrols swiped clean by fighters from the mainland).

It's technically doable by carriers, but I am not too sure it's a good use of carriers.

*other than Taiwan.
 
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