PLA interservice rivalry

One of the greatest revolution within the US armed forces was the "smoothing out" the interservice rivalry that has plague it since WWII. One of the prime examples was during Grenada (1982), when a US army officer had to call his wife, which calls his base, which relayed a message to the navy, which gave a circling naval plane coordinates for a close air support sortie. Not exactly efficient.

The second example was in Panama, where every single service wanted a piece of the action. The result was having higher casualties than would other wise be expected if the more efficient forces would have been placed.

The Operation Iraqi freedom highlights this cultural change. The armed forces of the US have smooth out this interservice rivalry. Now if a ground unti request air support, support can come from USAF, NAvy, Marine, or heliborne gunships. Gone are the red tape inefficiencies of the past. Furthermore, US armed forces are more inclined to be use as "ad hoc" forces, military formations put together when situation calls for it. Gone are the ridgid Armored Corps, Mechanized Infantry corps, Fighter wings, etc of the past. An example of this is Task Force Tarawa, who at one point in the war commanded, a British Armored brigade and a Brigade from the 3rd infantry division.

Now coming to the PLA forces. How is this problem solved or overcome? The name itself betrays which service has more previledge than the other. I mean the name, People's Liberation Army Navy or Airforce, would suggest that these forces are not as "important" as the army. In WWII when the USAF was still part of the US Army, there was some animosity between the two branches. If you were a Chinese sailor, having Army in your title does not exactly gives you more pride in the service you are in.

It's impossible to guage interservice rivalry in the PLA because there is no conflict which can be used as an example of how well they work together, although i'm sure many people would imply that there isn't a great deal of cooperation in the Chinese military because they haven't fought in a lot of conflicts and learned the same lessons as their western counterparts.

However it is also possible that China might be emulating the US and European forces as well on their own cooperation, and basing their interservice doctrines on them, seeing as it has been said many times before that China is carefully watching the US' performance in Iraq.

You are right of course. In light of the lack of combat experience of the PLA forces, I tend to go with the way the PLA is structured. The name itself is a dead giveaway. The Army is the senior service, the one that gets the majority of funding, prestige, etc. Why else would the navy or airforce be called PL Army Navy or PL Army Air Force? I believe this would cause some grief with the various airman or sailor in those services. I mean I know many Marines who refuse to admit that the USMC is under the Department of the Navy.

I think that soon the designation of the Navy and Air Force as part of the Army will dissappear. They will become seperate branches. The only reason why it hasn't happened yet is the political considerations. Once China declares that it's Navy is now seperate, it will signal to the world that China is serious about global power projection

Here is an articel from strategy page. I don't know how reliable it is but you should read it.



June 13, 2006: While the Chinese Navy (formally the People's Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN) scares pundits with its purchases of modern weapons and equipment, it is having less success in updating its leadership. Actually, there are three problems with the leadership. First, the senior admirals tend to be more concerned with protecting their little fiefdoms, than in training their sailors to the highest level of readiness for combat.



Second, major portions of the navy still, despite years of orders from above, tend to operate separately. Naval Aviation, the PLAN marines, and the major fleets tend to operate like they were independent of any centralized navy command. That is slowly changing, and that's because you still have too many senior officers, some of them who started out in the army, who are afraid to, well, rock the boat. These dinosaurs don't really understand modern naval warfare, and are afraid of speaking out, and risk letting their peers see that confirmed. Worse yet, the admirals have not really accepted the fact that in any future war, success would hinge on how closely the navy worked with the army and air force. The admirals accept this "joint operations" stuff in theory, but not so much in practice.



And then there's the problems they are having upgrading the quality of officers. Smart, ambitious and well educated Chinese college grads do not see the navy as a prime career choice. There are much better jobs available in the civilian sector. The navy is trying to attract grads with technical degrees, to at least insure that all the new equipment stays in working order. Bonuses and promises of rapid promotion are not doing the job. The navy still has a reputation as a place where promotions come first to those who are accomplished communists, not skilled sailors.



As a result of all these problems, the navy is heading for a future where it may have brilliantly designed ships, commanded by morons. That's nothing new in Chinese history, and there are commanders in the navy, and in more senior positions, that are trying to avoid this fate. So far, progress is more theoretical than real.