Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (India can't escape its restrictions)


Martian

Senior Member
A simple question: Why would China approve of a "clean" waiver for India from the restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (i.e. NPT)?

The obvious answer: China would not permit India to become a de-facto nuclear weapon state under the NPT. Hence, it should be obvious to everyone that India's exemption in 2008 from the Nuclear Supplier Group (i.e. NSG) was riddled with restrictions, which imposed the core NPT prohibitions in an explicit or implicit manner.

Bottom line: There will be no real exemption from the NPT for India. If India is not bound by the NPT then no other country will continue to accept the NPT restrictions placed on them.

All of the NPT restrictions are still in place. Excerpt from article:

"Through the ratification legislation—the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act (NCANEA)—Congress actually busted several myths peddled by New Delhi. First, NCANEA makes explicit that, “Nothing in the [123] Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde Act.” Second, NCANEA stipulates that the US promise of uninterrupted fuel supply is a “political”, not legal, commitment. It cannot be anything else because the 123 Agreement itself confers an open-ended right on the US to suspend or terminate cooperation."

What benefit did India receive from the NSG exemption? Not much. Excerpt from article:

"Apart from retaining nuclear facilities in the military realm, India is being treated, for all intents and purposes, as a non-nuclear-weapons state and thus subject to the non-proliferation conditions applicable to such states, but with its non-membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty carrying continuing penalties."

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"Nuclear chickens come home to roost
Posted: Wed, Jun 29 2011. 1:15 AM IST

The myth of a clean waiver from NSG has been finally busted with the group tightening its guidelines

During the more than three-year-long process to finalize the terms of the nuclear deal with the US, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh kept meretriciously reassuring the nation that he would operationalize the deal only after securing a broad political consensus in support. He even pledged: “Once the process is over, I will bring it before Parliament and abide by the House.”

Yet, he completely bypassed Parliament. And instead of any attempt at consensus building, the country witnessed a polarizing single-mindedness to clinch the deal at any cost.

Now, with several of Singh’s key assurances to the nation falling by the wayside, the nuclear chickens have come home to roost. The Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG’s) new ban on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment transfers fulfills one of the last remaining conditions of US’ Hyde Act, highlighting the rising costs for India of a deal whose much-trumpeted benefits are likely to remain elusive. India also has ended up without a legally binding fuel supply guarantee, despite its bitter experience over the US-built Tarapur plant. And it has secured no right to take corrective measures even if the  US  again  unilaterally terminates cooperation, as did in the 1970s.

That NSG granted India a clean, unrestricted waiver in 2008 is a myth the politically besieged Singh government created to save face in public. In truth, it had signalled to the US earlier that it could live with a conditional waiver as long as the conditions were not embarrassingly conspicuous. Indian diplomacy sought to ensure that prohibitions on nuclear testing and ENR transfers remained implicit, or else Singh would stand exposed at home.

In this light, NSG, amid a tussle between non-proliferation purists and pragmatists in its ranks, arrived at a waiver whose language was politically palatable to New Delhi, but whose basic terms meshed with the stipulations in the Hyde Act and some of the purists’ demands. The waiver text incorporated several layers of riders— some explicit and some implicit.

While the bar on Indian nuclear testing was imposed by linking it to the NSG Guidelines’ paragraph 16, which deals with the consequences of “an explosion of a nuclear device”, the prohibition on “transfers of sensitive exports” was fashioned by specifying that such transfers will “remain subject to paragraphs 6 and 7 of Guidelines.” Paragraphs 6 and 7 incorporate a presumption of denial of sensitive items. This linkage to the two paragraphs was devised as an interim step until NSG formalized a ban on ENR and other sensitive sales.

Now, last week’s formal ban— which, in effect, singles out India —meshes with the Hyde Act’s bar on the transfer of ENR and heavy-water equipment to India, other than for a multinational or US-supervised facility. It also blends both with the Hyde Act’s call for an NSG-wide ban and with the US-India 123 Agreement, which excludes ENR and heavy water equipment transfers by saying they “will be subject to the Parties’ respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies”. Even the Indo-French and Indo-Russian civil nuclear agreements do not include ENR and other sensitive transfers in their scope of cooperation.

India, which committed itself to support NSG moves to halt the spread of ENR technologies “to states that do not have them”, has itself become an NSG target. It will, moreover, have to build a costly new internationally safeguarded reprocessing facility without getting the smallest component for it from overseas.

The NSG ban highlights, another fundamental reality, about India that is also embedded in the Hyde Act, the 123 Agreement and the Safeguards Agreement: Apart from retaining nuclear facilities in the military realm, India is being treated, for all intents and purposes, as a non-nuclear-weapons state and thus subject to the non-proliferation conditions applicable to such states, but with its non-membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty carrying continuing penalties. But the ban’s real effect is to expose New Delhi’s charade that it secured a clean, unconditional NSG waiver. Disturbingly, the government expended greater efforts to pull the wool over the Indian public’s eyes than to stick to Singh’s assurances to the nation.

Consider another telling fact: Though the deal was ratified by the US Congress on 1 October 2008, Singh has yet to make even a statement in Parliament on how its final terms square with his 17 August 2006 assurances to the nation. What can he tell Parliament when the US Congress has removed his government’s last possible fig leaf?

Through the ratification legislation—the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act (NCANEA)—Congress actually busted several myths peddled by New Delhi. First, NCANEA makes explicit that, “Nothing in the [123] Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde Act.” Second, NCANEA stipulates that the US promise of uninterrupted fuel supply is a “political”, not legal, commitment. It cannot be anything else because the 123 Agreement itself confers an open-ended right on the US to suspend or terminate cooperation. And third, the final deal grants the US specific rights, but spells out only Indian obligations.

More fundamentally, the deal has come to symbolize the travails of the Singh government—scandals, broken promises, malfeasance, poor public accountability, and the resort to casuistry to camouflage reality. The cash-for-votes scandal in Parliament set the stage for the other scams that have followed.

Brahma Chellaney is professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi."
 

Martian

Senior Member
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Don't Count on the Russians

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"Russia silent on whether NSG ban on ENR supply will cover India
by Vladimir Radyuhin
MOSCOW, June 29, 2011

Russia appears to confirm New Delhi’s concerns that India is not being exempted from new restrictions on the supply of uranium enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) equipment to countries outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

An official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry refused to say whether India was affected by the ban on export of ENR technologies approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at its meeting on June 24 in the Netherlands.

“We do not think it proper to publicly discuss individual countries,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich said on Wednesday responding to a direct question from The Hindu whether the NSG ban was effective only against North Korea and Iran or targeted India as well.

Mr. Lukashevich said the new NSG guidelines are already incorporated in the Russian legislation through a government decree adopted in December 2009 in compliance with the Group of Eight 2008 ban on the sale of ENR equipment.

Russian government decree #992 of December 4, 2009 allowed export of ENR equipment and technologies only to countries that are signatories to the NPT. In line with the G8 practice, the Russian decree was valid for 12 months and was renewed in December 2010 following the G8 reiteration of its ban earlier last year.


At the same time Mr. Lukashevich stressed that Russia had consistently worked to push through the 2008 NSG waver for India and strongly supported India’s bid to join the NSG.

“We are determined to do our best to facilitate India getting full membership in NSG,” the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said."
 

Martian

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Don't Count on the French

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"In post-NSG statement, France ducks ENR ban on India
by Sandeep Dikshit
NEW DELHI, July 2, 2011

In a carefully worded statement that conceals as much as it reveals, France has sought to reassure India that its recent endorsement of tighter rules for the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment (ENR) at the Nuclear Suppliers Group “in no way undermines the parameters of our bilateral cooperation” in the nuclear field.

France is committed to the full implementation of its cooperation agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed on September 30, 2008, Ambassador of France to India Jérôme Bonnafont said in a statement on Friday. ``France confirms that this NSG decision in no way undermines the parameters of our bilateral cooperation”.

``Coming after the decision of exemption from the full-scope safeguards clause, adopted in favour of India in September 2008, it does not undermine the principles of this exemption,'' he added.

Mr. Bonnafont's articulation of France's position comes in the wake of an Indian demarche reminding Paris of the specific assurance on ENR President Nicolas Sarkozy gave Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2009 when the latter had expressed his disappointment at the G8 support for a new rule at the NSG banning ENR sales to countries that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

However, the latest French statement is silent about that presidential pledge. Ambassador Bonnafont's declaration that the new NSG ban will not undermine the bilateral Franco-Indian agreement is a non-sequitur since that agreement does not cover ENR transfers anyway. And though his reassurance about the validity of the exemption the NSG gave India from its full scope safeguards clause will be welcomed by New Delhi, the Ambassador's silence about the new condition of NPT membership for ENR transfers will not be. Indian officials regard the new rule as tantamount to a rewriting of the 2008 bargain the nuclear cartel struck with India. Anil Kakodkar, who was head of India's Atomic Energy Commission when that deal wasreached has termed the NSG's latest decision a “betrayal.”

Implictly acknowledging the negative impact of the ENR ban on India, Mr. Bonnafont insisted this decision “does not target any country but is the fruit of prolonged discussions initiated in 2004”.

Indian officials do not agree, noting that even if the ENR discussions went back to 2004, France and others ought to have incorporated India's exemption into the new rules, in keeping with the letter and spirit of the 2008 clean waiver."
 

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