Lessons learned by the US military in Iraq applied to the PLA

A

Americanoilman

Banned Idiot
Hello all

I have been thinking about this topic for a while and I believe it would be fair to apply some of the lessons learned by the US military in Iraq to the PLA. Tell me if you agree or disagree with these 'lessons.' Feel free to add any of your own.

1. Most wars today are fought in limited-high-tech conditions. The PLA's massiveness is useless against a much smller, more modern, an more professional force. From the experiences of US CAS (close air support) pilots in Iraq, a single fighter bomber can destroy (on average) 12-50 tanks in a single sortie with little risk to itself. In some cases a singel A-10 or F-16 have destroyed more than 200 enemy tanks and APCs when loaded with cluster munitions. Likewise it is not unlikely for a single squadron of Apaches to come out with over 100 kills whenever they sally out to attack enemy tank formations. Keep in mind the 'killcount' system the US military uses is quite conservative. Two other personnel and the original shooter must see the enemy target killed/destroyed for it to be counted as a 'confirmed kill.'

2. SAM defenses are the wrong answer to try to stop an opposing air force. In Iraq, Iraqi air defenses scored 0 kills against American aircraft (save a couple fo AH-64s brought down by ground fire). Before the war, it was thought that the Iraqi anti-air nework was still a significant threat despite having been degraded from over 10 years of sanctions. To stop an opposing modern air force, the PLA must build an strong air force of its own.

3. Fancy toys don't make your military strong. Well, this is more of a lesson from the first Gulf War. Back then, the media and general public had greatly overestimated the capabiltiy of Iraq's military and the Republican Guard because of all the 'fancy toys' and modern equipment they had bought themselves. T-72s and MiG-29s were thought to be serious adversaries. For all the money Hussein had drained into his armed forces, much like the PLA is doing now, they came out extremely poorly agaisnt a more well-trained professional force. Just because the PLA might be buying a lot of flashy equipment from Russia and is developing a lot of thing that may seem to stack up well against what the US military has on paper, in the end, it depends more ont he skill of the armed forces themselves. One American M1 Abrams commander said after the Gulf war, even if you gave us the T-72s and the Iraqis the Abrams, we still would have won. No matter how much money the PLA puts into buying new ships and new aircraft, in the end it is training and experience that matters most, and this is were the PLA is lacking the most.

4. Military success does not equal political success. In most of the skirmishes in Iraq, the US military fights outnumbered but nonetheless comes out on top, having killed or captured 30,000 Iraqi army and Republican Guard during the initial invasion against less than 200 US casualties; and having captured or killed around 60,000 to 70,000 insurgents in the post-war occupation (according to a Jane's defence today estimate and a number of independent think thanks) against 2000 or so US deaths. Despite this disparity that clearly demonstrates the military superiority of the US military, the US has not emerged the political victor, as military success does not equal political success.

Well what do you think? Your thoughts are expected.
 
A

adeptitus

Captain
VIP Professional
I agree with most of your points, however I think the Iraq analogy works in some comparisons, but not others.

Iraq is a country divided among social (tribal), ethnic (Arab vs. Kurds), religious (Sunni vs. Shi'ite vs secular Arab natioanlist), and economic lines. Saddam was a generalissimo from a minority group, which isn't unusual considering Napoleon (Corsican) or Stalin (Georgian). But unlike Napoleon, Saddam was stuck with... Iraq.

In Iraq, there are approx. 150 tribes ('ashira), they form federations (qabila). Under each tribe you have multitude of clans, houses, and extended families (khams). Loyalty is given to family first before government. Saddam could prolly trust tribesmen from Tikrit, but those from other tribes were iffy. To Saddam, it was a loyalty issue, not dollar issue.

The same condition doesn't represent China, a country with a dominate ethnic majority (Han). There are ethnic dissidents but only in far-western, sparsely populated areas (Xinjing/Tibet). For the PLA, it's less of a loyal problem, but more of a dollar problem. They inherited a huge number of obsolete early Soviet-era weapons and was given a small budget. So they had to make some hard choices on buying new hardware or spend it on training, support, and pay.

According to RAND's estimates, China has 3.25 million active military (PLA) and paramilitary (PAP) personnel, with annual budget of ~$50 billion USD. In a hypothetical and unlikely situation, if the PLA was given $500 billion/year budget, or reduce its current active military manpower down to 325,000, then the situation would look completely different.

As for the difficulty in occupation, the US population are used to instant gratification and have unrealistic expectations. They should look at Japan's experience in Taiwan and early US experience in the Philippines. If the US is serious about pacifying Iraq, I think we need to impose the draft and send at least 1-2 million occupation forces over, impose martial law over 20-30 years, and completely disrupt its traditional/tribal structure (relocate people to force integration) before the country is pacified.
 
Gollevainen

Gollevainen

Colonel
VIP Professional
Registered Member
Clewer observator migth recon that after Gulf war, china seriously begun its air arm modernisation, not just by adding new types, but organisational as well. And this apply to PLA itself as well, but as it is the biggest one on the top of the earth, its not easy and flexible task to deal whit.

Only lesson that chinese hasent learn comse from the naval field. Coalition ssm armed helicopters made scrab metal out of iraqian missile boats (and captured kuwatian ones as well) In suspequent, all other navyes in the world begun to focus on strong passive and active defence upon their missile boats, and CIWS and short range SAMs begun to find their way into the desings, and smaller desings like the famous Lursen 45m almoust completely vanished out of the way of the Lursen 57m modell that earlyer was ordered mainly as a flotilla leader boat. But not in china....which still produces pure fast attack craft whit philoshophyes of the ealry 60's added whit few 21st century disquises (Surface-effect, Sthealth). Its rather sad that the potent Houjan class whit enough sterch to carry all the nessecityes for modern missle boat wasent put on mass production.....little bit more steahlthyer hull and some close in weapon system onboard and PLAN could have been proud owner of top five class FAC among the all....

But mostly I think gulf war made out some sort of hype or false security feelings among the western armyes that they are practically invinsible whit their high tech, high training and expertise. But in 1999 in Kosovo campaing all this proven to be some thing different. Army whit good motivation and something that i like to call as 'normality' eq working military infrastructure and rich heritage can do lot of different. Good dispresion of even outdated SAMs allowed Serbian army to stay almoust untouched during the whole campaing and therefore the coalition couldnt dare to enter the ground war as the opponent wasent so smashed as it was on Gulf. if Serbia would have had workaple fighter air defence, the whole campaing migth have ended up in totally different consequences.

If one has ever followed anything about PLA about its modernization (not those common westewrn sources that stalls in mid 90's whit their reports.) one can only admire the pace and tetermination how it has taken place. And if chinese mainlanders have even small portion of ther national pride that all the foreing living chinese have, they wont have proplems whit motivation and strong morale....
 
F

FreeAsia2000

Junior Member
I agree with Golly, I'm rather surprised at the headline post.

The US military was facing a third world state armed with 20 year old
weapons which had been severely degraded by the Iran-Iraq war, in
addition the first Gulf war was bankrolled to a large part by the Saudi's
to the extent that it nearly bankrupted them.

In what possible way can China compare to Iraq ?
 
aquilis182

aquilis182

New Member
FreeAsia2000 said:
I agree with Golly, I'm rather surprised at the headline post.

The US military was facing a third world state armed with 20 year old
weapons which had been severely degraded by the Iran-Iraq war, in
addition the first Gulf war was bankrolled to a large part by the Saudi's
to the extent that it nearly bankrupted them.

In what possible way can China compare to Iraq ?
Click to expand...

China's military still behind U.S. military in terms of technology and professionalism, but they are nothing to compare with Irak... They are far more powerfull than Irak in the gulf war, besides China have few ICBMs than can reach the U.S. (chek fas.org), Chinese soldiers are not as well trained than U.S. soldiers but I put my money than Chinese soldiers are far better than Iraquis in the gulf war, I still think than If U.S. and China goes to the war, U.S. will be the victorious, but Im asure that a war like that will not be a walk in the park... The USAF will not have a big trouble with the PLAAF, but the USN will find some degree of challenge with the PLAN scince they have the SS-N Sunburn (from Russia, regarded as the best antiship missile in the world) Plus Chinese submarines aren't easy to find, plus they can inflict serious damages to USN's CBG before they find the subs, but when USN find those subs they will sends P-3 Orions to say hello. The ground forces is a different story, IF the USAF and USN inflict enough damage to the PLA they US Ground forces will have a real chanse to defeat the PLA. China knows that very well and off course they learn are learning from it. Thas why are focussing on improving those weakness by raising they military budget and improving their tactics (chek:
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) Off course, that don't take a week end to do so. In fact The Chinese specail forces a.k.a SOF learn the lessons of the gulf war. If China keep his economic boom and they want to they can have a very proffesional force in couple of years, If I where the Defence minister of CHina I rise the standars and kick out thouse soldiers who cant keep up with... I still thinking that quality it's better than quantity, but if you can have both... Thats great. Even if the PLA still not as well trained as US Army (for example) they still very motivated and can be mush better soldiers if China keeps putting more attention to them like they are doing in the last years.
 
I

IDonT

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Americanoilman said:
Hello all

I have been thinking about this topic for a while and I believe it would be fair to apply some of the lessons learned by the US military in Iraq to the PLA. Tell me if you agree or disagree with these 'lessons.' Feel free to add any of your own.

1. Most wars today are fought in limited-high-tech conditions. The PLA's massiveness is useless against a much smller, more modern, an more professional force. From the experiences of US CAS (close air support) pilots in Iraq, a single fighter bomber can destroy (on average) 12-50 tanks in a single sortie with little risk to itself. In some cases a singel A-10 or F-16 have destroyed more than 200 enemy tanks and APCs when loaded with cluster munitions. Likewise it is not unlikely for a single squadron of Apaches to come out with over 100 kills whenever they sally out to attack enemy tank formations. Keep in mind the 'killcount' system the US military uses is quite conservative. Two other personnel and the original shooter must see the enemy target killed/destroyed for it to be counted as a 'confirmed kill.'

2. SAM defenses are the wrong answer to try to stop an opposing air force. In Iraq, Iraqi air defenses scored 0 kills against American aircraft (save a couple fo AH-64s brought down by ground fire). Before the war, it was thought that the Iraqi anti-air nework was still a significant threat despite having been degraded from over 10 years of sanctions. To stop an opposing modern air force, the PLA must build an strong air force of its own.

3. Fancy toys don't make your military strong. Well, this is more of a lesson from the first Gulf War. Back then, the media and general public had greatly overestimated the capabiltiy of Iraq's military and the Republican Guard because of all the 'fancy toys' and modern equipment they had bought themselves. T-72s and MiG-29s were thought to be serious adversaries. For all the money Hussein had drained into his armed forces, much like the PLA is doing now, they came out extremely poorly agaisnt a more well-trained professional force. Just because the PLA might be buying a lot of flashy equipment from Russia and is developing a lot of thing that may seem to stack up well against what the US military has on paper, in the end, it depends more ont he skill of the armed forces themselves. One American M1 Abrams commander said after the Gulf war, even if you gave us the T-72s and the Iraqis the Abrams, we still would have won. No matter how much money the PLA puts into buying new ships and new aircraft, in the end it is training and experience that matters most, and this is were the PLA is lacking the most.

4. Military success does not equal political success. In most of the skirmishes in Iraq, the US military fights outnumbered but nonetheless comes out on top, having killed or captured 30,000 Iraqi army and Republican Guard during the initial invasion against less than 200 US casualties; and having captured or killed around 60,000 to 70,000 insurgents in the post-war occupation (according to a Jane's defence today estimate and a number of independent think thanks) against 2000 or so US deaths. Despite this disparity that clearly demonstrates the military superiority of the US military, the US has not emerged the political victor, as military success does not equal political success.

Well what do you think? Your thoughts are expected.
Click to expand...

1.) There are many people that believed that wars between great powers (US vs China) are at an end due to the introduction of Nuclear weapons. Such weapons make the cost of war, even for the winner, very high. As a result, the most probable war will be that of a Great Power vs small countries. In this regard, China, as one of the great powers, needs to have an armed forces that are expeditionary in nature, that is small, well trained, and highly mobile.

The US military is unmatched in this field. A single heavy division manage to take out the majority of Iraq's military. This was due to two things: airpower working in concert with ground forces.

a.) To defend against air attack, you need to disperse your forces. However you are vulnerable to beig destroyed piecemeal by enemy ground forces.

b.) To defend against ground attack, you need to concentrate your forces. However you are vulnerable to air attack.

Do you see the problem?

2.) The best defence against air attack is an air superiority fighter. SAM systems are useful compliments but are a poor substitute. The reason is that they always start their engagement at 0 elevation and 0 airspeed. Especially true against modern anti-sam tactics and technology employed against it. In this regard, the PLAAF needs a modern airforce, not just in terms of air superiority fighters, but also force multipliers. It needs to stop relying on ground controllers, developed tactics in concert with an AWACS, etc.

3.) The order of importance is training, tactics, and technology. If you are not well trained, all the best weapons in the world can't help you if you do not know how to use it. France had better tanks in 1939, than Germany, yet they were defeated by the Blitzkrieg tactics in a span of 6 weeks. Unfortunately, the PLAN's technology is greater than its tactics and greater than its training.

4.) Very true. The US won every single engagement in Vietnam yet still lost the war. However, one should not start a war based on defeating an opponent politically. There are too many variables for such an outcome. The Japanese in WWII made this mistake and awaken a dragon.
 
S

sunchips

Just Hatched
Registered Member
Americanoilman said:
Hello all

I have been thinking about this topic for a while and I believe it would be fair to apply some of the lessons learned by the US military in Iraq to the PLA. Tell me if you agree or disagree with these 'lessons.' Feel free to add any of your own.

1. Most wars today are fought in limited-high-tech conditions. The PLA's massiveness is useless against a much smller, more modern, an more professional force. From the experiences of US CAS (close air support) pilots in Iraq, a single fighter bomber can destroy (on average) 12-50 tanks in a single sortie with little risk to itself. In some cases a singel A-10 or F-16 have destroyed more than 200 enemy tanks and APCs when loaded with cluster munitions. Likewise it is not unlikely for a single squadron of Apaches to come out with over 100 kills whenever they sally out to attack enemy tank formations. Keep in mind the 'killcount' system the US military uses is quite conservative. Two other personnel and the original shooter must see the enemy target killed/destroyed for it to be counted as a 'confirmed kill.'

2. SAM defenses are the wrong answer to try to stop an opposing air force. In Iraq, Iraqi air defenses scored 0 kills against American aircraft (save a couple fo AH-64s brought down by ground fire). Before the war, it was thought that the Iraqi anti-air nework was still a significant threat despite having been degraded from over 10 years of sanctions. To stop an opposing modern air force, the PLA must build an strong air force of its own.

3. Fancy toys don't make your military strong. Well, this is more of a lesson from the first Gulf War. Back then, the media and general public had greatly overestimated the capabiltiy of Iraq's military and the Republican Guard because of all the 'fancy toys' and modern equipment they had bought themselves. T-72s and MiG-29s were thought to be serious adversaries. For all the money Hussein had drained into his armed forces, much like the PLA is doing now, they came out extremely poorly agaisnt a more well-trained professional force. Just because the PLA might be buying a lot of flashy equipment from Russia and is developing a lot of thing that may seem to stack up well against what the US military has on paper, in the end, it depends more ont he skill of the armed forces themselves. One American M1 Abrams commander said after the Gulf war, even if you gave us the T-72s and the Iraqis the Abrams, we still would have won. No matter how much money the PLA puts into buying new ships and new aircraft, in the end it is training and experience that matters most, and this is were the PLA is lacking the most.

4. Military success does not equal political success. In most of the skirmishes in Iraq, the US military fights outnumbered but nonetheless comes out on top, having killed or captured 30,000 Iraqi army and Republican Guard during the initial invasion against less than 200 US casualties; and having captured or killed around 60,000 to 70,000 insurgents in the post-war occupation (according to a Jane's defence today estimate and a number of independent think thanks) against 2000 or so US deaths. Despite this disparity that clearly demonstrates the military superiority of the US military, the US has not emerged the political victor, as military success does not equal political success.

Well what do you think? Your thoughts are expected.
Click to expand...


In regards to comparing China to Iraq, i jsut wanted to add that I had heard from a friend that:

upon hearing about how bad the iraqis sucked in the war, some chiense general laughed, saying that if the chinese had been left with the same low level of technology, they would have been able to inflict much much much more casualties on US.

Also, I was jsut wondering how about the "rapid reaction" units in pla: I heard that.. firstly: they are pretty big (300 000 was it?), but I was wondering how they compare with us army mainstream?

thanks!
 
I

IDonT

Senior Member
VIP Professional
sunchips said:
In regards to comparing China to Iraq, i jsut wanted to add that I had heard from a friend that:

upon hearing about how bad the iraqis sucked in the war, some chiense general laughed, saying that if the chinese had been left with the same low level of technology, they would have been able to inflict much much much more casualties on US.

Also, I was jsut wondering how about the "rapid reaction" units in pla: I heard that.. firstly: they are pretty big (300 000 was it?), but I was wondering how they compare with us army mainstream?

thanks!
Click to expand...

In the first Gulf War(1991), the US estimated that it will win and that they will suffer 10,000 fatalities. That is why they bought 10,000 body bags. The Russians and Chinese expected the same thing. The war's low casualty rate sent shockwaves to the PLA. That was the catalyst towards changing the PLA doctrine from a low tech "peasant army" that uses numbers to overwhelming an opponent to a smaller technologically advance force. The transition is still ongoing.

The Iraqi's were good, especially the Republican Guard. In the battle of Medina Ridge (the largest tank battle the US Army ever fought). The Medina division were well-deployed such that they could not be seen by American forces advancing until after they had cleared the top of the Medina ridgeline. This position gave the Iraqis protection from the powerful long-range direct fire of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley IFVs. The American units found it necessary to engage an entrenched enemy at close range. During the battle, the American forces suffered only one fatality and no fatalities were due enemy fire while destroying 186 Iraqi tanks (mostly Soviet built T-72s and T-55s) and 127 armored vehicles. Only four Abrams tanks were hit by direct fire and disabled. Not a single coalition tank was destroyed in the action.

The Iraqis were good, US were just better.
 
King_Comm

King_Comm

Junior Member
VIP Professional
The Iraqi's weren't that good, although moving behind the ridge was a good idea, it doesn't cover up the fact that the Iraqi defences still weren't very well prepared, 2nd brigade Medina division had several days to prepare, they could have set up proper dug in positions for their tanks that will allow them to remain turrent down until the enemy get close(this is very important given that the US had the advantage of having thermo visions, staying turrent down will significantly reduce the chance of been seen), also deploy covering forces that will alert the main force of the approaching enemy(it is also very important as fearing enemy air strikes, Iraqi weapons are frequently unmanned or undermanned as their crews take cover in air raid shelters), and deploy mines and obstacles to delay the enemy advance, and register points on likely avenues of enemy approach so that artillery can hit the enemy as they move through those points. The Iraqi's did none of these, and their mistakes were ruthlessly exploited by the US forces, and it cost them the battle.

So, the lesson is, your errors can significantly magnify what ever advantage the enemy over you.
 
utelore

utelore

Junior Member
VIP Professional
**One American M1 Abrams commander said after the Gulf war, even if you gave us the T-72s and the Iraqis the Abrams, we still would have won.**

that is plan and simply false...trust me. Most of the tanks we engaged were at 2500-3000 meters at night and the poor Iraqi did not even know what or who were hitting them. They would turn on a active IR light and we would would have a loader sitting up top with a PVS-7 which could detect the IR light and then that tank and IR light died.

NOW..the engagements we had with a non-republican guard div with T-62 tanks gave us a bit of a fight at 400-500 meters. The problem was the T-62 got first hit but could not hurt us in our Abrams. Once we figured out we walked into a tank battle at close range, ID the OPFOR it was over.

I have seen other Abrams hit with 125mm T-72 rounds and it did nothing. the worst Abrams I have seen shot up was by a BMP-2 that took around 20 round of 30mmAP and HE.

IN closing if we the U.S would have switched equipment like the T-72 we would have not won the ground war.....think King tiger VS Sherman
 
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