CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

Helius

Senior Member
Registered Member
RE: immediate numerical parity vs. waiting for nuclear.

Another aspect is that aside from the Djibouti overseas base, and Gwadar naval port, China lacks many overseas navy bases for refueling/restocking supplies. (I know refuelling complements can escort, but less than ideal since it is one more dependency in the kill-chain to disrupt operational efficiency of conventional carriers, particular at great distances)

IF there is no rush for war, I suspect it would be wise to wait for nuclear-majority CATOBAR fleet, rather than rushing with more Type 003 conventional to "fill-in the gap". Time is on China's side. China doesn't have the luxury of many naval bases to refuel, so range and endurance should be a priority aspect for Chinese CATOBARs, even if it takes longer to achieve numerical parity.
It depends where China sees the intended theatres of operation for her carriers would be, really. China's immediate and pretty much the primary security concern is the 1st and 2nd island chains.

Unlike the US there's no real need for a PLAN CSG to sail halfway across the world. The bases throughout SCS offer the PLAN plenty of means to refuel and resupply; and for whatever reason the PLAN would ever need to send a CSG to the Indian Ocean, then like you said Djibouti has it covered.

So personally I don't see a CVN as something the PLAN terribly needs for the immediate or near future, or even long term for that matter unless China intends to project her power near US and Western shores.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
China may have only just begun to reap the benefits of its previous investments in aircraft carriers, but by the same token China has only just begun to incur the costs associated with aircraft carriers. R&D is cheap compared to production and especially operational costs.

I agree that carriers are useful, but the level of investment required to realise a credible capability is enormous, and the carrier itself is only a minor part. You need all the combat and support aircraft, many thousands of personnel both onboard and ashore, and a robust surface and subsurface escort capability and all their personnel. The cost required to realise a useful carrier capability is probably ten times the cost required to realise a useful nuclear submarine capability. In a benign strategic environment, that would be fine, for in the longer-term China can certainly support those costs. But when you are faced with the credible prospect of conflict against a superior adversary perhaps three or five or even ten years from now, finite resources need to be allocated where they can best serve to enhance the prospects of victory and avert the prospects of defeat. Ironically, the dream of a world-class carrier capability is likely to be fully realised only after the threat of war has already begun to diminish. In the long-term, China will be fine. The challenge is to get through the short- and medium-term. And I don't see how carriers, particularly nuclear-powered carriers, are going to help with that. To be clear, I am not suggesting that China should abandon its pursuit of aircraft carriers, rather that carriers should be de-prioritised in favour of capabilities that can deter potential adversaries more rapidly and cost-effectively over the period to 2035. Submarines, both conventional and nuclear, are at the top of that list.

If I look at China's situation today, China can credibly hold air and maritime superiority to a distance of 500km offshore.
And as China's Air Force and Navy continues modernising in the next 5years, this superiority will become even more pronounced.

But China's land-based aircraft will be limited in operating in large numbers past 1000km from the Chinese mainland, so longer-ranged capabilities like nuclear submarines, carriers, bombers and long-range missiles are the logical next step.

China already has a fleet of 60-odd conventional submarines, which seems like a large enough fleet. The Yuan SSKs are likely around $300 Million each and they only need to build 2-3 per year to maintain this fleet size.

And If China matches the US in building 3 SSNs per year, that results in a fleet with over 100 SSNs, based on a 35 year lifespan.
My guestimate is $15-$23 Billion for 15 SSNs over a 5 year period.

Overall, I just don't see the financials being the limitation in building more submarines, bombers or long-range missiles.
But it is rather the time required for development, and then to ramp up the supply chain and build worker expertise.
 

Helius

Senior Member
Registered Member
If I look at China's situation today, China can credibly hold air and maritime superiority to a distance of 500km offshore.
And as China's Air Force and Navy continues modernising in the next 5years, this superiority will become even more pronounced.

But China's land-based aircraft will be limited in operating in large numbers past 1000km from the Chinese mainland, so longer-ranged capabilities like nuclear submarines, carriers, bombers and long-range missiles are the logical next step.
Not sure where you arrived at these limitations, but the H-6 bomber has a combat range of 1,800km (out of maximum cruise range of 6,000km), while even the J-11 has a max range of 3,560km i.e. 1,780km combat range... just to name a couple of examples.

It's not exactly comparable to, say, the B-1's combat range/max range of 5,500km/12,000km, so a hypothetical air strike at, say, Guam isn't really worth entertaining. But still, I wouldn't worry too much about China's air coverage in the distances you've mentioned.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
Not sure where you arrived at these limitations, but the H-6 bomber has a combat range of 1,800km (out of maximum cruise range of 6,000km), while even the J-11 has a max range of 3,560km i.e. 1,780km combat range... just to name a couple of examples.

You can push out aircraft to their maximum range for a short time, but they don't have any persistence.
So 1500km will remain contested or uncontrolled space, as it is halfway between the Chinese mainland and Guam.

But at 500km from the Chinese mainland, you've got a much higher level of Chinese air presence and a much lower level of US air presence due to the distances involved.
 

Phead128

Captain
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
It depends where China sees the intended theatres of operation for her carriers would be, really. China's immediate and pretty much the primary security concern is the 1st and 2nd island chains.

Unlike the US there's no real need for a PLAN CSG to sail halfway across the world. The bases throughout SCS offer the PLAN plenty of means to refuel and resupply; and for whatever reason the PLAN would ever need to send a CSG to the Indian Ocean, then like you said Djibouti has it covered.

So personally I don't see a CVN as something the PLAN terribly needs for the immediate or near future, or even long term for that matter unless China intends to project her power near US and Western shores.
I agree short- to medium- term, Indian and Western Pacific is more than sufficient, that's 80% of world population right there, most important trade routes, and commodities flow through. With Gwadar and Djobouti, Conventionally powered is more than sufficient.

In the Longer term, I suspect the Northern Sea Route, the frozen Arctic waterways north of Siberia, to be increasingly accessible due to climate change, which would require long distance endurance in harsh weather and zero port infrastructure.

Russia operates nuclear-powered ice breakers due to difficulty of refueling in the Artic region and lack of ports in Siberia. The Northern Sea Route can replace the Strait of Malacca one day as the most important sea lane between Europe and Asia, given the significantly shorter distance and fuel saving for merchant shipping. Nuclear CATOBARs can sail this harsh weather without worrying about difficulty of refueling in the artic region.
 
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KevinG

New Member
Registered Member
Which base do you think 003 will be deployed to? Shandong or Hainan? It does not seem like there is going to be new aircraft carrier base. If so, a new dock construction should already begin.
 

MwRYum

Major
Which base do you think 003 will be deployed to? Shandong or Hainan? It does not seem like there is going to be new aircraft carrier base. If so, a new dock construction should already begin.
Shandong will be the most logical of answers, since the carrier aviation's training facilities are up in the north, and despite how much of a duck pond the Bohai Sea actually is, it should be adequate as far as the first few years of the CATOBAR training goes, not to mention its proximity to major shipyard compare with Hainan (unless shipyards in Guangzhou also rated for aircraft carrier maintenance, don't know what grade of work the newly completed drydock in Hainan rated for).
 

KevinG

New Member
Registered Member
Shandong will be the most logical of answers, since the carrier aviation's training facilities are up in the north, and despite how much of a duck pond the Bohai Sea actually is, it should be adequate as far as the first few years of the CATOBAR training goes, not to mention its proximity to major shipyard compare with Hainan (unless shipyards in Guangzhou also rated for aircraft carrier maintenance, don't know what grade of work the newly completed drydock in Hainan rated for).
I don’t quite agree with your logic. I don’t think the main purpose of 003 will be training pilots, because landing will be same as 001 and 001A, and launching can be easily trained on the land facilities. Maintenance should not require Jiangnan Shipyard very often. Given the power system should be similar to what 001 and 001A, which don’t return to Dalian very often
 

weig2000

Captain
China may have only just begun to reap the benefits of its previous investments in aircraft carriers, but by the same token China has only just begun to incur the costs associated with aircraft carriers. R&D is cheap compared to production and especially operational costs.

I agree that carriers are useful, but the level of investment required to realise a credible capability is enormous, and the carrier itself is only a minor part. You need all the combat and support aircraft, many thousands of personnel both onboard and ashore, and a robust surface and subsurface escort capability and all their personnel. The cost required to realise a useful carrier capability is probably ten times the cost required to realise a useful nuclear submarine capability. In a benign strategic environment, that would be fine, for in the longer-term China can certainly support those costs. But when you are faced with the credible prospect of conflict against a superior adversary perhaps three or five or even ten years from now, finite resources need to be allocated where they can best serve to enhance the prospects of victory and avert the prospects of defeat. Ironically, the dream of a world-class carrier capability is likely to be fully realised only after the threat of war has already begun to diminish. In the long-term, China will be fine. The challenge is to get through the short- and medium-term. And I don't see how carriers, particularly nuclear-powered carriers, are going to help with that. To be clear, I am not suggesting that China should abandon its pursuit of aircraft carriers, rather that carriers should be de-prioritised in favour of capabilities that can deter potential adversaries more rapidly and cost-effectively over the period to 2035. Submarines, both conventional and nuclear, are at the top of that list.

So it sounds like you agree carriers are nice and important, but it's just that China cannot afford it. In that case, we have a huge disagreement. I'll make it simple to explain.

A few years back, when discussing future PLAN orbat at SDF, I made the argument that PLAN should benchmark USN because it's the world's most advanced navy and also PLAN's main potential adversary, and therefore target to achieve between 1/2 - 2/3 of the force of USN by the middle of 2030's. Given the "deteriorating strategic environment" in the last few years, let's say the target is 2/3 of the USN.

Chinese defense spending is about 1/3 of that of the US at nominal term, and should be roughly 1/2 in real term when taking into account the purchasing power and low cost. Chinese economy will likely surpass the US economy between 2025 and 2030, and will be anywhere between 1.5 - 2 times of the US economy by 2035, in nominal term.

China today has two conventional STOBAR carriers. In the most aggressive scenario, China will have built by 2035 four more conventional CATOBAR carriers (Type 003) and two nuclear-powered carriers, which will only start to construct in the 2030's. Effectively, that's less than 2/3 of the USN's nuclear-powered supercarrier fleet at 11-12.

In other words, from spending at half of the US's today to about the same as the US's in 2035 in real terms, are you saying China can not afford 2/3 of the USN by 2035? Keep in mind, China would still spend substantially less in percentage of GDP in this scenario than the US.

In your statement above, you almost make it sound like China doesn't know what it's getting itself into by jumping into the carrier building program, with all the escort fleet, combat and support aircraft, various personnel etc. etc. It's like they will have a sticker shock or something like it. I have to say this feels a bit condescending.

All the escort ships (055/052D/054A/054B) are in place and will continue to be built regardless how many carriers will be built given the "deteriorating strategic environment." All the aircraft are needed and will be built regardless how many carriers will be built: the difference being whether they're going to be parked on land (J-20/J-16/J-16D/KJ-500) without aircraft carriers or on aircraft carriers (J-35/J-15B/J-15D/KJ-600) to be forward deployed in the Western Pacific to give China more strategic defense space. And, for all the supposedly prioritized SSN/SSGN's, they are better off to go with CBG's in many cases.

Your suggestion really amounts to building some more SSN/SSGNs at the expense of a few large carriers. That's a false trade-off. A worse one.

To summarize, China can absolutely afford up to six large CATOBAR carriers and their associated escort fleet, support aircraft and personnels with defense spending as a percentage of GDP less than the US by 2035. And, a balanced force structure that include large carriers, SSN/SSGN/SSBN's and strategic stealth bombers are so much more effective and powerful than some narrowly-focused navy.
 

Sczepan

Senior Member
VIP Professional
I don’t quite agree with your logic. I don’t think the main purpose of 003 will be training pilots, because landing will be same as 001 and 001A, and launching can be easily trained on the land facilities.
agree, and so 003 at first will be deployed with the North-Fleet, Quingdao as I suspect.
 
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