Combating WMD: Defence building
By David Siegrist, Senior Research Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, VA
In January, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assigned the US Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) the task of taking the lead within the Department of Defense (DoD) in integrating and synchronising efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This task includes non-proliferation, including diplomacy and arms control; counter-proliferation, including precision strikes; consequence management, including military support to civil authorities; as well as exercises and training.
In the middle of 2004, STRATCOM was implementing an earlier order by the defence secretary to be able to deliver precision strikes anywhere on the globe with a few hours' notice. Referred to as Global Strike, this capacity supports the National Strategy, which is to be able to pre-empt 'rogue' states or terrorist groups from being able to release WMD in the US. Such a strike might be envisaged to destroy a terrorist laboratory or take out a weapons development infrastructure in an entire country. This involves keeping forward-deployed STRATCOM assets in alert status, but also requires weapons, intelligence and planning capabilities that stretch the state of the art.
Nuclear strikes
Some aspects of possible global strike missions, including target location uncertainty, deeply buried or hardened facilities and the need for prompt agent neutralisation may seem to require nuclear weapons to accomplish the mission. We see in the recent draft DoD publication Joint Publication 3-12: Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations that nuclear use to prevent or respond to WMD attacks on the US is indeed contemplated. However, nuclear use raises a host of practical issues in addition to the overarching ethical and legal ones. For example, in the case of self-proclaimed nuclear-capable North Korea, which reportedly buries weapons in deep and hardened sites, the prevailing winds blow to the east. Fallout landing on Japan from a US nuclear strike on Yongbyon would be deemed unacceptable for a host of reasons, despite even severe provocation from North Korea.
Even if the theoretical use of nuclear weapons against rogue states has been admitted, some of the elements needed to implement the new doctrine do not appear to be in place. Congress has refused to fund even a study of the development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator for the US and Rumsfeld has been quoted as disparaging the capability of current nuclear weapon designs to perform the mission of digging out and neutralising deeply buried and hardened targets.
By David Siegrist, Senior Research Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, VA
In January, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assigned the US Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) the task of taking the lead within the Department of Defense (DoD) in integrating and synchronising efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This task includes non-proliferation, including diplomacy and arms control; counter-proliferation, including precision strikes; consequence management, including military support to civil authorities; as well as exercises and training.
In the middle of 2004, STRATCOM was implementing an earlier order by the defence secretary to be able to deliver precision strikes anywhere on the globe with a few hours' notice. Referred to as Global Strike, this capacity supports the National Strategy, which is to be able to pre-empt 'rogue' states or terrorist groups from being able to release WMD in the US. Such a strike might be envisaged to destroy a terrorist laboratory or take out a weapons development infrastructure in an entire country. This involves keeping forward-deployed STRATCOM assets in alert status, but also requires weapons, intelligence and planning capabilities that stretch the state of the art.
Nuclear strikes
Some aspects of possible global strike missions, including target location uncertainty, deeply buried or hardened facilities and the need for prompt agent neutralisation may seem to require nuclear weapons to accomplish the mission. We see in the recent draft DoD publication Joint Publication 3-12: Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations that nuclear use to prevent or respond to WMD attacks on the US is indeed contemplated. However, nuclear use raises a host of practical issues in addition to the overarching ethical and legal ones. For example, in the case of self-proclaimed nuclear-capable North Korea, which reportedly buries weapons in deep and hardened sites, the prevailing winds blow to the east. Fallout landing on Japan from a US nuclear strike on Yongbyon would be deemed unacceptable for a host of reasons, despite even severe provocation from North Korea.
Even if the theoretical use of nuclear weapons against rogue states has been admitted, some of the elements needed to implement the new doctrine do not appear to be in place. Congress has refused to fund even a study of the development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator for the US and Rumsfeld has been quoted as disparaging the capability of current nuclear weapon designs to perform the mission of digging out and neutralising deeply buried and hardened targets.