China's transport, tanker & heavy lift aircraft

sndef888 said:

Just realised the Y20 has very similar characteristics to the IL-76 used for the KJ-2000 AEW plane

One difference is that Y-20 has a fatter but shorter fuselage compared to IL-76's slimmer but longer one.

Does this affect the flight performance/endurance of the plane? For example if they make a AEW version would it have less endurance?

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Absolutely it'll affect performance and endurance. If we looked at the four forces of flight (lift to weight, thrust to drag), well having such a physically large structure like a radar that's welded on top of a plane creates adds additional weight and drag.... More thrust would be required to overcome the elements of drag and weight.... more thrust = higher fuel consumption, and thus a penalty on endurance.

caohailiang said:

i dont think the piece is trying to express that idea "with the introduction of Y 20U China will be able to hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island"

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You should read the article carefully and actually measure the distance between East China coast say Taizhou and let say Naha Okinawa. With more Y20U they don't have to worry about running out of fuel after long distance strike or patrol
It is assessed in this Chinese analysis that each Y-20 would have sufficient fuel to top off 18 Su-30s, enabling them to operate beyond a distance of 1,000km. Interestingly, the article also mentions advantages for China’s western flank (e.g. Tibetan Plateau), where higher altitude airfields complicate takeoff weight.

Hendrik_2000 said:

You should read the article carefully and actually measure the distance between East China coast say Taizhou and let say Naha Okinawa. With more Y20U they don't have to worry about running out of fuel after long distance strike or patrol
It is assessed in this Chinese analysis that each Y-20 would have sufficient fuel to top off 18 Su-30s, enabling them to operate beyond a distance of 1,000km. Interestingly, the article also mentions advantages for China’s western flank (e.g. Tibetan Plateau), where higher altitude airfields complicate takeoff weight.

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Enabling combat radius all the way towards okinawa is great, but i dont get how this will result in "hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island"

caohailiang said:

Enabling combat radius all the way towards okinawa is great, but i dont get how this will result in "hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island"

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Because Okinawa is part of the first island chain Do I need to be explicit ? Anything after that is 2nd chain of island. Gee some people need spoon fed!

Hendrik_2000 said:

Because Okinawa is part of the first island chain Do I need to be explicit ? Anything after that is 2nd chain of island. Gee some people need spoon fed!

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Look, I appreciate you wanting to have a serious discussion but no need to be patronizing or jumpy

Extending combat radius of some PLAAF fighters to Okinawa is one thing, while assuming the air superiority is then won and opponent will have to retrieve to second island chain is completely another matter.

The result of air battle over the first island chain will be influenced by many factors, i would say ariel refueling is not even the most important one here.

So the logic in asserting the introduction of Y20U fleet will directly result in PLA to hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island is just too weak, and honestly that article is not really saying that.

caohailiang said:

Look, I appreciate you wanting to have a serious discussion but no need to be patronizing or jumpy

Extending combat radius of some PLAAF fighters to Okinawa is one thing, while assuming the air superiority is then won and opponent will have to retrieve to second island chain is completely another matter.

The result of air battle over the first island chain will be influenced by many factors, i would say ariel refueling is not even the most important one here.

So the logic in asserting the introduction of Y20U fleet will directly result in PLA to hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island is just too weak, and honestly that article is not really saying that.

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I think you are just criticizing for the sake of criticizing, what is lacking is your analytical skill. Modern air battle is decided by who has the better socalled "force multiplier" who can see further who can persist longer and air refueling is part of it . By being able to loiter over longer period of time it can denied opposing force free access to launch their missile. The article clearly said that if you bother read the full article

Here's What You Need to Remember: For China’s strike aircraft, such as the J-16 and Su-30, both heavy aircraft that will need to fly low, more tankers will afford them significantly more loiter time over the battlespace, for example in Taiwan or South China Sea scenarios.

One of the reasons why every country’s military appreciates such impressive heavy lift capabilities is that they can be critical to so many kinds of military operations, from conveying crucial supplies for humanitarian relief to rescuing nationals abroad in a tight spot (non-combatant evacuation) to delivering elite to far-flung battlefields. On the latter point, there seems to be a noticeable uptick in the PLA’s interest in airborne operations recently, but here we will dwell on another, slightly more subtle, but potentially even more significant strategic impact of the advent of the Y-20 era for Chinese aviation. This concerns the development of the Y-20 for aerial refueling.

That subject was capably

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in this forum a few years back. In that piece, author David Barr asserted that Beijing would likely develop the Y-20 for refueling purposes. He noted that aerial refueling has been absolutely critical to U.S. military operations in distant theaters, such as Afghanistan. Thus, Barr explains that 4,500 aerial refueling sorties were flown mostly by USAF KC-135s and KC-10s to accomplish roughly 6,500 strikes in just the first few months of that war during late 2001.

Having a more robust tanker capability that is able to extend the range of your bomber aircraft and fighter aircraft is obviously desirable, and in theory what Lyle translates from Aerospace Knowledge is correct -- but only in theory.

Obviously in a true high intensity conflict, having the ability to "hold off any attacker to 2nd chain of island," or having "the ability to put U.S. and partner armed forces operating outside the second island chain, such as Alaska and Hawaii at risk," is much more complex than having a viable tanker capability alone.
An emerging and sizeable fleet of Y-20Us/larger sized tankers will offer significant enhancements to the ability to operate at extended distances, yes. And it will fill a significant gap in the PLAAF's overall tanker fleet (or lack thereof, at present).
But let's not exaggerate.
The introduction of a large fleet of tankers alone will not enable the PLA to hold off the 2nd island chain or have the ability to put Alaska and Hawaii at risk -- instead, they are a key prerequisite to enable those to happen but far from the only prerequisite. There is a wide variety of other systems that are being procured and that need to be developed to enable it robustly.



As for the article itself, there are a few points I find questionable.
- I'm not sure what kind of mission profile Lyle thinks would require J-16s and Su-30s to "fly low" like in the SCS or in Taiwan contingencies. In both scenarios, even for strike missions, the aircraft would likely operate at medium and high altitudes for most of their flight profile. I can't imagine many scenarios which would require a lo-lo-lo profile.
- Lyle exaggerates the previous article written by Barr a little bit. It's not like the idea of a Y-20U tanker variant was first floated by Barr in his November 2017 piece -- if anything, when the idea of a "Y-XX" strategic cargo aircraft first emerged in the mid/late 2000s, as early as back then, it was quite obvious that a tanker variant would likely be on the cards.
- I'm not sure what sort of mission profile would see a single Y-20U be able to refuel "to top off 18 Su-30s, enabling them to operate beyond a distance of 1,000km" -- because operating "beyond 1000km" could mean anything. Would those 18 aircraft be operating at 1,100km, or 1,500km or 2,000km? Because those are all technically "beyond 1000km"
- Overall, the strength and weakness of these articles by Lyle is that he does a good job of reading Chinese language texts (most often military magazines like aerospace knowledge or modern weaponry), but he takes all of their analysis at face value as if it necessarily represents official PLA requirements or official PLA thoughts or doctrine.

But let's not exaggerate.
The introduction of a large fleet of tankers alone will not enable the PLA to hold off the 2nd island chain or have the ability to put Alaska and Hawaii at risk -- instead, they are a key prerequisite to enable those to happen but far from the only prerequisite. There is a wide variety of other systems that are being procured and that need to be developed to enable it robustly.

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I don't know why you say it is exaggeration because without tanker the J16 or J11 does not have the persistence of air patrol in conjunction with AWAC. Having it loiter longer without worrying or scurrying back to refuel is the required prerequisite for robust air defense. Every war strategy from ancient time want to increase the defense perimeter to deny the foe the advantage of surprise and freedom of action to launch their missile.

Of course it has to be paired with robust situation awareness, sigint, network etc that is understandable But without refueling capacity it is just not possible.

Not to mention that PLAAF has to eliminate US bases around China and provide escort support to H6K How can they do it without tanker as Guam and Diego Garcia is more than 3000 mile from China mainland return trip

Hendrik_2000 said:

I don't know why you say it is exaggeration because without tanker the J16 or J11 does not have the persistence of air patrol in conjunction with AWAC. Having it loiter longer without worrying or scurrying back to refuel is the required prerequisite for robust air defense. Every war strategy from ancient time want to increase the defense perimeter to deny the foe the advantage of surprise and freedom of action to launch their missile.

Of course it has to be paired with robust situation awareness, sigint, network etc that is understandable But without refueling capacity it is just not possible.

Not to mention that PLAAF has to eliminate US bases around China and provide escort support to H6K How can they do it without tanker as Guam and Diego Garcia is more than 3000 mile from China mainland return trip

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What I wrote was "The introduction of a large fleet of tankers alone will not enable the PLA to hold off the 2nd island chain or have the ability to put Alaska and Hawaii at risk -- instead, they are a key prerequisite to enable those to happen but far from the only prerequisite. There is a wide variety of other systems that are being procured and that need to be developed to enable it robustly."

My issue with Lyle's interpretation of the Aerospace knowledge article and your take on it, is that it makes it seem like with the introduction of a good sized tanker fleet, that the PLA will be capable of those operations at those distances.

I'm saying that a good sized tanker fleet is important to enable operations at those distances, but in a true high intensity conflict you need much more than only tankers.


To enable operations at those distances, you also need an overall capable multi domain force of other combat air power (fighters, long range bombers, stealthy and non-stealthy alike), long range land based missiles and strike systems, a capable, survivable and large surface naval fleet including capable carriers, as well as submarines, to be able to fight a war at those distances, all mutually supporting each other and each others respective force multipliers.

Tankers will be an important component in allowing the combat air to operate at those distances, but introduction of a fleet of tankers by itself will not suddenly enable the PLA to operate at those distances in a high intensity conflict.

Hendrik_2000 said:

I think you are just criticizing for the sake of criticizing, what is lacking is your analytical skill. Modern air battle is decided by who has the better socalled "force multiplier" who can see further who can persist longer and air refueling is part of it . By being able to loiter over longer period of time it can denied opposing force free access to launch their missile. The article clearly said that if you bother read the full article

Here's What You Need to Remember: For China’s strike aircraft, such as the J-16 and Su-30, both heavy aircraft that will need to fly low, more tankers will afford them significantly more loiter time over the battlespace, for example in Taiwan or South China Sea scenarios.

One of the reasons why every country’s military appreciates such impressive heavy lift capabilities is that they can be critical to so many kinds of military operations, from conveying crucial supplies for humanitarian relief to rescuing nationals abroad in a tight spot (non-combatant evacuation) to delivering elite

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to far-flung battlefields. On the latter point, there seems to be a noticeable uptick in the PLA’s interest in airborne operations recently, but here we will dwell on another, slightly more subtle, but potentially even more significant strategic impact of the advent of the Y-20 era for Chinese aviation. This concerns the development of the Y-20 for aerial refueling.

That subject was capably

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

in this forum a few years back. In that piece, author David Barr asserted that Beijing would likely develop the Y-20 for refueling purposes. He noted that aerial refueling has been absolutely critical to U.S. military operations in distant theaters, such as Afghanistan. Thus, Barr explains that 4,500 aerial refueling sorties were flown mostly by USAF KC-135s and KC-10s to accomplish roughly 6,500 strikes in just the first few months of that war during late 2001.

Click to expand...

Well said with analytical anlylisis. Not few puffs on nonsensical hot air by

Hendrik_2000 said:

I think you are just criticizing for the sake of criticizing, what is lacking is your analytical skill. Modern air battle is decided by who has the better socalled "force multiplier" who can see further who can persist longer and air refueling is part of it . By being able to loiter over longer period of time it can denied opposing force free access to launch their missile. The article clearly said that if you bother read the full article

Here's What You Need to Remember: For China’s strike aircraft, such as the J-16 and Su-30, both heavy aircraft that will need to fly low, more tankers will afford them significantly more loiter time over the battlespace, for example in Taiwan or South China Sea scenarios.

One of the reasons why every country’s military appreciates such impressive heavy lift capabilities is that they can be critical to so many kinds of military operations, from conveying crucial supplies for humanitarian relief to rescuing nationals abroad in a tight spot (non-combatant evacuation) to delivering elite

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

to far-flung battlefields. On the latter point, there seems to be a noticeable uptick in the PLA’s interest in airborne operations recently, but here we will dwell on another, slightly more subtle, but potentially even more significant strategic impact of the advent of the Y-20 era for Chinese aviation. This concerns the development of the Y-20 for aerial refueling.

That subject was capably

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

in this forum a few years back. In that piece, author David Barr asserted that Beijing would likely develop the Y-20 for refueling purposes. He noted that aerial refueling has been absolutely critical to U.S. military operations in distant theaters, such as Afghanistan. Thus, Barr explains that 4,500 aerial refueling sorties were flown mostly by USAF KC-135s and KC-10s to accomplish roughly 6,500 strikes in just the first few months of that war during late 2001.

Click to expand...

Caohailiang just puffed a few non -sensical hot air. Well done, I believe he'd never read the artical by David Barr so how could he know or understand.