Chengdu next gen combat aircraft (?J-36)

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
Was it just me that the canopy from that one ground shot look liked it was a cover or it was digitally blackened out? They seemed to go out of their way to make sure no one saw what the J-20 cockpit looked like blurring it. I remember there was a large high resolution shot of the whole J-20 and I zoomed into the cockpit and they bothered to blur that small little part where you couldn’t see the instrument panel. Why not with the J-36?
 

DeltaGreen

New Member
Registered Member
The future air combat campaign I envision is somewhat similar to the large army corps battles of the Napoleonic era, where air assets from both sides form corps, moving and engaging as corps units.

The front line has a large number of CCAs (acting as infantry), but the capabilities of this "infantry" are not as strong or dense as those in World War I, so they cannot form a front line that covers all airspace.

Further back are fifth-generation aircraft, playing a role similar to infantry fighting vehicles—commanding the "infantry" while also participating in combat themselves.

Behind them are sixth-generation aircraft, analogous to armored reserves, coordinating breakthroughs. They manage the battle by expanding breakthroughs, preventing enemy breakthroughs, and countering enemy efforts to widen their breakthroughs.

Even further back are 4.5-generation aircraft, which launch hypersonic missiles and act in a role similar to artillery.

However, I have three categories of questions I would like to ask:

  1. In the context of all-domain operations and system destruction warfare, how is a "breakthrough" achieved? Is it through firepower or other means? Specifically, how do our assets across various domains coordinate to break through the opponent in the electromagnetic and cyber domains? What role would the J-36 play in this?
  2. Many people believe that in certain situations, the J-36 would operate relatively independently while coordinating with CCAs, but I do not understand this point—why would it do this? I think some of its design features, such as its large weapon bay and supersonic performance, suggest it is intended for long-range engagement missions. However, I cannot understand why it would need to operate independently, detached from the corps. Given its management role, should it really be engaged in "combat"? Under what circumstances would it operate independently? Why would it not remain in a relatively rearward position? For what scenarios and combinations of enemy targets are the hypersonic missiles it carries, similar in size to the JingLei-1, intended?
  3. If we try to remove the J-36's large weapon bay and even moderately reduce some of its kinematic capabilities and stealth performance while maintaining its original electronic warfare capabilities to lower costs, could we obtain a type of numerous, relatively cheap, forward-deployed electronic warfare "management aircraft"? What role would they play in the context of all-domain operations and system destruction warfare?
 

Nautilus

New Member
Registered Member
The future air combat campaign I envision is somewhat similar to the large army corps battles of the Napoleonic era, where air assets from both sides form corps, moving and engaging as corps units.

The front line has a large number of CCAs (acting as infantry), but the capabilities of this "infantry" are not as strong or dense as those in World War I, so they cannot form a front line that covers all airspace.

Further back are fifth-generation aircraft, playing a role similar to infantry fighting vehicles—commanding the "infantry" while also participating in combat themselves.

Behind them are sixth-generation aircraft, analogous to armored reserves, coordinating breakthroughs. They manage the battle by expanding breakthroughs, preventing enemy breakthroughs, and countering enemy efforts to widen their breakthroughs.

Even further back are 4.5-generation aircraft, which launch hypersonic missiles and act in a role similar to artillery.

However, I have three categories of questions I would like to ask:

  1. In the context of all-domain operations and system destruction warfare, how is a "breakthrough" achieved? Is it through firepower or other means? Specifically, how do our assets across various domains coordinate to break through the opponent in the electromagnetic and cyber domains? What role would the J-36 play in this?
  2. Many people believe that in certain situations, the J-36 would operate relatively independently while coordinating with CCAs, but I do not understand this point—why would it do this? I think some of its design features, such as its large weapon bay and supersonic performance, suggest it is intended for long-range engagement missions. However, I cannot understand why it would need to operate independently, detached from the corps. Given its management role, should it really be engaged in "combat"? Under what circumstances would it operate independently? Why would it not remain in a relatively rearward position? For what scenarios and combinations of enemy targets are the hypersonic missiles it carries, similar in size to the JingLei-1, intended?
  3. If we try to remove the J-36's large weapon bay and even moderately reduce some of its kinematic capabilities and stealth performance while maintaining its original electronic warfare capabilities to lower costs, could we obtain a type of numerous, relatively cheap, forward-deployed electronic warfare "management aircraft"? What role would they play in the context of all-domain operations and system destruction warfare?
Why would you put your stealthier and more capable 6th gens behind your more vulnerable 5th gens?
 
Deino, I think you've posted multiple times about how Janes (both their articles and infographic drawings) are poor quality and inaccurate, which I agree with.

This infographic/drawing is also poor quality. At this point I think Janes' articles and drawings are not valuable as baseline.
And they called DSI "forward swept engine intakes." Points for creativity I guess.
 

jnd85

Junior Member
Registered Member
Imo this (below) was the last nail in their credibility coffin

This has to be the worst graphic I've ever seen by a "serious" publication
View attachment 163941
You could argue the opposite, that because we do not yet have clear imagery of what this aircraft looks like in detail other than screen captures from video that has been extremely zoomed in (enhance!), that it would be irresponsible for any publication to produce an extremely realistic looking picture that would necessarily be portraying details they do not know for sure are present. Note they also do not use any of the unproven names popularly assigned to the plane either, since that too is unknown.

As an analogy, when performing lab measurements you have this concept of significant/meaningful digits that are defined by the least precise instrument employed in the experiment. Here, our samples = available videos of the plane, and precision = video fidelity.

Anyone could use an AI image generator to create a graphic that would be completely realistic looking yet not represent what the plane actually looks like. As the Devil's Advocate, I would argue that by using a graphic that is obviously cartoonish, the publishers are signaling to their readers that there remain many things about this plane that are unknown or still developing, and to accept them as such. So this art is functional on several levels.

Really, for the purposes of labeling theorized features even a line drawing would have done.
 
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