South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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It is not a dispute or debate but I am simply curious regarding usage of the term "move beyond". At best it would suggest that the initial position is temporal and such a position needs to be sustained by something more substantive. In other words, the initial position is effectively contingent on subsequent reinforcement. You seem to be suggest that in terms of normal usage that it may include first dropping the initial position. Can you suggest of an example in usage that would align to such a meaning.

I think it depends on context and the subject being discussed, but in general normal conversation if I said to someone "you should move beyond doing XYZ and actually do ABC," I think "move beyond" would have a potential undertone of "drop it" or "get over it"?

If "move beyond" was replaced with something akin to "in addition to" like "in addition to doing XYZ, you should also do ABC," then it would reduce or remove the aforementioned undertone.
 

Brumby

Major
Law is subject to interpretation.



That's your PERSONAL interpretation of the power of the binding nature of UNCLOS arbitration. Most commentators from Australia appear to differ in their interpretation on the binding nature of UNCLOS arbitration. Law abiding nations like Australia believe that opting out of mandatory UNCLOS arbitration is perfectly reasonable and legal.

In 2002, Australia declared that it had legally opted out of mandatory UNCLOS arbitration. China has also declared that it has opted out of mandatory arbitration.

It's perfectly legitimate to do so. Every single article from Australia that I've seen appears to agree that Australia is not bound by mandatory UNCLOS arbitration, since they opted out of the mandatory arbitration provisions.






I've provided multiple Australian sources that agree with the interpretation that withdrawing from mandatory UNCLOS arbitration is perfectly legal. Many Australians appear to have interpreted the limits of mandatory arbitration differently from you.
That is straw man reasoning. If you wish to argue about the Philippines-China arbitration then I am happy to do so. Please don't use "'A" to argue about "C". That is basic common sense.
 

Yvrch

Junior Member
Registered Member
Law is subject to interpretation.



That's your PERSONAL interpretation of the power of the binding nature of UNCLOS arbitration. Most commentators from Australia appear to differ in their interpretation on the binding nature of UNCLOS arbitration. Law abiding nations like Australia believe that opting out of mandatory UNCLOS arbitration is perfectly reasonable and legal.

In 2002, Australia declared that it had legally opted out of mandatory UNCLOS arbitration. China has also declared that it has opted out of mandatory arbitration.

It's perfectly legitimate to do so. Every single article from Australia that I've seen appears to agree that Australia is not bound by mandatory UNCLOS arbitration, since they opted out of the mandatory arbitration provisions.

East Timor takes Australia to UN over sea border
The outcome of the UN conciliation process is non-binding because Australia controversially exited the jurisdiction of UNCLOS two months before East Timor became a nation state in 2002.

Jose Ramos Horta: Australia needs to negotiate not litigate with neighbours
Australia withdrew itself from their jurisdiction for the express purpose of marking maritime borders. Allowable yes, but also regrettable.

East Timor: Concession is the price for a rules-based order
Crucially, two months before East Timor gained independence in 2002, Australia withdrew from the jurisdiction of both the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea for 'any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones'. It is certainly legal for any country to establish reservations on ICJ or ITLOS jurisdiction, but Australia has itself set the objective of strengthening regional rules and architecture.

I've provided multiple Australian sources that agree with the interpretation that withdrawing from mandatory UNCLOS arbitration is perfectly legal. Many Australians appear to have interpreted the limits of mandatory arbitration differently from you.

That quite nicely sums up this song and dance routines running around in farcical loops here.

International law may be an interesting subject, but it is far from be all end all reign supreme single most important item in international relations. Far from it. International law has to balance out and adjust to domestic political discourse , whatever the case for legal necessity may be internationally.

In the case of US not ratifying UNCLOS, domestic political discourse trumps up the legal necessity of joining it.In Australian example provided, same as in UK case a few pages back, domestic political discourse won the day and both denied the legal necessity to be bound by the court's rulings.

Sovereignty, which is inextricably intertwined with a nation's security and survival, and implicitly couched in Philippines court case, will strongly dictate the domestic political narrative. China do not have a political or legal culture of submitting her sovereignty issues to an outside body run by foreigners, unless we want to bring up the good ole days of Opium Wars. China resolved her border issues bilaterally where she has a direct say in the outcome. That's her political tradition and her domestic political discourse.

Nobody in China today has the political capital to have such a weighty issue decided by a foreign tribunal on behalf of Chinese state, so no political discourse whatsoever along that line.

But regardless, I'm pretty sure we'll keep seeing the catch weight of adjectives in definitive scales, splitting of prepositions in sub atomic levels and cuddly philosophical droppings of law principles.
 

Yvrch

Junior Member
Registered Member
Exactly. Talk to me directly if you want to get things done. That's China's attitude.

Eff the paragraphs and articles. I will just count the DF41's.
 

confusion

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The criticism here of Kissinger is unfair IMO.
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Former Secretary of State and former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger speaks at the Vietnam War Summit at the LBJ Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, Tuesday, April 26, 2016.
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April 28, 2016 10:51 PM

AUSTIN, TEX.—
Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has denied signing any agreement with the Chinese government decades ago to pave the way for Beijing to occupy a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea.

Kissinger said this week at the Vietnam War Summit in Austin, Texas, that the Paracel Islands — a point of friction between Hanoi and Beijing — was not as important as other issues at that time.

“The American position with respect to the islands has been that we do not take a position of sovereignty of these islands," the former presidential advisor added. "In 1974, in the midst of Watergate and the war in the Middle East, I can assure you that the Paracel Islands were not foremost on our mind. But there is no agreement that was ever signed in which we gave China a right to occupy the Paracel Islands, nor have the Chinese ever claimed that.”

Nationalist sentiments over China are running high in Vietnam as its giant neighbor consolidates claims over disputed waters with a military build-up and mass artificial island-building projects.

Some Vietnamese, especially those who fought for former U.S.-backed South Vietnamese forces, have held a grudge against the United States for not intervening in the 1974 naval battle with China that left dozens of Vietnamese dead and ultimately forced their withdrawal from the Paracels.

Kissinger was then the top diplomat in the Nixon administration, which was seeking rapprochement with China. In an unrestricted — but at times tense — interaction with audience members in Austin, Kissinger said he sympathized with the suffering of the South Vietnamese, calling the evacuation after the fall of Saigon “one of the saddest moments” of his life.

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FILE - This file aerial view taken on July 27, 2012 shows part of the city of Sansha on the island of Yongxing, also known as Woody island in the disputed Paracel chain, which China now considers part of Hainan province.

The controversial war that ended 41 years ago was once again revisited by high-profile figures in the current and former U.S. administration.

Tom Johnson, former executive assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson, said he was “pleased” and “grateful” over progress being made in the relations between Hanoi and Washington.

He said the two sides get closer as they want to “work on economic development,” while some point to China’s assertiveness over the South China Sea.

“There is a concern, I know, about China’s military build-up. There is a concern about newly-created islands, but I do think that the leaders on both sides see the importance of trade,” Johnson said.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry, former soldier-turned-Vietnam War protestor, said at the same summit on Wednesday that Washington and Hanoi have come a long way since the two countries normalized their relations.

“Twenty years ago, there were fewer than 60,000 American visitors annually to Vietnam. Today, there are nearly half a million," he said. "Twenty years ago, bilateral trade in goods with Vietnam was only $451 million. Today, it is more than $45 billion a year.”

Kerry said the two sides are now cooperating on security issues, especially with respect to the South China Sea, an area he said might have not been foreseen two decades ago.

The top U.S. diplomat said Hanoi and Washington “obviously continue to have differences,” but “we talk about them frankly and regularly and often productively.”

Dialogue over the history of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region coincided with the introduction of
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on Wednesday that calls for the White House to increase U.S. naval patrols in the disputed, resource-rich maritime territory.
 

confusion

Junior Member
Registered Member
So, the endgame for stationing these A-10s at Clark might ultimately be selling these planes to the Philippines? These planes are 30+ years old - if the US wants the Philippines to have them, just gift them for free.
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Fairchild Republic's old winged warhorse rides again over the South China Sea.

a10-philippines_large.JPG

A-10 Warthog ground attack aircraft have begun flying out of Clark Air Base, Philippines. Image source:
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photo by Staff Sgt. Benjamin W. Stratton.

Just to the south of China, there's a body of water conveniently named the "South China Sea." According to international law, it's open and free to passage by anyone who wants to use it. From China's perspective, though, if it's got China's name on it, it belongs to China.

The U.S. Air Force and four A-10 Thunderbolt II "Warthog" attack planes beg to differ.

Red storm rising
The past few years have been full of stories of Chinese military activities in the South China Sea -- tales of small-scale naval actions against
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, of artificial islands suddenly rising from the seas
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, and the like. China's submarine fleet, too, has been unusually active in the region and, in at least one recent instance, was spotted "stalking" the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) in international waters.

None of this is particularly surprising given China's claims to the area, made famous in its declaration of a "
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" encompassing about 80% of the South China Sea. But it is worrisome. Some analysts theorize that China's creation of artificial island fortresses among the Paracel and Spratly island chains is intended to turn the entire South China Sea into one big submarine pen -- one in which China's growing fleet of submarines (which may number as many as 70, and some nuclear-armed) can hide in safety and threaten foreign shipping at will.

That's a big concern for the other countries that share borders with the sea, or use it to carry their shipping. In addition to China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all border the South China Sea. Many other nations send vessels through these waters, which contain some of the world's most important shipping routes, traveled by vessels flagged within the region and without.

fleetmoncom_large.JPG

After traversing the Malacca Strait south of Malaysia, a steady stream of ships takes a hard left and heads directly into the South China Sea.

So, in an effort to allay these countries' concerns, and push back against Chinese military expansion, the U.S. has dispatched the A-10 Warthogs to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. There, says the Air Force, the A-10s will operate in "international airspace in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal west of the Philippines providing air and maritime situational awareness."

Their mission: to "promote transparency and safety of movement in international waters and airspace."

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) notes that the A-10s are just the "first iteration of the air contingent mission" that has been ongoing since the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) began cruising the South China Sea a few weeks ago. In cooperation with the Filipino military, Stennis has entered the area to conduct "freedom of navigation" patrols -- exercising its right to peacefully sail through international waters in demonstration that the U.S. really does believe the waters are international.

But what happens when this mission is over?

uss-stennis_large.png


USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) is visiting the South China Sea -- and it's been a lovely trip, but it really must be going soon.

The future of the A-10... abroad?
Some analysts believe it's possible A-10s could remain in the Philippines permanently. Last year, with
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in the U.S. uncertain, the Philippines began feeling out the U.S. about the possibility of selling, or gifting, as many as 24 A-10s to the Filipino military. Around the same time, officials from Boeing (
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) -- currently working
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to upgrade the wings on dozens of older A-10s for the Air Force -- suggested that if the U.S. ultimately decides to retire the planes, other countries might want to buy our surplus aircraft. (In that case, Boeing would happily continue upgrading them -- a message more implied than stated outright.)

Northrop Grumman (
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), which acquired all A-10 assets from Fairchild Republic in 1987 and a partner with Boeing on maintaining the plane, would probably like this idea as well. And Lockheed Martin (
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), believed to be a prime mover behind the Air Force's effort to shift A-10 funds toward buying new F-35 stealth fighter jets, might also find the move appealing.

Will it happen? Will the U.S. Air Force find a compromise solution to
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, and a new home for the A-10 Warthog among folks who will finally appreciate it? No one can say for certain.

But as solutions go, this sounds like a good one for making everybody happy... except, perhaps, the Chinese.

devils-crosses_large.JPG

The A-10 has been nicknamed "the Devil's Cross" (by those on the ground and in its crosshairs). Here's a picture that shows why -- A-10s now patrolling out of Clark Air Base, Philippines. Image source:
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.
 

confusion

Junior Member
Registered Member
First, China's not going to care too much if the US disinvites them from RIMPAC
Port call refusal could signal more trouble in the South China Sea
Kirk Spitzer, USA TODAY
TOKYO — China’s surprise rejection of a port visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier last week could signal a further escalation of tensions in the disputed South China Sea.

Chinese authorities refused last week to grant permission for the USS John C. Stennis battle group to make a routine port call at Hong Kong. It is the first time in nearly a decade that China has turned away a U.S. carrier.

The move came just two weeks after Defense Secretary Ashton Carter used a high-profile visit to the Stennis to criticize China’s territorial claims and island-building campaign in the South China Sea, a critical waterway that supports $5 trillion a year in international trade.

China has claimed sovereignty over virtually all of the South China Sea and has built a string of landfill islands with military-grade runways and port facilities to bolster its position.

The refusal to host the Stennis battle group was a direct response — and challenge — to Carter’s visit, said Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo.

“From the Chinese perspective, the U.S. has no business in the South China Sea — except perhaps to go through it en route to somewhere else,” said Newsham, a former Marine Corps liaison officer with Japan’s armed forces. “As the Chinese see it, since the U.S. does not follow Chinese rules for operations in this Chinese territory, there is no reason to invite the U.S. Navy to visit Hong Kong.”

Taiwan and four other countries, including the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, also claim territory in the South China Sea and have protested China’s actions. The U.S. is concerned that China could use the new islands to interfere with sea and air navigation in the region.

Cmdr. Bill Urban, a Defense Department spokesman in Washington, said Sunday that U.S. officials in Hong Kong were informed by the Chinese government on April 28 that a request for the Stennis and its four escort vessels to visit Hong Kong from May 3-8 was denied. No reason was given.

The flagship of the U.S. 7th Fleet, the USS Blue Ridge, based in Yokosuka, Japan, is currently making a port call in Hong Kong and was not affected.

Urban said U.S. warships have been refused entry to Hong Kong — a frequent port of call for Navy ships for decades — on only two other occasions since China resumed sovereignty in 1997.

“We have a long track record of successful port visits to Hong Kong, including with the current visit of the USS Blue Ridge, and we expect that will continue,” Urban said.

635976989727312074-AP-US-China-Port-Call-001.jpg

In this photo Dec. 1, 2014 file photo, the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis in a file photo Dec. 1, 2014. (Photo: Larry Staegall, AP)

Tensions over the South China Sea are likely to increase in coming weeks.

An international court of arbitration in The Hague is expected to issue a ruling soon on the Philippines’ claims that China is illegally occupying a resource-rich area known as the Scarborough Shoals.

The Philippines considers the region part of its exclusive economic zone. China claims the court has no jurisdiction in the case and has refused to participate in the proceedings.

Although the United States does not officially support individual territorial claims, Carter visited the Stennis while it was cruising not far from the Scarborough Shoals. Lest anyone miss the point, Carter was accompanied by the Philippines’ defense minister on his visit to the nuclear-powered flattop.

Although Carter did not mention China by name during a speech aboard the Stennis, he made it clear the U.S. was unhappy with its behavior in the region.

“In international affairs, disputes should be resolved peacefully, and not by changing the status quo unilaterally,” Carter said. “And we're against that by any of the claimants.”

Since last fall, the U.S. has conducted two “freedom of navigation operations” in waters surrounding islands newly built by China and is likely to conduct a third in the coming weeks.

Alessio Patalano, a lecturer in war studies at Kings College London and a specialist in East Asia maritime security, said the U.S. sent ambiguous messages with the two earlier operations but is likely to get the next one right.

“The U.S. is handling the situation much better now, but of course the key issue is how to prevent the reclamation at Scarborough Shoal,” Patalano said. “Short of parking a couple of destroyers around the area to run an interdiction, there’s little one can do.”

One option would be to rescind an invitation for China's navy to take part in a major multinational naval exercise in waters off Hawaii next month.

Carter told members of Congress in March that he was “reassessing” the invitation for China to attend the exercise, hosted by U.S. Pacific Command every two years. The invitation was extended after China took part in the exercises — for the first time — in 2014, before the current scale of the island-building program in the South China Sea became evident.

“Disinviting (China's navy) would send a clear signal, and a strong one, to both Chinese and (U.S.) partners,” Patalano said. “The Chinese would take it as a serious loss of face, and ... the loss of an opportunity to spy on the U.S. and others.”

As I've mentioned before, Grant Newsham is a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, an organization with deep links to Toru Hashimoto. Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine Colonel and a former member of the US Foreign Service.

The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies has done a really good job of getting its message out to multiple media outlets. This one is in USA TODAY.

I'm surprised that someone with his profile received clearance from the US government to work for the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.

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United States Marines
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US Foreign Service
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Brumby

Major
China’s Divide-and-Rule Tactics in South China Sea Will Backfire
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China recently announced that it had reached a consensus on the South China Sea with three members of Asean. What could be wrong with that? That would be fine, actually, if Asean had only three members. But Asean has ten full-fledged members and seven weren’t consulted on that consensus. What gives?

Take a look at the substance of that consensus. First, it says that there’s no dispute between Asean and China on the South China Sea and that disagreements between individual Asean members and China should not affect Asean-China relations. That’s correct.

Second, according to the consensus, countries have the right to choose how to resolve their disputes according to international law. That, too, is correct. But then it adds that the “imposition of a unilateral approach” would be wrong. Does that refer to the Philippines going before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to seek clarification on the merits of China’s claim to virtually all of the South China Sea?

If so, the consensus misses the point. For the Philippine case before the PCA isn’t intended to resolve any territorial or sovereignty dispute between the Philippines and China. Since it is all about the validity of the nine-dash line and the nature of the geographic features enclosed by that line, the case is a matter of interest to all nations that subscribe to and would make use of freedom of navigation. Just because China refuses to take part in the PCA legal proceedings does not make the Philippine suit an “imposition of a unilateral approach.”

Third, the consensus says that according to Article IV of the DOC, parties in the South China Sea should resolve their territorial and sovereignty disputes through dialogue and consultation. That’s right on the money. The devil is in how China behaves when a party attempts to engage it in bilateral negotiation. As I remember, the Philippines tried to engage China in such a dialogue but nothing much happened because China treated the Philippines as a supplicant and not as an equal negotiating partner.

It’s not yet too late. Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte, front-runner in the current Philippine presidential elections, has broadly hinted that he’s willing to renew bilateral talks with China when he gets to be president. If China is itself willing to negotiate as an equal toward a win-win solution, no Philippine president will pass up the chance to peacefully resolve his country’s territorial dispute with China.

And fourth, the consensus says that Asean and China are capable enough of jointly safeguarding peace and stability in the South China Sea. Well said. And China can substantiate this assertion by promptly concluding with Asean a Code of Conduct (COC) on parties in the South China Sea.

Then the consensus hastens to add that external parties should play a constructive role, instead of the reverse. What does that mean? Does that mean that the navies of the US, Japan, India and Australia should stay away from the disputed waters of the South China Sea? If so, it’s an unrealistic expectation. So long as China keeps reclaiming geographic features and militarizing them, then so long will external powers feel called upon to carry out “freedom of navigation operations” and to show China that it isn’t the only boy in the playground that has military muscle.

What’s China up to anyway? Soon after the announcement of the consensus, Bilahari Kausikan of the Singapore ministry of foreign affairs commented that this could be seen as China’s way of dividing Asean before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) could rule on the merits of China’s nine-dash line and its claim to virtually all of the South China Sea. Former Asean secretary-general Ong Keng Yong, now Singapore’s ambassador-at-large, added that the consensus was tantamount to China meddling in Asean internal affairs.

That raised China’s hackles. Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin asked Singapore to explain the statements of its two senior diplomats. In fact it’s China that has some explaining to do.

For starters, why is it only China that’s announcing the consensus? Why is it doing all the talking for all four states involved? And if the consensus were as non-controversial and well intentioned as China claims it to be, why didn’t China go for a full Asean-China consensus? Instead, it roped in just three, two of which are seen by many as its clients.

One of them, Laos, happens to be the current chair of Asean. If the maelstrom of controversy surrounding the consensus gained velocity, then the credibility of Laos as chair of Asean would be severely compromised. So would be the credibility of Asean centrality.

An Asean diminished by dissensions, including one fostered by China, will not stay relevant for long. In that event, everybody will lose, including China, which would be bereft of a robust and credible partner in the South China Sea. Instead it will have several individual claimants forever diplomatically swarming like a bunch of wasps against its position on the South China Sea.

It won’t enjoy the kind of peace possible only with a strong and united Asean partner in the region. And worse, the external powers that China wishes would stay away from the South China Sea would have all the more reason to carry out freedom of navigation operations (fonops) on a perennial basis.

The smart thing for China to do right now is to speedily conclude a COC with Asean and thus prove for good that it can deal constructively with an Asean that’s united like a true community. An early COC would restore some of the credibility that Asean lost as a result of the unfortunate consensus and to some extent refurbish China’s fading claim to a peaceful rise.
 

SamuraiBlue

Captain
China recently announced that it had reached a consensus on the South China Sea with three members of Asean.

Laos is a landlock nation and Thailand has no conflict with the nine dash line so the only nation that actually has conflict is Brunei one of the smallest countries within the region next to Singapore with a smaller population and virtually no military.
As for Philippines Presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, looks as if he has a lot half hidden in his closet.
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