Significance of the Chinese military contribution to World War 2 disputed.

There are so many things wrong with this post:

lightspeed said:

Han Liancheng deserved great credit for the battle victory. that demonstrates a highly skilled undercover agent. i don’t know why you like to downplay the spies’ significance ? it would spoil the brilliance of CCP’s military accomplishment or make the victory less glorious or enjoyable ? anyway, subversion and espionage directed against the enemy is an integrant part of warfare.

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I'm not the one downplaying the effectiveness of intelligence in war. You're the one downplaying the PLA's combat effectiveness.

lightspeed said:

the CCP’s senior commanders had been fighting against the KMT for years before 1937 ( the 1930s Encirclement Campaigns ). the Communist troops actively fought against the Nationalists in the Hubei-Shandong-Shaanxi region during the anti-Japanese war. they also fought some battles against puppet troops. that explains the combat experiences.

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Wow, just wow. So you think all of the communist's combat experience comes from fighting the Nationalists? Seriously? If this is really what you believe, then there's no point arguing with you anymore because you're just going to ignore reality.

I also don't understand your point about "puppet troops". Those are effectively Japanese troops.

lightspeed said:

if the CCP didn't have the weapons and ammunition, they won’t build a large army. that’s why the CCP had large irregular forces. do read Zhu De’s January 1945 letter to Wedemeyer, and you will understand it. you think what was the CCP’s troop strength at the point of end of ww2 ?

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You're conveniently ignoring the fact that the Chinese defenders of the Great Wall in 1931 were also severely under-equipped. That's why they had those Big Sword units. Are you going to lecture them on how they shouldn't have recruited more soldiers than they had guns for?

lightspeed said:

the CCP asserted that they were the main fighting force in the anti-Japanese war.

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Keep up with the times, will you? This isn't the 1960's anymore.

lightspeed said:

the Communist's small-scale guerilla attacks made no significant contribution toward China’s war efforts by any means. they could have focused the small-scale attacks on the Jinpu or the Longhai railways, and that could have disrupted the Japanese’s supply lines. but if the Communists dared to attack the Jinpu railway, the Japanese would attack them. so that was not in the Communist's interest to disrupt the Japanese’s control of the Jinpu railway. have you read the Pan Hannian semi-biographies, and Peng Dehuai's account of The Hundred Regiment Battle ?

if you don’t understand or choose to ignore the Soviet factor ( the Soviet’s great help to CCP ) in the civil war, you will never be able to figure out the puzzle of the war.

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You can have your own opinions, but I would remind other readers that the same communist commanders who ran the campaign against the Japanese would later fight against US-led troops in Korea. History itself can attest to the effectiveness of their tactics and strategy.

solarz said:

You can have your own opinions, but I would remind other readers that the same communist commanders who ran the campaign against the Japanese would later fight against US-led troops in Korea. History itself can attest to the effectiveness of their tactics and strategy.

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Oh yes, human waves of ill equipped cannon fodders is great strategy. You really got to credit Mao and his generals for realizing if you throw more troops into the meat grinder than the other side has bullets, then you're sure to win some battles.

Blackstone said:

Oh yes, human waves of ill equipped cannon fodders is great strategy. You really got to credit Mao and his generals for realizing if you throw more troops into the meat grinder than the other side has bullets, then you're sure to win some battles.

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How much of that is propaganda?

Blackstone said:

Oh yes, human waves of ill equipped cannon fodders is great strategy. You really got to credit Mao and his generals for realizing if you throw more troops into the meat grinder than the other side has bullets, then you're sure to win some battles.

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That's just a tired old myth from the American side.

delft said:

How much of that is propaganda?

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We know "human wave" tactics were used by Russian forces in WWI, and by Chinese and Soviet forces in WWII, so is it surprising the poorly equipped PLA would, once again, resort to 人海 (human sea) in the Korean War? Is not like Mao cared how many Chinese widows he created.

Blackstone said:

We know "human wave" tactics were used by Russian forces in WWI, and by Chinese and Soviet forces in WWII, so is it surprising the poorly equipped PLA would, once again, resort to 人海 (human sea) in the Korean War? Is not like Mao cared how many Chinese widows he created.

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WWI is technologically a far stretch from the Korean War. WWI forces didn't have the B-52 super fortress.

If you believe that the PVA relied on "human wave" tactics to win, then how do you explain that they sustained far more casualties in defensive actions than in offense?

solarz said:

If you believe that the PVA relied on "human wave" tactics to win

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The technical term is "infiltration assault". This has been discussed ad nauseam.

Later, the term "human wave attack" was often misused[12] to describe the Chinese short attack — a combination of infiltration and the shock tactics employed by the PLA during the Korean War.[13] According to some accounts, Marshal Peng Dehuai—the overall commander of the Chinese forces in Korea—is said to have invented this tactic.[14] A typical Chinese short attack was carried out at night by small fireteams on a narrow front against the weakest point in enemy defenses.[13] The Chinese assault team would crawl undetected within grenade range, then launch surprise attacks against the defenders in order to breach the defenses by relying on maximum shock and confusion.[13]

If the initial shock failed to breach the defenses, additional fireteams would press on behind them and attack the same point until a breach was created.[13] Once penetration was achieved, the bulk of the Chinese forces would move into the enemy rear and attack from behind.[15] During the attacks, the Chinese assault teams would disperse while masking themselves using the terrain, and this made it difficult for UN defenders to target numerous Chinese troops.[7] Attacks by the successive Chinese fireteams were also carefully timed to minimize casualties.[16] Due to primitive communication systems and tight political controls within the Chinese army, short attacks were often repeated indefinitely until either the defenses were penetrated or the attacker's ammunition supply were exhausted, regardless of the chances of success or the human cost.[13]

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Indeed, one of the favorate propaganda piece of the CCP was the story about the soldier that burned to death quitely in a fire caused by a flare, then make a noise and give away the assualt.

solarz said:

I'm not the one downplaying the effectiveness of intelligence in war. You're the one downplaying the PLA's combat effectiveness.

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the spies provided the great catalyst for the CCP’s victory. I've gotta hand it to them. I recognize their superiority. I have the impression that you are belittling their achievements.

solarz said:

Wow, just wow. So you think all of the communist's combat experience comes from fighting the Nationalists? Seriously? If this is really what you believe, then there's no point arguing with you anymore because you're just going to ignore reality.

I also don't understand your point about "puppet troops". Those are effectively Japanese troops.

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don’t make assumptions when you don’t fully understand a situation.

there is of course a difference between Puppet and Japanese.

that was the reality of the situation in North China ( Hubei-Shaanxi ): the Puppet troops enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. the Japanese almost never employed the Puppets against the Nationalist main army. the Japanese almost exclusively employed the Puppets against the Communist forces and the Nationalist irregular forces. the Puppets received the occasional Japanese troops support depending on circumstances. the Puppets fought for control of the land against the Communist forces and the Nationalist irregular forces in that complicated jigsaw-puzzle combination of Puppet-held, Nationalist-held, Communist-held and local militias-held territories in North China. the Communist-held territory was not in direct conflict with the Japanese direct-held territory. that situation closely applied to Shandong and the Lower Yangtze Delta region too.

the Communists mostly fought against the Nationalists and Puppets. the Communists fought the Nationalists more often than the Puppets. the Communists fought few real battles against the Japanese. both the Communists and the Nationalists accused the other side of colluding with the Puppets to attack them.

the Communists greatly exaggerated their battles against the Japanese or Puppets whatever. their effective small-scale attacks cannot be verified. General Wedemeyer cannot confirm the Communist’s great military efforts too. effective in this case means making a useful contribution toward China’s war efforts, not the CCP’s war position in whole.

do show me the list of Communist’s battles. I even give you some of their battles for starter. eg. the Anyang battle, the Changlecun battle, the Langya Mountain battle, etc.

solarz said:

You're conveniently ignoring the fact that the Chinese defenders of the Great Wall in 1931 were also severely under-equipped. That's why they had those Big Sword units. Are you going to lecture them on how they shouldn't have recruited more soldiers than they had guns for?

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it's pointless linking the big swords story to the Communists. it's not like the Communists used them too.

I repeat. read Zhu De’s January 1945 letter to Wedemeyer. I have repeated many times. if you think they have 1 million or 1.2 million regular troops. then you should prove it by counting the units under the commanders. you can’t just talk your way out of it without the facts.

solarz said:

Keep up with the times, will you? This isn't the 1960's anymore.

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you’re always wrong. you are just arguing for the sake of arguing.

人民日报特约评论员文章
中国共产党是全民族团结抗战的中流砥柱——写在中国人民抗日战争胜利60周年

solarz said:

You can have your own opinions, but I would remind other readers that the same communist commanders who ran the campaign against the Japanese would later fight against US-led troops in Korea. History itself can attest to the effectiveness of their tactics and strategy.

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don’t divert the issue and suddenly link it to the Korean war. they fought effectively in the Korean war so they must have fought effectively in the anti-Japanese war too: your logic made no sense.

you always try to talk your way out of it without the facts. do show me a significant Communist attack on the very important Japanese controlled Jinpu railway during the war.

you have to read Pan Hannian semi-biographies to figure out a part of the Communist’s trickery. you have to read Peng Dehuai's account of The Hundred Regiment Battle, that provided interesting insights into the battle. ie. it was 22, not 100 regiments.

solarz said:

WWI is technologically a far stretch from the Korean War. WWI forces didn't have the B-52 super fortress.

If you believe that the PVA relied on "human wave" tactics to win, then how do you explain that they sustained far more casualties in defensive actions than in offense?

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What do you mean "defensive actions?" Combat-related or from starvation and disease? What's the source of your information?

Blackstone said:

What do you mean "defensive actions?" Combat-related or from starvation and disease? What's the source of your information?

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Look at the 5 campaigns waged by the PVA. In the first 3 campaigns, the PVA was on the offensive. The 3rd campaign ended with the PVA taking Seoul. In the 4th campaign, the PVA was forced to retreat, and in the 5th campaign, the frontline remained at the 38th parallel.

The casualties sustained by the PVA was far higher in each of the 4th and 5th campaigns were higher than their casualties in the first 3 campaigns combined. The 5th campaign was especially brutal, as that is where the PVA fought most of their defensive actions.