Principles of PLA watching

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Blitzo

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Intelligence successfully making its way up to the top and then getting blatantly ignored is even more unlikely. You're suggesting the US intelligence community believed China was developing a 5th-gen fighter capable of rivalling the F-22 that would have entered service before 2020 in meaningful numbers but was unable to convince their country's leaders to not shoot themselves in the foot by cancelling the most viable and existing solution to that problem.

Yeah, lol, no. I think the intelligence just wasn't there. Gates had no reason not to cancel the F-22 because the people responsible for finding out if there were good reasons to continue production (DIA/CIA/NSA) didn't do their jobs properly and concluded there were no good reasons to continue production. By 2009 when they seemed to have reversed their conclusions, it was already too late and the F-22's fate had been sealed.

On this matter, I feel like we should not underestimate the role of institutional prejudices and organizational incompetencies.

I believe that there definitely would have been individuals or groups in the US intelligence community who would have had an accurate reading of J-20/J-XX, but I suspect that their information may have never made it up all the layers due to the factors I described above.


Of course, organizational and institutional prejudices and incompetencies are just as important in determining the overall ability of an intelligence service as the actual ability to gather raw intelligence in the first place, meaning the fact that such intelligence apparently did not make its way up to the top is still a miscarriage of their duties.
 

Klon

Junior Member
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It seems that the opposition's case has been reduced to two points: halting F-22 production and Gates' statements. I'll do this reply without quoting those comments, to save time and space.

First, let's look at the decision to stop making the F-22. Jura helpfully linked an
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which recounts the perspective of Norton Schwartz, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, on the events.
Behind the scenes, Schwartz's predecessor General Mike Moseley "never gave up in his principled attempts to get those 381 F-22s" the book states. That push ended up getting Moseley fired along with his civilian counterpart, Air Force Secretary Mike Wynn. After the culling, the brass thought that the new bomber was simply too important and that the chances of winning both the F-22 and bomber arguments with Gates, who was staunchly averse to building high-priced weapons that couldn't be used in Iraq or Afghanistan, was next to zero.

Schwartz, in an attempt to see if a reduced F-22 production number would be palatable to the Defense Secretary, executed an independent assessment that ended up stating 243 F-22s was the absolute minimum the force could get by with. But Gates balked at that number as well.
So we can see that leaders of the USAF always wanted all the planned F-22s, but had to compromise because of budget constraints and competing priorities. This directly counters the argument that they were fine with stopping production because they didn't have correct intelligence on the Chinese program.

Additionally, let's see what Gates
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about it.
Air superiority and missile defense – two areas where the budget has attracted the most criticism – provide case studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future potential conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. air supremacy? For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president’s budget request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs – aircraft that have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target. And we will buy many more in the future.
We also took into consideration the capabilities of the newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of areas – most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the advantages produced by economies of scale – some 500 will be bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the life of the program. And we already have eight foreign development partners. It has had development problems to be sure, as has every advanced military aircraft ever fielded. But if properly supported, the F-35 will be the backbone of America’s tactical aviation fleet for decades to come if – and it is a big if – money is not drained away to spend on other aircraft that our military leadership considers of lower priority or excess to our needs.
To me, this sounds reasonable, although many apparently disagree. For example, if the F-35 brings 85% (the number is obviously arbitrary, but not unrealistic) of the capability at 60% of the cost of the F-22, a choice to "trade" 200 F-22 for 330 F-35 can make sense. Even more relevantly, neither of these can substitute for a new bomber, which is what the decision ultimately came down to.

I don't intend to make the case that it was an absolutely correct decision. It's not the kind of thing that can be known without having the all details in a professional setting. I have, however, shown that it wasn't some kind of unexplicable error that proves that the decision makers were delusional about the J-20.

Let's also take a look at Gates' more controversial comments. In the same speech as above, he also said the following:
Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America's national security.
Clearly, he was wrong in what he said about the timelines of China's fifth-generation fighter. Some apparently consider this to be decisive proof that Gates was acting on wrong intelligence (or was otherwise delusional), but let's anyway consider why he might have said that and in what context he was speaking.

Early in his speech, he makes it clear that he is there to make the case for that year's defense budget, which was facing resistance in Congress and other quarters. He was speaking to civilians, not military professionals. Much of the speech is about explaining the decision to end production of the F-22, meaning that it was likely one of the more controversial aspects of the budget. His comment above was also made in this context.

My opinion is that he was speaking as a politician, with his utmost priority being to find support for the budget, and took liberties with the truth to make his point stronger. After all, saying China won't have any fifth-generation fighters by 2020 (and a "handfull" by 2025) was much simpler and more convenient for his task there than the truth. I think that posters here can agree than in some contexts people make false but necessary statements. If I remember correctly, that was the general opinion when heads of the USAF and the IAF, Goldfein and Dhanoa, made dismissive comments about the J-20: they said what they had to say.

This doesn't mean Gates was uninformed about the progress of the J-20 when making the decision to end F-22 production, which would in any case be made with many others, both his superior and subordinates (read above about the thoughts of top USAF generals), which again makes it very unlikely that it could come down to one person having bad intelligence.

Once more, the rest follows.
 

Klon

Junior Member
Registered Member
Moving to other points, both comments say that US intelligence was only right about the J-20 late, presumably referring to Ulman's comments from 2010. I don't particularly like restating basic points endlessly, but if it's necessary...

That there aren't publicly available comments from US intelligence describing the J-20 in levels of detail that would please some here from before an arbitrary date doesn't mean that they were unaware of those details. Intelligence agencies aren't newspapers and don't seek to publish their findings.

In all three cases where we have direct comments from intelligence services about the program, the information given is correct, as much as some might want to paint it as late (remember, in 2009 "the intelligence community has been warning of the development of a Chinese fifth-generation fighter for several years") or vague.

Again, if we are to believe that they at some point underestimated the J-20 as a 4.5-generation fighter, there should be quotes that show this and the same goes for being wrong about timelines.

Actually, before we go any further, will the other side agree that the absence of public reports about a program doesn't mean that there isn't detailed intelligence about it? Because this is both self-evidently true and somehow disputed every time there are demands that I find a detailed report from a certain year. As they say, absence of reports is not evidence of absence of classified intelligence. It's not even an indication in that direction, because no baseline has been established where such reports are expected. (Seriously, is there anything about the PAK-FA or any other program? If not, what does this prove?)

Although I have explained numerous times why I reject arbitrary standards ("too vague"), let's consider the
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one more time, in the flesh. It said, in 1997, that the J-10 "is China's first indigenous design of a fourth generation fighter" with performance "in the general category of the U.S. F-16". The XXJ is then described under a header of China: The Future.
China's major designers are competing to develop a much more capable fighter. This aircraft is expected to be a large multi-role fighter with an emphasis on air combat and a reduced radar signature design. The aircraft could enter service with both the air force and the navy around 2015.
There is also an illustration with the words "XXJ - future fighter".

It's obvious to anyone reading that with an open mind that they're talking about a fifth-generation fighter. That someone decided that the only way they'll agree to this is if they read the words "fifth-generation" or "F-22", after knowing these weren't used, shouldn't mean anything.

Also, the theories that US intelligence either vastly underestimated the J-20, got the timelines wrong or that the intelligence somehow didn't reach the decision makers, remain extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence. Any evidence would be a start. The same goes for the idea that they were somehow worse at collecting OSINT than SDF or that they didn't manage a single relevant hack.

It almost seems we're back at the old issue of double standards: it's fine to accuse people and institutions of being incompetent and frankly stupid, as long as we're not talking about China. Then we should only assume the best and everything can be understood.
 

jobjed

Captain
Also, the theories that US intelligence either vastly underestimated the J-20, got the timelines wrong or that the intelligence somehow didn't reach the decision makers, remain extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence. Any evidence would be a start. The same goes for the idea that they were somehow worse at collecting OSINT than SDF or that they didn't manage a single relevant hack.

Well, shit, if you don't consider Gates' statements and the premature termination of F-22 production to be colossal screw ups in the USAF's procurement OODA loop starting with 'Observation', then you're on another level of deluded we have nothing left to talk about.

To be fair, it's not just the USAF that's been making startlingly short-sighted and uninformed decisions, I believe the USN edges past them in idiotic procurement in the post-Cold War era.
 

Blitzo

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Let's also take a look at Gates' more controversial comments. In the same speech as above, he also said the following:

Clearly, he was wrong in what he said about the timelines of China's fifth-generation fighter. Some apparently consider this to be decisive proof that Gates was acting on wrong intelligence (or was otherwise delusional), but let's anyway consider why he might have said that and in what context he was speaking.

Early in his speech, he makes it clear that he is there to make the case for that year's defense budget, which was facing resistance in Congress and other quarters. He was speaking to civilians, not military professionals. Much of the speech is about explaining the decision to end production of the F-22, meaning that it was likely one of the more controversial aspects of the budget. His comment above was also made in this context.

My opinion is that he was speaking as a politician, with his utmost priority being to find support for the budget, and took liberties with the truth to make his point stronger. After all, saying China won't have any fifth-generation fighters by 2020 (and a "handfull" by 2025) was much simpler and more convenient for his task there than the truth. I think that posters here can agree than in some contexts people make false but necessary statements. If I remember correctly, that was the general opinion when heads of the USAF and the IAF, Goldfein and Dhanoa, made dismissive comments about the J-20: they said what they had to say.

This doesn't mean Gates was uninformed about the progress of the J-20 when making the decision to end F-22 production, which would in any case be made with many others, both his superior and subordinates (read above about the thoughts of top USAF generals), which again makes it very unlikely that it could come down to one person having bad intelligence.

Once more, the rest follows.

So, you're saying that these individuals of great power are making false "but necessary" statements despite knowing the truth to be something else entirely?

How is such a claim easier to defend than the assertion that they merely made a mistake in underestimating and/or not taking seriously the intelligence that they were fed?

Moving to other points, both comments say that US intelligence was only right about the J-20 late, presumably referring to Ulman's comments from 2010. I don't particularly like restating basic points endlessly, but if it's necessary...

That there aren't publicly available comments from US intelligence describing the J-20 in levels of detail that would please some here from before an arbitrary date doesn't mean that they were unaware of those details. Intelligence agencies aren't newspapers and don't seek to publish their findings.

In all three cases where we have direct comments from intelligence services about the program, the information given is correct, as much as some might want to paint it as late (remember, in 2009 "the intelligence community has been warning of the development of a Chinese fifth-generation fighter for several years") or vague.

Again, no one is disputing whether there have been individuals or groups inside the US intelligence community who may have been aware of this.

But the fact that such information had apparently not reached high levels of govt or defence officials as evidenced by Gates' completely incorrect statement in 2009 means we do not have evidence that individuals at high levels of service or govt were aware of J-XX in the capacity that at least we had been.



Again, if we are to believe that they at some point underestimated the J-20 as a 4.5-generation fighter, there should be quotes that show this and the same goes for being wrong about timelines.

It doesn't necessarily have to be a 4.5 generation fighter -- but the lack of description of it as a 5th generation fighter, or one intended to compete with the F-22, or even the term "VLO" means we cannot reasonably assume that in 1997 they believed China was intending to develop such a fighter.



Actually, before we go any further, will the other side agree that the absence of public reports about a program doesn't mean that there isn't detailed intelligence about it? Because this is both self-evidently true and somehow disputed every time there are demands that I find a detailed report from a certain year. As they say, absence of reports is not evidence of absence of classified intelligence. It's not even an indication in that direction, because no baseline has been established where such reports are expected. (Seriously, is there anything about the PAK-FA or any other program? If not, what does this prove?)

Again, refer to the service level/govt level argument above.



Although I have explained numerous times why I reject arbitrary standards ("too vague"), let's consider the
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one more time, in the flesh. It said, in 1997, that the J-10 "is China's first indigenous design of a fourth generation fighter" with performance "in the general category of the U.S. F-16". The XXJ is then described under a header of China: The Future.

There is also an illustration with the words "XXJ - future fighter".

It's obvious to anyone reading that with an open mind that they're talking about a fifth-generation fighter. That someone decided that the only way they'll agree to this is if they read the words "fifth-generation" or "F-22", after knowing these weren't used, shouldn't mean anything.

They also could have used other terms such as "very low observable" which in 1997 should have already been in circulation for the understanding of what a 5th generation fighter would be seeking to achieve.

In hindsight it's absolutely possible to think they could have been referring to a 5th generation fighter, but in 1997 do you think it would have been reasonable to interpret that from how vague their statement is? Absolutely not in my opinion.



Also, the theories that US intelligence either vastly underestimated the J-20, got the timelines wrong or that the intelligence somehow didn't reach the decision makers, remain extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence. Any evidence would be a start. The same goes for the idea that they were somehow worse at collecting OSINT than SDF or that they didn't manage a single relevant hack.

Secdef Gates, 2009, Chicago Economic Club. "Handful of 5th generation fighters only by 2025". Of course, if we accept that the statements from high level US govt and military officials no longer carry any water, then why are we even having this discussion in the first place?

We can just wave our hands and say nothing matters.



It almost seems we're back at the old issue of double standards: it's fine to accuse people and institutions of being incompetent and frankly stupid, as long as we're not talking about China. Then we should only assume the best and everything can be understood.

This is not an issue of double standards -- the arguments and premises that we are raising did not just magically arrive out of nowhere.

I'm not sure how new you are to PLA watching, but I've been doing this for over a decade now, and I've consumed US govt and military declassified reports on PLA developments this whole time -- initially because I imagined they must surely be the ones who are most on top of new PLA developments -- but now I read them because I want to see how far behind their reports are from the leading edge of OSINT PLA watching.


I'm not badmouthing the ability of the US to gather raw intelligence -- again, see my definition of what I mean by "US intelligence" ("whether that information would have been adequately conveyed to the sufficient high levels of US govt and military responsible for the US to actually conduct actions (i.e.: procurement and strategy) in response to new intelligence is another matter. So when I speak of the "US" or "US intelligence" this is what I refer to.") -- but I am criticizing the way in which that intelligence does not seem to have reached their govt officials and high level service officers, including the open declassified reports that the US govt and military releases.
There are few if any occasions I can think of when they had managed to pre-empt the PLA watching community on a new weapons development programme.


To say that the PLA's weapons developments tend to exceed US (public/declassified) estimates and projections, and to say that the US estimates and projections and statements tend to underestimate PLA weapons developments is not praising China at the US's expense. It is a reflection of what we have been able to see over the course of a decade of unveiling new ships, aircraft, and other systems.
 
went through the recent posts, think the best point is:
Secdef Gates, 2009, Chicago Economic Club. "Handful of 5th generation fighters only by 2025". Of course, if we accept that the statements from high level US govt and military officials no longer carry any water, then why are we even having this discussion in the first place?

We can just wave our hands and say nothing matters.
in response to:
Also, the theories that US intelligence either vastly underestimated the J-20, got the timelines wrong or that the intelligence somehow didn't reach the decision makers, remain extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence. Any evidence would be a start. The same goes for the idea that they were somehow worse at collecting OSINT than SDF or that they didn't manage a single relevant hack.
Klon
you pull quotes which are convenient to you AND then throw in
...

My opinion is that he was speaking as a politician, with his utmost priority being to find support for the budget, and took liberties with the truth to make his point stronger. After all, saying China won't have any fifth-generation fighters by 2020 (and a "handfull" by 2025) was much simpler and more convenient for his task there than the truth. I think that posters here can agree than in some contexts people make false but necessary statements. ...
that's what people do here while talking around the table with multiple beer mugs on it (LOL trust me I know)

this way you may think about pretty much anything you "proved" it
 

Klon

Junior Member
Registered Member
Well, shit, if you don't consider Gates' statements and the premature termination of F-22 production to be colossal screw ups in the USAF's procurement OODA loop starting with 'Observation', then you're on another level of deluded we have nothing left to talk about.

To be fair, it's not just the USAF that's been making startlingly short-sighted and uninformed decisions, I believe the USN edges past them in idiotic procurement in the post-Cold War era.
I guess if you don't have an argument, it's time for insults.


So, you're saying that these individuals of great power are making false "but necessary" statements despite knowing the truth to be something else entirely?

How is such a claim easier to defend than the assertion that they merely made a mistake in underestimating and/or not taking seriously the intelligence that they were fed?
I hope you read what I wrote, specifically in what context Gates was speaking and what his aim was. He was a politician and the budget getting passed was the number one priority in that moment for him and his boss, the president. That politicians sometimes lie is not some unheard of idea that I just made up.

I claim it's quite likely that he found it more convenient and effective to say China will have no fifth-generation fighters by 2020 than having to explain they will have about fifty, while the USA will still have a massive numbers advantage.

Also, his statement is qualitatively similar to the ones the heads of USAF and IAF made (separately) about the J-20, where they essentially said that they're not concerned and downplayed it's importance. If people can accept that's basically what they had to say, even if it's not true, why can't they accept Gates had to (or chose to) lie on the job when he downplayed the timelines of the J-20?

Or, for example, if China's minister of defense or head of the air force are asked about the proliferation of the F-35 around China and say they're not concerned at all, does them not taking the F-35 seriously in that statement mean they're not taking it seriously in their work? Could I then claim they're not getting good intelligence?


Again, no one is disputing whether there have been individuals or groups inside the US intelligence community who may have been aware of this.

But the fact that such information had apparently not reached high levels of govt or defence officials as evidenced by Gates' completely incorrect statement in 2009 means we do not have evidence that individuals at high levels of service or govt were aware of J-XX in the capacity that at least we had been.
Explained above.

There is another interesting thing to note. Gates spent 26 years in the CIA and was Director of Central Intelligence in the '90s, which makes it even more unlikely he would disregard the importance of intelligence.

We also know that the USAF top's generals opposed cutting F-22 numbers. Does that mean they were realistic about the J-20? Wouldn't they have told Gates about it in the discussions they must have had to make this huge decision? Actually, it's almost guaranteed such decisions are made after considering complex projections about each available scenario and involve dozens, if not hundreds of people, which again reduces the likelihood of it all coming down to Gates not reading some briefings close to zero.


It doesn't necessarily have to be a 4.5 generation fighter -- but the lack of description of it as a 5th generation fighter, or one intended to compete with the F-22, or even the term "VLO" means we cannot reasonably assume that in 1997 they believed China was intending to develop such a fighter.

Again, refer to the service level/govt level argument above.

They also could have used other terms such as "very low observable" which in 1997 should have already been in circulation for the understanding of what a 5th generation fighter would be seeking to achieve.

In hindsight it's absolutely possible to think they could have been referring to a 5th generation fighter, but in 1997 do you think it would have been reasonable to interpret that from how vague their statement is? Absolutely not in my opinion.
I have already stated that anyone reading the ONI report without having made their mind up first would understand they are talking about a fifth-generation fighter (or next-generation, where they clearly state the J-10 represents the current, fourth-generation).

But again, nobody has to take my word for it. Let's take a look at how people understood it at the time.

First, we have Fisher's article from 2001.
Future combat aircraft. Since the late 1990s there has been speculation about the PLA’s next-generation combat aircraft, referred to by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence in 1997 as the “XXJ.
He clearly thinks they are referring to a next-generation fighter.

Then we have
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, apparently the result of someone's hobby, that was last updated in 2002.
China's Jian-12 or J-12 (F-12 for foreign markets) is 5th generation multirole jet due to fly by 2012 and enter service by 2015. It has been codenamed XXJ by US's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).
So this is another person (writing as close in time to the original report as available) who understood they were describing a fifth-generation fighter.

By now, insisting that they were somehow too vague is veering into dishonesty.


Secdef Gates, 2009, Chicago Economic Club. "Handful of 5th generation fighters only by 2025". Of course, if we accept that the statements from high level US govt and military officials no longer carry any water, then why are we even having this discussion in the first place?

We can just wave our hands and say nothing matters.
Can we agree the context, intention, audience and occasion on which statements are made influence how much importance they should be accorded?



This is not an issue of double standards -- the arguments and premises that we are raising did not just magically arrive out of nowhere.

I'm not sure how new you are to PLA watching, but I've been doing this for over a decade now, and I've consumed US govt and military declassified reports on PLA developments this whole time -- initially because I imagined they must surely be the ones who are most on top of new PLA developments -- but now I read them because I want to see how far behind their reports are from the leading edge of OSINT PLA watching.


I'm not badmouthing the ability of the US to gather raw intelligence -- again, see my definition of what I mean by "US intelligence" ("whether that information would have been adequately conveyed to the sufficient high levels of US govt and military responsible for the US to actually conduct actions (i.e.: procurement and strategy) in response to new intelligence is another matter. So when I speak of the "US" or "US intelligence" this is what I refer to.") -- but I am criticizing the way in which that intelligence does not seem to have reached their govt officials and high level service officers, including the open declassified reports that the US govt and military releases.
There are few if any occasions I can think of when they had managed to pre-empt the PLA watching community on a new weapons development programme.


To say that the PLA's weapons developments tend to exceed US (public/declassified) estimates and projections, and to say that the US estimates and projections and statements tend to underestimate PLA weapons developments is not praising China at the US's expense. It is a reflection of what we have been able to see over the course of a decade of unveiling new ships, aircraft, and other systems.
I hope you're able to agree that any reports are not made with you in mind, i.e. they don't seek to fulfill your expectations or give you more information than what's already out there. For example, in the case of the annual DOD report the fact the J-20 was only mentioned after its first flight in 2011 to me clearly reads like a choice to focus on present developments, in line with the general absence of detailed projections or other discussions of the future. The same goes for many publicly available reports: they limit what they say by choice, not because they couldn't do any better.

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: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress has this to say about its sources:
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China, 2015 and 2009 reports on China’s navy from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), published reference sources such as IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, and press reports.

Also, if there are declassified (not ones that were always public) reports that show US intelligence actually being behind the curve compared to "the leading edge of OSINT PLA watching", do post them. It's hard to take people's word for it when it sounds very improbable and sources aren't provided.

Actually, it seems to me that the results of serious intelligence gathering (spying, hacking) wouldn't be declassified for decades in order not to reveal what one knows and one's methods and sources.
 
around the turn of the 20th century the US planners were full of stuff of the type then coming out of
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so even if the CIA had had a credible info about the Chinese buildup,

who in the Pentagon would've done anything about
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; F-35 A+B+C; the USN vessels "revolutionizing naval warfare" etc. huh?

later they couldn't throw enough money at "transformational" projects (because of the wars they fought, in case you didn' know), so we may fast-forward to now

I'm saying this also because when I was leaving the US (in the end of 2002), I purchased some Pentagon-made brochure for ten bucks (great value for $9.99, glossy paper, colorful), sounding like a sci-fi but at that time the content was seriously meant (formations of the Zumwalts prowling the Oceans etc. etc.), LOL I even kinda believed that: the US was on top
 

jobjed

Captain
I guess if you don't have an argument, it's time for insults.

Don't flatter yourself, mate. Your being unable to register my arguments does not mean I didn't present any.


I hope you read what I wrote, specifically in what context Gates was speaking and what his aim was. He was a politician and the budget getting passed was the number one priority

I claim it's quite likely that he found it more convenient and effective to say China will have no fifth-generation fighters by 2020 than having to explain they will have about fifty, while the USA will still have a massive numbers advantage.

Also, his statement is qualitatively similar to the ones the heads of USAF and IAF made (separately) about the J-20, where they essentially said that they're not concerned and downplayed it's importance. If people can accept that's basically what they had to say, even if it's not true, why can't they accept Gates had to (or chose to) lie on the job when he downplayed the timelines of the J-20?

Or, for example, if China's minister of defense or head of the air force are asked about the proliferation of the F-35 around China and say they're not concerned at all, does them not taking the F-35 seriously in that statement mean they're not taking it seriously in their work? Could I then claim they're not getting good intelligence?

In other words, he and everyone whose perspectives went into deciding what the budget was collectively concluded there was no point continuing F-22 production to counter the PLA 5th generation fighter. The reason Gates gave was "China will have no 5th generation fighters until 2020", which you believe were the words of a lying politician and in actuality, he would've known quite accurately what stage the JXX project would've been at, what capabilities it would've had, and how many would've entered service by 2020.

So what's your theory? He understood the effects of JXX and knowingly elected to compromise his military's ability to counter those effects? Or do you believe the F-35 is a better counter to the J-20 than an F-22 with F-35-level upgrades?


There is another interesting thing to note. Gates spent 26 years in the CIA and was Director of Central Intelligence in the '90s, which makes it even more unlikely he would disregard the importance of intelligence.

We also know that the USAF top's generals opposed cutting F-22 numbers. Does that mean they were realistic about the J-20? Wouldn't they have told Gates about it in the discussions they must have had to make this huge decision? Actually, it's almost guaranteed such decisions are made after considering complex projections about each available scenario and involve dozens, if not hundreds of people, which again reduces the likelihood of it all coming down to Gates not reading some briefings close to zero.

My point exactly. Gates didn't disregard intelligence that made it into his report, he didn't get any in the first place.

Had he actually known what the J-20 would've become, how soon before it became it, and how many many of it there would be, F-22 numbers would be far higher than 187 and likely still be in production today equipped with APG-77(V)1, IRST for which it was designed for but not with, and other auxiliaries that were dispensed with at the end of the Cold War.

I have already stated that anyone reading the ONI report without having made their mind up first would understand they are talking about a fifth-generation fighter (or next-generation, where they clearly state the J-10 represents the current, fourth-generation).

But again, nobody has to take my word for it. Let's take a look at how people understood it at the time.

First, we have Fisher's article from 2001.

He clearly thinks they are referring to a next-generation fighter.

Then we have
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, apparently the result of someone's hobby, that was last updated in 2002.

So this is another person (writing as close in time to the original report as available) who understood they were describing a fifth-generation fighter.

By now, insisting that they were somehow too vague is veering into dishonesty.

Can we agree the context, intention, audience and occasion on which statements are made influence how much importance they should be accorded?

I hope you're able to agree that any reports are not made with you in mind, i.e. they don't seek to fulfill your expectations or give you more information than what's already out there. For example, in the case of the annual DOD report the fact the J-20 was only mentioned after its first flight in 2011 to me clearly reads like a choice to focus on present developments, in line with the general absence of detailed projections or other discussions of the future. The same goes for many publicly available reports: they limit what they say by choice, not because they couldn't do any better.

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: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress has this to say about its sources:


Also, if there are declassified (not ones that were always public) reports that show US intelligence actually being behind the curve compared to "the leading edge of OSINT PLA watching", do post them. It's hard to take people's word for it when it sounds very improbable and sources aren't provided.

Actually, it seems to me that the results of serious intelligence gathering (spying, hacking) wouldn't be declassified for decades in order not to reveal what one knows and one's methods and sources.

Despite everything you've said, the F-22's not coming back.

I believe that's the fault of US intelligence services who failed to appreciate what the J-20 was to become.
 

Blitzo

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I hope you read what I wrote, specifically in what context Gates was speaking and what his aim was. He was a politician and the budget getting passed was the number one priority in that moment for him and his boss, the president. That politicians sometimes lie is not some unheard of idea that I just made up.

I claim it's quite likely that he found it more convenient and effective to say China will have no fifth-generation fighters by 2020 than having to explain they will have about fifty, while the USA will still have a massive numbers advantage.

Also, his statement is qualitatively similar to the ones the heads of USAF and IAF made (separately) about the J-20, where they essentially said that they're not concerned and downplayed it's importance. If people can accept that's basically what they had to say, even if it's not true, why can't they accept Gates had to (or chose to) lie on the job when he downplayed the timelines of the J-20?

Or, for example, if China's minister of defense or head of the air force are asked about the proliferation of the F-35 around China and say they're not concerned at all, does them not taking the F-35 seriously in that statement mean they're not taking it seriously in their work? Could I then claim they're not getting good intelligence?

Whether Gates was "concerned" or not about Chinese stealth programmes is not what I'm challenging, it was his quantitative statement about China only possessing a handful of stealth fighters by 2025 which I am challenging as a lie.

If the Chinese Minister of Defence made a statement in 2009 about USAF F-35 quantity that ended up being off by seven years then I would absolutely agree that they were either being fed bad intelligence or there was a significant compromise in the ability to share raw information up the food chain.





Explained above.

There is another interesting thing to note. Gates spent 26 years in the CIA and was Director of Central Intelligence in the '90s, which makes it even more unlikely he would disregard the importance of intelligence.

Experience is not the same as wisdom.

Regardless, he got his numbers quantitatively wrong, off by seven years.

You can either explain that he was deliberately knowingly lying, in which case



We also know that the USAF top's generals opposed cutting F-22 numbers. Does that mean they were realistic about the J-20? Wouldn't they have told Gates about it in the discussions they must have had to make this huge decision? Actually, it's almost guaranteed such decisions are made after considering complex projections about each available scenario and involve dozens, if not hundreds of people, which again reduces the likelihood of it all coming down to Gates not reading some briefings close to zero.

See above.



I have already stated that anyone reading the ONI report without having made their mind up first would understand they are talking about a fifth-generation fighter (or next-generation, where they clearly state the J-10 represents the current, fourth-generation).

Reading it in 1999 I earnestly believe it would have been unreasonable to assume that they were talking about a 5th generation fighter.



But again, nobody has to take my word for it. Let's take a look at how people understood it at the time.

First, we have Fisher's article from 2001.

He clearly thinks they are referring to a next-generation fighter.

Clearly derived from the ONI report. "Next generation fighter" -- not 5th generation fighter.

Richard Fisher was definitely one of the better China watchers in the 2000s, but it was only later in the decade that he explicitly described the XXJ/J-XX as a 5th generation aircraft.



Then we have
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, apparently the result of someone's hobby, that was last updated in 2002.

So this is another person (writing as close in time to the original report as available) who understood they were describing a fifth-generation fighter.

By now, insisting that they were somehow too vague is veering into dishonesty.

In that case I maintain that their interpretation of the ONI report was either flawed, or influenced by the illustrations of the "F-22 like" fighters with PLAAF insignias from the Flight Global article or otherwise.

Let's put it this way -- if the original ONI report had also shown a "next generation fighter" image that featured one of the two drawings shown on that page of what was clearly a 5th generation fighter, then I'll happily concede this particular point.



Can we agree the context, intention, audience and occasion on which statements are made influence how much importance they should be accorded?

There is a difference between making an emphasis on one point and de-emphasizing another, versus making a prediction that is quantitatively off by seven years.




I hope you're able to agree that any reports are not made with you in mind, i.e. they don't seek to fulfill your expectations or give you more information than what's already out there. For example, in the case of the annual DOD report the fact the J-20 was only mentioned after its first flight in 2011 to me clearly reads like a choice to focus on present developments, in line with the general absence of detailed projections or other discussions of the future. The same goes for many publicly available reports: they limit what they say by choice, not because they couldn't do any better.

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: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress has this to say about its sources:

Or maybe it only hit the top brass on the head that J-20 was actually real after it was revealed.

By now I think what we are really debating whether the public/declassified reports on the PLA are the standard of intelligence about PLA developments that end up making it to high levels of US govt leaders and military officers.

Let me repeat that I absolutely agree that there would have been US intelligence operatives and groups that would have gotten accurate readings of Chinese weapons developments.

But the reason why I hold such importance on the relationship between what US govt leaders and military officials reveal openly in public/declassified, is because US defence procurement and strategy is one which is debated by elected representatives, and debates would be informed by the basis of what is understood about the developments of US strategic competitors.



Also, if there are declassified (not ones that were always public) reports that show US intelligence actually being behind the curve compared to "the leading edge of OSINT PLA watching", do post them. It's hard to take people's word for it when it sounds very improbable and sources aren't provided.

When I used the term "declassified reports" I meant reports that were "never classified" or "not classified". (or perhaps "unclassified"? In any case I am not referring to reports that were once "classified" and became "declassified")
AKA the same ones you describe as open source, public etc.



Actually, it seems to me that the results of serious intelligence gathering (spying, hacking) wouldn't be declassified for decades in order not to reveal what one knows and one's methods and sources.
 
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