Rand Report

A most bizarre report.



RAND Corporation Lobbies The Pentagon To Start New War To Save U.S. Economy PDF Print E-mail
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Saturday, 01 November 2008 19:24

Shocking proposal urges military leaders to attack major foreign power.

According to reports out of top Chinese mainstream news outlets, the RAND Corporation recently presented a shocking proposal to the Pentagon in which it lobbied for a war to be started with a major foreign power in an attempt to stimulate the American economy and prevent a recession.

A fierce debate has now ensued in China about who that foreign power may be, with China itself as well as Russia and even Japan suspected to be the targets of aggression.

The reports cite French media news sources as having uncovered the proposal, in which RAND suggested that the $700 billion dollars that has been earmarked to bailout Wall Street and failing banks instead be used to finance a new war which would in turn re-invigorate the flagging stock markets.

The RAND Corporation is a notoriously powerful NGO with deep ties to the U.S. military-industrial complex as well as interlocking connections with the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations.

Current directors of RAND include Frank Charles Carlucci III, former Defense Secretary and Deputy Director of the CIA, Ronald L. Olson, Council on Foreign Relations luminary and former Secretary of Labor, and Carl Bildt, top Bilderberg member and former Swedish Prime Minister.

Carlucci was chairman of the Carlyle Group from 1989-2005 and oversaw gargantuan profits the defense contractor made in the aftermath of 9/11 following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Carlyle Group has also received investment money from the Bin Laden family.

Reportedly, the RAND proposal brazenly urged that a new war could be launched to benefit the economy, but stressed that the target country would have to be a major influential power, and not a smaller country on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq.

The reports have prompted a surge of public debate and tension in China about the possibility that a new global conflict is on the horizon.

China’s biggest media outlet, Sohu, speculated that the target of the new war would probably be China or Russia, but that it could also be Iran or another middle eastern country. Japan was also mentioned as a potential target for the reason that Japan holds the most U.S. debt.

North Korea was considered as a target but ruled out because the scale of such a war would not be large enough for RAND’s requirements.

The reported RAND proposal dovetails with recent comments made by Joe Biden, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright and others, concerning the “guarantee” that Barack Obama will face a major “international crisis” soon after taking office.

It also arrives following a warning from Michael Bayer, chairman of a key Pentagon advisory panel, who echoed the statement that the next administration will face an international crisis within months of taking office.

One would hope that good people, or at least sane people who don’t wish to start a global nuclear war, will oppose the RAND proposal, such as top the military generals who threatened to quit if Bush ordered an attack on Iran. Admiral William Fallon, the head of US Central Command, quit in March last year as a result of his opposition to Bush administration policy on Iran.

It's more like forcing the Chinese to operate AWAY from their defences than the Chinese being on the defensive; by forcing the PLAAF to fly OVER Taiwan to engage the USN, you can pick the Chinese off very quickly by carefully manuevering forces into position into traps with both aircraft and SAM's.

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Real PLA commanders are not as incompetent as the AI on a simulator.... what you are describing is a completely one-sided scenario in which one side has all the initiative while the other is forced to only respond. First off, the PLAN/PLAAF do not have to attack the USN. There is no reason for PLAAF aircraft to even venture very far into Taiwan at all; most of the ROCAF can be engaged off the Taiwanese coast. For actual air strikes the USN/ROCAF will have very little response time since it will be near impossible to tell strike packages apart from CAPs. And while the USN is protected by the island of Taiwan, and AEGIs, so is the PLAN. Although the PLAN might not have as much as organize air defense assets as CVGs, they also enjoy land-based SAM coverage. Any competent commander knows to avoid attacking the enemy's strongpoints. The PLA cannot overcome the USN's superiority directly but they do not have to in order to accomplish their objectives.

Since we're heading into who plashes whom a bit. I think the main point can be put as: We agree (?) that taking Taiwan would still require a high intensity campaign over quiet some time.
Now the question is can and outside force, the US in this case, infringe enough on the capabilities needed to support that campaign, that the level of intensity becomes impossible to sustain long enough.
The RAND guys seem to have some doubts over the USAF part on that.

Regarding sortie rate. Since the Aera of Ops is roughly 600-850km away from Kadena, transit time (forth and back) would be around 1:30h - 2:10h (?) with two times AAR. On station time I assume to be around 1h, but that greatly depends on how often aircraft there have to engage the afterburner.
Now the question is what would be the average turn around time per A/C on base? Normally a crew should be able to rearm, refuel and quick check an A/C in one hour, but how long could such a pace be maintained until longer inspections have to be made and repairs are necessary?
E.g. assuming two hours would mean one A/C on station for four on transit or turn around.
And how much A/C could Kadena, or Guam for that matter, actually handle in a surge status, when it's fully operational or degraded to some extent.
The number of variables already skyrockets again.

From Guam btw distance is already between 2.700 and 2.800km. Transit time would be around 6:30h. Perhaps 4:30h when supercruising.

This also raises another question with me. Would a bigger number of Raptors be of much help? I mean once the bases in the area are full, they're full. Additional Raptors could only replace lost once. If of course Japan and SK bases would be available, that would change as well.
That leaves us with the navy. 11 super carriers, but only 10 wings. Then again, the new LHAs with -B Lightning IIs would also be an option.

Roger604 said:

If they were not pinged, they would know that they are undiscovered.

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Well, that is clearly wrong. You don't need to use active sonar on a sub to detect it. Hydophones picking up the noise produced by the sub are enough. And since this method is passive, the other one never knows if he was detected or not.
It's the same principle as using IRST instead of radar in air warfare.
You may well be right with your assertion, but given the lack of proper, specific info, it's as plausible as it is implausible.

From Guam btw distance is already between 2.700 and 2.800km. Transit time would be around 6:30h. Perhaps 4:30h when supercruising.

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A plane flight from Guam to Manila, Philippines takes 3.5 hours, and a plane flight from Guam to Tokyo takes 3 hours. I'm talking commercial civil airliners and regular flights.

Distances of cities relative to Guam.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Real PLA commanders are not as incompetent as the AI on a simulator.... what you are describing is a completely one-sided scenario in which one side has all the initiative while the other is forced to only respond. First off, the PLAN/PLAAF do not have to attack the USN. There is no reason for PLAAF aircraft to even venture very far into Taiwan at all; most of the ROCAF can be engaged off the Taiwanese coast. For actual air strikes the USN/ROCAF will have very little response time since it will be near impossible to tell strike packages apart from CAPs. And while the USN is protected by the island of Taiwan, and AEGIs, so is the PLAN. Although the PLAN might not have as much as organize air defense assets as CVGs, they also enjoy land-based SAM coverage. Any competent commander knows to avoid attacking the enemy's strongpoints. The PLA cannot overcome the USN's superiority directly but they do not have to in order to accomplish their objectives.

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The problem is that historically, in order to successfully launch an invasion, air superiority must be gained by the attacker. If the attacker fails to gain complete air superiority, then you have disasters such as the Dieppe Raid. Even with today's technology, this rings true.

Also, SAM's become LESS effective the further out you get from the launcher. There is more time for detection of a missile launch, and more time to react to a launch. Any intelligent commander will try to draw the enemy towards their launchers; and for the Chinese, time is not on their side. The longer their operation takes, there is a decreasing likely hood of success.

SampanViking said:

You know SeaDog, this is precisely why I have a serious problem with the type of picture you are trying to paint for me. What you call a "set of circumstances" I deal with on a regular basis under the heading of "Sensitivity Analysis".

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I'm not painting any picture for you. I understand variation being used to quantify results and how they're used. And most certainly, it is applied here. However what you're not understanding is RAND is setting a scenario to address a specific set of concern to USAF planners. And it simply does not account for battlespace preparation. Nor does it account for variation in PLAAF combat readiness deficiencies. Thusly, the variation used in sensitivity analysis as applied to any total scenario is not complete. This RAND report is not addressing this from a total scenario standpoint. If they did, the F-22's uses would be quantified much differently. And they wouldn't be able to address whatever it was USAF planners were looking for. Any USAF General who looked at this report would understand that the context of this report doesn't account for these things.

crobato said:

Well I can certainly give you Putin's opinion on it. He would consider it an outright nuclear attack. That already removes the most likely rationale and scenario for the system as a "safe" system.

This is not the only place where comments are made about it. Among different sites, I find the overall opinion to be negative.

A good comment to describe it is using an 18 wheeler truck to deliver a pizza.

Lets also put it this way. The Navy wants $250 million over for "research and development". That's not even making a single missile yet. Now tell me how is that $250 million going to be spent and to whose pockets its going?

The Trident cost $30 million to build during the Cold War. What its going to cost now, over $100 million? To deliver a 1 ton warload? That's like expending an F-35 for one way trip each.

Another problem is targeting.

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You only ever argue merits of the system crobato. Been there, done that. We do have the capability to upgrade to this standard, and screaming about the merits doesn't change that. There are however a number of naval leaders who disagree with you on those merits and viability of this system. It's obvious as they continue working the issue in FY09. I do know they know alot better than the average internet forum poster.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Real PLA commanders are not as incompetent as the AI on a simulator.... what you are describing is a completely one-sided scenario in which one side has all the initiative while the other is forced to only respond. First off, the PLAN/PLAAF do not have to attack the USN. There is no reason for PLAAF aircraft to even venture very far into Taiwan at all; most of the ROCAF can be engaged off the Taiwanese coast. For actual air strikes the USN/ROCAF will have very little response time since it will be near impossible to tell strike packages apart from CAPs. And while the USN is protected by the island of Taiwan, and AEGIs, so is the PLAN. Although the PLAN might not have as much as organize air defense assets as CVGs, they also enjoy land-based SAM coverage. Any competent commander knows to avoid attacking the enemy's strongpoints. The PLA cannot overcome the USN's superiority directly but they do not have to in order to accomplish their objectives.

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PLA commanders have absolutely no real battlefield experience. They have no idea what to expect. I have no doubts that they are highly trained, but their effectiveness in a real scenario has not been tested or evaluated.
Much of what you write here is a big "IF". I think it will all depend on how the US would go about preparing the battlespace. And how effective they can spread PLA resources in theater. There is simply no way China will be able to adequately defend their many resources used to generate sufficient air sorties over time. Nor do they have enough SAM's to defend everything.....everywhere. If we were able to degrade or suppress even a small to moderate percentage of SAM's, you begin to create gaps and spread resources. That's when your cruise missile strike potential makes huge gains. We wouldn't have to take down the entire network of SAM coverage. You simply would need to create gaps. Some of the things China would need to defend would be naval logistics and bases. Alot of targets there, and a large effort to defend is needed. The potential to destroy PLAN naval potential lies here. And it will be pursued. Resources needed to generate sufficient air sorties would also need a large defense as there are many factors needed to support air sorties. Fuel one of the most important. You're not going to stop the dwindling of this resource, or the persistent attacks on this vital resource. Command and control facilities of which there are many would also need a large defense to prevent losses and gaps in command structure. And many more resources would have to be expended to defend many more assets. And there is alot more potential there to degrade a defending Chinese force. China will use an immense amount of defense resources to defend these resources and they would see losses. And they could not prevent us from mining their naval forces from the battlespace, or mining their naval forces from their logistics. This also limits movements of their surviving surface and submarine fleet, or at least has the potential to greatly slow them down. If this is the case, they seriously would not be able to achieve their major objective which is the invasion and holding of Taiwan. And launching ballistic missiles at Japan and South Korea would only further complicate matters for China. The best defense for China is don't invade Taiwan.

The PLA enjoys overwhelming superiority on the ground in every category- training, readiness, numerical advantage, qualitative advantage, so I beleive air superiority is not necessary for the duration of the invasion. If they can expand their sealift capabilities in the next few years, then air superiority will only be necessary for the first 48-72 hours of the operation in order to support the landing force and to attack Taiwanese air and air defense assets. Afterwards I can envision the PLAAF settling into more of an air denial role and air support role where their primary missions will be to deny access to the immediate airspace over Taiwan as well as launch their longer ranged PGMs... much like the USN could possibly do with their JSSMs and JDAMs.

And they could not prevent us from mining their naval forces from the battlespace, or mining their naval forces from their logistics. This also limits movements of their submarine fleet, or at least has the potential to greatly slow them down.

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How are these naval bases going to be mined? By stealth bombers? i hope you don't make me laugh by saying submarines...

FriedRiceNSpice said:

The PLA enjoys overwhelming superiority on the ground in every category- training, readiness, numerical advantage, qualitative advantage, so I beleive air superiority is not necessary for the duration of the invasion. If they can expand their sealift capabilities in the next few years, then air superiority will only be necessary for the first 48-72 hours of the operation in order to support the landing force and to attack Taiwanese air and air defense assets. Afterwards I can envision the PLAAF settling into more of an air denial role and air support role where their primary missions will be to deny access to the immediate airspace over Taiwan as well as launch their longer ranged PGMs... much like the USN could possibly do with their JSSMs and JDAMs.

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They simply would not be able to persist in an offensive posture. If they did, they couldn't defend their war-making resources. And you're arguing the line of gaining capability in the next few years regarding sealift. Right now, I assume you do acknowledge they don't have enough sealift capability to deploy adequate numbers quickly enough in theater. But adding more won't do alot of good anyway. I hope you realize that they're not going to be able to hide any of this. And consolidating invasion forces like this would open it all up for at least preemptively deploying assets to repel them. Or if necessary potentially attacking it prior to successfully landing. As said before, how we prepare the battlespace will determine alot of action. If prepared correctly, it may never come to any missiles flying. Or it could come to an invasion force which would regrettably lead to major decisions and actions being taken against major Chinese war-making resources. And the targeting of war-sustaining industries including support. China would be the defender in this scenario. There is no question about it. Right now, they have nothing militarily that shows anything different. The thing they do have that gives me pause is their diesel submarine fleet. They have a great capability there to threaten choke points in the littorals with those. But then again, I addressed how this can be degraded over time in another post on this topic.

How are these naval bases going to be mined? By stealth bombers? i hope you don't make me laugh by saying submarines...

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I have a good idea how they would go about it, but I wouldn't say how I believe they would do this on an internet forum. But it would get done. Although I would say more than one type of platform would be used. Also more than one type of mine would be used.

If they did, they couldn't defend their war-making resources.

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The need to deploy in depth as to protect their more important assets on their side of the strait- i.e. air bases, military infrastructure, vital c4 assets. Fighters loitering over the strait will retain the ability to selectively engage enemy strike packages.

Right now, I assume you do acknowledge they don't have enough sealift capability to deploy adequate numbers quickly enough in theater.

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Yes, that was implied in my statement.

I hope you realize that they're not going to be able to hide any of this. And consolidating invasion forces like this would open it all up for at least preemptively deploying assets to repel them.

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It will take the PLA less time to assemble their assets than the USN due to distance/proximity.

And the targeting of war-sustaining industries including support.

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How do you define war-sustaining industries? It will lead to a war that the US will be unwilling to fight.

I have a good idea how they would go about it, but I wouldn't say how I believe they would do this on an internet forum.

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Why's that?


I would also like to ask what the time frame of all these scenarios we are discussing is. The RAND report gave the year 2020 and in many of the arguments we are discussing current capabilities. A scenario 5 years down the road will be very different than one today. One in 2020 will be even more different.

Furthermore for any scenario to be discussed with any meaning we have to take into the account the circumstances leading up to it as well as the scope of US intervention. It makes a big difference on how/if Taiwan does anything to provoke the conflict, as well as other factors that could determine to what degree the US will be willing to help. However we cant really look into those factors since they dwell too close to the ream of politics.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

The need to deploy in depth as to protect their more important assets on their side of the strait- i.e. air bases, military infrastructure, vital c4 assets. Fighters loitering over the strait will retain the ability to selectively engage enemy strike packages.

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Oh yeah? How are they going to sustain the type of support they would need to secure the air over the Taiwan battlespace with enough strength to ensure total air superiority. Especially when they start dwindling fighters through attrition, and their fuel supplies themselves start depleting through use and loss by attacks.

It will take the PLA less time to assemble their assets than the USN due to distance/proximity.

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It would take no time to strike assembled assets if necessary as we have submarines and surface ships carrying cruise missiles in the Western Pacific today. Not only that, we also have forward deployed assets in forward bases. And we can strike with air assets from the continental US in less than a day. And we have the means to mine alot of these areas of operations in pretty short order as well. The real answer is, can China sustain any invasion if they are busy and dwindling their own assets defending their war-making resources. We have the ability and reach to put them in the cross-hairs. The answer is, they have nothing to prevent us from targeting and eliminating their most vital war supporting resources. And they simply couldn't launch an invasion fast enough, nor could they sustain it very long with major intervention being brought on the scene in a certain amount of time.

How do you define war-sustaining industries? It will lead to a war that the US will be unwilling to fight.

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Don't underestimate the US. If we're talking war, you can bet anything that is supporting Chinese war efforts can and will be targeted. I don't think you understand how war is fought. And what the objectives would be here. You have no idea what the contingency plan is for a scenario like this. Nor do you understand the implications of allowing China the ability to wantonly wage war and light East Asia on fire with impunity. You think we'd fight China like Iraq? Or not at all? That is very laughable FR&S. While the US doesn't exactly want this scenario to play out, don't assume they wouldn't commit to it. If China was sane, and I think their leadership is very cautious and rationale indeed, they shouldn't want this type of war either. They should know that this kind of underestimation of US will has been at the detriment historically for those who have made the mistake. I can't trust they understand this. As such, we should continue to watch the Chinese leadership very carefully in the future.

I would also like to ask what the time frame of all these scenarios we are discussing is. The RAND report gave the year 2020 and in many of the arguments we are discussing current capabilities. A scenario 5 years down the road will be very different than one today. One in 2020 will be even more different.

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Well, I don't see much change in the larger picture by 2020. That's larger picture I'm talking about. I believe China will have a new generation fighter deployed and such. But it's hard to see if their own resource situation changes in any large way to change anything significantly. And this RAND report doesn't address that as well.

Furthermore for any scenario to be discussed with any meaning we have to take into the account the circumstances leading up to it as well as the scope of US intervention. It makes a big difference on how/if Taiwan does anything to provoke the conflict, as well as other factors that could determine to what degree the US will be willing to help. However we cant really look into those factors since they dwell too close to the ream of politics.

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Well that's true. Taiwan could do things to lessen US intervention. Taiwan knows how that situation works though. So I'm not too concerned about that. Not talking politically, but the US sees status quo, or peaceful integration as the only way. Crazy Chinese invasion scenarios are out of the question.