Rand Report

Roger604

Senior Member
My feeling is that this report is a moot issue. PLA has already achieved "critical mass" in terms of its development. It's impossible to put the genie back in the bottle now. China is no more than a generation or a half generation behind the US in areas of military technology important to it.

There simply is no mass cruise missile strategy or B-2 bombing strategy available. China simply has a far far greater anti-air assets. It's far too good at concealment, movement, entrenchment and dispersion for any feasible attack to really hurt. Its radars are far too advanced to be vulnerable to B-2.

China's only real vulnerability is an energy embargo from more than 2,000 km away.

The future doesn't look good for US funding for ever more expensive programs either. It doesn't look like a soft landing is possible, but a sharp crash is in the cards.
 

Sea Dog

Junior Member
VIP Professional
My feeling is that this report is a moot issue. PLA has already achieved "critical mass" in terms of its development. It's impossible to put the genie back in the bottle now. China is no more than a generation or a half generation behind the US in areas of military technology important to it.

There simply is no mass cruise missile strategy or B-2 bombing strategy available. China simply has a far far greater anti-air assets. It's far too good at concealment, movement, entrenchment and dispersion for any feasible attack to really hurt. Its radars are far too advanced to be vulnerable to B-2.

China's only real vulnerability is an energy embargo from more than 2,000 km away.

The future doesn't look good for US funding for ever more expensive programs either. It doesn't look like a soft landing is possible, but a sharp crash is in the cards.

Actually, China has not caught up in any significant means to prevent a land strike counter offensive against it's most vital war making capacities. They still don't even have a viable and consistent surface fleet(Although ships like 054A FFG are great designs), no mobile naval air platforms, very few nuclear submarines with questionable quality in their builds, and while PLAAF has advanced greatly(J-10, more advanced Flanker type, good missiles) it is still lagging in our current 4th generation in missiles and sensors. The US currently has the means to deploy mass strike assets using limited platforms. Less than 20 total can deliver over 700 cruise missiles alone. Because China's war-making capabilities are largely in fixed sites, are highly immobile, and are largely exposed, cannot be adequately defended, there is simply no means to prevent a cruise missile strike from acheiving it's major objectives. Which is seriously under-cutting China's ability to sustain any major war effort in the Far East. And B-2 strikes are another challenge for China. We've become very familiar from the early 2000's how the S-300's work. The B-2's absolutely do have their place in setting up the battlespace for major offensives. Yet, they are not a total solution in and of themselves. Those strikes are also limited in application but can have a major impact if executed properly. And China has no "magic" radars that will give it any serious advantages over B-2's inherent strengths. Another talking point from Chinese bbs. That's all it is. There is no substantial proof of anything contrary. We got some pretty stellar radars ourselves, and guess what, the USAF is extremely confident in the B-2 to conduct it's mission successfully. And concealment, movement and such have their own limitations in regards to how things are actually deployed. Hiding your stuff and keeping them on the move ensures they're inadequately used. If things are coordinated correctly, it will be hard for Chinese land units to find any acceptable balances. Also, China is vulnerable from being cut off from major resources. But their bigger problem lies in their inability to defend major portions of their military infrastructure at sea. And their vulnerability against mine warfare. I'm also not concerned about taking out PLAAF forward airfields, and fuel supplies. Anything basically to prevent a sustained sortie generation capability for aircraft is a targeted given. Almost impossible to conceal those things. Nor is my concern in placing the PLA into a defensive posture from a potential offensive starting point. That's nothing critical either. My major concern is China starting a war in the Far East in the first place.

And I wouldn't talk about economic issues too much. I agree there are funding problems currently here. And major economic concerns in general. It won't last forever though. And much of our infrastructure to conduct large scale war efforts are in place and viable. And we're still at a point that China can't really grow much without access to major Western markets, and are still pretty reliant on growth using technologies developed from the West. Although we need them as well. But if we go down, it's looking like a ripple effect that will have adverse effects on China as well. I'm not exactly hoping for China or the USA to tank. Not good for either side.

SampanViking said:
The point of the Rand report is to illustrate that US Strategic Policy of being able to fight/win very high intensity but also very short wars by overwhelming numerical and technological advantage is seriously flawed when faced with an adversary of moderate technological development and strategic depth.

That's not what they're saying at all. They simply don't outline anything strategically, because it doesn't fit into their narrow subset of concern to USAF planners. They are not war-gaming in their report in any way. This is totally like their Sovremenny case. And you're interpreting this one exactly the same way. What they are saying is that in the context of their report, barring any battlespace preparation, that these set of circumstances are feasible. It in no way outlines strategy of any kind. Nor does it say anything regarding providing numerically large firepower potential, or any strategy that deals with a longer term scenario. I don't know how you came up with any type of analysis like that. It's obvious reading RAND reports like this how specific their analysis can become.

They're assuming we will do no battlespace preparation. Sorry to let you down Sampan, but that will be hoping for alot. Just ain't gonna happen this way. And people at RAND know this as well. It would be hard for them to make their point in the report if such assumptions were made. Reports like this actually help the DoD make better decisions.
 
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Totoro

Major
VIP Professional
While i'd certainly agree china can't hope to pull off an invasion of taiwan with the US fully involved, i do believe it would take quite a bit more than a missile strike to achieve that. It'd take proper aircraft strikes, a lot of them, over a fairly long period of time.

Missiles in themselves, be they cruise missiles or ballistic missiles, with multiple warheads, single warheads, submunitions, etc, etc - are not used on their own. Not in a real conflict. It is one thing to fire a few dozen at a factory in africa, at some buildings in afghanistan, etc, etc, but agianst a wide range of military targets such tactic is only a preparation for proper, *sustained* strikes. That can not be stressed enough. Sustained strikes.

Lets imagine china using just their missiles against taiwan. What good would that do? It'd paralize the system for a little while, disrupt communications to a certain extent, and it'd last anywhere from several hours to at worst a day or so. Same thing with air bases. Air operations would be at a pause, until runways get cleared of mines or repaired (which iraqis semi-routinely did in a matter of hours during desert storm) and then sorties would go on.

Command and control centers are not fixed. Neither in taiwan nor in china nor in US. Communication network is a fluid thing. You destroy one comm array, a new one gets erected in a matter of hours or days, depending on the situation. Then there's a whole network of mobile comm assets, on wheels. There are landlines in both us, taiwan and china that could be used for part of the comm needs, which are easely repairable. All that is a fundamental fact which, naturally, can be disputed but then there is no need to have any sort of debate on it, nor will i adress it further. We could only agree to disagree.

That being said, lets move on. Strategic fuel supply for both taiwan and china can be cut off, either with a sustained and systematic blockade or with proper *sustained* strikes. Actually i'd rather use the term "paused". But we need to distinguish strategic fuel supplies on the level of whole country, be it taiwan or china, and tactical fuel supplies. Location of strategic fuel supplies are fairly well known and they're located in a relatively small number of places, each holding vast amounts of fuel in peacetime. Tactical fuel supplies are NOT known to anyone. Sure, intelligence services may get lucky and know where parts of them at a certain time, then lose track, and so on. But in general, those are far too dispersed to be tracked and targeted. By china, taiwan, US or any other country in the world. Sure, some countries are better prepared than other, some will have more tankers, more inflatable fuel holds, etc, etc. Depending on the size of country's armed forces, we could be talking anywhere from hundreds to tens of thousands of various smaller fuel holds. Keep in mind, these are not necesarrily all military installations. In fact, most of them would be civilian assets. But rest assured, capitalism, communism or whatewerism, in a state of a serious threat, US, taiwan, china or vatican would put every resource in the country to use for whatever purpose is seen fit. Be it regular diesel fuel, marine diesel, jet kerosine, etc, etc.

China can not hope to paralyze taiwan with missile strikes alone for any more than several hours or perhaps a day or so in certain areas. Same applies for Taiwan striking china, US striking china or china striking US assets on guam or kadena or wherever. Missile strikes are not even close to a permanent solution.

So, to try to cut the story short: I believe if there will ever be a proper US campaign against chinese assets it'd go something like this:

Positioning of needed assets in place, both for strikes and for defense. That means all the ohio SSGNs, (its almost certain not all four would be available at any given time, its more realistic to figure three would be ready for deployment. That doesnt mean US would wait for all three to get in place in order to start the strieks) Positioning of a certain, minimum number of Carrier battlegroups, which could be 2, 3, 5 or whatever number of carriers gets deemed necessary for the given opening missions. Very important, a quite large and potent air defense fleet, courtesy of USN, positioned around Okinawa. Kadena AFB is simply far too crucial to US and no first strike would begin without securing Okinawa. Granted, chinese could choose do a preventive strike against US assets but while that could get them some short term advantage, long term political repercussions would be, in my opinion, far too grave. Even so, a missile strike against kadena, like any other missile strike, would at best render the base inoperational for several days.

Depending on political situation, USAF may or may not use additional bases in the vicinity, except for Kadena and Guam, for fighter strikes. PErhaps with some countries only use of non combat platforms would be negotiated. PErhaps with some only fly overs would be negotiated, etc etc. All this is, even though extremely important, simply impossible to calculate and i'd ask that we all stay out of that topic. It simply can not be known what sort of aid could various neighbouring countries offer to any side in the conflict.

When enough assets are in place, strikes would start. First with various cruise missiles, be they fired from the subs, surface ships, US bombers of various multirole fighters. Depending on the platform and the location of the launch, which are again dependant on the various bases around china, some missiles could only hope to reach certain parts of chinese coastline while others could reach a bit farther inland. Since one wants to mass the attack at key spots and not disperse it, it is very likely coastline and areas nearest to the coastline would be hit with greatest number of such missiles, with only seleceted targets inland being hit as well.

Key would be not only to negate the immediate threat to taiwan, but to try to negate, as much as possible, possible interceptors coming from inland china, against the US aircraft coming in the second wave, shortly after the initial missile strikes.

Number of missiles fired is really not that important, when compared to the aircraft strikes that *must* and *would* follow. One could hope to do considerate damage with a few hundred cruise missiles to 5 airbases, perhaps even covering every square meter with some sort of submunition, in hope to destroy aircraft on the ground. BUT. It is more likely that missile strikes would be used to deny the planes on the ground to get up, as much as possible. (that doesnt mean just hitting the runways) Far less missiles per airbase would be needed for that, meaning more airbases could be hit simultaneously. And then the airplanes would try and hit the actual planes at the base, carrying far more warheads than missile strikes could offer.

B2s werent used on their own even in 1999 against Serbia. They still had fighter cover and they still had jammers aiding them. (of course, not flying right next to them) B2s would certainly not be used on their own against china. Someplace, where applicable, a flight of jammer airplanes would follow them, with their own fighter cover, in addition to a flightl of Raptors protecting the B2s, flying close enough for a quick reaction.

But it really depends on what would be struck. If we're talking about coastline, less cover is needed, perhaps there would indeed be situations where lone B2s could fly. But the moment you cross the coastline, and the deeper you go inland, one can forget about not being spotted, Low RCS or not. I'm not talking about tracking the planes for immediate engagement, but sporadic events of planes being spotted. It doesnt matter how stealthy a plane is, if a radar makes a circle around an object, it is quaranteed to get at least four spikes and four large radar returns. In the real world, there'd be more than four spikes, albeit of different sizes. But the enemy would know someone is out there and they would know the approximate location and path. Now, depending on how good the SEAD/DEAD missions were, the AFB denial strikes were, the enemy might be able to pool enough assets to try for a proper interception or not. But these are details.

In general, by the end of the conflict, one can be sure of the following: chinese navy and chinese fixed navy infrastructure would be more or less obliterated. That chinese air force would be seriously shrunk in size and air force infrastructure close to the coastline would be heavily damaged, with inland infrastructure being selectively targeted and damaged to a certain extent. That chinese army would be more or less intact, save for selected infrastructure points, but that doesnt include the AD network which would, again, be selectively destroyed or shrunk in size, against mostly around selected coastline areas. Percentage wise, a fair portion of air surveillance and AD network would still be operational.

On the other side, a fair number of USN aircraft would be destroyed, be that in dozens or a few hundred. A slightly smaller number of USAF aircraft would be destroyed, including an occasional B2 and F22, but most of them would probably be F15s.

Several USN attack subs might get destroyed and perhaps a couple of USN surface ships. Probably no carriers would be sunk (due to USN not risking them and keeping them in location where they can protect each other and/or be fairly far away from the chinese coastline. USN aviators and F18s would be more expendable.) though one or, at best/worst two may get damaged enough so they'd have to withdraw for repairs.

Please keep in mind that the first several paragraphs are important, the last few with my projected casualties are really insignificant and are here for illustration purposes only. Naturally, they could vary widely. If you're gonna comment, try not to comment on the numbers, comment on something more fundamental. Thank you. :)
 

twodollarss

Banned Idiot
To defeat the Carrier group, all China needs is tons of scramjet missile. I think they don't have one available yet but they will soon. It will make all existing technology obsolete and defenseless.
 

Roger604

Senior Member
So, to try to cut the story short: I believe if there will ever be a proper US campaign against chinese assets it'd go something like this:

Positioning of needed assets in place, both for strikes and for defense. That means all the ohio SSGNs, (its almost certain not all four would be available at any given time, its more realistic to figure three would be ready for deployment. That doesnt mean US would wait for all three to get in place in order to start the strieks) Positioning of a certain, minimum number of Carrier battlegroups, which could be 2, 3, 5 or whatever number of carriers gets deemed necessary for the given opening missions. Very important, a quite large and potent air defense fleet, courtesy of USN, positioned around Okinawa. Kadena AFB is simply far too crucial to US and no first strike would begin without securing Okinawa. Granted, chinese could choose do a preventive strike against US assets but while that could get them some short term advantage, long term political repercussions would be, in my opinion, far too grave. Even so, a missile strike against kadena, like any other missile strike, would at best render the base inoperational for several days.

I think you haven't really considered the impact of the Type 022 fast attack craft and the Yuan subs.

There simply isn't enough time for extensive anti-submarine warfare in a high tempo exchange like you are describing. The Yuan (and later Song subs) are nearly invulnerable in the Asian littorals. Sending nuclear attack subs to try to engage them is a losing exercise. If an SSGN wanders to close to the littorals, chances are it will fall victim to the Yuan too. The Yuan can make sure no subs or surface ships come within at least 1,000 km of the Chinese coastline.

Yuans and Song are quickly mass produceable for China. It can pump them out like sausages.

The same goes for the Type 022 FAC, China can pump them out very quickly. The same goes for their Harpoon-class antiship missiles. Swarms of these things can totally dominate the Asian littorals and make sure no surface ships get within 1,500 km of China.

The adversary's navy would have an extremely tough time trying to do launch any missile salvos. The Type 022's and Yuans are extremely frustrating to the adversary. In a high pitch battle, the PLAN's large surface combatants may be vulnerable, but the Type 022's and Yuans are like mosquitoes and cockroaches..... there's an infinite number of them.
 

crobato

Colonel
VIP Professional
I do know they have improved. But it took a few tries for them to get there as well. I do also applaud them on their manned efforts. The USN did destroy a satellite at a lower orbit which means faster orbital speed and less time in the visible horizon. This was also done from a sea-based mobile system. And did it on the first try with 1 missile. I'm not taking away anything from China's ASAT test. But some perspective needs to be placed.

Sorry, but 250km is what is considered to be space. 205km isn't really in space anymore, and you are talking about a dying orbit. Dying orbit means lower orbital speeds because atmospheric drag is already an issue. Furthermore, the missile is equipped with thermal guidance. Given that the orbit has decayed and atmospheric drag is already a factor, the satellite is also heating up making it easier for thermal guidance. So there is an end game thermal guidance being played here.

For the Chinese ASAT test, while the target is at 865km and slower, the fact that it is much higher means that the missile's escape velocity has to be much higher than that of trying to hit a target at 205km. The total velocities should be between the orbital velocity of the target + the escape velocity of the kill vehicle. At the cold of space, definitely far more difficult by use of thermal guidance especially since the kill was done apparently at the Earth's night side. At 865km that definitely is far from reentry, no atmospheric friction and such. Whether or not its launched from the ground or sea does not matter, you're only talking about the difference of 20 to 30 knots against a vehicle that goes by thousands of miles an hour.

Much of that accuracy has to be achieved using the INS alone. And no, GPS doesn't work on orbits.

Right. However warhead design does have penetration capability not found in some cruise missiles. Both have their advantages. This issue is more complex than you give it credit for.

Yes if you hit a mountain with layers of solid bed rock, it still won't be penetrating. Furthermore, for a BM and SSM attack to succeed, it has to be followed up by subsequent volleys because the bases themselves are repairable, and there is going to be backup bases here and there.

Can you trust China's decision makers not to fire off ballistic missiles all over the Western Pacific including Taiwan. Seriously the USA is in no mood for war. But deterrence is a vital interest. That means hostilities if necessary.

You can trust they won't do a nuclear strike first. BMs thrown all over the Western Pacific would achieve very little without massive concentrations. Likewise you will also achieve little there is not enough missiles per se, even with 24 for a sub.

Plus their lack of a credible second strike element. But yes, the USA has no desire to nuke anybody anyway. Nor does the USA want to fight such a war. The Chinese hopefully will realize where they may put us if they began launching BM's at Japan, Guam, and other placxes of strategic interests. Seriously crobato, your view seems to be that the USA should allow China to target anybody, and the USA responding in kind or finalizing the deterrent role adequately is destabilizing. I adamantly disagree. If China doesn't launch, they have nothing to worry about.

For BM's to be militarily effective, especially so by using it conventionally, it has to be fired en masse and in volleys. I doubt that China has enough medium range rockets to make an impact on Japan. BMs is a horrible way in terms of cost and weight delivery ratio in delivering payload. You do nothing but make people mad at you and you lose the sentiment war. CMs and bombers offer superior cost and weight delivery ratios.

Furthermore, China's medium and intermediate range missiles are for the most part, remained mostly in northern silos, so their likely target, isn't Japan but Russia.

Another thing that you seem to be mentioning is all wrong. You assume that missiles aimed at Taiwan can be aimed at somewhere else. Not true. These missiles, like DF-11s, just don't have the range. Your missiles like SCUDs and Pershings were meant for land wars and border battles, not across seas. Missiles are not fired off the coast, but inland. Its very questionable if DF-11s can be used against Japan.


Well, you're seriously arguing merits again. Like I said, argue with the DoD and the Navy. They're the ones seriously considering this alternative plan.

Always looking for ways to justify budgets.

If you have 14 Ohios launching Tridents simultaneously, each with 24, and the only way conventional BMs are going to be effective is via massed, volleyed attack, that's going to look like the beginning of a nuclear exchange. You would have to assure the other party before hostilities begin, that your ballistic missile submarines are carrying conventional weapons and won't be creating apocalyptic mass destruction. Which also results in admitting to your potential opponent that you would have denuclearize one of your most important strategic nuclear assets.
 
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Pointblank

Senior Member
I think you haven't really considered the impact of the Type 022 fast attack craft and the Yuan subs.

There simply isn't enough time for extensive anti-submarine warfare in a high tempo exchange like you are describing. The Yuan (and later Song subs) are nearly invulnerable in the Asian littorals. Sending nuclear attack subs to try to engage them is a losing exercise. If an SSGN wanders to close to the littorals, chances are it will fall victim to the Yuan too. The Yuan can make sure no subs or surface ships come within at least 1,000 km of the Chinese coastline.

Yuans and Song are quickly mass produceable for China. It can pump them out like sausages.

The same goes for the Type 022 FAC, China can pump them out very quickly. The same goes for their Harpoon-class antiship missiles. Swarms of these things can totally dominate the Asian littorals and make sure no surface ships get within 1,500 km of China.

The adversary's navy would have an extremely tough time trying to do launch any missile salvos. The Type 022's and Yuans are extremely frustrating to the adversary. In a high pitch battle, the PLAN's large surface combatants may be vulnerable, but the Type 022's and Yuans are like mosquitoes and cockroaches..... there's an infinite number of them.

1. The USN is highly proficient at ASW tactics. Many of their allies are even more proficient (Japan, Canada, etc). The USN is highly capable of sanitizing the ocean around them very effectively. They can pump out enough low frequency sonar to create a dead whale bridge between all of the islands of Japan. Any target that comes into the general vicinity of a carrier group will be viciously prosecuted by the escorts and ASW aircraft until destroyed.

Another issue is that USN carrier groups can move very fast. A conventional submarine is limited by how big the batteries are; even with AIP, they can only maintain top speeds of around 20 knots for only a few hours before requiring the diesels having to recharge. The only submarines that can possibly keep up are nuclear attack boats; they have the raw speed and endurance that can keep up with a fast moving CVBG.

I also personally don't think that a CVBG will be operating alone; the USN might also use amphibious assault ships as part of the escort, with them being converted to sea control ships and loaded with only Harriers and ASW helicopters. Furthermore, the USN might also combine multiple carrier groups into a single one; strengthening the escort and making it very difficult to get at the carriers.

2. The Type 22 FAC is vulnerable to air attack. This has been the major shortcoming of any FAC in the world. A single F-18 can carry 4 Maverick missiles or numerous laser guided bombs, and hang out of range of retaliation. SeaHawk helicopters are also cleared to carry Hellfires (4 on MH-60R, 8 on MH-60S using the Armed Helo Kit). We have seen this happen during the Persian Gulf War; Iraqi FAC's and infiltration boats were quickly sunk by naval helicopters, namely RN Westland Lynx's armed with the Sea Skua missile).

3. In war, you go into battle with what you have, not what can be produced later on.
 

Sea Dog

Junior Member
VIP Professional
I think you haven't really considered the impact of the Type 022 fast attack craft and the Yuan subs.

There simply isn't enough time for extensive anti-submarine warfare in a high tempo exchange like you are describing. The Yuan (and later Song subs) are nearly invulnerable in the Asian littorals. Sending nuclear attack subs to try to engage them is a losing exercise. If an SSGN wanders to close to the littorals, chances are it will fall victim to the Yuan too. The Yuan can make sure no subs or surface ships come within at least 1,000 km of the Chinese coastline.

Well, I agree that these Chinese platforms are both very good and excellently suited to the region from which they would operate. But it wouldn't make any difference if they can be mined into a confined space. Or if they make it out, mine them off from their support structures. Conventional subs like Yuan are highly immobile, and limited in duration as an asset. And the Type 022 simply doesn't have the legs to venture off very far. And the further they do, the easier they are to pick off. Those would make the most impact closer to shore as a means to support PLAN naval forces in the straits themselves. These are places our SSGN's wouldn't wander in the early stages anyway. They wouldn't need to. No telling where the Virginia SSN's and other subs would operate. I don't know. But they are more than capable of taking on sub-surface assets in the littorals. And I'm of the belief that Japanese conventional submarines may be a factor to the Chinese also.

You're right, Songs and Yuans would be a mean customer in these areas. They are deadly platforms. But it's a flaw in thinking that they are "invulnerable". Not only that, if their bases and supply chains can be destroyed or at least drastically degraded (and they can), then they wouldn't make any impact after 30-45 days at all. They simply would not be able to operate. The hope would be to limit the damage they can do in that time. And these small PLAN subs are capable of doing a good amount of damage if used correctly. Even though this is the case, subs like these require a whole lot of logistic support and are low duration anyway due to size and limited crew support. War would make life hell for the people crewing these diesel subs. You would see after these days just how sizable an advantage a nuclear submarine fleet makes.

crobato said:
more on the same topic......

At this point I'm done arguing the merits of such a system. You keep going around in circles on that. You don't like it, write your congressman and let them know. Not an American citizen? Then your opinion is merely just that....an opinion. My whole point was that a capability exists to do this, and it does. And military planners are still considering it. Arguing the way you're trying simply won't change any of it at all.

Sorry, but 250km is what is considered to be space. 205km isn't really in space anymore, and you are talking about a dying orbit. Dying orbit means lower orbital speeds because atmospheric drag is already an issue.

Actually it is very low earth orbit. Yes a decayed orbit. But really cooking. It was moving at nearly the speed of a seperated warhead from an ICBM....Uh Oh! And all from a mobile sea based system. No major rocket prep work, no launch pad. Full-up missile package in a VLS.
 
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crobato

Colonel
VIP Professional
I have seen the same report up in several sites and still have the same criticisms.

And the means to assure countries that its no nuclear strike remains about the same:

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These "cooperative measures" might include "providing information to bilateral partners about the [conventional prompt global strike] system, its operation and the doctrine for its use; immediately notifying of launches against countries; and installing devices (such as continuous monitoring systems) to increase the confidence that conventional warheads had not been replaced by nuclear warheads," according to the report, "U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond."


What?

The best response is at the bottom of the page.

"On a per pound of TNT basis, conventional Tridents would be the most cost-ineffective munition ever invented. Its wastefulness would be metaphysical. Are all the people in DC now completely stupid? I was a budget examiner with the National Security Division at OMB. I have never ceased to marvel at the ability of the denizens of DC to waste money."
Don Jones Posted August 21, 2008 8:49 AM
 

Sea Dog

Junior Member
VIP Professional
I have seen the same report up in several sites and still have the same criticisms.

Ahh. Classic. I see you only put the opinion of those who agree with your own opinion and provide no balance to point out the other side in the article. It's known there are two sides to it. Putting the side up you agree with doesn't exactly prove it's a non-viable system. The Navy is still working the issue for FY09. Even though funds are not made available for the conversion process. It's still being worked on.
 
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