Rand Report

tphuang

tphuang

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so, I read the entire pdf document on this. I must say that it's content is very very good. For those who are dismissive of its material, I suggest that you read it and try to get its point. We often look at the conflict from this side has this and that side has that. But realistically speaking, most of us forget about the logistics involved in such a war scenario.

There are just things everyone has to think about like whether Japan will let USA use its air bases, whether Japan will join the conflict, how much oil is stored in the different air bases and in Taiwan and how long can each side stay engaged in such a conflict.

For example, if US cuts off China's oil supplies, where is it going to get oil from? How long can it keep on fighting with no energy? Similarly, can US keep its forward bases supplied? How long can the carriers keep on fighting and maintain high sortie rates? How far does the carrier group need to stay off the coast of China to maintain a good safe distance and how that would affect F-35 and super hornets?

These are all good questions. Don't just dismiss the report if some of the stuff it says is incorrect. Anyways, I'm preparing a blog entry on this.
 
tphuang

tphuang

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Sea Dog said:
Yes. It does not take into account many things and portrays a strategy that would not be used. If the US military had to take on China for real, you can bet that 6 F-22's would not be used as a main component force against a Chinese air and naval component that hasn't been sufficiently dealt with first. Without getting into specifics, I believe that US moves would coordinate 10-15 B-2 strikes at night against radar (SAM and GCI) facilities immediately followed/timed by air launched and sub launched cruise missile strikes on air bases, HQ/command centers, and fuel facilities. Take out radar, aircraft, fuel, and command targets first. That would negate any decent Chinese air response. You take out a number of SAM sites on the coast, long ranged search radars, and a good amount of fuel supplies, then you can put a significant presence of F-22's and other units in the region. I believe this (and many other beginning actions) would all be done prior to fighter aircraft being brought into direct conflict. I think only Taiwanese fighters and US naval air would be the only element in the beginning phase. US naval air on a limited footing. No we would bomb large scale before we went for pure air dominance over the strait. We wouldn't fight Chinese air forces before we could negate their ability to generate sufficient sorties first. This is a good study, but you're right. This is not how the US would fight. I know Rand doesn't know how the US military would plan and structure a military campaign here. This should only be used on a scale of what-if's.
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you do realize that the Chinese air defense is built to withstand tens of thousands of cruise missiles attacks, right? How many cruise missiles does the US have? Even aside from the HQ-9 and S-300 batteries they have, they have plenty of AD artillery units, small and mobile air defense units against cruise missiles. Assuming B-2 can come in and make their bombs on Chinese air bases and such and go away unscathed every time, there is no guarantee that they can actually put anything out of commission with the number of levels of air defense units available. And even if some things do get destroyed, think about the amount of people available to rebuild these things. If there is one thing they are good at in China, that would be building things. Of course, this cuts on both sides. If China manages to destroy air bases in Kadena and Taiwan, we should expect there to be a lot of rebuild operations going on in those air bases too. We can't expect that those air bases will be out of commission permanently either. And when we talk about hitting these bases, we are not just talking about ballistic missiles attacks. That's a very small part of it. We are talking about WS-2 launches, cruise missiles, air to surface missiles by fighter-bombers, PGMs and such. And even US starts taking liberties with which military installations or even civilian targets they go after, they need to start worrying about their military bases all over the world. I'm specifically talking about the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. I could be wrong here, but I don't think those bases are designed with Chinese cruise missiles in mind.
 
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lcortez

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With my admitted limited knowledge.I would have to concur with the above reply:).
I personally see any conflict over the Taiwan Strait being primarily an air/naval conflict with a negotiated peace, before ever a boot Chinese boot sets foot on Taiwan,or vica versa.
Whom that peace favours,I believe,would vastly depend on the ability of the manufacturing capacity of the US and China to keep churning out missiles,aircraft etc.:)
 
Finn McCool

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In regards to sortie generation rates out of the various theater airbases, I do not think that the USAF at least would try to maintain a continuous presence over Taiwanese airspace. Rather I think that the USAF would attempt to commit large numbers of F-22s and F-15s at the decisive moment/s of the battle. When the Chinese launch their largest sorties, the USAF will enter the battlespace. However it is counter-productive to try to fly CAP over Taiwan.
 
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Totoro

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Trouble with that approach is that there will probably be little warning of chinese attacks. At best there may be warnings when the planes will be taking off. And then it's a matter of who is farther away from taiwan. While USN may be close enough to react properly, USAF would be too far to do get into the fight early enough to intercept. At best, Kadena based planes might intercept the chinese planes on their egress from taiwanese airspace. (how many planes can one base support, even if its as large as kadena, though? Three squadrons worth?)

Trouble for chinese will be the fact that if they want to pull of any kind of invasion, their air forces will not be able to perform just sporadic strikes. When the main assault begins, and days and perhaps weeks after it starts, PLAAF would have to maintain more or less constant presence over taiwan, doing close air support and battlefield interdiction missions. That would offer a good continuous opportunity for the US forces to constantly harass PLAAF and get them into a war of attrition which I don't believe PLAAF can survive for more than a few weeks.
 
Finn McCool

Finn McCool

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Totoro said:
Trouble with that approach is that there will probably be little warning of chinese attacks. At best there may be warnings when the planes will be taking off. And then it's a matter of who is farther away from taiwan. While USN may be close enough to react properly, USAF would be too far to do get into the fight early enough to intercept. At best, Kadena based planes might intercept the chinese planes on their egress from taiwanese airspace. (how many planes can one base support, even if its as large as kadena, though? Three squadrons worth?)
Yes, that's the trouble. But there are not really any "perfect" options for the US in this scenario. They have to take what they can get. I mean if an invasion fleet is approaching Taiwan, then that would be a clue that a major airstrikes is about to happen. Immediately after the initial missle barrage (if there is one) etc. But still, you're right, distance is on China's side. Perhaps continual harrassment and attrition is the best US option. However that has a downside too. Attrition works both ways; China can put more aircraft in theater than the US can, far more. I don't think that the kill ratio would be that lopsided in the favor of the USAF. Combine that with the possibilty of a strike on Kadena. Yet again things look difficult for the USAF trying to intervene in a Taiwan scenario.
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Pointblank

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Finn McCool said:
Totoro said:
Trouble with that approach is that there will probably be little warning of chinese attacks. At best there may be warnings when the planes will be taking off. And then it's a matter of who is farther away from taiwan. While USN may be close enough to react properly, USAF would be too far to do get into the fight early enough to intercept. At best, Kadena based planes might intercept the chinese planes on their egress from taiwanese airspace. (how many planes can one base support, even if its as large as kadena, though? Three squadrons worth?)
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Yes, that's the trouble. But there are not really any "perfect" options for the US in this scenario. They have to take what they can get. I mean if an invasion fleet is approaching Taiwan, then that would be a clue that a major airstrikes is about to happen. Immediately after the initial missle barrage (if there is one) etc. But still, you're right, distance is on China's side. Perhaps continual harrassment and attrition is the best US option. However that has a downside too. Attrition works both ways; China can put more aircraft in theater than the US can, far more. I don't think that the kill ratio would be that lopsided in the favor of the USAF. Combine that with the possibilty of a strike on Kadena. Yet again things look difficult for the USAF trying to intervene in a Taiwan scenario.
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We constantly keep forgetting USN CV support. Any buildup will be noticed through increased ELINT, COMINT, and SIGINT activity, coupled with major buildups around Chinese airbases and ports that will be spotted via satellite. The USN has a number of carriers that can be on station within 2 weeks time. They alone can put a major dent into anyone's plans.
 
FriedRiceNSpice

FriedRiceNSpice

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Any buildup will be noticed through increased ELINT, COMINT, and SIGINT activity, coupled with major buildups around Chinese airbases and ports that will be spotted via satellite.
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The only hint US would need is if Taiwan declares independence... Every other sign would be redundant. If Taiwan declares independence, US will know that within the next two weeks hostilities will ensue. If Taiwan does not, then there will be no hostilities.
 
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Totoro

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We were talking about US forces already being alerted. Meaning additional USAF forces in guam and kadena, a few (if not several) carrier groups in vicinity, etc. Invasion is imminent, and everyone knows it kind of situation. Still, it may not pay off to keep a CAP for USAF planes. We're not talking about strategical surprise, but a tactical one. When will strike group A strike, from which direction. Then the next day, or a week after that. There'd be like hundreds of strikes in the first week or two, which can not be intercepted in time by USAF, unless they're already in the air and close by. USN is another story.

It is very likely US wouldn't do anything rash or risky until they've accumulated enough forces in the vicinity of taiwan. So, unless US gets to position all the forces it wants where it wants, before China can organize air strikes (unlikely), there's bound to be little US involvement in the initial stages of the conflict. As time passes, US may very well assemble large enough force so even if we disregard the quality gap, the quantity ratio between available US and chinese planes may not be very large.

We don't know if there's enough present infrastructure to hold majority of PLAAF and PLANAF forces within proper reach of Taiwan. Or, if there is, at what cost? It's one thing using a prepared air force base and another thing using a civilian airport, where sortie generation is likely to be a bit less. Even more so for uprepared runways, etc. (same goes for the Taiwanese operating their planes from the highways and so on)

How many chinese planes would be lost even before main US force is assembled? To gain air superiority one has to fight through a large taiwanese force, a potent air defense network and a navy with very decent air defense capabilities. Granted, a big part of those may be negated with chinese navy and various missiles but still, even a half of the mentioned taiwanese forces would do some serious attrition to any attacker. I don't think it's out of the question that several hundred chinese planes are brought down before air superiority is achieved. (and thats without any US help)

In such a high stakes war there'd be tensions and potential threats on other places of the globe as well. PLAAF will most probably have to spare some of its planes near Korea, Afghanistan, India, etc, etc. There may not be more than a thousand combat planes left for operations against Taiwan, and not all would be fighter planes.

On the other hand, when US forces assemble, we may be looking at several hundred of combat planes, every one being more capable than what chinese can throw in the air. With just Kadena air wings and four carriers (lets say US won't wait to assemble max it could, some 7-8 carries) we're looking at over 300 quality fighter planes. And if USN can provide good enough air cover around Kadena, USAF may decide it's safe enough to house F-22s there, which would give additional quality edge.

In a war of attrition, where Chinese are flying CAS and CAP missions around the clock over Taiwan, and US forces choose the time of their strikes - it's actually more likely US would be the one to have numerical advantage in the air, as well as qualitative. It is actually quite possible Chinese would very quickly learn to just run away and pause their CAS missions. Naturally, that may come very handy to the Taiwanese land army, which would then have the upper hand, since the numbers are on their side versus whatever chinese can land/paradrop/whatever in a given period of time. Not to mention that Chinese forces on Taiwan would not be equipped with heaviest of weaponry, while Taiwanese would enjoy using whatever their have in their arsenal.
 
D

daveman

New Member
Totoro said:
On the other hand, when US forces assemble, we may be looking at several hundred of combat planes, every one being more capable than what chinese can throw in the air. With just Kadena air wings and four carriers (lets say US won't wait to assemble max it could, some 7-8 carries) we're looking at over 300 quality fighter planes. And if USN can provide good enough air cover around Kadena, USAF may decide it's safe enough to house F-22s there, which would give additional quality edge.

In a war of attrition, where Chinese are flying CAS and CAP missions around the clock over Taiwan, and US forces choose the time of their strikes - it's actually more likely US would be the one to have numerical advantage in the air, as well as qualitative. It is actually quite possible Chinese would very quickly learn to just run away and pause their CAS missions. Naturally, that may come very handy to the Taiwanese land army, which would then have the upper hand, since the numbers are on their side versus whatever chinese can land/paradrop/whatever in a given period of time. Not to mention that Chinese forces on Taiwan would not be equipped with heaviest of weaponry, while Taiwanese would enjoy using whatever their have in their arsenal.
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Hahaha.... okay, buddy.

No need to worry about Iran. Or Iraq, or Afghan. Nope, the U.S. does not need any forces there, because China certainly will not pressure those fronts. Nope....

And Russia will certainly NOT take advantage of the situation and make a move on Georgia, Ukrain, or the other shrimps waiting to be served. Nope, no need for US forces in those places...


Seriously, isn't this board suppose to be filled with military, strategic experts? Where did we get all these fanboys positing these fantastic pie-in-the-sky scenarios?

These posts do not contribute to the professional image of the forum, they make the forum look like it's of a lesser caliber than it really is. Moderators should take note.
 
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