The Richard Fisher Strikes Back!

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
Yeah, I don't understand the call for "transparency" when everyone seems to know everything. Like a little ASAT test that's not suppose to happen at least for another 10 years. The question is did the program start earlier than estimated by the experts or was the technology quickly developed? Either way, China probably doesn't follow other known models.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
The idea the J-XX would enter service in 2013 to 2015 as Roger asserts isn't credible. The F-35 is flying in prototype form today after a decade long design period and a Low Rate Initial Production decision at Milestone C will not be made until all the IOT&E is complete in 2012. Somehow China is going to start from scratch and put a "Fifth Generation" fighter into service before a decade old US project reaches initial production? Well now...........
The fifth generation project has been ongoing for a while now. They are building a modern assembly line at SAC for it. CAC has been assigned most of the design work and SAC got some too. We are not sure when the first flight will happen, but probably anywhere from 2010-2012. It's often believed that the fifth gen fighter will achieve IOC at around 2015. The status of WS-15 (the engine for the fighter) seems to corroborate on this.
 

Infra_Man99

Banned Idiot
Richard Fisher is NOT an idiot. He is probably a tool instructed by his superiors to publish China-fear articles to justify US military expansion. Then his articles are used by the US press as authoritative sources to convince most of the US on why the US must build up its arms against China.

Fisher claims the US must now design space weapons to defend the US against China. The truth is that the US has been researching space bombers and satellite gun for many decades, such as the current Global Strike space bomber and Rods from God satellite gun.
 

Skywatcher

Captain
He and Pinkov occupy two different ends of the spectrum regarding the China Threat hype.

Strategy page seems to want to be in both places simulataneously, though.
 

AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
It Is Time for the Pentagon’s PLA Report to Grow Up

by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on March 22nd, 2008
ARTICLES


For the first time in many years, on March 3 the Pentagon issued its annual China Military Power report prior to the March 15 deadline called for by the 1997 Congressional authorization language.[1] One apparent reason for the early delivery was to use the report as part of an intensified effort to convince China to relax its deeply ingrained resistance to “military transparency.” However, the key requirement for this annual report as mandated by the Congress was that the Department of Defense report “on the future pattern of military modernization of the People's Republic of China.” The 2008 report offers some interesting new data, even as it prompts new and old questions. Responding fully to its Congressional mandate and serving better to convince China to reveal more about its capabilities and intents will require more. The time has come to greatly expand and upgrade the China Military Power report.

China’s Foreign Ministry replied to this latest PLA Report by urging the U.S. to “abandon its Cold War mentality.”[2] It also accused the U.S. of playing up the “China Military Threat Theory.” The fact remains, however, that the annual China Military Power report is the most authoritative statement concerning China’s military power and intentions made by any government.[3] No other government seeks to make such an assessment and China’s annual condemnation nicely reflects its fear of even 66 pages of “transparency.”

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Cold War Mentality: On March 4, 2008 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang offered the annual reply to the PLA Report by urging the U.S. drop its “Cold War mentality.” Source: People’s Daily


The China Military Power report is nevertheless not a wholly satisfactory document. While guided by Congressional demands it is also the product of compromises between the demands of policy and intelligence security. But there is apparently scope for creativity. For 2008 the report’s drafters apparently chose to add a chapter length “Special Topic” on “Human Capital in the PLA Force Modernization” which examines the PLA’s progress in creating a more professional and capable personnel core. Other topics might be at least as informative and relevant: for example, “China’s Continued WMD Proliferation and How Chinese Leaders Profit,” but not surprisingly, that nettle was left un-grasped.[4]

As with previous versions this review will focus on threat-related concerns.

Space Warfare Concerns

For 2008 the Pentagon’s PLA Report places a new stress on China’s space and counter-space capabilities, due largely to the “unannounced test” on January 11, 2007 of the PLA’s SC-19 direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor. Regarding future direct ascent ASAT weapons, the PLA Report notes curiously that “Beijing’s efforts to develop small, rapid reaction space launch vehicles currently appears to be stalled.” (2008, p. 27) It is not clear whether this is a reference to China’s intention to build mobile space launch vehicles out of the DF-31 ICBM family, known as the KT-2 and KT-2A. In terms of other “rapid reaction” vehicles the PLA may be working on two air-launched space launch vehicles that could be used to deploy ASAT weapons. The first is similar to the U.S. Orbital Sciences Pegasus air launched vehicle revealed at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow. The second may be based on larger version of the Shenlong space plane vehicle first revealed in December 2007.[5] Air launched ASAT carriers are far more flexible than ground-mobile systems like the SC-19 or a potential future KT-2 based system.

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Possible Air Launched SLVs: A Pegasus-like space launch vehicle and the Shenlong space place form two possible air launched “rapid reaction” space launch vehicles for the PLA. Source: Chinese Internet


Regarding China’s manned space program the 2008 PLA Report notes “The majority of the technology used in China’s manned space program is derived from Russian equipment, and China receives significant help from Russia with specific satellite payloads and applications.” (2008, p. 3) In October 2008 China will likely fly its Shenzhou-8, its third manned mission and the first to exercise a space-walk. The below image from a Chinese government website indicates that China’s extravehicular activity (EVA) suit is substantially derived from the Russian Orlan-D space suit. The PLA Report also notes “China’s goal is to have a manned space station and conduct a lunar landing, both by 2020.” (2008, p. 27) However, the PLA Reports have not noted how China has used all Shenzhou missions thus far to support military surveillance missions, which sets a precedent for the possibility of China using its future space stations and Moon program to support military goals.

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China’s EVA Suit: This is the first image of China’s manned space suit, which will likely be used during the Shenzhou-8 mission planned for this October; it shows a marked similarity to the Russian Orlan-D suit. Source: Chinese Internet


More Missile Data Prompts Old Questions

The 2008 PLA Report provides interesting updates from 2007 regarding the PLA’s increasing nuclear missile forces. While the 2007 report noted that that the 7,200km range solid-fuel and road-mobile DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had “achieved initial threat availability in 2006” (2007, p. 9), the 2008 report asserts that DF-31 deployment is now less than 10 (2008, p. 66). The 2007 report also noted that the larger 11,200km range DF-31A “is expected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2007” (2007, p. 3), and indeed, the 2008 reports that fewer than 10 are now considered deployed. This could suggest an annual production rate of 5 to 10 missiles for both types. Chinese Internet images of what is likely the DF-31A ICBM show that is it is much larger than the DF-31 and is carried by a 16-wheel transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 ICBM. A 1996 reported noted that U.S. satellite had detected a large MAZ TEL outside a Chinese factory,[6] indicating that Belarus or Russian firms have cooperated with China’s development of these new large TELs.


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Recent DF-31 ICBM Images: Appearing in mid-2007, this image show that recent production DF-31 ICBMs now have a four-door truck cab. In July 2007 China for the first time revealed a model of the DF-31 ICBM. The Pentagon reports close to 10 may be deployed. Source: Chinese Internet


Regarding nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs), the 2008 PLA Report states that by 2010, the PLA could have “up to five JIN-class SSBNs, each carrying between 10 and 12 JL-2 SLBM.” (2008, p. 25). This formalizes an estimate revealed by the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence in late 2006 that Type 094 SSBN (JIN-class) production could reach five. Fairly clear Chinese Internet-source images of the Type 094 show that this second-generation Chinese SSBN carries 12 SLBMs. Provided that subsequent Type 094 do not carry more than 12 missiles, this points to a new Chinese SLBM force of 60 missiles. Might China build more? Again, Beijing is not revealing its intentions. Concern about the future numbers of PLA ICBMs and SLBMs is heightened for three reasons.

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12 SLBMs Per 094: This image of the Type 094 SSBN clearly shows it carries 12 SLBMs. However, Chinese Internet sources suggest that future 094 versions could carry 16 or 18 SLBMs. Source: Chinese Internet


No.1: How many nuclear missiles will China build? The 2002 PLA Report contained an estimate that China could deploy 60 ICBMs by 2010 (2002, p. 27). With the deployed number of upgraded DF-5Mod2 missiles remaining at 20, and an annual production rate of 5 to 10 DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs, it is thus possible that the PLA could possibly triple its land-based long range nuclear ICBM force to 60 missiles by some time in 2009. But will the PLA stop at a force of 60 or so ICBMs or continue building additional DF-31 and DF-31A units? Will there be follow-on more capable ICBMs? At least one recent unconfirmable Chinese Internet source asserts there will be an initial DF-31A force of 60 missiles.[7] Such an assertion might be easy to dismiss. However, the Chinese government is unwilling to reveal its planned ICBM numbers. The variance is significant: Is China moving toward a nuclear missile force of 60 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs or a force of 100 ICBMs and 60 SLBMs?


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Possible DF-31A Images: These images, two revealed in early 2007, and a new side view first seen on March 8, show a much larger 16- wheel TEL similar to the MAZ-7916 used by the Russian SS-27 mobile ICBM. This could be the DF-31A mobile ICBM. Source: Chinese Internet


No.2: Is China arming its new missiles with multiple warheads? While one might prefer to temper concern about even 160 new Chinese nuclear ballistic missiles compared to the nuclear missile arsenals of the United States (500 ICBMs and 336 SLBMs) and Russia (452 ICBMs and 172 SLBMs), what if China is arming these new missiles with multiple warheads? The 2002 PLA Report noted that “perhaps” China would develop multiple warheads, most likely for the new DF-5Mod2, as a means of countering U.S. National Missile Defenses (2002, p. 28). Now after six years, the 2008 PLA Report revives the matter of possible Chinese multiple warheads by noting countermeasures to U.S. missile defenses that “China is researching.” It is worth quoting the entire passage:

“The addition of nuclear capable forces with greater mobility and survivability, combined with ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching—including maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding and ASAT weapons—will strengthen China’s deterrent and enhance its capabilities for strategic strike.” (2008, p. 25)

The 2008 PLA Report does not make any statement that Chinese missiles have multiple warheads now, but having revived this issue, the report then fails to explain how the potential for multiple warhead missiles could impact China’s nuclear weapon capability. The author, however, has previously cited estimates of other Asian military officials, which include: DF-5Mod2: 8 warheads; DF-31A: 3-4 warheads; JL-2: 3-4 warheads.[8] As before, the author cannot verify if these numbers are true. However, after six years it is reasonable to question whether the PLA not only has such programs, but also have they made progress? The 1999 Cox Report, which was based on broad U.S. Intelligence Community testimony before a Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, noted that if China were to aggressively develop multiple warheads for its missiles it could have 1,000 by 2015.[9] The chart below shows estimates for China’s nuclear missile force based on low and high estimates for missile numbers and for potential multiple warhead configurations.


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MaRV and MIRV Indications: The top Chinese television image from 2005 suggests a maneuverable warhead that could potentially be used by the single warhead DF-31 ICBM. The second image from December 2007, from the display table of a Chinese hypersonic research institute, shows a blunt-nose missile at the back of the table, a configuration that could indicate multiple warhead carriage. This missile may represent the DF-31A or the JL-2 SLBM. Source: Chinese Internet


More clarity is required from either from U.S. government or Chinese government sources regarding future numbers of Chinese nuclear missiles and warheads. The U.S. and Russia are now in the process of reducing their nuclear warhead count to about 2,200-1,700 by 2012 as part of the May 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. The U.S. is also in the process of reducing the warhead load of most of its 500 fixed-silo Minuteman-III ICBMs from three to one.

No.3: Is China’s ASAT program tied to an ongoing strategic missile defense program? The issue of nuclear warhead numbers becomes even more critical if one considers the indications that China may also be working on a new strategic missile defense program. Successive Pentagon reports have not spoken directly to this possibility. However, the listing of China’s ASAT capability in the above quoted list of “ballistic missile defense countermeasures which China is researching,” can be interpreted as an indication that some in the U.S. Intelligence community are concerned with China’s potential development of missile defenses. After all, the technological capabilities needed for intercepting satellites and ballistic missile warheads are basically the same, as the U.S. demonstrated on February 21 by using U.S. Navy ship-based SM-3 ballistic missile interceptors to prevent an errant U.S. reconnaissance satellite from causing harm on earth. From 1963 to 1980 China pursued its 640 Program missile defense project, which was intended to produce short and long-range missile interceptors, new long range radar, and also had an off-shoot ASAT project. Chinese sources also mention a possible strategic defense program with the numerical designator “863-8XX,” meaning it is under China’s famous “863 Program” started in 1986 to mobilize technological resources to achieve a broad range of military modernization goals.

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640 Program ABM Precedent: The FJ-1 and FJ-2 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, though never fully developed and produced, were two products of the 640 Program. These set a precedent for China’s potential current interest in strategic missile defense, in stark contrast to its long-standing harsh rhetoric against such systems. Source: Chinese Internet


The future configuration of China’s strategic offensive, and potential strategic defensive capabilities should be of critical concern to the United States, which unlike Russia and China, extends its nuclear deterrent to treaty allies in Europe and Asia. The U.S. does this because it believes that it is in America’s strategic interest that many of its allies not do so themselves—a point perhaps not sufficiently appreciated in Beijing and Moscow. Precisely because China has used its current limited nuclear arsenal to attempt to “intimidate” or “coerce” the United States from aiding Taiwan in the event of a Chinese military strike, several U.S. allies in Asia, themselves not yet nuclear, are quite sensitive to U.S.-Chinese-Russian nuclear balance.[10] Should a much larger Chinese nuclear offensive and defensive nuclear force come to be judged as “neutralizing” the American strategic deterrent in Asia, or worse, come to aid a hostile Chinese conquest of Taiwan, some may see little choice but to pursue their own strategic or even nuclear deterrent.

As it did in 2007, the 2008 PLA Report repeats doubts about China’s oft-state “No First Use” policy for nuclear weapons, in light of “periodic PRC military and academic debates” which question this policy. For example, in January 2008 Chai Yuqiu, a vice principal with the Nanjing Army Command College, told the Ta Kung Pao newspaper that China’s no-first-use nuclear policy is not unlimited, saying,

"The policy of not to use nuclear weapons first is not unlimited, without conditions, or without premises,” Chai also noted, “China will never use nuclear weapons first, especially not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries…When big powers equipped with nuclear arms disregard the completeness of sovereignty and territory of Chinese people and make frequent moves that are unconventional and hurt the fundamental interests of Chinese people, however, it is not impossible to break such a strategy on tactical issues.”[11]

This is apparently the latest reference, albeit veiled, that China could use nuclear weapons against the United States in an offensive manner in the event of a full conflict over the future of Taiwan. It follows previous threatening statements made by former General Staff Second Department (Intelligence) Director General Xiong Guangkai in late 1995 and then National Defense University professor General Zhu Chenghu in July 2005.[12]

To diminish China’s capacity for nuclear coercion, it is necessary that the U.S. maintain a sufficient nuclear weapons capacity to deter nuclear attack against itself and against regional allies. If China is indeed building up toward a nuclear force of 500 or more warheads, then it is logical that the U.S. reconsider whether SORT warhead numbers and the current limited National Missile Defense posture are sufficient to sustain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. There may or may not be a need for the U.S. to alter its planned nuclear missile and defensive missile posture. But at a minimum, it would be a necessary hedge against uncertainty and retain, as the U.S. has reportedly decided, 25 of its Minuteman-III ICBMs armed with multiple warheads[13] and to fully fund the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to ensure a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent.[14]

Despite China’s potential for pushing the U.S.-China nuclear competition in the direction of a new “Cold War,” not all this is necessarily bad news. China’s interest in strategic missile defenses, within a political context that does not exist today, offers the potential to achieve negotiated offensive-defensive limits that could form the basis for global weapon reductions. This is one of many reasons to press hard, as the Bush Administration has been doing, for a real dialogue with the PLA on nuclear weapon related issues. But it is likely that any lasting progress toward a verifiable nuclear stability with China will require 1) a significant resolution of the ideological-strategic conflicts between Communist China and the community of Democratic nations, especially as regards Taiwan; and 2) a sea-change in China’s longstanding resistance to the levels military transparency needed to foster real military confidence with other countries.

Update on Threats to Taiwan

A key reason why a Communist Party led China is not going to evolve positively in these two areas of concern for some time is China’s strengthening commitment to force “unification” on a democratic Taiwan that wants preserve its democratic freedoms as it decides, on its own, the future of its relationship with China. Taiwan itself poses no military threat to China and Taiwanese appear willing to pursue greater economic integration with China. Ultimately it is Taiwan’s free-wheeling multi-party democracy which most threatens the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. But in recent years Chinese military scholars have begun formulating geostrategic justifications for the conquest of Taiwan, as the PLA Report has repeatedly noted, is but a stepping stone toward greater strategic ambitions. While the PLA Reports for 2007 and 2008 have quoted a useful passage from the The PLA National Defense University (NDU) textbook The Science of Military Strategy (2008, p. 29), it is worth quoting additionally from this government-approved textbook:

“The reunification of China’s mainland and Taiwan not only is something that concerns China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity…buy also will exert impact upon the survival and development of the Chinese nation and the rejuvenation of the great nation of China in this century…If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but also a large water area and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into the hands of others. What’s more, our line of foreign trade and transportation, which is vital to China’s opening up and economic development will be exposed to the surveillance threats of separatist and enemy forces, and China will be forever locked on the west side of the first chain of islands of the West Pacific…”The independence of Taiwan” means the start of war…Although this is something undesirable for China, we have to face it. Taiwan issue is the largest and the last obstacle which we must conquer in Chinese people’s path to rejuvenation in the 21st Century…”[15]

From this PLA perspective, control of Taiwan would “rejuvenate” Chinese power by causing a geostrategic shift in China’s favor. Far more important than the territorial or resource benefits to be gained, it would also give the PLA an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” astride the sea lanes vital to the economic security of South Korea, Japan, Australia, India and the Southeast Asian economies which depend on unhindered commerce. For sure, these sea lanes are just as important to China’s economy, and the PLA Navy could be almost as disruptive from its current bases. But Taiwan’s East Coast offer one advantage not allowed by bases on the mainland: immediate access to very deep water patrol areas for nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

As Ross Munro noted in 1999, “In the eyes of PRC leaders, Taiwan is first and foremost a strategic target that must soon be subjugated if China is to realize its goal of becoming Asia's dominant and unchallenged power.”[16] For Taiwan, this suggests that policies that seek to ameliorate conflicts with China will not alter Beijing’s ultimate goal of controlling Taiwan, which would require the eventual subjugation of Taiwan’s democratic government by force. A PLA conquest of Taiwan would almost certainly require violation of Japanese territory which extends, through the Sakishima Island chain, to Yonaguni Island, which is inhabited, sixty miles east of Taiwan’s Pacific coast. Such violation would almost certainly lead to wider war. Even if China somehow managed successfully to conquer Taiwan, the result would be to place Chinese forces about 60km from Japanese territory, a potentially explosive situation.

Such an outcome tragedy would have to assume either the defeat of U.S. forces or their political or military neutralization, and would herald the beginning of an era of Asian conflicts. A crisis of confidence in its American alliance could move Japan to rearm and build nuclear weapons, and have a similar effect on South Korea. Such outcomes are unpalatable for our allies, as would be the prospect of Washington becoming enmeshed in a new era of Asian nuclear-military competition.

For these reasons it is necessary to continue with the wisdom of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and continue to sell Taiwan the weapons it needs to deter a Chinese decision to attack. In addition to many campaign statements that he will seek new levels of understanding and tension reduction with China, presidential front-runner and Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou has also stated he would raise Taiwan’s defense spending to 3 percent of GDP and pursue the purchase of modern “defensive” weapons to ensure Taiwan will not be vulnerable to Chinese coercion.[17] The 2008 PLA Report notes new threats to Taiwan that will serve to justify Ma’s intention to increase defense spending.

Missile Threats: China’s missile threats to Taiwan continue to accumulate; presenting a potential first-strike force that could devastate Taiwan’s air and naval defenses and diminish fixed army systems. The 2008 PLA Report notes a high estimate of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) at 1070 (2008, p. 56), an almost 10 percent increase over the 2007 high estimate of 975. DF-21 (CSS-5) medium range missile numbers have increased from high estimates of 50 to 80 in the last year. A new anti-ship variant of the DF-21 could account for this increase. The PLA Report for 2008 does not detail the new variants for these missiles, which include the DF-15C deep-penetrating SRBM, the DF-15B with an apparent maneuvering warhead, or a new medium range missile called “DF-25” by some, but which may also be a new variant of the DF-21. For the first time the 2008 PLA Report notes that new land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) could number up to 250. This number could only represent land-based “DH-10” LACMs, and thus this number could increase rapidly as the PLA Air Force builds LACM-carrying H-6K bombers and a naval variant of this LACM arms new PLA Navy nuclear attack submarines.

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More LACMs: This artist’s illustration from a Chinese military magazine offers one indication that China’s new air-launched LACMs may benefit from the Russian Kh-55 LACM, obtained by China from the Ukraine via A.Q. Khan’s nuclear smuggling network. Source: Naval Weapons


As far as is known, Taiwan has no ballistic missiles or LACMs aimed at China. While Taiwan is developing both, these are opposed by Washington and KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou has said he will halt the development of “offensive” missiles. After a long delay, it appears that Taiwan will buy new Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 missiles capable of intercepting most PLA SRBMs, but these are expensive and the numbers required are prohibitive. Instead, as this author has previously suggested, Taiwan requires energy intensive weapons like lasers and rail-guns. These have the potential of firing thousands of very inexpensive “rounds” and thus have a chance giving Taiwan’s “defensive” posture a significant advantage over the PLA’s offensive missiles.

Air Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes that 20 percent of the PLA’s 2,250 combat aircraft can be considered “modern,” 4th generation or with 4th generation capabilities, which works out to an estimated 450 modern aircraft (2008, pgs, 34, 52). Of this number, close to 300 are from the Russian Sukhoi family of Su-27K, Su-30MKK, Su-30MKK2, plus the co-produced Shenyang J-11A, and soon, the largely copied J-11B—which may soon enter series production. Added to this there is close to 100 indigenous Chengdu J-10 multi-role fighters and then 50 or more of the indigenous Xian JH-7 and JH-7A strike fighters. Shenyang and Chengdu are developing twin-seat dedicated attack variants of the J-11B and the J-10. There are persistent though unconfirmed reports that the PLA will purchase the light-weight Chengdu FC-1 co-developed with Pakistan. Most Russian-made fighters are armed with the self-guided Vympel R-77 medium range and the helmet-sighted R-73 air-to-air missile (AAM). All new Chinese-made fighters carry the self-guided Luoyang PL-12, though they could also soon carry the helmet-display sighted PL-10/13 and the long-range ramjet-powered PL-13/14, which both apparently benefit from South African technology.[18] China is now developing two families of laser-guided and satellite-guided bombs for precision attacks.

But as repeated PLA Reports have noted, the PLA air threat also comes from increasing numbers of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) acquired from Russia, and increasingly, produced by China (2008, p. 56). The PLA Air Force is in the process of acquiring up to 900 missiles of the deadly Russian S-300 family, to include 300 of the 150km range S-300PMU-2. From Fujian Province bases the S-300PMU-2 can reach targets over Taiwan. And with Russian technological help, China has put its 100-150km range HQ-9 into production, a SAM that is thought to be as good as early versions of the S-300. The 2008 PLA Report says there are 64 HQ-9 launchers, meaning a potential for at least 300 of these SAMs. The Pentagon for the first time mentions an “HQ-9 follow on” (2008, p. 56); Asian sources have noted that the PLA may be working on a 400km range SAM. These new SAMs combine very high speed and highly difficult to jam phased array radar guidance systems which pose a very high threat to U.S., Japanese and Taiwanese 4th generation combat aircraft.

Taiwan’s 390 combat aircraft face a rapidly increasing threat from the PLA’s missiles, LACMs and increasing numbers of advanced combat aircraft armed with modern aerial combat and precision ground-attack weapons. As repeated PLA Reports have noted, Taiwan would do well to invest much more in passive defenses such as shelters. However, Taiwan has also in the last year requested to begin the process of purchasing 66 new Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 50 fighters, which the Bush Administration has so far refused to commence. Given the rapidly increasing threat from Chinese missiles and precision strike aircraft that can target Taiwan’s Air Force, and the growing threat posed by modern Russian SAMs, it is necessary for the U.S. to consider Taiwan’s requirement for a 5th generation fighter like the Lockheed-Martin F-35B. This fighter has advantages of stealth which can counter the threat of the PLA’s new SAMs and a very-short take-off capability to allow for rapid aircraft dispersal to avoid missile attack.


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Want Vs. Need: Taiwan is requesting 66 new F-16C Block 50 fighters to replace its very old F-5 fighters, but the mounting missile, air and SAM threat from the PLA would easily justify a future request from Taipei for the 5th generation F-35B V/STOL fighter. Source: RD Fisher


Naval/Invasion Threats: The 2008 PLA Report notes slight growth over 2007 in the PLA’s total submarine force, from 58 to 60, and further notes for the first time that a nuclear powered attack submarine is deployed with the East or South Sea Fleet near Taiwan. What this report does not note, however, is that after three years of trial and development, the PLA Navy has started series production of the new Yuan-class conventional submarine. Two new Yuans were spotted near the Wuhan shipyard in early 2008, and recent production runs for PLA submarines have ranged from 10 to 20. In 2007 Chinese sources also revealed the first images of the new Type 093 nuclear attack submarine, which Asian sources in the past have said three were launched by 2006. The 2008 PLA Report also does not assess the significance of the PLA Navy’s first Type 071 large LPD amphibious assault ship, launched at the end of 2006. It displaces about 20,000 tons and may carry up to 800 troops plus armor and equipment. In early 2008 Chinese Internet sources revealed the first images of the specialized hovercraft, similar in size to the U.S. Navy’s LCAC, which may be used by China’s LPD and LHD to move equipment rapidly to shore. Chinese sources and other reports also indicate that the PLA will be building a similarly sized helicopter assault ship or LHD.[19]

Quest For PLA Transparency Requires Better PLA Report

One key goal that the Bush Administration has sought to advance by releasing 2008 PLA Report early, and on the week it did, was clearly to increase pressure on Beijing to improve its willingness to become more “transparent” militarily. The 2008 PLA Report warns bluntly:

“China’s leaders have yet to explain in detail the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s modernizing military capabilities…The lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown.” (2008, p. 1)

DoD released its report on Monday March 3, just as China’s largely rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC) convened in Beijing. For Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the NPC provides an essential opportunity to justify its near total political control of China, by detailing economic goals and announcing budgets, usually led by its military spending announcement, which for 2008 marks 17.6 increase for 2007. But instead, the Bush Administration chose that week to put Beijing on the defensive by offering facts about China’s military build-up that the CCP would never reveal, and posing questions that it cannot answer at the risk of having to really justify its actions to the people of China.

It was indeed welcome that the Bush Administration would elevate its pressure in this way to seek to convince the Chinese government to become far more open about its military modernization and military-political goals. However, successive administrations since Ronald Reagan have pursued the same goal, with the Bush Administration the latest to resort to venting frustration. While pressing China to increase transparency may be laudable, it is simply the fact that China’s responses reflect a centuries-old abhorrence of military transparency.

When questioned on the BBC in 2006 about U.S. concerns about China’s military spending and transparency, China’s UN Ambassador to Geneva Sha Zukang said “It's better for the US to shut up and keep quiet.”[20] At least Dr. Shen Dingli of Shanghai’s Fudan University, an oft-cited unofficial “spokesman” for the Chinese government, offered an honest reason for Chinese reticence: "We have to keep certain secrets in order to have a war-fighting capability…We can't let Taiwan and the U.S. know how we are going to defeat them if the U.S. decides to send forces to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan.”[21] Ralph Sawyer has noted that for Sun Zi, perhaps China’s most venerated military strategist, a stress on secrecy was a “force multiplier,” quoting his formulation, “The pinnacle of military employment approaches the formless…If I determine the enemy’s disposition while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented.”[22]

As long as China perceives that there will be opposition to its military goals, for Taiwan or for the Greater Asian region, it will seek to mask its intentions and to conceal its accumulating military capabilities. Largely cordial diplomatic attempts to make Beijing explain and reveal basic military information will only result in marginal gains. Even though these meager gains may justify continued effort, it is also time to greatly increase pressure on Beijing. During the Cold War the Reagan Administration’s Soviet Miltiary Power served not only to inform Americans and their allies of real threats, it also informed citizens in the former Soviet Bloc of the massive military expenditures that undermined economic and social conditions. A relatively easy upgrade for the online China Military Power report would be to translate it into several languages, including multiple Chinese dialects. But ultimately this report deserves to be a standing volume with extensive images and charts. The “risks to stability” of China’s military buildup are very real and deserve a far more serious investment in the China Military Report.




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[1] The text of the 1997 authorizing language for the annual Department of Defense China Military Power Report can be accessed at:
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[2] Li Xiaokun, “Pentagon report smacks of Cold War Mentality,” People’s Daily, March 5, 2008,
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[3] Annual Report To Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
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[4] Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III noted in his memoirs one reason for China’s persistence in selling missile technology to Pakistan in the 1990s was because “…several senior government and party officials or their families stood to gain from the performance of those contracts,” see, James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolution, War and Peace, New York: G.P.Putnam & Sons, 1995, p. 593.

[5] See author, “Shenlong Space Plane Advances China’s Military Potential,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, December 17, 2007,
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[6] Bill Gertz, “Missile-related Technology Sold To Beijing by Belarus,” The Washington Times, June 12, 1997, p. A9.

[7] This report appeared on the WarSky web page on March 3, 2008, titled, “The United States Wants China To Stop Deployment of DF-31A: China’s Military Rejects Categorically,”
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. This report also suggests that that China may eventually deploy 120 DF-31A ICBMs. The Chinese Internet is often a fertile source of disinformation and the author cannot confirm the veracity of this report, which is cited to illustrate the uncertainty surrounding projections of China’s future nuclear missile forces.

[8] “Two Cheers for the 2007 PLA Report,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 10, 2007,
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[9] Report of the Select Committee On U.S. National Security And Military/Commercial Concerns With The People’s Republic of China, Volume 1, Submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p. 186.

[10] This point was made recently to the author by a Japanese defense official.

[11] Ta Kung Pao, January 20, 2008, relayed in “China rethinks no-first use of nuclear weapons: Policy not unlimited, without conditions,” East-Asia Intel.com, January 30, 2008.

[12] Alexandra Harney, Demetri Sevastopulo and Edward Alden, “Top Chinese general warns US over attack,” Financial Times, July 15, 2005,
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[13] Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Might Retain Multiple Warheads on 25 Intercontinental Missiles,” Global Security Newswire, November 30, 2007,
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[14] For background see, “Reliable Replacement Warhead program,” National Nuclear Security Administration Fact Sheet,
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[15] Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy, English Edition, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005, pgs. 442-443.

[16] Ross Munro, “Taiwan: What China Really Wants,” National Review, October 11, 1999.

[17] Ma Ying-jeou, “A SMART Strategy for National Security,” A Speech before the Association for the Promotion of National Security, Republic of China, February 26, 2008.

[18] See author, “China’s Emerging 5th Generation Air-to-Air Missiles,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, February 2, 2008,
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[19] See author, “Chinese Aspects of Singapore’s IMDEX Naval Technology Show,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, June 20, 2007,
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[20] H. Josef Hebert, “Top Chinese Diplomat Tells US To ‘Shut Up’ On Arms Spending,” Agence France Presse, August 17, 2006.

[21] David Lague, “A Mystery in Beijing: Who Runs the Military?,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2007,
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[22] Ralph D. Sawyer, “Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent and Projections,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/2007, pgs. 4,5.

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AssassinsMace

Lieutenant General
Maybe they should stop selling luxury handbags to China too. The leatherstrap handles can be used dual-use to strangle enemy soldiers as well. Richard Fisher is mining deep into the well of desperation. Afterall the other stuff that has shown up in China lately, he's resorted to writing about stopping to sell China Segway scooters because they're being used by the Beijing police. At least this time Richard Fisher can't be accused of cutting and pasting information in this article from forums like this one. I wonder if Jackie Chan is now public enemy No.1 in the US since he holds a monopoly on the Segway scooter market in China.


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China’s Military Employment of American Dual-Use Technologies

by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on August 1st, 2008
ARTICLES


On June 5, 1989 President George H.W. Bush announced the United States suspension of sales of items on the U.S. munitions list, or an arms embargo, in response to the June 3-4 Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing, China. In 1990 this policy was codified by the U.S. Congress.[1] But almost from its inception successive American presidents have made exceptions to this law, primarily by issuing wavers to allow the purchase of Chinese satellite launch services. In addition, by the mid-1990s the U.S. Commerce Department has allowed a growing trade in so-called "dual-use" items that may have a military use but are not weapons in and of themselves.

In a 2005 exchange regarding U.S. exports of dual use technologies to China, former Department of Defense official Lawrence Korb (then with the Center for American Progress) told Peter Lichtenbaum, then Acting Undersecretary for Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, that "…the United States exports equipment and technology to China that actively contributes to Beijing's ability to wage war." Korb noted that U.S. exports were not "…being used in a manner consistent with our national security and nonproliferation interests."[2]

Lichtenbaum disagreed, noting, "The United States maintains an arms embargo on China. Because dual-use items (such as computers) have important commercial uses, we do not have an embargo on exports of dual-use items to China. However, we have a general policy of denying export license applications for dual-use items to Chinese military end-users."[3] Nevertheless, it is clear that the State and Commerce Departments have used this distinction to allow an increasing traffic in American made or designed products to China which do have a specific military use. Despite Mr. Lichtenbaum’s assurance, these items are going directly into the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) inventory, or are easily accessible by the PLA from Chinese "civilian" entities.

Open source information shows that the PLA and China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) are benefitting from many American made or designed products. Some, like the AM General Humvee vehicle, were explicitly designed for military use. Others, like jet airliners, utility helicopters, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and Segway personal transports may not have been originally designed for military or police use, but are thus used in the West, and now in China. In the case of airliners, it is proving the case that both the United States and Europe have sold China a considerable potential military capability. As such, one can conclude that the State Department and the Commerce Department are not doing their job and ensuring that these dual use items do not end up increasing China’s military capabilities.


PAP Segway Squad: As part of sanctioned exports of US police technology, the People’s Armed Police now uses the innovative American Segway transporter. Source: Chinese Internet


From 2005 to the present, both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress have expressed their opposition to Europe relaxing its 1989 arms embargo. In 2008 the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress have affirmed their support for Europe’s embargo. However, Europe also has its problem in allowing a greater traffic in dual-use technology that is increasing Chinese military capabilities. This is especially true in the case of helicopter and transport aircraft technologies. Despite the 1989 EU arms embargo Eurocopter has sustained a technology relationship with Chinese helicopter companies, and is now co-developing the EC-175/Z-15 advanced utility helicopter with China. Furthermore, in its rush to secure a greater share of the Chinese airliner market from rival Boeing, Airbus has transferred an airline "kit" assembly line to Tianjin that can only help China advance its own program to build a large airliner by 2020, one that will likely be produced in multiple military variants.



Not A Toy: American All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) maker Polaris has shifted much of its production to China, which makes it easy for the PLA to use Polaris ATVs as do U.S. Army Special Forces units (bottom), photographed in May 2008. Source: Chinese Internet and RD Fisher


However, it is critical that before Washington considers taking any complaints to Brussels, that it review how American dual-use exports to China are being used to improve PLA and PAP capabilities. What follows is a list of U.S. dual-use technologies that are benefiting China’s military.

AM General Humvee Light Truck

While the ubiquitous M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV, or Humvee) is now being quickly supplanted by thousands of more heavily armored Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles in U.S. service, tens of thousands of this AM General design have entered the U.S. armed forces and about 45 other countries since the early 1980s. Designed as the successor to the iconic Willy’s Jeep of World War II fame, the 1.5 ton Humvee can carry a much greater array of modern weapons and equipment and has been produced in over twenty variants for the U.S. services alone, from utility transport, to ambulance, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, electronic warfare and weather station missions. The Humvee became a critical system to fulfill new U.S. Army doctrines of the 1980s that stressed greater mobility and firepower, and thousands were successfully used during the 1990-1991 and 1993 wars against Iraq.



Dong Feng Motors and Shenyang Humvees: A Dong Feng Motors production line for Humvees and a Shenyang Aircraft Corporation copy of the Humvee, with SAMs, seen at the 2004 Zhuhai Airshow. Source: Chinese Internet and RD Fisher


While the PLA was reportedly very impressed with the Humvee’s performance during the first Gulf War, its introduction to this vehicle predated that war. In 1988 AM General was reported to have displayed the Humvee at a military exhibition in Beijing.[4] Other Chinese sources have noted that the U.S. Government may have given China a small number in the late 1980s as part of early anti-narcotics cooperation. However, at the 2000 Zhuhai Airshow this analyst noted that a picture of a Humvee-like vehicle appeared in a brochure of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. And then at the 2004 Zhuhai show, an actual Shenyang copy was put on display, armed with the TY-90 anti-aircraft missile of Luoyang Optoelectric Technology Company. But by this time it was apparent that a second copy was also being produced by the Dong Feng Motors Company, called the EQ2050 "Meng Shi." This version was marketed at the 2005 IDEX show in Abu Dhabi armed with a turret equipped with FN-6 short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)[5] that almost copied the Boeing FIM-92A Avenger still in use by the U.S. Army.



China’s Avenger: A Boeing FIM-92A Avenger Humvee-mouted SAM carrier, seen in May 2008, and a Chinese facsimile, seen on a Dong Feng copy of the Humvee, in model form from the 2007 IDEX show. Source: RD Fisher


Despite repeated inquiries from 2005 onward, this analyst could not get a response from AM General officials regarding the reasons why two Chinese companies would be producing Humvee vehicles. This changed in early 2008 when on AM General official, on condition of anonymity, explained that the State and Commerce Departments sanctioned the sale and co-production of the civilian H-1 version of the Humvee for the Chinese market in the 1997 time frame. This led to a partnership with Dong Feng Motors. It is less clear that there was a formal relationship with the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. However, the official noted that AM General sells parts to both companies. This official also acknowledged that the PLA and the Chinese government are the main customers for these co-produced Humvees. So far it appears that Dong Feng may produce 1,500 copies but that has not happened yet. However, neither company has rights to sell versions to the civilian market. AM General had also received in 2007 a reconfirmation from the Commerce Department of its authorization to sell Humvees to the Chinese market.


Dong Feng “Humvees” In Tibet: A line of Dong Feng Motors trucks outside a Tibetian monestary, which includes versions of the Humvee. Source: Chinese Internet


Currently Dong Feng Motors appears to be the most active producer of Chinese-made Humvee versions. Dong Feng made Humvees apparently use a slightly more powerful diesel engine. One Chinese article suggested that if Dong Feng were to enlist other companies, it could produce up to 100,000 a year for wartime production.[6] So far Chinese-made Humvees have been purchased by Chinese Police departments, the PLA Marines, various PLA Army units to very likely include Airborne and Special Forces units. Dong Feng markets a version armed with a roof-mounted 23mm cannon and another Special Forces version armed with a automatic grenade launcher and a squad machine gun. Another version of the Humvee forms the carrier for 81mm automatic mortar[7] and a twin-23mm anti-aircraft gun, and are being used by a novel PLA "Mechanized" Special Forces unit. The Poly Technologies arms trading firm markets the "FB-6A Missile Launching Vehicle," which is armed with eight FB-6A man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) anti-aircraft missiles.[8] This vehicle is a virtual copy of the Boeing Avenger system. Inasmuch as Taiwan makes extensive use of several version of the Humvee, and has purchased 72 Boeing Avengers for Army air defense, the PLA’s growing inventory of Humvee copies presents many opportunities for surprise and deception operations against Taiwanese forces.



PLA Special Forces Humvee Variants: This variant Humvee chasis now carries a 81mm automatic mortar or a twin 23mm anti-aircraft cannon, as part of an effort to create a “Mechanized” or more heavily armed helicopter-portable Special Forces Unit. Dong Feng also makes a Special Forces variant (bottom) Source: Chinese Internet


Despite the capability that has been transferred to the PLA and the growing threat this presents to U.S. friends like Taiwan, AM General faces tough competition in the China military vehicle market from European automakers. The Italian IVECO designed NJ2046 produced by Chinese partner NAVECO is used by the PLA in several versions, including one for Airborne Forces. The PAP uses one IVECO van version as a mobile lethal-injection prisoner execution platform. Germany’s Mercedes Benz has several truck versions in production in China, and the PAP uses an armored Mercedes G-Class vehicle with an anti-sniper detection device.

Helicopters

As it has at various times during the Bush Administration there has been the suggestion that the U.S. relent on Tiananmen related sanctions and permit the sale of spare parts for the 24 Sikorsky S-70 Blackhawk helicopters sold to the PLA in the 1980s.[9] Most recently China requested these spare parts for humanitarian concerns related to the S-70’s role in relief operations responding to the devastating May 12, 2008 Sichuan earthquake. However, this idea has been repeatedly rejected, in large part due to the S-70s overt military role; this helicopter is regularly seen in PLA exercises carrying artillery and Special Forces vehicles. It will almost certainly be employed in any future operations against Taiwan—which also operates the S-70 and is seeking more.



PLA S-70s: The PLA’s Sikorsky S-70 Blackhawk contributed to relief efforts following the May 12 earthquake, and it could in the future carry Special Forces vehicles to help attack Taiwan. Source: Chinese Internet


However, in part due to pressure from the U.S. helicopter industry the Commerce and State Departments have relented in permitting sales of U.S. helicopters to "civilian" Chinese entities. In 2001 United Technologies subsidiary Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation sold S-76 transport helicopters to the Chinese Ministry of Communications, and in 2005 sold S-92 helicopters to China Easter General Aviation to support offshore oil drilling operations. In 2007 Sikorsky entered into a partnership with Chinese helicopter maker Change Aircraft Industries Corporation to co-produce S-76 airframes to support Sikorsky production.[10] In 1998 Sikorsky entered into a partnership with China’s AVIC-2 consortium to co-develop the larger S-92 helicopter, and it manufactures the tail of that helicopter. In 2003 Sikorsky established its Chinese partner "Shanghai Sikorsky," and in 2008 AVIC-2, though its subsidiary Change, became a shareholder of Shanghai Sikorsky.[11] Change also co-produces the Sikorsky-Schweitzer S-300, a lightweight training helicopter, which also formed the basis for U.S. Navy’s Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned helicopter.


Sikorsky S-92 Superhawk: Shown being delivered to a branch of China Eastern Airways, the S-92 is one of the most modern and capable helicopters in the world. Source: Chinese Internet


Another United Technologies subsidiary, the Pratt Whitney Canada aircraft engine maker, sold ten of its PT6C-67C helicopter turboshaft engines in 2000-2001 to assist the Chinese Medium Helicopter program of the Chinese Helicopter Research and Development Institute (CHRDI),[12] the chief designer of China’s helicopters. In 2007 Pratt and Whitney Canada claimed they thought they were assisting the "civilian" version of this program,[13] which had been thought to include the 5.5 ton WZ-10 dedicated attack helicopter, and a 6 ton utility helicopter based on the same drive train. The later has yet to materialize, while several prototypes of the Z-10 military attack helicopter are now flying powered by PT6C-67C engines. The Z-10 is about the same size and configuration as the Eurocopter Tiger, one of the world’s most modern and capable attack helicopters. Full production of the Z-10 powered by Pratt Whitney engines would give the PLA an unprecedented level of "aerial artillery" to support amphibious invasion and subsequent operations against Taiwan.



PLA Z-10 and United Technologies PT6C-67: A Pratt Whitney Canada turboshaft engine (top) powers the current prototypes of the PLA’s new sophisticated attack helicopter, which is comparable to the Eurocopter Tiger and as capable at Taiwan’s Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. Meanwhile, China is blackmailing U.S. helicopter makers selling to Taiwan. Source: Chinese Internet and RD Fisher


Bell Helicopter Canada, a subsidiary of the American Textron Company, sold its Bell-427 light helicopter in China after 2000, and in 2003 entered into a partnership with Hafei Aviation Industries to manufacture airframes for the Bell-430 helicopter.[14]

However, on a corporate or company level there is a thin-to-no distinction between selling to a "civilian" and a "military" entity in China. All of China’s helicopter companies perform either research and development or manufacturing for the PLA. While one might quibble that Sikorsky S-76 and Bell-430 airframes or S-300 helicopters are relatively low-tech, it is likely that China’s intelligence services have targeted these companies to ensure that Chinese companies benefit from data gathered in China, or via cyber espionage operations that could benefit from an understanding of corporate data bases. In addition, all U.S. helicopters sold to "civilian" Chinese entities are theoretically subject to emergency military mobilization. This was demonstrated in the response to the May 12 Sichuan earthquake when a S-76 helicopter sold to a "civilian" operator was used along with Russian Mil Mi-17s and European Eurocopter AS-332 helicopters sold to other Chinese "civil" operators.[15] These helicopters are equally likely to be used to support potential Chinese military operations against Taiwan, Japan and India.


Civil Helicopter Lineup: This lineup of Chinese civilian helicopters aiding earthquake relief efforts includes a Sikorsky S-76, an indication that the Chinese government could mobilize these helicopters for military missions against Taiwan as well. Source: Chinese Internet


As is the case with autos, American helicopter companies believe they must compete with Russian and European firms which gain political favor by selling helicopters and technology to the PLA. The PLA has purchased about 240 Russian Mil Mi-17I/V5 medium utility helicopters and has just entered a kit-based co-production agreement anticipated to add an additional 160 to its inventory over five years.[16] While Russia may hope to safeguard its technology,[17] it is apparent that Europe views the transfer of its helicopter technology as key to securing future helicopter market share. Eurocopter helped CHRDI design the drive train for the Z-10 attack helicopter.[18] Since 2004 Eurocopter and China’s AVIC-2 have proceeded with a co-development and co-production project to create a new 8-ton utility helicopters, called the EC-175 in Europe and the Z-15 in China. Its first flight is expected in 2009 and it is expected to be certified in 2011. A Eurocopter official told this analyst that they do not expect the Chinese military to use the EC-175.[19] But Eurocopter’s record is not encouraging; Eurocopter’s SA321, SA365, AS350 and HC-120, all co-produced in China, serve in the PLA, as the Z-8, Z-9, Z-11 and HC-120.

PLAAF Boeing B-737-300 Electronic Platform

At the November 2004 Zhuhai Airshow this analyst noticed a peculiar feature in a video presented by the Xian Aircraft Corporation. In a section of the video that showed newly built H-6 bombers outside the Xian factory, there was a Boeing B-737 jet transport with what appeared to be new fairings atop the fuselage. When the author asked Asian military contacts about this oddity there was a surprising report: China had converted two Boeing 737 airliners to serve as electronic control and monitoring platforms to support testing for new long range Land Attack Cruise Missiles. Subsequent Internet-source pictures of the aircraft revealed that new fairings has been placed on top of and on the bottom of the fuselage. Such a configuration could support a command and control or the suggested cruise missile test monitoring mission. A more recent Internet-source photo shows the aircraft to be part of a special PLA Air Force squadron equipped with other electronic and radar test aircraft.



PLAAF’s “Pirate” Boeing 737: A Xian Aircraft Co. video from 2004 offered the first indication that China had altered a Boeing 737 for military missions (top) and subsequent internet photos show this PLAAF aircraft has new fairings ontop and below the fuselage. Source: RD Fisher and Chinese Internet


In early 2005 officials in the State and Commerce Departments told Bill Gertz of the Washington Times that this PLA use of an American-made aircraft was under investigation. A State Department official reported to Gertz, "…commercial jets are permitted for export to China without a license, but that converting a civilian aircraft into a military jet is not allowed under U.S. export rules." This official then stated, "It is unquestionably true that these jets could not have been sold to the Chinese military without a presidential waiver, which is very unlikely," Gertz also reported that if China had violated U.S. export rules, "penalties could range from fines to the imposition of economic sanctions on China that would bar purchases of U.S. aircraft worth hundreds of millions of dollars."[20] However, three and half years later, there has been no action by the State Department or the Commerce Department reacting to this flagrant Chinese military employment of a controlled American technology. Instead, Boeing continues to sell its B-737 airliners to Chinese airlines, which now operate over 200. In March 2008 the Pentagon reported that China could have as many as 250 new Land Attack Cruise Missiles targeting Taiwan.[21] In early 2007 Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense reported that only 100 such PLA cruise missiles were deployed.[22]


PLA’s Boeing 737s In Regiment: This Chinese Internet photo from 2008 shows two modified Boeing 737s in a PLAAF regiment dedicated to radar and electronic warfare testing aircraft.


PLA Use of American Cargo Airliners for Military Operations

A more ominous use of American made airliners is the PLA’s regular incorporation of civilian airliners into military troop and cargo transport missions. It has long been known that the PLA uses China’s fleet of civilian airliners as a "reserve" air transport resource. These airliners have been used to perform troop rotations and are occasionally used in troop transport exercises. Following the May 12 Sichuan earthquake the PLA again used Boeing and Airbus airliners with China Southern and China Eastern airlines to make emergency shipments of personnel and material. These supplemented the use of PLAAF Ilyushin Il-76 and Xian Y-8 transports for the same missions. But then in mid-June, perhaps capitalizing on the need to hone emergency airlift mobilization, the PLA conducted another exercise in which PLAAF Il-76 and both Airbus and Boeing airliners were mobilized to move PLA Airborne troops.

However, there was a unique addition to this mid-June exercise: the use of at least one Boeing B-747F and one McDonnell Douglas MD-11F dedicated cargo transports. A cursory count of U.S. made cargo airliners used by Chinese airlines—which would now include Hong Kong’s airlines-- indicates that they have at least 31 Boeing 747F cargoliners of various models and 9 MD-11F models, for a current total of 40 cargoliners.[23] An Il-76 can carry about 48 metric tons while a Boeing B-747F-400 can carry about 55 metric tons. If one accepts current estimates that the PLAAF has about 20 Il-76 cargo transports, then the potential addition of U.S. made cargoliners could potentially treble the PLA’s air cargo lift capacity. But this is set to increase as Hong Kong’s Cathay Airlines has 16 Boeing B-747 cargoliners on order, and China Southern Airlines has six new Boeing B-777 cargoliners on order. Enlisting "civilian" cargoliners in potential operations against Taiwan would be very attractive to the PLA. These aircraft could concentrate on moving the wide variety of palletized cargo, from bullets to artillery rockets to beans, that would be needed to sustain light and medium weight tracked and wheeled armored forces that would be best moved by Il-76s. By using civilian cargoliners to build up weapons and supplies, PLA Airborne armored forces sent to capture a Taiwanese airport could quickly move from a defensive to an offensive mission.



PLA Cargoliners: A mid-June 2008 PLA mobilization exercise saw the first noted use of civilian Chinese Boeing B-747F and MD-11F cargoliners to help transport PLA Airborne troops and their equipment. Source: Chinese Internet


China’s Arms Embargo Of America ?

Despite the U.S. and European arms embargos of 1989 responding to the Tiananmen Massacre, an event for which the Chinese government refuses still to acknowledge responsibility or offer justice, China’s military is making flagrant and increasing military use of American and European dual use technologies. In the case of the PLA Air Force’s "pirate" Boeing B-737, the U.S. State Department and Commerce Department cannot even organize themselves to define and enforce American law. This aircraft has very likely made a major contribution to the development of the PLA’s now rapidly growing offensive cruise missile capabilities. Co-produced Humvees, Sikorsky and Bell helicopters, plus Boeing and McDonnell Douglas cargoliners all are available now to the PLA to undertake direct attack or deception operations against Taiwan.

But there is perhaps another lesson for American policy makers. Instead of quietly increasing its exploitation of this growing instance of American weakness, China’s leaders are instead pressing for their own "embargo," actually threatening American aircraft makers Boeing, Bell and Sikorsky that they cannot sell to the Chinese market if they sell new weapons to Taiwan. In mid-May Defense News reported:

"Over the past two years, China has threatened to stop buying commercial airliners from Boeing and civil helicopters from Bell Helicopter and Sikorsky if the companies continue to sell weapons and "advanced helicopter technologies" to Taiwan, sources said. Each of the companies stands to lose billions of dollars in potential orders, sources added… In 2006, China’s threats led Boeing to shutter its Taipei office and move the staff to Singapore, sources said."[24]

The fact of the matter is that China cannot yet make its own commercial/military high-capacity transport aircraft or even keep pace with helicopter technology without foreign assistance. This, however, could change dramatically in the next decade should Airbus and Eurocopter, either willingly or otherwise, give China the technology needed to make competitive aircraft that will form the basis for indigenous military versions. Yet the Chinese leadership believes that it is now strong enough to blackmail American aircraft corporations into forcing the American government into betraying a longstanding security interest in Asia: defending the democracy on Taiwan.

The regular and evidently intentional fudging of restrictions on dual use and other exports is most likely understood as manifesting the rarely-spoken but clear expectations that have set Washington’s expectations since the 1970s. These are first that whatever happens, China will sooner or later emerge as the supreme economic and military power in Asia. The second is that it is therefore essential for the United States to be friendly with that China, regardless.

Expert opinion is divided. Some believe China will indeed continue smoothly on her present course and that her neighbors will sooner or later acquiesce. The result will be a replication of the China-centered tributary system that, although it never existed in fact, was widely portrayed in traditional Chinese writings. Others see dangers ahead for China—not just popular unrest and the problem of keeping political control without elections or free speech, but also environmental degradation, waste of resources—and if China attempts to coerce her neighbors, the emergence of a powerful coalition to balance her.

For Washington to plump so firmly on one side of this debate, making little provision for internal problems in China or external adventures, is most unwise. For the moment, however, that seems to be the signal being sent to China by the White House.

Reading this, the Chinese see themselves as engaged in a classic test of will what they consider the declining power of the United States and its allies. Analyzing our policy choices, they see an increasing willingness to defer to their wishes rather than to consider the interests of Asia as a whole. Few things are more dangerous in international affairs than a state that expects to be able to step into a position of primacy, be it regional or global, more or less effortlessly—indeed with the hegemon-emeritus smoothing the way. That China would actually be able to assume such a position and that the United States would knowingly smooth the way are both most doubtful propositions. But if our actions, for example with respect to dual use technologies, have the effect of convincing China that we are packing up and leaving the field to them, and leading our allies to think that they will soon be on their own, the results are likely to be opposite to what Washington intends—and potentially conflictual.




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] H.R. 3792, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, (Considered and Passed by House),
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[2] See, "An E-mail Exchange between the Department of Commerce and the Center for American Progress," March 27, 2005,
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[3] Ibid.

[4] "EQ2050 High Mobility Utility Vehicle," SinoDefense.com, March 27, 2007,
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There are many English and Chinese language references to, and photographic coverage of China’s co-produced Humvees: "PRC HMMWVs," Wikipdeia,
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There has also been steady coverage of these vehicles in SinoDefence.com forum, China-Defense.com web page and Chinese language military issue web pages like CJDBY.com, Warsky, FYJS and Top81.

[5] Brochure, Poly Technologies, "FN-6 Portable Air Defense Missile System," obtained at the 2005 IDEX show.

[6] "Mengshi vehicles could have wartime annual output of 100,000," viewed on the War-Sky web page, June 28, 2008,
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[7] Christopher Foss, "NORINCO develops quick-firing 81 mm self-propelled mortar," Jane’s International Defence Review, July 2008, p. 12.

[8] Brochure, Poly Technologies, "FB-6A Missile Launching Vehicle," obtained at the 2007 IDEX show.

[9] "US has "no plans" to lift China sanctions," Agence France Presse, October 17, 2001.

[10] Elizabeth Keck, "China’s Changing Skies," The China Business Review, March-April 2001,
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"S-76," Deagle.com,
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Press Release, "Sikorsky Selects Changhe to Supply S-76 Helicopter," August 24, 2007,
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[11] "AVIC-II Joins Shanghai Sikorsky," China Aviation, February 8, 2008,
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[12] David Pugliese, "Canadian engine flies Chinese attack helicopter, sale OK’d for civilian version of helicopter, Pratt Whitney says," The Ottowa Citizen, October 18, 2007,
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for previous reporting see "Elementary Watson, There Is A Z-10," ShowNews, Farnborough 2004, July 19, 2004, p.16,
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Robert Hewson, "China’s Z-10 helicopter build on Western Expertise," Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 13, 2005.

[13] Pugliese, op-cit.

[14] "China, Canada to Jointly Manufacture Bell-430 Helicopters," People’s Daily, September 30, 2003,
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[15] Photos of these helicopters in the quake zone was posted on the FYJS web page on June 12, 2008,
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[16] Prasun K. Sengupta, "Mi-17 Deliveries On The Rise In Southeast Asia," Tempur, July 2008, pgs. 87-88.

[17] At the November 2007 Dubai Airshow a Russian source had noted their concern about protecting their helicopter technology in light of China’s blatant copying of the Sukhoi Su-27 as the basis of its J-11B fighter.

[18] Hewson, op-cit.

[19] Interview, Dubai Airshow, November 2007.

[20] Bill Gertz, "Conversion of jetliners in China draw attention," The Washington Times, February 1, 2005,
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[21] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report To Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 56.

[22] Bradley Perret, "Almost 1,000 Chinese missiles ranged against Taiwan," Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 29, 2007, p. 27.

[23] Numbers of U.S.-made cargoliners in Chinese, Macau and Hong Kong airlines from "World Airline Directory," Flight International, March 27, 2007, April 15, 2008 and April 22, 2008.

[24] Wendell Minnick and Vago Muradian, "China Threatens U.S. Defense Contractors Over Taiwan," Defense News, May 12, 2008.
 

flyzies

Junior Member
^ He makes it sound like as tho all those billions of dollars worth of contracts Boeing is getting from China is a bad thing for US! :rofl:
Im sure Airbus would love it if Boeing wasnt allowed to sell jumbos to China...
 

Baibar of Jalat

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Here he is linking China with the Taliban.

Seriously when US and China relations worsen people like him will appear on western media channels very regularly. At moment terrorist, middle east and islam experts tend to be regulars on TV. If I notice this to be the case, I be first to cry foul on attempts to demonise China.
 

crobato

Colonel
VIP Professional
The 737 does not seem to be PLAAF but rather used by the CCP itself. That aircraft does not appear to be fitted with anything that can be used by the military (e.g. surveillance radar) although it is fitted with satcom and communication links. However, communications equipment, no matter how sophisticated, can easily fall into the realm of civilian government use. Export provisions do not allow the use of airliners for military use but all forms of civilian use, including that of the government are allowed. Technically the aircraft is still civilian, it does not carry the logo of the PLAAF but instead the flag of the PRC. As far as my take of the aircraft, its like the PRC's version of Airforce One. There was a 737 that was meant to be Deng's presidential plane before, but after its overhaul in a Texas facility, Chinese intelligence found the aircraft to be bugged. I'm not sure if this is the same airplane.
 

crazyinsane105

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Here he is linking China with the Taliban.

Seriously when US and China relations worsen people like him will appear on western media channels very regularly. At moment terrorist, middle east and islam experts tend to be regulars on TV. If I notice this to be the case, I be first to cry foul on attempts to demonise China.

I especially like the part where he says anti-material rifles have found their hands in Iraqi insurgents, even though I haven't read of a single report claiming Iraqi insurgents have managed to get these weapons.
 
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