Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress Iran

planeman

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress Iran
Planeman 02/2008

fortressiranyp7.jpg


+ Pls note that this is amateur research and illustrations. Corrections and constructive feedback welcome.





TEHRAN
The nation’s capital is defended by static emplacements of area-defense SAMs and short range air-defense, and in times of tension or conflict may have additional mobile air defenses mobilized.


Area Air-Defense Systems
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SA-5 Gammon (S-200)
Iran declared the SA-5 long range missile system operational in 1997 and apparently now produces the missiles which Iran calls the “Ghareh”. There are 5 fixed SA-5 sites covering Tehran. Iran recently showcased an ‘optimized’ SA-5 but quite what that optimalizsation involves is not clear – although one can surmise that the existing SA-5 infrastructure must be sub-optimal in the eyes of the Iranian military ;)
sa5illustrationgr8.jpg

SA-5 coverage around Tehran (i]Source: Sean O’Connor)
sa5sitespo4.jpg


I-Hawk SAM
In 1983 Iran was reported to have 23 Hawk/I-Hawk batteries, ironically receiving extra missiles from Israel and US during the Iran-Iraq war.
hawkillustrationqo9.jpg


Four Hawk sites circle the south and west of the city, at about 20-30km from the city centre. Of these only the southern-most two appear active in Google Earth. A fifth active Hawk site is located at Mehrabad air base.
hawksitesom1.jpg

Hawk is a relatively mobile system and can be redeployed in times of threat. During the Iran-Iraq war Hawk was mostly employed close to the battle front in temporary emplacements. Similarly1990’s Iranian Hawk sites on the islands of Sirri and Abumusa are much more rough-and-ready than the older Western built Hawk sites in Tehran’s ring. What is significant however is that even though the system can be redeployed, the signature layout is maintained, although three launcher configurations are more common than the original six:
hawkabumusaac6.jpg

Coming back to the Tehran batteries, the west-most battery, although empty, is clearly built with only three firing positions:
tehranhawkrp6.jpg

To me, this suggests that this site was built by the Iranians after the revolution and reflects the initial spares shortages facing Iran in the 1980s and early 90s before local production had stabilized the Iranian I-Hawk community.



Standard SAM
Iran has reverse engineered the SM-1 Standard naval SAM missile and employs variants as both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems, possibly with the local name “Fajr”. The success and extent of service of the system is open to question, and it is thought that the Iranian Navy, who had fitted a Kaman class missile boat with the system after the retirement of the sole Babr class destroyer (Allen M Summer class FRAMII) which had carried 4 twin boxed launchers, and also trialed an air-launched anti-ship version, has retired the system. The reverse-engineered missile is claimed to have several enhancements including digital components allowing it employ different radar frequencies. In the SAM role the Fajar is fired from twin as per the SM-1 system on Babr, which are now mounted on an adapted I-Hawk SAM launcher. Performance is not known but is likely to be similar to the SM-1MR (RIM-66A Block-IV) naval missile, having a range of about 32km; significantly shorter than the I-Hawk.
standardillustrationai4.jpg

None of the identified I-Hawk sites on Google Earth appear to have Standard missiles and given the likely inferior performance compared to the I-Hawk it seems likely that the system has not been adopted in meaningful numbers if at all.


SA-6 Kub
The 1960’s SA-6 Kub mobile medium range SAM system was first introduced into Iranian service in 1990, and is (exclusively?) operated by IRGC-AF. In concept the system is a fully mobile area-defense system for maneuvering army brigades, but can be employed to defend fixed sites with the advantage of being able to redeploy to fresh sites frequently. Although the system was incredibly successful in the 1970s in Egyptian hands against Israel, it was far less successful in subsequent conflicts and although still considered a credible threat is no longer cutting edge.
sa6illustration1rv9.jpg



HQ-2B/ Sayyad-1/Sayyad-1a
sayyadillustrationot8.jpg

Iran first received Chinese HQ-2 (Chinese version of SA-2) SAMs during the Iran-Iraq war, possibly also with some SA-2s from other countries during that time. The system is generally regarded as obsolete and appears many HQ-2 sites are now empty, suggesting a general reduction in strength, but since 1999 Iran has produced an enhanced version of this system as the “Sayyad-1” and “Sayyad-1a”, which has an increased effective range of 50km (as per later HQ-2s) and possibly an improved warhead and elements of Hawk and Standard missile technology. It is probable that the Sayyad-1 is employed as an improved missile for existing HQ-2 sites rather than a complete stand-alone system.

There are four HQ-2/Sayyad-1 sites covering Tehran, forming a semi-circle around the on the South-west side of the city, positioned about 30km from the city centre. Only the western-most site appears active and it is possible that the southern three are remnants from the Iran-Iraq war. It is not possible to discern whether the missiles employed are Sayyad-1 or original HQ-2s, but I’ve drawn the arcs at 50km range of the Sayyad-1:
sayyadsitesie3.jpg


The active site is protected by seven 23mm AAA positions:
tehranhq2sm7.jpg

The 23mm AAA is however insufficient to cover the whole of the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s dead ground, leaving a significant opening for attacking aircraft /missiles to fly in under the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s altitude limits and then pop up 7-5km from their target for a diving attack that the ZU-23-2 would be almost powerless to stop.
sayyadsitecover1ix5.jpg

The combination of a relatively poor missile potency, particularly at short ranges and low altitudes, combined with the inadequate point defense and static installations makes the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM sites easy prey to cruise missiles and modern stand-off weapons. At the same time the sites themselves are not sufficiently valuable to warrant deploying SA-15 (Tor) or SA-19 (Panstyr) systems to shoot down incoming missiles.


S-300
Perhaps the longest running and most controversial rumor surrounding Iran’s air defenses is the supposed acquisition of advanced S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) SAMs from Russia. For years people have argued whether Iran has them but in recent months several fresh rumors and credible reports have rekindled the fire. On the one hand there has been a spate of credible reports that Iran is in negotiations with Russia for the comparatively advanced S-300PMU1 (SA-10D) system:
S-300PMU1 TEL:
sa10illustrationss2.jpg

Whilst this deal was being denied by some Russian Government sources, reputable defense news source Jane’s published an article claiming that Iran was in final negotiations to purchase two batteries of the older S-300PT (SA-10A) system from Belarus. The report was denied by Belarus, but accuracy remains unclear. The S-300PT is less capable than the S-300PMU1 and less mobile, using trailer launchers that require significant preparation to redeploy relative to the much more mobile S-300PMU1 which uses either a self-propelled Maz truck launcher (TEL, above) or a more mobile truck and trailer configuration. At first glance it seems that Iran is so desperate to upgrade its air defenses that it is willing to pay over-the-odds for surplus early-model S-300s, although it now seems probable that the ‘leak’ was a political ploy to spur the Russian government into finalizing the S-300PMU1 deal. Strangely China’s comparable HQ-9 and KS-1A SAM systems don’t seem to be in the picture. The satellite imagery below shows one of the Belarusian S-300PT batteries supposedly involved in the deal:
s300ptbelarsor1.jpg

The S-300PT uses the original trailer launchers without integral generator:
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planeman

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD)

Iranian SHORAD missile systems:
comprangeshoradcs3.gif


Lighter Air-Defense systems:
comprangelightzy1.jpg


Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
By far and away the most advanced and potent air defense system in the current Iranian inventory, the 29 Tor-M1 systems entering service provide a credible defense against cruise missiles, stand-off weapons and medium/low flying aircraft including fast jets. Their main weakness is that they are relatively short ranged and cannot reach the highest altitude bombers.
torm1illustrationpa3.jpg

Although the Tor was designed to provide organic air defense to maneuvering armored brigades, Iran’s greatest threat is perceived as pre-emptive air strikes on key installations, and it seems likely that at least some of the Tor systems are deployed around key strategic targets during times of tension.

The Tor system in Iranian service is not the most current Tor variant, but it remains a very formidable adversary.


Pantsyr S-1E (SA-19 Grisom)
In May 2007 Iran was reported to have purchased at least 10 Pantsyr S-1E combined gun/SAM systems from Russia via Syria, although subsequent delivery to Iran has yet to be confirmed. The Pantsyr system is extremely potent with similar anti-missile capability to the Tor-M1, but with more missiles (12 ready to fire vs 8) and two 30mm auto-cannons. The only noteworthy weakness of the system is that it is truck based and requires deployment of stabilizing legs to operate, thus making it inherently static in operation and thus cannot move to escape anti-radiation missiles, although it could conceivably shoot down the incoming ARM providing a measure of self defense.
pantsyrnd1.jpg

For the role of defending key facilities and cities Pantsyr is a better choice than the Tor-M1, so delivery of the Pantsyr may free up any Tors that are being used for static defense for their more fitting role as regular maneuver units.


FM-80/Shahab Thaqeb (Matra R440 Crotale)
Iran had attempted to purchase the Crotale (Rattlesnake) short range SAM system from the French in 1985 but appears to have been rebuffed. However, Iran subsequently purchased a number of FM-80 (HQ-7) Crotale short -range SAM systems from China and more recently succeeded in reverse engineering the system under the Ya-zahra project. There is speculation that Iran also captured French made Crotale units from the Iraqis, and it is possible that Libya, who also operate Crotale and where allied to Iran in the 1980s also supplied equipment and/or technology. The new system, which differs in use of the Oerlikon Sky Guard radar instead of the original French radar, is called Shahab Thaqeb. It is not clear what the operational status of either the Shahab Thaqeb or FM-80 systems s and they are rarely (if ever) paraded for the press or photographers in an operational state.
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Rapier SAM
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Before the revolution Iran had planned to mass produce the Rapier system under license, but when the regime change put paid to that only a small number of British assembled launchers had been delivered. The planned technology transfer required for local production had not taken place. Unlike other systems it is not thought that any extra missiles were delivered during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iranian Rapier systems were the original “Mk 1” system but with added ‘Blindfire’ tracking radars (sometimes retrospectively described as FSA; Field Standard “A”). This is essentially the same system that Britain used with modest (often over-stated) success in the Falklands war. However, several design flaws were found and subsequent modifications made, in particularly to increase the range, the addition of a warhead with proximity fuse. Iranian Rapiers however still use the non-warhead “Mk 1” missile that has to hit its target to inflict any damage (a “hittle” not a “miss-ile”…). Iran has developed local production of missiles and possibly fire units, but it is likely that the Rapier is not very widely deployed, not least because it is becoming obsolete, although some degree of operational service remains, evidenced by the routine inclusion of the system in military parades. Relative to the Shahab Thaqeb (FM-80) program the Rapier is much shorter ranged and has less modern electronics.

Iran experimented with a fully mobile Rapier system employing an all-terrain 8 wheel drive truck, with a distinctive tandem stepped cockpit reminiscent of an attack helicopters on the left hand side of the vehicle. There were four reloads in protective boxes on the back of the truck. It’s not clear if there was an additional search radar.
rapiertruckillustrationgp4.jpg

Although this variant improved mobility it reduced the arc of fire and for whatever reason does not appear to have made it into production.


Sky Guard / 35mm AAA
Iran purchased 24 SkyGuard systems before the revolution and primarily deployed them as point defense for air bases and other strategic targets. The AAA used is the Oerlikon ***-001 35mm twin mount. In 2008 Iran unveiled a reverse engineered version which appears virtually identical to the ***-001 and does not appear to include any of the design changes included in the later ***-002>005 types now in service. Over the years the serviceability of the SkyGuard radars probably deteriorated and other radar sets were substituted. More recently Iran has unveiled a new radar similar to the existing Feldermaus fire control radar for locally produced ***-001s, and possibly receiving upgraded Super Feldermaus radars from India . Although the ballistic performance and rate of fire make it by far the most potent of Iranian AAA systems, it is still reliant on manual aiming and firing, and lacks AHEAD or similar advanced ammunition.
35mmillustrationcp5.jpg


Although it is difficult to ID AAA from civilian satellite imagery, a fair guess can be made by using the relative size of the ‘blob’. The two main AAA pieces used by Iran are the Swiss ***-001 and Soviet ZU-23-2. When viewed from above the latter is much smaller, especially as the wheels are often removed if the gun is going to be sitting there for a prolonged period:
skyguardcompst9.jpg

Hawk SAM launchers are also about this size but these sites have a distinctive signature – as a rule if there are less than 5 or 6 ‘blobs’ then it’s not a Hawk site. FM-80 on the other hand would appear much larger whilst Rapier would be smaller than the 35mm AAA and would have a generator connected by a cable and control station(s) nearby.

Because the system comprises of a radar and two AAA guns, the site layout is typically triangular although there are several exceptions. A typical site layout is “A” shaped:
skyguardline1apd3.jpg

The radar position and gun positions are usually raised to improve the fields of view/fire.

The distribution of SkyGuard around Tehran can be divided into four groups; A, B, C and D:
skyguardtehranuq4.jpg

Group A approximately encircles the city centre, but is primarily sited at air bases. Because of the city centre is highly built up it is difficult for the AAA to have a full field of fire and it is possible that additional AAA would be sited on the tops of tall buildings in times of conflict.

Group B defends the alleged missile development facilities and is co-located with a cluster of lighter 23mm AAA. Group C defends a large oil refinery. Group D, which again is co-located with a cluster of 23mm AAA positions, protects the Parchin facilities.

Additionally there are several ‘possible’ sites although none appear to be occupied.


ZU-23-2 Light AAA
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Probably the main AAA weapon in terms of numbers employed, the Zu-23-2 is a reasonably effective weapon against low-flying targets at short range. It uses essentially the same gun as in the infamous ZU-23-2 Shilka but only two rather than four, thus having only half the rate of fire. The weapon is crewed and relies on the crew for alignment with the target, although the crew may be cued by radar. The strength of the system is its simplicity, but it is generally ineffective against fast moving targets such as missiles and provides little comfort against cruise missile attack. The system is usually deployed in single gun positions surrounding key installations.
 

planeman

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Secondary Light Air Defenses
In the event of a defensive war Iran would probably mobilize its reserve air defense forces and redeploy the army’s mobile air defense units around key targets including Tehran. Iran has numerous types of light/secondary air defenses including several locally produced and unique types.

MANPAD
Iran operates several types of man-portable air defense SAMs including the US made Stinger, and Chinese QW-1/2. All are broadly speaking similar. In general MANPADs are least threatening to missiles and fast flying jets, and anything flying above about 5km relative to the terrain. As such, whilst they are potent insurgency weapons, they do not present a significant threat against enemy bombers and missiles.

Misagh-1/2 series MANPADs
The Misagh-1 and 2 are based on the Chinese QW-1 and QW-11/18 respectively. The QW-1 is based on the Russian SA-16 missile but incorporates features of the US Stinger. The QW-11 and QW-18 are further enhancements. It’s not clear how different the Misagh series is from its Chinese parents.

Misagh-2 is widely deployed among infantry and light motorized units, but has also been developed into a twin pedestal mount that can be fitted to jeeps (typically Toyota derived designs) for enhanced mobility, targeting and crew comfort (and thus readiness). The mount has two missiles ready to fire with enhanced targeting and larger batteries to allow prolonged activation, thus reducing reaction time.
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Mobile 23mm AAA

Iran operates several 23mm AAA systems, the most potent being the infamous ZU-23-4 “Shilka” system imported from Russia. The ‘-4’ in its designation indicates the number of barrels. The Shilka has the gun in a turret mounted on a lightly armored tracked chassis, with integral fire control radar mounted at the back of the turret.
shilkaht9.jpg


The ZU-23-1 is, as the name implies, half a ZU-23-2 (note the -1 not -2). Actually that’s my name for it; I don’t think there’s a widely given name for this uniquely Iranian system. Although the twin barreled ZU-23-2 is frequently mounted on the back of a pick-up, doing so limits its field of fire because the cab gets in the way. The Iranians have sought to overcome this by reducing the weight of the gun so that it can be mounted higher up, and what better way to reduce the weight than to remove one of the guns?
ZU-23-2 mounted on a Toyota derived pick-up:
zu231illustrationmy0.jpg


Another peculiarly Iranian attempt to remedy the field-of-fire problem with vehicle mounted ZU-23-2s is to bolt them to the top of a commercial mini-van. As if that concept isn’t comical enough someone attacked them with a can of spray paint and the standard Iranian camouflage ‘splodge’ stencil. I promise you I couldn’t make this up…
zu232truckillustrationcnw4.jpg



12.7mm Light AAA machine guns
Iran operates several types of 12.7mm AAA, mostly for secondary defense of tanks and troop vehicles, but also as dedicated air defense guns. In the latter role the main type is the Russian ZPU-4 towed AAA:
zpuillustrationfo3.jpg

Although 12.7mm AAA can make a mess of unarmored helicopters, it is widely regarded as obsolete.
zpu4dshk8pd8.jpg

Despite this Iran has recently showcased an indigenous 8 barreled 12.7mm AAA piece using Iranian manufactured MGD 12.7mm machine guns, a copy of the Soviet DShK type and also used on Iranian T-72, mounted on a ZPU-4 carriage . Each gun can fire 600rds/min but only has a 50-70rd magazine. The system has an effective range of about 1.6km against aerial targets. The DShK series of machine guns was replaced in Soviet service by the NSV series in part due to the former’s relative inaccuracy. Although an eight-barreled gun is quite intimidating it is of questionable combat merit in the modern air defense picture.
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Other AAA
Iran also operate Soviet S-60 57mm and KS-19 100mm heavy AAA but these are pretty much obsolete.


Air mines
I don’t regard the tales of air mines (balloons filed with explosives) as credible. There are several flaws to the concept, not least that they can’t carry a meaningful fragmentation warhead, and are too low altitude. Also, timing explosions would be very difficult against maneuvering targets. Just thought I’d mention them though ;)
 

planeman

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Point defense of other high-value sites
Iran has several locations that Iranian military consider sufficiently high value to warrant permanent air defenses. These are typically sites associated with Iran’s alleged WMD programs.

The main point air-defense of these sites is the ZU-23-2 23mm AAA, although several also have SkyGuard sites. Defenses would also include man-portable SAMs.


Natanz, alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
4 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
12 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
25 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements) (plus 2 more several km to the south east)
4 x Unidentified AD positions, possibly RBS-70 SAM
2 x I-Hawk batteries (One 7km North and one 17km West)
1 x HQ-2/Sayyad-1 battery (21km north west)
natanzck2.jpg


The SkyGuard positions around Natanz are interesting because, if you look carefully, you can see that the radars being used at at least one of them is the original SkyGuard-1 system supplied to Iran in the 1970s, with the surveillance radar mounted above a round fire control radar:
natanzskyguardiz5.jpg

This is significant because it appears that Iran has replaced this radar with simpler fire-control only sets in many of the SkyGuard sites, presumably because of spares shortages for this particular system.

There are also several unidentified positions around the site, consisting of small ramps with no berms or sand bags around the position, and a small item on top (1-2m across), with another small items nearby.
rbspossm3.jpg

There is no real way to tell what these are – there are too few supporting positions to be Rapier etc. One possibility is that they are pedestal mounted MANPAD (man portable SAM) positions. Iran has several types of MANPAD including the locally produced Misagh 1 &2, but an intriguing possibility is that they are the remaining Bofors RBS-70 systems procured on the black market during the Iran-Iraq war. The RBS-70 is unusual in that it is laser guided making it very hard to jam. The early model RBS-70 that Iran is thought to have are relatively slow (mach 1.2) but have a range of about 5km and a maximum altitude of 3km.
rbs70illustrationfg4.jpg

Another plausible explanation for these isolated positions is infantry-detecting radar.

A closer look at the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM site to the north west reveals that although there is clear evidence of operational activity with missiles on their launchers and radar/command set up, it is also deployed at half strength with only three of the normal 6 missile positions occupied. This is a theme in Iranian SAM sites – I-Hawk batteries with only three firing positions (normal = 6), SA-5 sites with only two firing positions (normal = 6) etc. Also, although this HQ-2/Sayyad-1 site has 8 positions for light AAA (Zu-23-2 etc), none are occupied at the time of the satellite over-flight.
natanzhq2ih7.jpg



Esfahan, alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
5 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
6 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
13 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
esfahan1qt1.jpg


Examples of Esfahan’s Skyguard sites:
esfahan2go4.jpg

esfahan3qk4.jpg

esfahan4bg3.jpg



Bushehr, nuclear facility
Defenses:
1 x I-Hawk site adjoined to facility (empty)
3 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar (one only has one gun position occupied))
13 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
6 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
2+ empty AAA positions
bushehrmf5.jpg



Qushm Island, not-so-secret secret mini-sub base(?)
Defenses:
4 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
4+ empty AAA positions
23vay5l.jpg



Arak, alleged nuclear facility
Defenses:
2x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
7 x 35mm AAA (single gun emplacements)
23 x 23mm AAA (single gun emplacements) + 2 further north and one empty position
3 search radar positions
arak1ja2.jpg

Arak’s AAA positions are arranged in two concentric rings; the outer ring is more sparse and consists of 35mm AAA with the occasional SkyGuard and 23mm AAA sites. At least three well sited search radars are also positioned in this ring. The inner ring consists of 23mm AAA encircling the site itself.
A quick comparison between the facility’s two SkyGuard sites shows a stark contrast; the site on the left has a more permanent feel to it whereas the site on the right hasn’t even got the guns on raised platforms etc.
2i9meqs.jpg



Isfahan, alleged weapons facility
Defenses:
8 x SkyGuard sites (2 x twin 35mm AAA plus radar)
iranskyguard5zommedoutcvd5.jpg

All of the SkyGuard positions appear empty but are otherwise in perfect condition.
iranskyguard2wy1.jpg
 

man overbored

Junior Member
You know the US or one or two of our allies has all of these systems in their possession. I recall after Desert Storm seeing ZSU-23-4's by the rail car on a siding outside Oceanside CA in plain view. SA-6 ( the infamous "Three Prongs of Death" )? Check. SA-8 Gheko? Check. The Greeks operate Tor-1M and the Cypriots have S-300. Both are good allies of the US and Israel. Hawk is a US system, and the US Army used Roland in Europe. Crotale is French. Nothing Iran has is unknown to us and the Israeli's, so countermeasures to these systems all have been worked out some time ago. If you recall last summer the Swedes walked out of a Nato exercise in Greece when an Israeli Army unit showed up. The Red Force at Fort Irwin used to use Soviet tanks and IFV's until they wore them out.
If Israel chooses to do the deed in Iran, they will have over two hundred aircraft available with the range to make the trip, and the countermeasures to effectively suppress Iran's air defenses.
 

RedMercury

Junior Member
Huge assumptions there. Any competent designer will tell you that there is no security in obscurity, true security is when a system is invulnerable even when knowledge of how it works is known. You are also assuming the sensor systems in the Iranian air defense hardware have stayed still. If you allow western systems to advance in ECM technology in your speculations, how can you justify assuming the Iranians have not moved an inch in ECCM technology?
 

man overbored

Junior Member
Having access to those exact systems we know their operating parameters, and thus will be able to identify and counter them. I have news for you, there are people who can develop exact copies of threat radars and use these to train against. When I served ( '82-'89 ) there was a ridge out at China Lake with precise copies of Head Lights, Head Net C, Top Steer, Bass Tilt and Peel Group. These weren't stolen systems ( how do you steal a radar like Top Steer that was only fitted to the Soviet's best cruisers? ) but copies made by techs at the Naval Weapons Center so our pilots could train against a realistic threat. As far as I know they are still out there.
In the case of Iran's systems, each is something that is currently in the inventory of some Western allie of the US, including Tor-1M and S-300. There won't be any surprises when the Israeli's do the deed in Iran, just like the Israeli's took care of business in the Bekka Valley in 1982, incidentally in that instance the Israeli's weren't fighting Syrian pilots and anti-aircraft crews, but real live Soviet forces. Do you recall the box score from that one? 82 MiG's hosed and not one Israeli aircraft lost. Read up sometime how they bamboozled their anti-aricraft missile sites and destroyed them using decoys to draw a radar lock and ground launched anti-radiation missiles to take out the site's radar so an F-16 could destroy the missiles. Clever. One Israeli we were briefed on hit his missile site and as he pulled out a Syrian Mig crossed in front of him. He nailed it with a Sidewinder! We all wanted to know if he then went home and got, um, well, you know :)

Check oout the photo of this ridge. Any of the radars look familiar?

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Head Lights is the second system from the right( you are looking at the systems rear face, the four antenna are facing away from the camera ) and Head Net C is on the big tripod. There are more where that came from, and this is the public site, snicker. You're seeing the decades old stuff.
 
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crazyinsane105

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Having access to those exact systems we know their operating parameters, and thus will be able to identify and counter them. I have news for you, there are people who can develop exact copies of threat radars and use these to train against. When I served ( '82-'89 ) there was a ridge out at China Lake with precise copies of Head Lights, Head Net C, Top Steer, Bass Tilt and Peel Group. These weren't stolen systems ( how do you steal a radar like Top Steer that was only fitted to the Soviet's best cruisers? ) but copies made by techs at the Naval Weapons Center so our pilots could train against a realistic threat. As far as I know they are still out there.
In the case of Iran's systems, each is something that is currently in the inventory of some Western allie of the US, including Tor-1M and S-300. There won't be any surprises when the Israeli's do the deed in Iran, just like the Israeli's took care of business in the Bekka Valley in 1982, incidentally in that instance the Israeli's weren't fighting Syrian pilots and anti-aircraft crews, but real live Soviet forces. Do you recall the box score from that one? 82 MiG's hosed and not one Israeli aircraft lost. Read up sometime how they bamboozled their anti-aricraft missile sites and destroyed them using decoys to draw a radar lock and ground launched anti-radiation missiles to take out the site's radar so an F-16 could destroy the missiles. Clever. One Israeli we were briefed on hit his missile site and as he pulled out a Syrian Mig crossed in front of him. He nailed it with a Sidewinder! We all wanted to know if he then went home and got, um, well, you know :)

Check oout the photo of this ridge. Any of the radars look familiar?

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


Head Lights is the second system from the right( you are looking at the systems rear face, the four antenna are facing away from the camera ) and Head Net C is on the big tripod. There are more where that came from, and this is the public site, snicker. You're seeing the decades old stuff.

Umm...real life Soviet forces operating in Syria back in the 80s? Do you have any link or proof for that at all? I'm sorry but I do have to disagree with you on that one. You're basically saying the Israelis killed hundreds of Soviet advisors...and the Soviets in return did absolutely nothing in return, not even make a diplomatic complaint? Very hard to believe dude. The Israelis were fighting Syrians in Lebanon, whether it was on the ground or in the air. There were instances back decades ago between the '67 and '73 war that Soviet forces were engaged by Israelis, but those too were just minor incidents.

The SAMs the Syrians had weren't exactly the latest Sovie tech. Most of the latest Soviet SAMs were stationed in Europe. And yes, due to Syrian incompetence, they did end up getting toast in Bekka Valley. But you're forgetting the reason why the Syrian Air Force got involved. The Syrian Air Force was outdated and ill equipped against the IDF which had some of the latest aircraft. So why did the Syrian Air Force go against the IDF? Well, one reason was so the Syrian ground forces were able to escape relatively unharmed from Lebanon back to Syria. If it had not been the Syrian Air Force pretty much sacrificing itself, then the Syrian military would have been pounded senseless from the air. Second off, morale in the air force would have dropped dramatically as they would have seen themselves as useless if they did not get involved in the fighting. So yes, material loss wise the Syrians did get pounded from the air, but their ground forces escaped pretty much unscathed.

Lastly, the Serbians did an excellent job with their outdated SAM systems against NATO. They weren't able to score any direct kills (minus the F-117 and damaging another aircraft), but they did accomplish their mission by keeping the NATO aircraft busy enough to not damage their ground forces.

You do have to remember that its not just technology but also strategy that makes difference in wars, both short and long term. The Israelis, if they ever attack (I've been hearing this for the past four years now on a monthly basis), will not only have to deal with the SAMs but the IRIAF. Now can you honestly say that the IDF will be able to fool the Iranian SAMs, IRIAF, bomb whatever target they intend to hit in Iran, and get away safe and sound? Even one dogfight or SAM fired could make those aircraft lose a vital amount of fuel which they need to get back. It might as well be a suicide mission for the Israelis, there are just too many risks for failure.
 

man overbored

Junior Member
We were briefed on the Bekka Valley operation in one squadron I served in. We received the play by play of every single Israeli engagement. Our pilots wanted to know the exact engagement parameters used ( speeds, ranges, off boresight angles,altitudes, turn rates, etc. ) . It was outstanding training.
As far back as the so-called War of Attrition immediately following the 1967 War Soviet pilots began to show up in Egyptian MiG's. Soviet forces manned Scud batallions in Egypt, and operated some SAM sites. This is nothing new or secret, it has been public knowledge for a long time. In the Bekka Valley engagement Syrian and Soviet pilots flew together using standard Soviet ground controlled intercept tactics. Many of the controllers were Sovs. Our Elint recorded perfect Russian spoken with Russian accents by the combatants.
The motivation for the Israeli attack was the placement over a year earlier of Syrian SAM sites inside Lebanon proper. Israel developed innovative tactics and tested these out of view for a year before attacking. Operation Peace in Galilee,the invasion of Lebanon was the proximate reason for the attack. Israel knocked out the first 17 SAM sites in two hours! The Syrians were so confident of their SAM's ( and we called the SA-6 "Three Prongs of Death" for a reason back then ) that they cleared the skies over Lebanon of their fighters to give their SAM's a clear field of fire. Bad move. I think the other two SAM sites were "disrupted" as the Israeli's put it, the next day. There were two furious days or air combat that followed where Syria lost 82 jets to no Israeli losses. Do not underestimate how badly this shook the Soviet military. The MiG-21 and 23 were front line equipment in Soviet Frontal Avaition in 1982. The MiG-29 would not show up until mid-'83. The Soviets saw front line equipment operated with standard Soviet tactics, in many cases by Soviet personnel, fail utterly in the face of US built equipment operated with innovative techniques by the Isreali's
What happen in Bekka Valley was a first, the systematic dismantling of an integrated air defense system by the innovative application of air power. Syria lost every single SAM site in Lebanon. A few weeks afterwards Syria plopped yet another SAM site in Lebanon and when an Israeli RF-4 went to investigate is was ambushed. Another melee ensued in which more Syrian MiG's were lost. I believe the grand total was 87 or 89. The use of AWACS, jamming and anti-radiation missiles would set the stage for what happened in Iraq in 1991 and later over Serbia.
Lets talk about Serbia. Again Russian air defense systems failed. Nato lost two aircraft, an F-117 and a bit earlier an F-16. Serbia lost all but two of it's large long range air defense radars. Nato SEAD was so effective there was nothing to constrain Nato from using Serb airspace above 12,000 ft ( to avoid manpads ) as it saw fit. Btw, where was the Yugoslav Air Force and it's MiG-29's during this campaign? Nato forced Serbia to bend to it's will solely by the application of air power. No ground troops. Serbia was unable to use it's few remaining mobile radars as they knew the instant they lit it off it would draw an anti-radiation missile, some "victory" for Serbia.
 

Finn McCool

Captain
Registered Member
Great job planeman, I love the Bluffer's Guide series. This must have taken a lot of work, but its excellent. :china:

While Iran's cumulative air defences are probably enought to deter an Israeli attack for the aforementioned reasons (although I wouldn't bet on it, the Israelis have a history of defying expectations) it is certainly inadequate to resist a major US strike. Any US operation would suffer losses well within an acceptable margin.

A suggestion: The IRGC/Iranian military would be better off distributing and hiding much of its AAA arsenal. These guns don't have much use against jets in a conventional campaign, but they would be excellent for inusrgency purposes. Hundreds of 12.7mm and 23 mm guns all across the country in garages, the backs of commercial trucks, inside buildings, etc. would provide a major problem to itinerant helicopter traffic if the US were to invade. This would be in line with the Revolutionary Guards apparent policy of instituting a Gladio-like program to deter a US invasion.
 
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