JF-17/FC-1 Fighter Aircraft thread

Brumby

Major
If it uses a threat library, it would have to use DRFM. All signals are captured and stored in the DRFM, which is then compared to the threat library for identification. In addition to that, if it has a record mode for data collection for post flight analysis, then it absolutely would require DRFM to do that. Sometimes you don't have to announce that it has this and that, when something is already so ubiquitously obvious that its no longer worth mentioning.

You are confused between the general nature of threat libraries and the function of DRFM. They are not the same based on principle of identity.

In basic logic it is expressed as follows:
All dogs are mammals but not all mammals are dogs
All DRFMs are integral to the threat libraries but not all threat libraries have DRFMs

Their difference as explained by Fundamentals of electronic warfare.

upload_2020-1-2_17-37-30.png
and threat libraries
upload_2020-1-2_17-37-44.png

The function of DRFM as explained in the book "Introduction to electronic defense systems".

upload_2020-1-2_17-38-50.png

Basically in legacy EW systems, using repeaters were sufficient to jam or spoof. However against modern radars repeaters were no longer adequate. It is all about fidelity and effectiveness against modern threats.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
You are confused between the general nature of threat libraries and the function of DRFM. They are not the same based on principle of identity.

In basic logic it is expressed as follows:
All dogs are mammals but not all mammals are dogs
All DRFMs are integral to the threat libraries but not all threat libraries have DRFMs

Their difference as explained by Fundamentals of electronic warfare.

View attachment 56323
and threat libraries
View attachment 56324

The function of DRFM as explained in the book "Introduction to electronic defense systems".

View attachment 56325

Basically in legacy EW systems, using repeaters were sufficient to jam or spoof. However against modern radars repeaters were no longer adequate. It is all about fidelity and effectiveness against modern threats.


You cannot store signal information on the threat library itself. Threat library contains different signal information but it is written on Read Only Memory, or ROM. Do you know what a ROM is?

In order to do a bit to bit comparison between the signals, you have to capture the threat signal and store it in memory, which is DRFM. It is the same way as if you are collecting notes and information and you have to write it on some scratch pad. That scratch pad is your DRFM. The notes you have written is then compared to the threat library. ESM uses a lot of these, as it is needed to store a lot of ambient signals it collected, and then compare these signals to every entry in the threat library for a positive.

Modern monopulse radars using pulse compression and phase coherency techniques, which means just about every current modern radar working on the planet today, would use DRFM to store a copy of the waveform it emits, and then compare the echoes to the stored copy. It will only accept signals that are close to that stored copy within certain parameters, which is determined through coherent processing.

In order to jam or spoof monopulse radars using such, the spoofer needs to capture and store the threat signal into DRFM, then alter it which is called range gating or velocity gating, which will fool the threat radar with false information. The spoof signal looks sufficiently similar to the copy stored by the threat monopulse radar that the radar accepts it as a valid echo, yet the waveform is altered to give the threat radar false information about the target's range and velocity.

The one possible way the threat radar can beat DRFM spoofing techniques with range or velocity gating is even tighter phase coherency algorithms.

If you are in SIGINT, your use of DRFM is a bit different since your main mission is to collect data, namely previous undocumented forms of threat signals that you can add to your library. If you are certain the signal is a threat waveform, but it does not match to any entry in your threat library, it remains stored in the DRFM for post mission analysis and potential inclusion to the threat library once it is properly identified.

DRFMs are used in radars. They are also used with cellular communications. In cellular communications, a base station needs to remember all the waveforms by all the cellphones within its range. That's like a teacher being able to remember the faces and voices of each student in the class. As time goes on, the students in the class change, the teacher has to remember the faces and voices of the new ones and where they are seating, as the new information displaces and is written over the memory of the previous pupil. So these things are as common as you can find in your phones, base stations and more sophisticated wifi units.

Screenshot 2020-01-02 at 4.55.08 PM.png Screenshot 2020-01-02 at 4.57.06 PM.png
 

Brumby

Major
You cannot store signal information on the threat library itself. Threat library contains different signal information but it is written on Read Only Memory, or ROM. Do you know what a ROM is?

In order to do a bit to bit comparison between the signals, you have to capture the threat signal and store it in memory, which is DRFM. It is the same way as if you are collecting notes and information and you have to write it on some scratch pad. That scratch pad is your DRFM. The notes you have written is then compared to the threat library. ESM uses a lot of these, as it is needed to store a lot of ambient signals it collected, and then compare these signals to every entry in the threat library for a positive.

Modern monopulse radars using pulse compression and phase coherency techniques, which means just about every current modern radar working on the planet today, would use DRFM to store a copy of the waveform it emits, and then compare the echoes to the stored copy. It will only accept signals that are close to that stored copy within certain parameters, which is determined through coherent processing.

In order to jam or spoof monopulse radars using such, the spoofer needs to capture and store the threat signal into DRFM, then alter it which is called range gating or velocity gating, which will fool the threat radar with false information. The spoof signal looks sufficiently similar to the copy stored by the threat monopulse radar that the radar accepts it as a valid echo, yet the waveform is altered to give the threat radar false information about the target's range and velocity.

The one possible way the threat radar can beat DRFM spoofing techniques with range or velocity gating is even tighter phase coherency algorithms.

If you are in SIGINT, your use of DRFM is a bit different since your main mission is to collect data, namely previous undocumented forms of threat signals that you can add to your library. If you are certain the signal is a threat waveform, but it does not match to any entry in your threat library, it remains stored in the DRFM for post mission analysis and potential inclusion to the threat library once it is properly identified.

DRFMs are used in radars. They are also used with cellular communications. In cellular communications, a base station needs to remember all the waveforms by all the cellphones within its range. That's like a teacher being able to remember the faces and voices of each student in the class. As time goes on, the students in the class change, the teacher has to remember the faces and voices of the new ones and where they are seating, as the new information displaces and is written over the memory of the previous pupil. So these things are as common as you can find in your phones, base stations and more sophisticated wifi units.

View attachment 56327 View attachment 56329

The conversation isn't about the engineering of DRFM or its adoption beyond military application. I have no interest in it or else I would have joined an engineering forum - not here. The subject is about EW and DRFM and its state of adoption. We have only seen evidence of it rolling out on Russian planes in the last 5 years as per AWST article below that reported it.

upload_2020-1-2_19-38-22.png

Source : AWST Feb 17, 2014 Page 49

I have no interest that it is found in phones or wifi. If you have evidence of it in Chinese EW please share that information.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
You need to have an interest on civilian applications because military applications tend to long precede civilian applications. One rule of analysis is to survey industrial and technological potential in the civilian sector as that will give you a good basis of what to expect in the military sector. The reason why this was even brought up because certain players are deliberately not transparent with their military technologies, which means you need to make an estimate what they are capable of that they are not telling.

The telecom sector is extremely important because many of the applications it has also exist in the military sector. For example, TDOA techniques used by ESM to geolocate emitter sources are used by every base station to locate all the cellphones within its cellular range. Furthermore, the telecom industry takes it to the next level where these developments would circle back to the military sector.

The key word is sampling. Anything that does sampling which requires putting something in a stored state uses DRFM, emphasis on M which is Memory. Samplings in a resident state is required for the signal to be compared with a threat library.

Evidence rolling out of Russian airplanes what? That evidence is for items for export, not internal use. In Russia, things happen for internal use long before they are allowed to be exported. I am not confident with the state of Russia electronics and they could be using smuggled foreign FPGAs like Xilinx for a while. Those export items could be using Chinese chips. What they are rolling out is already in an advanced state that they can hope to jam AMRAAM and other things. Russian ECM has been problematic in Syria. You cannot make this leap without taking some earlier steps first.

Furthermore, if the Russians are using Chinese chipsets, what would you think the Chinese have for their own use? Like the Russians they take care of the domestic requirements first which gets the best of everything, and you export the what's left. The export is not likely to be as good as the domestic stuff.

The moment the Chinese and the Russians developed monopulse radar with coherency, you can bet they are already using DRFM for pulse and waveform sampling needed for these radars. The next easy step would be developing what you need to jam a monopulse radar because it takes one --- the knowledge of making a monopulse, pulse compression, fully phase coherent radar --- to defeat one.

Screenshot 2020-01-02 at 6.59.07 PM - Edited.png Screenshot 2020-01-02 at 7.01.13 PM - Edited.png 200452714545719.jpg
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
If you go back to the topic of the JF-17, you can betcha the AESA radars are pulse compression, phase coherent, and the EW equipment to have DRFM and is meant to defeat monopulse radars operating with coherency. You should expect that as the baseline. What differs mainly is the parameters, or in particular, what the Chinese is willing to share with the Pakistanis in terms of the signal library because that is your real treasure. The library is the content, without it, its like Netflix without the shows.
 

Brumby

Major
You need to have an interest on civilian applications because military applications tend to long precede civilian applications. One rule of analysis is to survey industrial and technological potential in the civilian sector as that will give you a good basis of what to expect in the military sector. The reason why this was even brought up because certain players are deliberately not transparent with their military technologies, which means you need to make an estimate what they are capable of that they are not telling.

The telecom sector is extremely important because many of the applications it has also exist in the military sector. For example, TDOA techniques used by ESM to geolocate emitter sources are used by every base station to locate all the cellphones within its cellular range. Furthermore, the telecom industry takes it to the next level where these developments would circle back to the military sector.

The key word is sampling. Anything that does sampling which requires putting something in a stored state uses DRFM, emphasis on M which is Memory. Samplings in a resident state is required for the signal to be compared with a threat library.

Evidence rolling out of Russian airplanes what? That evidence is for items for export, not internal use. In Russia, things happen for internal use long before they are allowed to be exported. I am not confident with the state of Russia electronics and they could be using smuggled foreign FPGAs like Xilinx for a while. Those export items could be using Chinese chips. What they are rolling out is already in an advanced state that they can hope to jam AMRAAM and other things. Russian ECM has been problematic in Syria. You cannot make this leap without taking some earlier steps first.

Furthermore, if the Russians are using Chinese chipsets, what would you think the Chinese have for their own use? Like the Russians they take care of the domestic requirements first which gets the best of everything, and you export the what's left. The export is not likely to be as good as the domestic stuff.

The moment the Chinese and the Russians developed monopulse radar with coherency, you can bet they are already using DRFM for pulse and waveform sampling needed for these radars. The next easy step would be developing what you need to jam a monopulse radar because it takes one --- the knowledge of making a monopulse, pulse compression, fully phase coherent radar --- to defeat one.

View attachment 56332 View attachment 56333 View attachment 56334

Do you have information of DRFM incorporated unto Chinese EW suite on fighter planes - yes or no? The entire conversation is about how this may cascade to JF-17 in Block 3. It is not about a meaningless debate over the engineering of DRFM. Can't you even keep it simple and to the point?

PS. Sorry Deino. Did not see your warning above. This post will be my last.
 

timepass

Brigadier
PAKISTAN AERONAUTICAL COMPLEX INAUGURATES THE NEW SYSTEM INTEGRATION FACILITY.

81755748_1399767676864405_8017471986097717248_n.jpg


On 27 December 2019, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) inaugurated a new integration facility aimed at installing, testing and qualifying onboard electronics and weapons to the JF-17 Thunder.

The integration facility will work under PAC’s Avionics Production Factory.

The new integration facility would allow it to integrate avionics and weapon systems of choice to the JF-17.

With an integration facility at PAC, the PAF should be in a position to develop a custom subsystems and weapons package for the JF-17 and will not need to select an end-to-end ‘stack’ from only one supplier, which was the case for the Block-I and Block-II when it was left with choosing a package from France or China.

Moving forward, the PAF can set-up its own package comprising of a mix of Chinese, European, Turkish, and domestically produced subsystems and weapons. That said, the PAF had already started working on integration work on the JF-17, having added a stand-off weapon (SOW) to the platform in 2017 and 2019.

The integration facility is a sign of the PAF taking more ownership of the support of the JF-17. This facility joins a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) site at PAC for the aircraft, and an RD-93 engine overhaul capability at Air Engineering Depot 102 at PAF Base Faisal (AIN Online).

The launch of the new JF-17 integration facility comes ahead of the scheduled roll-out of two JF-17 Block-III fighters in 2020. The first two JF-17 Block-IIIs will likely be used for integrating, testing and qualifying air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions as well as electronic subsystems to the fighter. With 12 JF-17 Block-IIIs slated for 2021, it is likely that the first Block-III squadron will come online by 2022.
 

asif iqbal

Lieutenant General
Good to repeat the news of the block iii

yes 2 this year and 12 year after as per previous rumour or news

this year PAC will continue JF17B and flight testing of block III

they can make PAC even more busier if they can fully establish upgrade facility

that’s upgrade not overhaul big difference

so overall

8 x JF17B in 2019
14 x JF17B in 2020 with 2 x JF17A Block 3 = 16 Total
4 x JF17B in 2021 with 12 x JF17A Block 3 = 16 Total
Then 2022-23 we see 16-18 x JF17A Block 3

to complete Block 3 in 2023

2023 will also mark the 20th anniversary of the first flight of the JF17 over the parade day in March 2003 when I sat and watched in excitement the JF17 on TV over the sky’s of Islamabad
 
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