Future PLAN orbat discussion

PanAsian · Jun 2, 2019

Bltizo said:
Another rather poor SCMP article from Minnie Chan, this time about the Navy's surface fleet.

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Among the many doubtful claims and illogical claims made, the most curious thing is that her "military source" also said:

That statement would only make sense if the plans for ordering 8 055s had not yet been made, however we already know that 4 055s are in the water (two from JN and two from DL each), and based on pictures from the recent past we can confirm that two more 055s are in construction at DL (one in the drydock with the hull mostly finished awaiting topside structures, and one whose modules were alongside the dock in the staging area and awaiting assembly).
Furthermore based on pictures of JN, we are able to ID at least one hull under the mobile covers consistent with at least one 055 being assembled as well (i.e.: JN's third 055 at least).

Put altogether, this means we have 6-7 055s in various stages of work that we can see, if not 8 or more.
Furthermore we've had statements from fzgfzy in the recent past that we may see the 9th and 10th 055 this year (presumably in module form).

So all in all, even based off the minimum estimate of 6-7 055s being confirmed, it seems very unlikely that 8 055s have not already been ordered many years ago, and should be well beyond the "plan to build" stage of decision making.

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But I do think now may be a good time to do some basic arithmetic for what kind of surface combatant fleet the PLA may want for its future navy post 2030.
For a high end conflict, I imagine the PLAN will want to concentrate its forces in the pacific with the ability to fight open ocean battles, naturally which will require carriers among the multi-domain force. Let's say the PLAN wants to field 4 carriers at once in a semi-surge manner in the pacific (i.e.: its home turf). I believe that will require a peacetime fleet of 6 carriers of which almost all 6 will be mostly based at home and training to have high readiness for a high intensity conflict near home. Occasionally one may be deployed abroad such as to MENA for short durations. That means a 2/3 availability rate for a high intensity conflict close to China's doorstep given my deployment concept.

I believe the PLAN will also want to have a number of supporting surface action groups to support their 4 carrier groups; let's say 4 SAGs and 4 CSGs. These forces will be the primary "open ocean" force that the PLAN will rely on in a high intensity conflict in the western pacific.

During peacetime, I believe a normal PLAN CSG could be composed of 1 055, 2 052D/E, and 2 FFGs (054A or 054B). But during high intensity war, I believe the escort component may be doubled to 2 055s, 4 052D/E, 4 FFGs.
A PLAN wartime SAG would be composed of 2 055s and 4 052D/Es.

Using the 2/3 deployment concept again, and using my concept for the PLAN to deploy 4 wartime CSGs and 4 wartime SAGs, we would see the PLAN as needing at least this number of large destroyers, destroyers and frigates:
6 x (2 055 + 4 052D/E + 4 FFG) = 12 055 + 24 052D/E + 24 FFG for 6 CSGs (of which 4 will be deployable)
6 x (2 055 + 4 052D/E) = 12 055 + 24 052D/E for 6 SAGs (of which 4 will be deployable)

Adding that together, we get 24 055s, 48 052D/E + 24 FFGs, to allow 4 CSGs and 4 SAGs to be deployed (out of 6 CSGs and 4 SAGs).

However, I would consider this to be the "minimum" requirement for such a fleet concept, because these 4 CSGs and 4 SAGs will be the primary open ocean combat forces.
Let's call these 6 CSGs and 6 SAGs, the "beyond 1st island chain force," or "B1F".

The PLAN will obviously still require a number of ships to patrol and monitor waters closer to China's shores, let's call it the "within 1st island chain force" or "W1F".
The composition of the W1F will likely be far more tilted towards corvettes, FFGs and medium DDGs with only a small number of large destroyers, as they can rely on land based air power and missile power far more than the B1F.
Again, using the 2/3 deployment concept, I would posit such a fleet for the W1F:
30+ FFGs, of which 20+ will be deployable
10+ 052D/Es, of which 7 or so will be deployable
6+ 055s, of which 4 or so will be deployable
60+ corvettes, of which 40+ will be deployable

That provides a deployable W1F orbat of 20+ FFGs, ~7 052D/Es, 4 or so 055s, and over 40 corvettes, which I believe when supported by land based air power and missile power (as well as SSKs), would provide a viable and secure "home fleet" to guard the naval "rear" so to speak.

Putting all of those numbers together, when we consider the overall surface combatant fleet requirement for that high intensity conflict, we get:
B1F: 24 055s + 48 052D/Es + 24 FFGs
W1F: 6+ 055s + 10+ 052D/Es + 30+ FFGs (+ over 60 corvettes)

That is a fleet total of:
- 30+ 055s
- 50+ 052D/Es
- 60 FFGs (rounded up from 54+)
- (and 60 corvettes)

Of the blue water combatants (055s, 052D/Es and FFGs), that is a ratio of about 3:5:6.

Now, the deployment concept I listed above is inherently flexible to allow some of the B1F and W1F components to do other jobs, for example one of the B1F's SAGs and some elements of the W1F could be deployed to escort LHDs and LPDs for an amphibious assault if necessary.
Similarly, during peacetime low intensity operations, a fleet of 30+ 055s, 50+ 052D/Es and 60 FFGs will obviously be able to escort a number of CSGs or ARG/ESGs for power projection missions when using a peacetime escort concept.

However I think the PLAN's overall future surface combatant procurement rationale will be dictated by the "high intensity pacific" requirement whereby during peacetime the majority of their fleet is kept at home, where they will spend the majority of time training and at port kept at high readiness and sometimes sortieing for limited duration in the pacific.
Only a small percentage of the overall fleet will be deployed beyond the pacific at any one time for extended duration.

But I suppose the key numbers I've come up with are: 30+ 055s (of baseline and future variants naturally), 50+ 052D/Es, 60 FFGs. Depending on the trajectory of Chinese economic fortunes, I can envision such a fleet being operational by the mid 2030s.

Assuming they retain the same 6 DESFLOT structure between the three fleets, each DESFLOT will be composed of about:
- 5-6 055s
- 8-9 052D/Es
- 10 FFGs

Note, the above numbers and concepts are obviously my own idea and I'm certainly not suggesting that the PLAN "will" build that number of ships. But I think we are at a stage of PLAN advancement that it is reasonable to start thinking 10 or 15 years ahead. It would be no different to being in 2005 and thinking what the PLAN of 2020 may be like.

Some time ago when a similar discussion was going on I think I followed similar logic and arrived at slightly lower numbers for a slightly nearer timeframe.

Despite the seeming necessity of operations further afield I think the PLAN will still focus on defending mainland China and winning a conflict over Taiwan even in a worst case scenario. Now that PRC-US relations are clearly headed way downhill I think missile defense will become more of a driver for the PLAN thereby upping 055/A and 052D/E numbers instead of what might have been 054A/B's. It is more likely now that there will only be a 052E and no 054B.

Blitzo · Jun 2, 2019

PanAsian said:
Some time ago when a similar discussion was going on I think I followed similar logic and arrived at slightly lower numbers for a slightly nearer timeframe.

Despite the seeming necessity of operations further afield I think the PLAN will still focus on defending mainland China and winning a conflict over Taiwan even in a worst case scenario. Now that PRC-US relations are clearly headed way downhill I think missile defense will become more of a driver for the PLAN thereby upping 055/A and 052D/E numbers instead of what might have been 054A/B's. It is more likely now that there will only be a 052E and no 054B.

The fleet I describe would be intended to fight a full scale high intensity conflict in the western pacific; i.e.: against US forces deployed to the pacific as well as any additional redeployed forces from other theaters.
Such a conflict could certainly be precipitated by a Taiwan contingency, but the purpose of such a fleet (in conjunction with land based air power and missile power) would be to do far more than merely defend the mainland in the first island chain but to be able to strike at naval and land based targets and project robust airpower well into the 2nd island chain if not beyond.

Some Chinese big shrimps believe an 054B will still be on the cards; whether it will still be appropriate for the PLAN really depends on what its capabilities and characteristics are like.

PanAsian · Jun 2, 2019

Bltizo said:
The fleet I describe would be intended to fight a full scale high intensity conflict in the western pacific; i.e.: against US forces deployed to the pacific as well as any additional redeployed forces from other theaters.
Such a conflict could certainly be precipitated by a Taiwan contingency, but the purpose of such a fleet (in conjunction with land based air power and missile power) would be to do far more than merely defend the mainland in the first island chain but to be able to strike at naval and land based targets and project robust airpower well into the 2nd island chain if not beyond.

Some Chinese big shrimps believe an 054B will still be on the cards; whether it will still be appropriate for the PLAN really depends on what its capabilities and characteristics are like.

A 054B with universal VLS and stronger AA capabilities can conceivably eventually replace the 056 family if the PLAN has the budget and manpower, the escalated threat level is already there to warrant it. If the PLA is able to maintain its overall MAD deterrence effectiveness (both nuclear and conventional) without lapse during significant worldwide military technological change within the same timeframe then perhaps that won't be necessary.

Blitzo · Jun 2, 2019

PanAsian said:
A 054B with universal VLS and stronger AA capabilities can conceivably eventually replace the 056 family if the PLAN has the budget and manpower, the escalated threat level is already there to warrant it. If the PLA is able to maintain its overall MAD deterrence effectiveness (both nuclear and conventional) without lapse during significant worldwide military technological change within the same timeframe then perhaps that won't be necessary.

I think an 054B similar to what you describe would be more appropriate for blue water operations to support PLAN open ocean operations (as well as to operate closer to home).
054Bs would be entirely overkill to replace 056s; I see 056s as being manned patrol vessels not meant to operate far beyond China's own waters, where they rely on their large numbers and ASW suites to support monitoring and defense missions while supported by a number of 054A/B and a smaller number of 052D/E and 055 at home.

Tetrach · Jun 2, 2019

China can easely be blocked from the high seas as its shores open to confined spaces like the and Philipines and South China seas, which are perfer for submarine operations. Against such threats and in such situation those 056s can be mobilized en masse to cover exiting convoys and hunt down enemy submarines around those regions.
That been said in the high-end (past 2020) I don't see the need for an intermediate rank composed of frigates in the chinese navy. a upgraded 056 class and the duo 052/055 can do the job without diverting ressources on such vessels.

Blitzo · Jun 2, 2019

Whether the PLAN chooses to continue with a frigate class in the future I think will depend on what the balance of capabilities and cost a future 054B may offer compared to 052D/E.

For example the USN's pursuit of FFGX shows even they see the relevance of a capable frigate design to complement their larger surface combatants.
Additionally, people like fzgfzy are continuing to say that they expect 054B in the future, so for the moment I think projections of future PLAN surface combatants should be made with the assumption that an 054B class will emerge in some form, until a day where it can be overturned.

gelgoog · Jun 2, 2019

I think they need to upgrade the 056s to have ASW capabilities or build more 056As.

One issue with the 054A frigates is the vertical launch system being different from that on the destroyers.
That likely will lead to weapons commonality issues in the future.
I think that alone is a major reason to make the 054B.

I suspect they won't stop building the frigates. They aren't being built on the same shipyards as the destroyers so there is no overlap in production facilities. So shifting production from frigates to destroyers might simply not be possible. Plus given current tensions why should China reduce its naval construction speed? If anything I suspect it will increase with the new submarine and carrier construction shipyards which were built in the last couple of years.

Tam · Jun 3, 2019

I would think that given the tension, and the increased preoccupation with the "clash of civilizations", the CCP would push the PLAN into building more ships, accelerating build up plans and become even more ambitious in their scope. I would have thought there might be a problem of recruitment with Chinese millennials wanting to be engineers, become factory owners or work in tech companies, but an ensuing wave of patriotism may bring a tidal wave of recruits to the PLAN. Manpower might be the biggest bottleneck to expansion and that maybe getting solved.

The problem of trying to estimate what PLAN 2030 would be is trying to figure out and estimate what the 052E and the 054B would be, and how capable are these ships? Right now the 055 and the 052D might be the most capable ship by the Yuan, and this can mean the gravity of construction would point to that. So we might be expecting, wishing, hoping, we may see more 055s to cover up the technical deficiencies of the lesser ships. But when we finally know what the 052E and 054B might be more precisely, and think the PLAN may get more bang out of the yuan with these, the composition might shift.

One issue with the 054A frigates is the vertical launch system being different from that on the destroyers.
That likely will lead to weapons commonality issues in the future.
I think that alone is a major reason to make the 054B.

The hot launched VLS and the U-VLS are not mutually exclusive. Its possible to have a ship with different VLS systems. Like this one, the Admiral Grigorovich class. This ship has the same displacement as an 054A. It has 24 VLS specific to the Shtils, which is the equivalent to the HQ-16, and 8 UKSK VLS, which is equivalent to the U-VLS. Having a mix of VLS allows you to use a smaller VLS system to save space. The HQ-16 is deeply undersized for U-VLS, but may not be small enough to quad them into a single U-VLS cell.

A ship that can use both HQ-16 and HQ-9 would be burdened by the issue in which both missiles would require separate target illumination systems, unless both missiles are of the versions that would use active radar homing, especially when it comes to the HQ-16. But you can make all these moot too by having a new missile that can quad pack into the U-VLS and relies on active radar homing. But beyond the SAM issue, the U-VLS is also vastly overfit for the current ASROCs the PLAN use.

I myself would like to speculate on what the 054B and 052E might be, or what they should be, and from there, build the fleet numbers from that.

AndrewS · Jun 3, 2019

PanAsian said:
Some time ago when a similar discussion was going on I think I followed similar logic and arrived at slightly lower numbers for a slightly nearer timeframe.

Despite the seeming necessity of operations further afield I think the PLAN will still focus on defending mainland China and winning a conflict over Taiwan even in a worst case scenario. Now that PRC-US relations are clearly headed way downhill I think missile defense will become more of a driver for the PLAN thereby upping 055/A and 052D/E numbers instead of what might have been 054A/B's. It is more likely now that there will only be a 052E and no 054B.

Agreed, but until we see lasers or railguns in widespread service, high-cost missile defences are going to be at a disadvantage to lower cost offensive missiles.

And in the Western Pacific, China is better off with missiles launched from low cost trucks on the Chinese mainland.
Low cost Tomahawk/CJ-10 class missiles or more expensive DF-26/DF-15 class missiles would be able to reach all the military bases in the Western Pacific
But China's inventory of these missiles is still very modest.

Given the deteriorating strategic environment and the modest 2% of GDP that China spends on the military, I reckon we're going to see Chinese naval construction accelerate from today.
And if we see this happening, it likely means an even larger increase in longer range Chinese missiles being deployed.

But what is the purpose of such a military buildup?

When I look at the geopolitical situation, the key to the US position in the Western Pacific is Japan.
So what would it take to deter Japan from following the USA military in a war against China?

Japan really doesn't want the USA and China in conflict, because it knows a smaller Japan will end up a military/economic battleground.

So let's say China decides to match the US inventory of 4000 Tomahawk and 2000 LRASM type missiles in the next 10 years. I reckon that would cost around $8Billion per year, which is easily affordable.

That would give the Japanese leadership serious pause as to following the US.

Lethe · Jun 3, 2019

China can't threaten its way to a harmonious relationship with Japan. Any such behaviour would only drive Japan ever further into the US camp. Irrespective of what happens with the US, Japan and China will be neighbours forever, and Beijing should focus on laying the politico-diplomatic foundation for a harmonious relationship with Japan in the post-American era built upon a foundation of mutual respect and mutual interests.

Future PLAN orbat discussion

PanAsian

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

PanAsian

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

Tetrach

Junior Member

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

gelgoog

Brigadier

Tam

Brigadier

AndrewS

Brigadier

Lethe

Captain