China Navy Power

Chengdu J-10

Junior Member
The US won the cold war but still has major insecurities. It's military is a Rolls Royce and it worries about China's Hyundai. It wonders why some hate them just because they have believe in democracy and freedom but know little what their CIA has done in other countries. It blames China for selling goods cheap to them and is unappreciative when China lends them cheap money so they can go into Iraq - like you blaming your banker for making it so easy for you to borrow rather than you cutting back your spending. It provides nuclear know-how to India (which hasn't signed NPT) but prevents the EU from selling hi-tech arms to China. It flies spy planes around you and supports Taiwan (when is it democratic to say that 20 million people override 1,300 million. Is possession 90% of the law?). It tears up the ABM treaty and wants Starwars. It has several carriers and are still worried about one rusty Varyag! It calls North Korea and Iran axis of evil and then wonder why these countries want the bomb? .... I digress.

Back to navy. Forget aircraft carriers, subs are the future.
EU selling hi-tech arms to China? It won't even let normal standard arms be sold to China. If the nation isn't an ally with the US then it is its enemy. People think that China is going to take over the world once it get some carriers in their naval inventory. This is the image given to the public through constant US babling about the threat of the growing China is to make the image of China a non trusting ally to other nations. So that if China wants to ally with them they will get a bad image in their minds due to US announcements on some Chinese development and acquirment.
 

Sea Dog

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Having look at AB and 171, I just can't see how you can argue AB will have a lower RCS than 171 on any angle, but that's my opinion.

I'd agree with you on the side profile. But from angles coming from 45 degrees or more of elevation, I think the Arleigh Burkes have a much better reduction in radar return. I'm looking at angles and clutter topside. And again, both these ships are coming at the same problem with a different solution. Arleigh Burkes didn't intend to necessarily hide itself from active radar sources. But wish to look like something else. Whereas 052C seems to want to hide from radar as much as possible. I'm just saying, IMHO, that at elevations greater than a certain degree, Arleigh Burkes have a better profile. At lower angles, 052C probably does better. Depending whether or not they applied the technology correctly. For the sake of argument, we can say they did.
 

BLUEJACKET

Banned Idiot
And my point from start was that 1 carrier group sent by PLAN has to be able to defeat multiple carrier groups sent by IN ..
Excellent reason to retain the VLS on Varyag & future CVs for ASMs!
The Kuznetsov [and also Varyag] does not have a takeoff catapult, and its Su-33 fighters cannot take off with any heavy payload or at full fuel capacity. The Kuznetsov fighters cannot bomb land targets or attack enemy ships: They carry only light air-to-air missiles to intercept enemy planes. The Kuznetsov also has long-range S-300 anti-aircraft missiles and was built primarily to defend ships and submarines at sea against NATO air supremacy, while its helicopters can attack enemy subs.
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Actually, the F-15 was developed as a responce to the MiG-25 (which pioneered the twin vertical tailfins)- at that time the Americans didn't know that the MiG-25 wasn't a dogfighter; and so it's rather the
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, not the other way around!

It is indesputable that the US aims to contain China, just in case. Even if China takes over N.Korea there are still going to be plenty of unresolved disputes left in Asia. The reason India is being cultivated by the US is to prevent that country joining
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!
China Pursues Stronger Navy and Seeks to Calm Fears of Arms Race
Drafted By: Adam Wolfe
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On December 27, 2006, at a meeting of delegates to a Communist Party meeting of the People's Liberation Army Navy, Chinese President Hu Jintao said, "The navy force should be strengthened and modernized," and, further, the navy should be prepared "at any time for military struggle." Two days later, Beijing released a white paper outlining its military posture, which also emphasized the importance of developing a powerful navy. While the modernization of the Chinese navy has been progressing at a rapid pace for several years, the recent emphasis given to its development has raised concerns from Washington and other regional powers.

China's New White Paper

China aims for "blue water" status, or deep-water power projection capabilities, for its navy, but it has little experience beyond its coastal regions. Its current fleet is hampered by obsolete units, which it plans to replace in the coming years with modern ships. It is upgrading its surface fleet by bringing Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers into service, while also pursuing two new guided missile destroyer classes. For its underwater fleet, China is working with Russia to upgrade its existing diesel-powered submarines, while progress on the construction of its domestically designed units has progressed slowly. Its pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers is also progressing slowly, both due to technical difficulties and to a lack of strategic imperative behind the projects. [See:
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]

In its recent white paper, Beijing's plans for its navy were not altered significantly; however, the importance of gaining the ability to project force away from its coastal areas was given more prominence this time around. China has released white papers on its defense plans sporadically for the past eight years, in part to calm nerves about the military aspects of its rise in power. The focus on the navy is largely due to the importance of securing natural resources, namely oil, to fuel the continuing expansion of its economy. China's reliance on foreign energy means that it is more important for its navy to be able to protect sea lines of communication and keep open the "choke points" relevant to its trade.

Other goals for its navy include the ability to control areas of uncertain sovereignty (the Spratly Islands), protection of the exclusive economic zones it claims (most significantly in the East China Sea), and the development of a fleet capable of over-powering any other Asiatic country (with the exception of Japan and India, which it will attempt to counter-balance, rather than challenge directly). [See: "The Importance of the Spratly Islands"]

Still, the ability to retake Taiwan by force if necessary remains the main focus of China's navy. A fact not mentioned in the white paper is that much of China's plans for its navy seem to include developing the ability to deter the United States from protecting Taiwan in such a conflict. To this end, China does not appear to be pursuing a direct arms race with the United States, which it would have little hope of winning. Rather, Beijing's development of diesel- and nuclear-powered submarines appears to be an attempt to gain the ability to form a submarine blockade of Taiwan. This would put pressure on Taipei while possibly avoiding the potential consequences of a full-scale invasion, namely a U.S. counter-attack.

Much of the reaction to the white paper focused on China's 15 percent increase in defense spending. In 2006, China claims to have spent US$36 billion on its military; although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency believes the actual figure may be two to three times that amount. Beijing defended this increase by noting that its military spending only accounted for 1.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) in 2006, while the United States spent 6.2 percent of its G.D.P. on military expenditures.

China at times seems at pains to ensure its neighbors that its rise does not constitute a threat to the region, and it has similarly sought to dissuade Washington from believing it is pursuing an arms race. Many interests in Washington are quick to dismiss such notions, as China's modernization of its military is often cited as a strategic rational to increase military spending on new technologies and large-scale defense projects.

Nevertheless, military cooperation improved incrementally between China and the United States in 2006. A Pentagon report on China, released in May 2006, described China's military modernization in many of the same terms as Beijing's latest white paper, although it repeats the argument that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States." Chinese and U.S. forces staged their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea in 2006, and Washington downplayed an unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine near a U.S. aircraft carrier.

Officials in Beijing and Washington were also both quick to point out the overlapping security concerns that the world's largest oil importers share. To this end, China can be expected to continue pursuing measures to dissuade U.S. fears of a coming arms race, while still building a force capable of deterring the United States from interfering in an attack on Taiwan. Washington can be expected to react in turn, cooperating on some aspects of mutual interest, while continuing to cite China's military build up as a reason to upgrade its systems.

Similarly, China would like to assuage the fears that its military modernization might raise in India and Japan. After Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's election in 2006, China quickly reversed its position and accepted a state visit from the new Japanese prime minister. Beijing also used high-level meetings with New Delhi to highlight the burgeoning economic ties between their countries and to downplay their continuing border dispute.

However, while Beijing is striving to show that it is a "responsible stakeholder" to Washington, and that its neighbors have nothing to fear from China's rise, it continues to support governments that Washington considers "rogue regimes," and its policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically goes on unabated. Therefore, while it participated in more U.N. peacekeeping missions in 2006, it also moved closer to Iran and continued to support Sudan.

As long as this dual-track policy persists, Washington, and China's regional rivals, will continue to watch Beijing's military modernization with caution. In fact, two days after the white paper was released, Japan announced that it had staged a joint navy exercise with the United States in the East China Sea the previous month based on the assumption that China had invaded the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. [See: "Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Dispute Threatens Amiability of Sino-Japanese Relations"]

Conclusion

China's recent defense white paper had three audiences. It sought to dissuade Taiwan from breaking its "One China" commitments, while also calming regional fears of a greater military presence in the neighborhood. It also aimed to convince Washington that it was not pursuing an arms race, while at the same time demonstrating that it was developing the capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait. None of this information should come as a surprise, as part of China's policy on all of these fronts is to pursue a more transparent military, although many suspect that there is much more undeclared spending than accounted for in the report.

While there is little new in China's white paper, the emphasis given to the navy, as well as Hu's speech before its release, is worth noting. China believes that it will need to develop a blue water navy to protect its economic rise. This will allow it to protect sea lines of communication for the vast natural resources that it requires in order to ensure that its economy continues to grow at its current level. In some ways, this goal should bring Washington and Beijing closer. Nevertheless, other factors will continue to put pressure on their relationship.

The main obstacle is Taiwan, but neither party seems inclined to alter the status quo in the Strait. Also, China's rise in Asia will challenge Washington's hegemony there. As such, it can be expected that the competing goals will continue to be highlighted in Beijing and Washington, while their militaries also inch toward closer relations by focusing on mutual security concerns.

Report Drafted By:
Adam Wolfe

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to [email protected].
 
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SinoForce

New Member
I'd agree with you on the side profile. But from angles coming from 45 degrees or more of elevation, I think the Arleigh Burkes have a much better reduction in radar return. I'm looking at angles and clutter topside. And again, both these ships are coming at the same problem with a different solution. Arleigh Burkes didn't intend to necessarily hide itself from active radar sources. But wish to look like something else. Whereas 052C seems to want to hide from radar as much as possible. I'm just saying, IMHO, that at elevations greater than a certain degree, Arleigh Burkes have a better profile. At lower angles, 052C probably does better. Depending whether or not they applied the technology correctly. For the sake of argument, we can say they did.
That makes sense. The Burkes are expected to fight against aircraft and it's very dificult to hide from today's aircraft with radars up high, so blending by pretending to be something else makes sense. The PLAN is probably going to be fighting surface ships from neighboring countries, their radar is down low.
 

Kongo

Junior Member
Having look at AB and 171, I just can't see how you can argue AB will have a lower RCS than 171 on any angle, but that's my opinion.

Just because a ship looks stealthy doesn't mean it necessarily is. The converse is also true, as the Type 23 will attest to. It's non-stealthy appearance hides the fact that a lot of signature management techniques actually went into the design, so much so that in the end result of ship survivability, the Type 23 doesn't differ from the La Fayette.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
Just because a ship looks stealthy doesn't mean it necessarily is. The converse is also true, as the Type 23 will attest to. It's non-stealthy appearance hides the fact that a lot of signature management techniques actually went into the design, so much so that in the end result of ship survivability, the Type 23 doesn't differ from the La Fayette.
I'd love to read some expert analysis on Type 23 being as stealthy as La Fayette. Of course, the hull is not the only factor in stealthiness of a ship, but it is a large factor. So, your argument about a hull looking stealthy doesn't mean the ship isn't valid. You should've said that if a hull may look more stealthy than another hull, but the overall radar signature of the first hull isn't necessarily smaller than the second. And if you look at my conversation with Sea Dog, it's a conversation on the stealthiness of the hull.
 

Raven

New Member
Generic Use of Carriers

Hello Everyone,

Happy New Year All,

been away busy with classes, work and fixing up the home for the Mrs. Very interesting topic here and I felt I wanted to add in my tow cents.

As far as Aircraft Carriers go they are very demanding and very expensive. When you watch pilots flying for hours doing what we call FCLPs (Field Carrier Landing Practice) you really see how much it takes as far as cost,time,effort and commitment to train a pilot so he or she can land safely on "the boat" after completing the mission. It is clear that smaller VSTOL carriers such as those that operate Harriers or the old Soviet Forgers were limited to small scale operations. In fact most of these ships were more dedicated to moving ASW assets into an area. The Forgers were mainly meant to tackle NATO ASW assets such as the P-3s and Atlantics. As it stands, conventional aircraft like the SU-33 or F-18E/F have a greater range and warload over the various VSTOL aircraft.

A Navy with a few carriers can use them in many ways. If it is fighting at sea against an enemy Naval Force, the commanders of the carriers have to decide the best tactic to attack the force. Take as an example Navy A and Navy B. Say they are two allied nations with identical carrier forces and Air Wings. The commanders of each force must match tactics with what their forces plan to accomplish. Here is my take on it:

Navy A and Navy B both have three carriers and equal aircraft, support and screening vessels. The Commanders of each force must ask if it will seek out the opposing force as a main priority or will searching and engaging the adversary be a secondary task. Once the mission is established, the commanders and planners can act. Look at the 1942 battle of Midway. There was almost a balance of Carriers and aircraft yet one side had a huge advantage in other capital ships with the other side had more aircraft and better intelligence. The tactics of the Navies A and B would be along similar lines. The commanders could mass their carriers in one force, allowing the strike aircraft to be concentrated and mass attacks possible. Or the carriers could be divided up. It is said that in Naval Warfare a force should NEVER be split up yet both the US Navy and IJN split their carriers. The USN did benefit from having the carriers split in two groups. The bonus was that the American aircrews appeared to be coming from various locations. Add in land-based aircraft and you have very confused Japanese commanders and scout pilots. The Japanese suffered hard because their main carrier force was together. The large formation was great for striking a point target but limited long range search patterns since all aircraft would be going in the same directions. At the time, various light Carriers of the IJN were scattered across the Pacific. Many feel that these smaller carriers could have been used as scouting forces themselves. What could have happened if the US Navy which had a better idea of IJN intentions was sandwiched between carrier planes from two directions? Adm Raymond Spruance pondered this very question and took a gamble. He knew at one point of the battle the location of two IJN fleet carriers. He took a chance and all four CVs were caught together.

Which brings us back to the discussion of multiple carrier forces. What does a Navy plan to do with it's carrier force at one time? Split or mass them? The US Navy tried at Midway to coordinate strike aircraft with fighter support. As it turned out, the various squadrons of bombers, torpedo and fighter aircraft ended up over the IJN carriers at different times. This accidental tactic was costly but succeeded in negating Japanese fighter cover. There were few fighters above when several dive bomber squadrons attacked and hit all four carriers ( in two different strikes). Later at the battle of Santa Cruz, Adm Jack Fletcher launched a massive strike against what turned out to be a small carrier, learning too late that two fleet carriers were in the area. He was unable to turn the strike force from the smaller carrier to the larger ones. It wasted valuable time and planes.

A carrier commander has to match his forces with their mission. One demanding task is escorting a force such as an amphibious or merchant convoy. Escorting ships like tankers, troop ships and the like puts the carrier at an slow predicable path. Longer ranging ASW, Fighter and EW aircraft can lesson this problem. Once a mission and goals are established, the CVBG commander has to choose how best to employ his forces.
 

Jiang

Banned Idiot
Finally, Chinese governments realize the important of a strong navy power.

:china:
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Navy is extreamly important for China, because China needs to secure its supply routes for import(Oil, iron ore, and other nature resources), and exports( goods, cars, TVs, and other stuffs0.

However, Chins's neghbiors are not friendly toward China at all ( India, Japan, South Korea, Singapor, Veitnam, and of course the World's super power). So We must have a strong navy to live on.

I think right now, submarines and destroyers are more important than AC, but having 2 to 3 AC will be great.:china: :china:
 

Violet Oboe

Junior Member
@Jiang: I agree with you completely about the fact that it is very important that China continues to build a strong navy since her global interests have to be protected vigorously in the coming years; but unfourtunately your assumptions about a number of China´s neighbours are certainly misguided!

Only the US and their steadfast ally Japan can be designated as potential adversaries and India will tread very careful since her economic interests (China is India´s second most important trade partner) will suffer dearly if India unduly provokes China.

The ROK and Singapore have been turned by China´s succesfull diplomacy and economic weight by more than 90 degrees and both countries elites are absolutely aware about the fact that China is their biggest trade and investment partner. Some years into the future (the elder Lee Kuan Yew (Singapores somewhat sinophobic foundingfather) will probably be gone by then and the process of korean unification will eventually be under way) these countries will be turned by 180 degrees in their strategic orientation.

Vietnam is indeed a peculiar case since ordinary viets harbour deep resentments against the chinese people but the CPV wants to solidify their grip on power and has decided after some wavering that only cooperation with China holds the key for prosperity and stability in the indochinese region (look at who holds the big stakes in Cambodia and Laos already!).

After all China´s soft AND hard power position in her East and South East Asian neighbourhood has improved markedly in recent years and China should avoid irritating new friends by holding on to old prejudices.

@dear Jiang: Best regards Violet Oboe
 
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