Falklands War, 1982, Thread

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bd popeye

bd popeye

The Last Jedi
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FORBIN said:
Obi Wan Russell
Great thanks for sharing but now we need bd popeye for know more about 1982 USN CAW and escort o_O

Very possible he did not know that he could have gone up to Falklands :D
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Nope not me. My squadron was under an "CNO special project" by orders of the President of the United States. we did go to Hawaii six times for two weeks each time.:D..

At least one USN Carrier battle group was put on standby to sail to the South Atlantic to join the Task Force if we lost a carrier
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There were rumors about CV-59 being deployed to the Falklands.. And lending the RN an LPH.

USN Carrier Air wing in 1982? That's easy..this is what we had aboard America in 1981..
Aircraft included
24 Tomcats
24 A-7E Corsairs
15 Intruders
4 Hawkeyes
4 Prowlers
10 S-3A Vikings
6 SH-3G Sea Kings
1 A-3B Skywarrior
2 C-2 Greyhounds

Escorts
1 AOE or 1 AOR
1 SSN..don't know what class
1 California class CGN
2 FFGs .Knox class
2 DDs Spruance class
Not sure if any DDGs were with us in '81..
 
FORBIN

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
‎[QUOTE = "Obi Wan Russell, post : 435439, membres : 1579 »] [/ QUOTE]‎
test bd said:
Nope not me. My squadron was under an "CNO special project" by orders of the President of the United States. we did go to Hawaii six times for two weeks each time.:D..



There were rumors about CV-59 being deployed to the Falklands.. And lending the RN an LPH.

USN Carrier Air wing in 1982? That's easy..this is what we had aboard America in 1981..
Aircraft included
24 Tomcats
24 A-7E Corsairs
15 Intruders
4 Hawkeyes
4 Prowlers
10 S-3A Vikings
6 SH-3G Sea Kings
1 A-3B Skywarrior
2 C-2 Greyhounds

Escorts
1 AOE or 1 AOR
1 SSN..don't know what class
1 California class CGN
2 FFGs .Knox class
2 DDs Spruance class
Not sure if any DDGs were with us in '81..
Click to expand...
:cool:

Sweet :)

I think 2 CG/CGNs, 2 DDGs and 1-2 FFGs in general, in 1982 the Sturgeon class SSNs is the more numerous 37, 16 LA in 1982 Sturgeon was good SSNs as all US silencious but a bit less fast than Permit/Thresher 26 vs 28 kn build before coz more big but same reactor power, with LA speed found32 kn reactor more powerful depth better and mainly with new sonar more capable both armed with Tomahawk.
 
Obi Wan Russell

Obi Wan Russell

Jedi Master
VIP Professional
All the sources I've heard over the years have named the USS Forrestal as the carrier which was on standby to deploy south. She was at the time in the Caribbean I believe and fully worked up, her battle group would still have needed at least two and a half weeks transit time to the Falklands. Had she gone the matter would have been put beyond doubt. I think even our American allies were pleasantly surprised at how well we managed without them in the end though. Nice to know who your friends are...
USS Forrestal CVA59 03.jpg
 
Miragedriver

Miragedriver

Brigadier
b787 said:
The Mistakes Argentina made, were very well exposed by Martin Balza; Argentina should had extended the airstrip in the Islands, this would had pushed away the carriers, allowing the Daggers and Skyhawk from the continent refuel there and even go back to the continent.
This you will see would had limited the air cover and basically would had reduced the fleet`s ability to operate.

However there was never such move this was result of the idea there was not going to be any war among the Argentine military

However you have to see that Galtieri never really wanted a military solution but a political one, he knew he was not fighting England but NATO, he did not want to get into the Soviet camp, the risk was a 1961 missile crisis like the one that happened in Cuba.

He knew the dictators in South America were anti-communist, this meant Brazil could had turned against him at the long run.


So he limited the military involvement and tactics available, but he did a few important victories, he brought the issue again as a territorial dispute, he brought Latin America to support him and the UN, he brought Brazil to see South America as a collective issue.


He did well in some way and to see that see
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While the Argentine Army and Air Force moved roughly a division’s worth of troops to the islands by air, incredibly, neither force attempted to improve the airfield at Stanley to operate fast jets such as the A-4 Skyhawk’s or Dagger’s. As Dr. James S Corum notes in his commentary regarding the war:

“General Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent upon a tenuous airlift capability. He and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had little concept of the use of modern technology in war. For example, the Argentine Army and air force could have lengthened the airstrip at Port Stanley by 2,000 feet (existing runway was 1200 feet) and forward based the Skyhawk’s and Dagger’s in the islands. On the mainland the Argentines had the engineers, equipment, and pierced-steel planking that would have allowed them to extend the runway within a week or so of starting work. However, to get the engineers, materiel, and equipment to Port Stanley would have required reallocating much of the limited airlift capacity. General Galtieri’s strategy to defend the islands with a large number of ground forces committed all the airlift to transporting troops and ruled out any reallocation—and there was simply not enough airlift to do both. In April 1982, in contrast to General Galtieri’s decision, professional air force and naval officers in the United States and Europe thought lengthening the runway on the islands was the obvious thing to do.”

Had the Argentina maintained control of the waters around the islands through forward basing of airpower, there would have been no need for a large ground force, as Britain would not have been able to land any significant forces without prohibitive losses. Even the most cursory examination of the history of amphibious operations in World War II shows that establishing air superiority over the objective was critical to success. Time and time again, US or British forces would isolate an objective first by airpower, then by naval power, and only then would they attempt to land ground forces. The few times they failed to take that approach led to bloody campaigns such as Guadalcanal.
 
Miragedriver

Miragedriver

Brigadier
P.S.: By failing to improve the runway at Stanley, Argentina ensured that they would have to fight for air superiority over the islands. The distance from the mainland was such that virtually every advantage their Mirage and Dagger fighters had was squandered by the need to fly long distances just to reach the islands. Rather than being able to position a combat air patrol over Stanley and force the British Harriers to fly long distance strikes against them, they instead allowed the Royal Navy to operate relatively closely to the islands (and by staying about 100 miles east of the islands, they made it even harder for the Argentina's air assets to reach their task force). Harriers would have sufficient fuel to operate over the islands for as much as an hour at a time, whereas Argentine aircraft would have only enough time to drop munitions and dash, or they run out of fuel. The long range also meant that the Daggers and Mirages could not use their afterburners, and effectively reduced these Mach 2 interceptors to roughly the same speed as the Harriers.
 
b787

b787

Captain
Miragedriver said:
While the Argentine Army and Air


ArgeForce moved roughly a division’s worth of troops to the islands by air, incredibly, neither force attempted to improve the airfield at Stanley to operate fast jets such as the A-4 Skyhawk’s or Dagger’s. As Dr. James S Corum notes in his commentary regarding the war:

“General Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent upon a tenuous airlift capability. He and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had little concept of the use of modern technology in war. For example, the Argentine Army and air force could have lengthened the airstrip at Port Stanley by 2,000 feet (existing runway was 1200 feet) and forward based the Skyhawk’s and Dagger’s in the islands. On the mainland the Argentines had the engineers, equipment, and pierced-steel planking that would have allowed them to extend the runway within a week or so of starting work. However, to get the engineers, materiel, and equipment to Port Stanley would have required reallocating much of the limited airlift capacity. General Galtieri’s strategy to defend the islands with a large number of ground forces committed all the airlift to transporting troops and ruled out any reallocation—and there was simply not enough airlift to do both. In April 1982, in contrast to General Galtieri’s decision, professional air force and naval officers in the United States and Europe thought lengthening the runway on the islands was the obvious thing to do.”

Had the Argentina maintained control of the waters around the islands through forward basing of airpower, there would have been no need for a large ground force, as Britain would not have been able to land any significant forces without prohibitive losses. Even the most cursory examination of the history of amphibious operations in World War II shows that establishing air superiority over the objective was critical to success. Time and time again, US or British forces would isolate an objective first by airpower, then by naval power, and only then would they attempt to land ground forces. The few times they failed to take that approach led to bloody campaigns such as Guadalcanal.
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Mirage
why do not we get an Argentine source?
Seineldin has a better explanation

Geopolitics is the real reason Galtieri did not conducted the war as it would had needed to be.


looking at this map you could see Spain kept an empire united, England in 1770 returned the Falklands to Spain
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Argentina in 1982 was not even 20% of what was the Spanish empire,

Why you lost? See US supports England in 1982 with military equipment, information and logistics

Spain only diplomatic support.


Chile betrays Argentina in 1982

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Galtieri knew since April 1982, he was fighting NATO, and Chile sided with the British.

Question would had Argentina beat the British fleet what would the US would had done?


Galtieri only way was to get the Soviet Union involved in the conflict either directly like Egypt did in 1956 or Cuba did in 1961 or indirectly like the Syrians did in 1982 in the Lebanese war.Galtieri knew Brazil in 1982 was ruled by a General of anti-communist leanings.

So Galtieri knew their only hope was the US to mediate, and by June 1982 he understood the war was lost politically speaking and the solution was not bring the Soviet Union get involved.
 
Miragedriver

Miragedriver

Brigadier
b787 said:
Why you lost? See US supports England in 1982 with military equipment, information and logistics
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With the help of US airlift, the Royal Navy also used its mobility to build up a forward operating base at Ascension Island that would shuttle tankers and other replenishment ships to the task force, allowing it to stay at sea around the islands. See post 379
b787 said:
Galtieri knew since April 1982, he was fighting NATO, and Chile sided with the British.
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That is not the case. Strategically and operationally, the war shows the critical importance of having clear political and military goals. The invasion was conceived and executed almost without any strategic though of the implications by Galtieri and the Junta. The Junta saw it more as a political move than a military one. Galtieri thought they were going to negotiate a solution to the standoff, and as a remote possibly would have to fight. The British, on the other hand, assumed they would have to fight, and if there was a diplomatic breakthrough, so be it. This mindset clearly gave the British the upper hand in preparation for the coming battle.

In regards to Chile….As some of you may know, Argentina was in the midst of a serious border dispute with Chile at the time, known as the
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(see my posts in the South American conflict posts in the History section) . This meant that a significant faction of the nation’s forces and better trained and equipped troops were committed to defending against a very possible conflict with Chile. That is why consripts with four weeks training were sent to the MalvinasAlso the two nations came to the brink of war in 1978. The conflict was averted by Papal intervention. However, border tensions where high and skirmished where not uncommon
b787 said:
Galtieri only way was to get the Soviet Union involved in the conflict either directly like Egypt did in 1956 or Cuba did in 1961 or indirectly like the Syrians did in 1982 in the Lebanese war. Galtieri knew Brazil in 1982 was ruled by a General of anti-communist leanings.
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As some of you may know, South America was a hotbed of Communist activity in those days, and the Reagan White House had made a concerted effort to assist South and Central American governments and strengthen diplomatic and military ties throughout the region. It still boggels my mind as to how Galtieri managed to convince himself this would outweigh 70 years of the “special relationship” and an alliance through two world wars as well as the ties of NATO is a question indeed.
 
b787

b787

Captain
Miragedriver said:
With the help of US airlift, the Royal Navy also used its mobility to build up a forward operating base at Ascension Island that would shuttle tankers and other replenishment ships to the task force, allowing it to stay at sea around the islands. See post 379

That is not the case. Strategically and operationally, the war shows the critical importance of having clear political and military goals. The invasion was conceived and executed almost without any strategic though of the implications by Galtieri and the Junta. The Junta saw it more as a political move than a military one. Galtieri thought they were going to negotiate a solution to the standoff, and as a remote possibly would have to fight. The British, on the other hand, assumed they would have to fight, and if there was a diplomatic breakthrough, so be it. This mindset clearly gave the British the upper hand in preparation for the coming battle.

In regards to Chile….As some of you may know, Argentina was in the midst of a serious border dispute with Chile at the time, known as the
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
(see my posts in the South American conflict posts in the History section) . This meant that a significant faction of the nation’s forces and better trained and equipped troops were committed to defending against a very possible conflict with Chile. That is why consripts with four weeks training were sent to the MalvinasAlso the two nations came to the brink of war in 1978. The conflict was averted by Papal intervention. However, border tensions where high and skirmished where not uncommon


As some of you may know, South America was a hotbed of Communist activity in those days, and the Reagan White House had made a concerted effort to assist South and Central American governments and strengthen diplomatic and military ties throughout the region. It still boggels my mind as to how Galtieri managed to convince himself this would outweigh 70 years of the “special relationship” and an alliance through two world wars as well as the ties of NATO is a question indeed.
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Mirage with all due respect you are not seeing what many analysis see.
The Malvinas war was and is an extension of the wars between Spain and England, Spain kicked the British from the Malvinas in 1770, by military force, in 1741 Blas de Lezo defeated the British in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) you have to see Malvinas was part of the vice royalty the La Plata.

you can read about him
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England you know attacked Buenos Aires in 1807, you know their history of attacks to the Spanish world is old.

Galtieri did what he did because England dispatched a nuclear submarine in 1982 before the war started this forced the Argentine army to take the Islands earlier than planned.

Galtieri knew the war was not winnable with the US siding with England, he knew the war could be winnable only if a diplomatic solution was available before England could involve NATO in the war and only with American help to Argentina, England was NATO, you were a tiny nation of barely less than 30 million in 1982, you had no Chances, unless you would had done what Egypt did in 1956, asking the Soviets to threat England over the Suez channel; or what Cuba did in 1961 by deploying ICBMs in Cuban soil.


Chile and Argentina are not enemies but feudal remains of the vice royalty of la Plata and the Capitania de Chile obeyed more to geography than politics, keeping two Brothers angry at each other was essential for the British to control since 1821.

Galtieri did right, he did not renounced to the sovereignty of Malvinas, he did not involve Argentina with the Soviets, he brought Argentina`s main rival Brazil as an ally, he got our support to the Argentine claims, remember who did support you Speak Spanish, not English, in Fact Cuba was offering to Argentina, Soviet help, if Argentina would had accepted it, the risk of a really bad war or a crisis similar to 1961 Cuban crisis was real, so he knew, Mirage, he was not a fool, but he played his cards within the limits of possibilities well
 
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