China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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Hyperwarp

Captain
People, are there any estimates for current DF-31A numbers? Last pentagon report was rather vague claming 50 - 60 ICBM (DF-5A, DF-31/31A, DF-4). If we drop DF-4 and count only the others:

DF-5A - 10 (to be or already upgraded to DF-5B)
DF-5B -10
DF-31 - less than 15
DF-31A - ???
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
They must be mixing video because the daylight shots have flat tops. Cs and Ds don't have flat top canisters.

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Right check this website Catherine Dill at arm wonk discuss the shot and here is comment by Nick
base identification is correct: tonghua.
missile launched identification is also correct: df-21d.
launch video piece taken most probably from a test site is just an illustration (not associated with df-31 deployment time or place).
df-31 shown most probably on a training mission for deployment outside home garrison (any of known four brigades): using firing facilities for other mobile missile systems without actual firing.
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
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Harry Kazianis with his usual alarmist tone

While the world ponders
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, another recent missile firing in Asia, this time by China just days ago, seems to have flown under the radar. It could, however, be just as significant.

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and then picked up by the good folks over at
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,
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, or “carrier-killer” missile, on Wednesday, February 3.

In an interesting post where the comment section also features an in-depth discussion of the video footage that is just as important as the analysis itself, Catherine Dill, a research associate at the
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, breaks down the launch in great detail:

“The video begins at a base the night before a launch exercise. . .

“An alarm sounds, the troops prepare the convoy, and then they deploy to a remote area for the launch. The convoy shows several shots of the TEL. It appears to be a DF-31A. . .

“After the launch, it is time for the celebrations–complete with jiaozi–in a tent. During the celebrations the soldiers watch prerecorded videos from their families. Although probably somewhat staged, this scene does illustrate some of the hardships of the young launch brigader in being deployed far from home in remote areas for long periods of time. . .”

So where is the missile being fired from? Dill gives us some ideas:

“I fear my time of relying on the Directory of PRC Military Personalities is coming to a close, but in final bout of luck Pang Xiuhai (庞秀海) is in the book associated with Base 51’s 816th Mobile Launch Brigade (96115部队) out of Tonghua, Jilin Province. This is rather far north, so all of the snow present in the video makes sense (chains are even visible on the TEL if one looks closely).

“Now, where near Tonghua might this base be located? Although the soldiers put their phones in a glass case, there is a bus stop for the 96115 unit in Google maps. It is not directly outside of the facility, but it’s close enough that I can find the facility.

“I have high confidence in the identification match based on the hedge pattern and the tile pattern in the cement.”

So what do we know about the missile? Dill continues:

“The TEL is for a DF-31. However, I have associated Base 51 brigades with DF-3s and DF-21s (
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). I’ve been scrutinizing the video, and a closer inspection of the launch shows what appears to be a DF-21 or DF-21D missile exiting the canister. The shape of the nose-cone appears to more closely resemble a DF-21 warhead than that of a DF-31.

“This is not the highest quality video, so I do have some uncertainty about this determination. But if this is the case, why? At the moment, I don’t know. But I’m going to look into it.

“On a final note, I have not yet identified the site to which the launch brigade deploys. I commend anyone who wants to give it a try.”

The author later quite smartly updated her post after it made the rounds on the Internet. The update, posted below, seems to add much more weight to the idea that the DF-21D has been unveiled to the world in a launch setting:

“Update (7 Feb.): In my haste to post this quickly before the DPRK satellite launch (just barely made that deadline, as it turns out), I did not scrutinize the launch image as closely as I should have. My colleague at MIIS Philippe Mauger pointed out via email and my colleague RAJ47 pointed out in the comments here and on twitter (
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) that the TEL during the launch is a DF-21D, which certainly explains the missile. Another colleague pointed out on
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that the PLA even clarified this. So now the question is why the 816th brigade was driving around with an old DF-31 TEL. In the video the brigade appears to be preparing the DF-31A TEL for the launch–was this for show? It is also not clear to me from the short video whether the DF-21 fired in the launch was already at the deployment location or was a part of the same convoy from the Tonghua main base, or whether that portion of the video was taken from a different exercise altogether.”

Obviously from what we can gather from the above there seems to be more questions than answers from this video (see below). However, and perhaps more importantly, China seems much more willing to show off its latest and greatest military technology with greater frequency and media savvy than ever before. So when does Beijing actually test its mighty killer of carriers against a live target in the open ocean? Your guess is as good as mine. Stay tuned. . .
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
China plan to build early warning satellite and put the nuclear arsenal on "launch on warning"
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China’s military wants to put its relatively small nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert for the first time, according to newly translated documents. That’s not good. Such a radical departure from the country’s longtime nuclear policy could pose a threat not only to the U.S., but also to China itself.

Gregory Kulacki, an analyst with the Union of Concerned Scientists, discovered evidence of this potential policy change in a number of Chinese military documents. He published a paper this week that provides the details of what he found.
Photo credit: Xinhua / Li Ziheng
China’s military wants to put its relatively small nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert for the first time, according to newly translated documents. Photo credit: Xinhua / Li Ziheng

Why is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) considering such a major policy change?

According to Kulacki, it’s due to U.S. intimidation.

“It’s a combination of factors,” he explained. “First, the PLA is worried that it doesn’t have a credible nuclear retaliatory counterweight to highly accurate U.S. nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and missile defense systems. Second, U.S. officials have refused to acknowledge that the United States is vulnerable to a Chinese retaliatory strike, which the Chinese think means the United States is not deterred from attacking them. And third, the United States has threatened China with a nuclear attack a number of times and still refuses to adopt a no-first-use policy. All that makes the PLA very nervous.”

But why would it matter if the Chinese put their nuclear weapons on high alert?

Because it’s an extremely dangerous policy.

Too Many Close Calls

Since the beginning of the Cold War, both the U.S. and Russia have had a percentage of their respective nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, enabling them to be launched within minutes if an early warning system detected an attack. Given that it is highly unlikely that either country would launch a first strike against the other, it’s more likely that a technical glitch or human error would cause an accidental intercontinental ballistic missile launch in response to a false warning. In fact, there have been a number of incidents of this kind in Russia and the U.S. over the last few decades that could have prompted a nuclear launch. It’s dumb luck that one of them didn’t start World War III.

Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China currently keeps its nuclear weapons off alert. Its warheads are not even attached to their delivery vehicles. But Kulacki found passages in a several Chinese military texts suggesting that the PLA is considering adopting a launch-on-warning, high-alert posture. For example, the latest edition of The Science of Military Strategy, a standard Chinese military text, lays out what China would be able to do when its nuclear weapons are on high alert: “When conditions are prepared and when necessary, we can, under conditions confirming the enemy has launched nuclear missiles against us, before the enemy nuclear warheads have reached their targets and effectively exploded, before they have caused us actual nuclear damage, quickly launch a nuclear missile retaliatory strike.”

Adopting a hair-trigger policy would require China to build an early warning system like the ones the U.S. and Russia deploy and such a system may be in the offing. An internal November 2014 military document Kulacki obtained includes a chapter on constructing a system and asserts: “There are plans to launch experimental early warning satellites.” About a year later, in September 2015, China launched an experimental satellite that an independent U.S. news site, NASASpaceFlight.com, said may be the first in “a new series of Chinese satellites dedicated to early warning similar to the American Space-Based Infra-Red Sensor satellites.” An official Chinese press release claimed the satellite was for communications.

Still Time to Nip It in the Bud

The U.S. has a strong incentive to dissuade China from adopting a hair-trigger policy. As noted above, putting weapons on alert increases the risk of nuclear launches instigated by accidents or false warnings. And a mistaken launch due to a false warning is more likely to happen during the development of a new warning system. Indeed, the record shows that it was in the early days of U.S. and Soviet warning systems when technical glitches and human errors were a particular problem.

Kulacki recommended a number of actions the U.S. can take to help keep Chinese nuclear weapons off alert. One is for U.S. officials to recognize China’s nuclear deterrent by acknowledging that the U.S. and China are vulnerable to a nuclear attack from each other. A second is for the U.S. to abandon first-strike options by declaring that the sole purpose of its nuclear force is to deter and, if necessary, respond to a nuclear attack by another country.

Kulacki also argued that the U.S. should end its own hair-trigger policy. How can the U.S. credibly argue that China should not put its nuclear weapons on high alert when some 900 U.S. warheads can be fired within minutes? In any event, keeping U.S. weapons on high alert is not necessary for deterrence and increases the risk of a nuclear exchange that could devastate the U.S.

The Union of Concerned Scientists has long recommended that the U.S. take its own nuclear weapons off high alert and President Obama could do that without congressional approval before leaving office. Such a move, which has the support of a significant number of former high-ranking administration and Pentagon officials, would help put international pressure on Russia to do the same and China to refrain from adopting such a policy.

“It’s critical for the Obama administration to pay attention to this ongoing debate in China over a hair-trigger policy because it’s part of a bigger conversation about the future of the country’s nuclear forces,” Kulacki said. “They’re also talking about abandoning their no-first-use policy and using nuclear weapons to respond to conventional attacks. The alarm bells should be going off.

“But U.S. officials have to realize that China is contemplating these changes because it believes the United States is unwilling to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy—what President Obama promised to do in his famous speech in Prague back in 2009,” he added. “What the U.S. says and does regarding nuclear weapons has a profound effect on Chinese thinking. And right now, we’re pushing China in the wrong direction.”
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
So, what are the likely short-term and long-term outcomes if the PRC doesn't feel its existing nuclear stockpiles constitute credible deterrence against adversary's improved first strike capabilities, backed up with excellent missile defense shields? My guess is putting nuke forces on alert to deter near term adventurism, and building thousands more nukes for the long haul.

How's that good for anyone on the planet?
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
China plan to build early warning satellite and put the nuclear arsenal on "launch on warning"
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“But U.S. officials have to realize that China is contemplating these changes because it believes the United States is unwilling to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy—what President Obama promised to do in his famous speech in Prague back in 2009,” he added. “What the U.S. says and does regarding nuclear weapons has a profound effect on Chinese thinking. And right now, we’re pushing China in the wrong direction.”

With the successive advancement of China's HGV and other improving ballistic missiles with MIRV it's imperative for them to able to keep the other trigger happy untrusted nuclear power at bay.
 

antiterror13

Brigadier
So, what are the likely short-term and long-term outcomes if the PRC doesn't feel its existing nuclear stockpiles constitute credible deterrence against adversary's improved first strike capabilities, backed up with excellent missile defense shields? My guess is putting nuke forces on alert to deter near term adventurism, and building thousands more nukes for the long haul.
How's that good for anyone on the planet?

no, its not good for anyone. But it is also a two way street, the US and Russia should do the same to abandon "First strike" policy. I believe eventually China would adopt the "First strike" policy and increase the warhead to ~1,500 by 2025/30, technically even now China could increase the warhead to that number quite comfortably. In 2025/2030 when China roughly as big as the USA in nominal GDP and probably a slightly bigger (in PPP, China is already bigger than the USA in 2014/2015)

Very good article and analysis .... I don't really know who Gregory Kulacki is, but it seems a very clever and knowledgeable man.
 
no, its not good for anyone. But it is also a two way street, the US and Russia should do the same to abandon "First strike" policy. I believe eventually China would adopt the "First strike" policy and increase the warhead to ~1,500 by 2025/30, technically even now China could increase the warhead to that number quite comfortably. In 2025/2030 when China roughly as big as the USA in nominal GDP and probably a slightly bigger (in PPP, China is already bigger than the USA in 2014/2015)

Very good article and analysis .... I don't really know who Gregory Kulacki is, but it seems a very clever and knowledgeable man.

In terms of capability the only proven arrangement for stability is MAD, unfortunately as long as any one party attempts or actually achieves superior capability there is no stability.
 
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