Modern Carrier Battle Group..Strategies and Tactics

TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
true enough hence why I said Virtual CVE.and not CVL where a CVL was a small full carrier a CVE made sacrifices .
VTOL always suffers vs CATBAR, STOBAR, CTOL aircraft.
Use of the British concept of Shipborne rolling vertical landing can minimize some of that inefficiency.
A LHA/LHD may never accomplish the same rate of launch and recovery cycle of a Full CVN of the Nimitz or Ford class or the same sure amount of fire power but there presence blusters the number of active american carriers. They are in many ways the equal to many of the Worlds Top Carriers.
The Pacific fleet has at least four The America, The Makin Island, Essex and the Bonhomme Richard. they I would argue represent a fourth carrier CVN in the pacific.
 

joshuatree

Captain
While the debate has been much discussed, there is validity in looking into smaller carriers. Yes, the super carriers provide flexibility and certain economies of scale. But at what price when it comes to lower level operations?

LHA/LHDs may act as a CVE of sorts but it doesn't sport the same equipment as a CVN. A CVL would but just in smaller numbers. Not to mention, diverting LHA/LHDs to CVE missions takes them away from their ARG roles and we start to dilute the mission roles.

I think nuclear propulsion on carriers helps in the context of internal space saved in not needing large fuel tanks for the carrier's own propulsion needs. So a CVL should still be nuclear powered. Charles de Gaulle comes to mine. Of course, I'm only thinking in size, not necessarily that particular set of blueprints since that class has its share of problems.
 

Brumby

Major
Chinese Newspaper: Spy Satellites Will Target US Carriers

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In a recent issue of the Chinese-language state-run China Youth Daily newspaper, a report claims that the Gaofen-4 geostationary earth observation satellite will be launched by the end of this year with the express purpose of hunting US aircraft carriers. The satellite is equipped with a visible light imager at 50 meters and infrared staring optical imager at 400 meters.

“The Gaofen series of satellites, as the first series of satellites developed under the Medium and Long-term Development Plan for Science and Technology, plays an important role in building this system,” Kevin Pollpeter, senior research analyst on China at Defense Group Inc., said. “As China develops and deploys long-range, precision strike assets, it recognizes the need for an effective C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] platforms, to take imagery of large swaths of the ocean to attempt to locate targets such as aircraft carriers.”

Pollpeter said that during the time that it would take to process the imagery, the aircraft carrier would have moved, but its general location would have been fixed.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Federation of American Scientists' Nuclear Information Project, agrees that the Gaofen-4 will have limitations, but “China does not need to track every single US aircraft carrier around the globe — only those within striking range of China.” For knowledge of a carrier’s location to be useful for operators of the DF-21D, the satellite would have to be able to relay that information, more or less, continuously to the guidance system for a DF-21D to be able to strike the carrier.

The tragedy, according to Ian Easton, a China military specialist at Project 2049 Institute, is that China has made clear its intention to target US carrier groups with ballistic missiles.

“Yet the Obama administration chose not to issue a diplomatic demarche or raise the issue with [Chinese President Xi Jinping] at the White House,” Easton said. “By default, the White House is legitimizing China’s military buildup, which is aimed at [the US] and [its] friends. Any other sovereign country in the world would protest full throatedly. America’s silence on this issue is self-defeating.”
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
This is an interesting read coming from the National Interests.

The bulk of the United States’ cruise-missile defenses are on warships, such asArleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with Aegis — an advanced suite of radars, command and control computers and anti-air missiles such as the Sea Sparrow, SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6.

This is a formidable defensive weapon system … when your enemy doesn’t have a lot of missiles to throwatyou. In fact, the Navy designed these systems for engaging a relatively small number of incoming missiles atlongranges. This makes the SM family large, heavy and expensive. Another problem is that the ships’ launchers — the Mark 41 VLS — cannot be rearmed at sea.

A singleArleigh Burkedestroyer has around 90+ air-defense missiles. But not every missile will hit its target. In their report, Gunzinger and Clark note that an attacker could expend 32 anti-ship missiles — at a cost of less than $100 million — to deplete a destroyer’s entire compliment of SM-6s (worth $300 million) given a 70 percent success rate on the part of the defending ship.

That doesn’t include the cost of the destroyer, which is about $2 billion. And all it takes is a single missile to either sink the ship, cripple it, or render it out of action for weeks or months. Even if the destroyer survives, it must return to port and rearm. All told, this tactic means China could, in effect, bankrupt the U.S. Navy over time.

China’s missiles are getting smarter. The YJ-18, in particular, is a very
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. Having only appeared in China’s arsenal within the past few years, the YJ-18 can travel 290 nautical miles, most of the way at a speed of 0.8 Mach. But once the missile closes toward a target — and within range of a defending vessel’s weapons — it dumps one of its “stages” and accelerates to a speed of Mach 2.5.

Which makes it difficult for its intended victim to track and destroy it.

However, there is a way to stop China’s missiles from delivering a knockout blow to the U.S. military in the Western Pacific, but it will take years and be expensive, too. The solution is also … complicated.

The main takeaway from the report — the United States can no longer take it for granted that long-range missile interceptors will do the trick. Instead, Gunzinger and Clark propose a mix of tactical tricks and new technologies, including electromagnetic railguns with guided high-velocity projectiles, air-defense lasers and guided artillery rounds like the kind
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.

To make it harder to target U.S. forces, the report suggests dispersing bases when possible and hardening existing ones to force China to expend heavier, more expensive and longer-range weapons of its own. To strike the missile launchers before they fire, the authors want drones — lots of them — and stealthy bombers (like the B-21) that can penetrate China’s air defenses.

The United States wouldn’t have toabandonair-defense missiles — it just can’t depend on expensive, longer range variants. Electromagnetic weapons would be enormously expensive to develop (with manufacturing costs in the tens of millions of dollars each), so these will likely be less common than lasers, high-powered microwave weaponsandshort-to-medium range missiles that can be fired en masse.

If this vision ever comes to pass, it would be a major conceptual shift in how the Pentagon conceptualizes anti-missile defenses. Navy warships today include close-in weapons such as Phalanx to hit missiles during the seconds before they strike, but this is a last resort.

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kwaigonegin

Colonel
This is an interesting read coming from the National Interests.



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Interesting read however this is strawman and really just fear mongering and does not reflect real life combat scenarios.

Example:: A singleArleigh Burkedestroyer has around 90+ air-defense missiles. But not every missile will hit its target. In their report, Gunzinger and Clark note that an attacker could expend 32 anti-ship missiles — at a cost of less than $100 million — to deplete a destroyer’s entire compliment of SM-6s (worth $300 million) given a 70 percent success rate on the part of the defending ship.


On it's own merit this argument is factual HOWEVER the same can be said of the OPFOR also.. therefore making this point moot and meaningless since it's purely an exercise in mental gymnastic and nothing more.
Yes an attacker can launch 32 CM at an AB destroyer rendering it disabled but the AB can do the same as well LOL
.. and who is taking purely missile defense system for granted? Certainly not the USN. In case the author has not realized RG, LCIWS etc have been in the works for many years.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
Interesting read however this is strawman and really just fear mongering and does not reflect real life combat scenarios.

Example:: A singleArleigh Burkedestroyer has around 90+ air-defense missiles. But not every missile will hit its target. In their report, Gunzinger and Clark note that an attacker could expend 32 anti-ship missiles — at a cost of less than $100 million — to deplete a destroyer’s entire compliment of SM-6s (worth $300 million) given a 70 percent success rate on the part of the defending ship.


On it's own merit this argument is factual HOWEVER the same can be said of the OPFOR also.. therefore making this point moot and meaningless since it's purely an exercise in mental gymnastic and nothing more.
Yes an attacker can launch 32 CM at an AB destroyer rendering it disabled but the AB can do the same as well LOL
.. and who is taking purely missile defense system for granted? Certainly not the USN. In case the author has not realized RG, LCIWS etc have been in the works for many years.

I think what the author was trying to convey is that an "inundated offense (OPFOR MISSILES) is cheaper to replace than inundated defense (SHIPS)."
 

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
This is an interesting read coming from the National Interests.



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Firstly Equation you mention National Interests which is renowned for do worst anti Chinese propaganda and you know it :mad:

And btw
China’s missiles are getting smarter. The YJ-18, in particular, is a very
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. Having only appeared in China’s arsenal within the past few years, the YJ-18 can travel 290 nautical miles, most of the way at a speed of 0.8 Mach. But once the missile closes toward a target — and within range of a defending vessel’s weapons — it dumps one of its “stages” and accelerates to a speed of Mach 2.5

You see it is wrong haha :D


But incorrect there :rolleyes:
This is a formidable defensive weapon system … when your enemy doesn’t have a lot of missiles to throwatyou. In fact, the Navy designed these systems for engaging a relatively small number of incoming missiles atlongranges. This makes the SM family large, heavy and expensive. Another problem is that the ships’ launchers — the Mark 41 VLS — cannot be rearmed at sea.
AEGIS system used by Ticonderoga since 1983 and Burke after are completely able to engaged much targets about 20 for each combattant, system designed to counter Soviet massive attacks up to 100 missiles launched by SSGN especialy Oscar, Tu-22M or Tu-16 eventualy ships also.
USN wanted 2 AEGIS ships by CBG.
 

kwaigonegin

Colonel
I think what the author was trying to convey is that an "inundated offense (OPFOR MISSILES) is cheaper to replace than inundated defense (SHIPS)."

Generally speaking that is true for most scenarios.. no different than sending a $1M Hellfire to blow up a $5 donkey cart... or a $15M DF21D to blow up a $15B carrier.
 

Brumby

Major
Interesting read however this is strawman and really just fear mongering and does not reflect real life combat scenarios.

Example:: A singleArleigh Burkedestroyer has around 90+ air-defense missiles. But not every missile will hit its target. In their report, Gunzinger and Clark note that an attacker could expend 32 anti-ship missiles — at a cost of less than $100 million — to deplete a destroyer’s entire compliment of SM-6s (worth $300 million) given a 70 percent success rate on the part of the defending ship.


On it's own merit this argument is factual HOWEVER the same can be said of the OPFOR also.. therefore making this point moot and meaningless since it's purely an exercise in mental gymnastic and nothing more.
Yes an attacker can launch 32 CM at an AB destroyer rendering it disabled but the AB can do the same as well LOL
.. and who is taking purely missile defense system for granted? Certainly not the USN. In case the author has not realized RG, LCIWS etc have been in the works for many years.
Rather than commenting off the National Interest article I suggest instead to read directly Bryan Clark's latest published work from CSBA titled "Winning the salvo competition". The latest publication is an expanded work from last year where the concept was first discussed in much more detail. Essentially the idea is to shift from a present three tier defensive layer to a predominant mid tier layer by re-configuring the missile mix. The effect is a two to three fold increase in missile availability against salvo threats. In his latest report, two examples are given.
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FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
Interesting Mr Brumby i like much these stuff confirm what I thought and Jeff had say around 30 Tomahawks rather for a Ticonderoga than a Burke, 30 on 122 missiles do this 25 % in the chart.

But right now USN don' t have much SM-3 very expensive about 200 in more 72 SM-2 Bl IV and buy 100 SM-6 also expensive by year so right now only some combattants armed with it.

Full PDF
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